John Doe 21 v. Secretary of Health & Human Services

88 Fed. Cl. 178, 2009 WL 2386214
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJuly 30, 2009
DocketNo. 02-0411V
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 88 Fed. Cl. 178 (John Doe 21 v. Secretary of Health & Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Doe 21 v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 88 Fed. Cl. 178, 2009 WL 2386214 (uscfc 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER REGARDING THE JANUARY 16, 2009 DECISION ON REMAND DENYING ENTITLEMENT.

BRADEN, Judge.

As previously discussed, this proceeding was far from what the court expects from the Office of the Special Masters. See John Doe 21 v. Sec’y of HHS, 84 Fed.Cl. 19, 20 (2008) ("John Doe 21"). Taking six years before a ease initially is brought to the court for review is inexcusable. Id. Likewise, as previously noted, in the court’s judgment, Petitioner’s counsel did not approach this case with proper attention to precedent or with the amount of diligence that the court expects. Id. at 49. The court is aware that non-Table vaccine cases are difficult to prove for a variety of reasons. Most are handled on a contingency basis, limiting the available resources that can be devoted to any one individual case. The perspective of medical professionals who have treated a petitioner often differs. Many children do not see the same pediatrician during their first critical months, so that subtle but important symptoms may be missed. For this reason, the opinion of a physician who has had a long personal relationship with a patient is afforded more deference than an expert retained for litigation. In addition, highly specialized physicians who have not examined, much less treated, a patient understandably are reluctant to second-guess the opinion of a well qualified peer, particularly where medical records are many years old and were not made with the intent of satisfying the requisite specificity required to establish causation-in-fact under the Nation Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-l et seq. (2006) (the “Vaccine Act”).

The January 16, 2009 Decision on Remand Denying Entitlement reflects a substantial amount of work conducted in an expedited time frame by the third Special Master assigned to this case. See John Doe 21 v. Sec’y of HHS at *1 (Fed.Cl.Spec.Mstr. Jan. 16, 2009) (“Remand Decision”). Despite this effort, the court has determined that the Remand Decision erroneously concluded that:

A preponderance of the evidence establishes that Child Doe started to show some signs of developmental delay in January 2000, which was diagnosed in March 2000. [Petitioner] has failed to establish that Child Doe’s developmental delay was caused by the vaccination, which he received months earlier. Alternatively, Mr. Doe failed to establish that any adverse reaction to the July 20,1999 DTaP vaccine lasted more than six months. Consequently, he is not entitled to compensation.

See Remand Decision at *1.

To facilitate review of this Memorandum Opinion and Final Order, the court has provided the following outline:

[182]*182I. RELEVANT FACTS.182

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.194

A. The Initial Special Master Proceeding .194

B. The Initial United States Court Of Federal Claims Proceeding.195

C. The Remand Proceeding Before Special Master III.195

D. Current Proceeding Before The United States Court Of Federal Claims .196

III. DISCUSSION. 05 r — 1

A. Jurisdiction And Standard Of Review. 05 i — 1

B. Causation In Vaccine Act Cases. 05 t — (

C. Petitioner’s February 17, 2009 Motion For Review. 05 i — l

1. Petitioner’s Argument . 05 i — l

2. The Government’s Response. 05 t — I

3. The Court’s Resolution. 05 i — t

a. Petitioner Established A Medically Plausible Biological Theory. 05 05 l-H

b. Petitioner Established A Proximate Temporal Relationship 05 05 r — i

c. Petitioner Established A Logical Sequence Of Cause And Effect. 05 05 i — I

IV. CONCLUSION. .202

* * *

1. RELEVANT FACTS.2

On May 11,1999, Petitioner was born after a routine pregnancy. See 10/2/02 Gov’t Ex. B at 2-25. At birth, Petitioner weighed six [183]*183pounds, twelve ounces, and measured nineteen and one-half inches in length. Id. at 3; see also 7/11/06 Pet. Ex. A at 1. On May 24, 1999, Petitioner had a “healthy” two week examination and was beginning to hold his head and was responding to sound and light. See 10/2/02 Gov’t Ex. B at 30. On June 10, 1999, Petitioner had a one month examination, and he was found to be normal, except for constipation, and otherwise was “alert comfortable.” 7/11/06 Pet. Ex. A at 5.

On July 20, 1999, Petitioner’s constipation continued, but Dr. Earhardt, from the Department of Pediatrics of the North Shore University Hospital (New York), noted that Petitioner “roll[ed] side to side, lifts head very well, coos vocalizes, focuses on face, turns to voice, smiles.” 10/2/02 Gov’t Ex. B at 34. Petitioner’s assessment was “healthy.” Id. On that date, Petitioner received diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (“DTaP”), inactivated poliovirus (“IPV”), and COM-VAXtm,3 Hib, and Hepatitis B vaccinations. Id. at 32.

On the evening of July 20, 1999 at 9:47 p.m., Petitioner was admitted to the North Shore University Hospital Emergency Department with a fever of 101°F. Id. at 34B. The primary complaint “per mother” was “crossed eyes, moaning, acting unusual.” Id. at 34A. The triage nurse noted that Petitioner received a DTaP vaccine on that same date and developed a fever. Id. at 34B.4 The resident physician examination noted a rectal temperature of 101.3°F, an “enlarged thyroid,” and “adenopathy.”5 Id. at 34B. The attending physician noted: “fever & a 10 minute episode of eye crossing, without tonic/clonic activity,6 drooling[.]” Id. Subsequent tests, including blood and urine samples were negative. Id. at 36-44, 46-47. A neurological examination showed no “focal deficits” and a regular flat fontanelle.7 Id. at 34C. Petitioner was diagnosed with a fever, advised to take “Tylenol,” and Ms. Doe was instructed to “follow up with” Petitioner’s pediatrician “in the morning.” Id. at 34D. Petitioner was released from the Emergency Room around 11:00 p.m. in “satisfactory” condition. Id.

Petitioner’s fever, however, did not abate. Id. at 45. On July 21, 1999, Petitioner’s mother reported that her son still had a temperature of 101°F. See 7/11/06 Pet. Ex. A at 8.

On July 28, 1999, Petitioner’s medical records show that both eyes had “no tears” and were “crusty,” but Petitioner was “alert; awake ... [and his] neck [was] supple.” 10/2/02 Gov’t Ex. B at 48.

During an August 19, 1999 examination when Petitioner was 3 lh months, he experienced another fever episode of 101°F, was “cranky,” but “alert” and “active,” with a “neck supple.” Id. Other tests were unremarkable. Id. Because Petitioner’s older sister was also ill,8 the physician assumed the [184]*184cause of these symptoms was a “viral syndrome.” See 7/11/06 Pet.

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Bluebook (online)
88 Fed. Cl. 178, 2009 WL 2386214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-doe-21-v-secretary-of-health-human-services-uscfc-2009.