John David McNair v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 27, 1996
• Docket: 03-95-00358-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

McNair v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-95-00358-CR

John David McNair, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. B-94-0592-S, HONORABLE BARBARA WALTHER, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant John David McNair was convicted by a jury on two counts of indecency with a child by contact. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11 (West 1994). ⁽¹⁾ The jury assessed punishment at two years' confinement for the first count and a concurrent sentence of three years' confinement for the second count. Appellant raises two points of error on each count, challenging both the legal sufficiency and the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding of the requisite intent to arouse or gratify appellant's sexual desire. We will affirm the judgment of conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the fall of 1992, the complainant, a sixteen-year-old female student, enrolled in appellant's law enforcement class at Central High School in San Angelo. Appellant's class was a two-year elective course, and appellant was the first teacher in this program. In December of that year, appellant began to make advances toward the complainant. The complainant testified that appellant's first advance was to ask her whether she would ever see a married man. After that, appellant began asking the complainant during class to step into the hall with him, at which times he would stand close to her, put his arm around her waist, and ask her to stay in his classroom over her lunch period. In one instance, he added that he could lock the door and "be her coach." He often asked to see her on the weekend. Once, appellant asked the complainant to go wait in the rest room until class was over and the hall was cleared, when she could then sneak back into the classroom. At another time, appellant had his hands on the complainant's waist when another girl came out of a neighboring door. The complainant was able to slip back into her seat in the back of the room, but appellant walked to the door and asked loudly, "Well, what about sex?"

In early 1993, the frequency of the advances increased. Fellow students in the complainant's class stated that appellant took her into the hall at least once or twice a week, and that the trips were not for disciplinary reasons. According to the complainant, half of the time appellant would caress her and half of the time he would just talk to her. The occurrence that was the basis for the first count of indecency with a child took place on or about February 15, 1993. Appellant took the complainant into the hall, put his hands on her waist and moved them up and down her sides, touching her breasts in the process. He asked her, "What about today?" The second count was based on a repetition of the same acts in March 1993.

The complainant testified that she felt uncomfortable, but told no one of the advances except a friend, and later a policewoman. She said she felt like she did not have a choice about going into the hall when appellant asked her to do so, and a friend confirmed that appellant was a very authoritarian, dominant person. The complainant did not drop the class and subsequently signed up for the second year of the class (which was not required) because she felt she needed the credit to graduate, was interested in law enforcement as a career, and could earn twelve semester hours of class credit at a local college for completing the class.

After the complainant turned seventeen in May 1993, appellant remarked that she was "legal now" and did not need her parents' permission. In an attempt to deflect appellant's requests that she stay in his classroom over lunch, the complainant began asking a friend, Chris, to tell appellant that he (Chris) and the complainant were going to lunch together. As a result, Chris started experiencing increased hostility from appellant, who would ask about the details of the lunch, including if Chris would be paying. Appellant once remarked openly during class that Chris and the complainant were sleeping together; another time he harshly asked Chris if the complainant was "any good."

The sole evidence presented by appellant at trial was his own testimony that he did not touch the complainant.

DISCUSSION

The offense of indecency with a child is committed if a person engages in sexual contact with a child under the age of seventeen who is not that person's spouse. See Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). "Sexual contact" is defined as "any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." See Penal Code § 21.01(2). Appellant argues that, even assuming he touched the complainant's breasts, the testimony presented at trial fails to sufficiently prove that he did so with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire.

The critical inquiry on review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court does not ask whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

The law is well settled that the specific intent at issue here can be inferred from the defendant's conduct, his remarks, and all surrounding circumstances. McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Bowles v. State, 550 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). However, there must of course be some evidence upon which to base the inference. Baker v. State, 781 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1989, pet. ref'd). Evidence of extraneous acts committed by the accused is admissible to prove scienter, where intent is an essential element of the State's case and cannot be inferred from the act itself. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 404(b). If extraneous acts are used to prove intent, such acts must be sufficiently similar in nature to the charged offense to raise an inference of improbability of accident. Baker, 781 S.W.2d at 690. For the evidence of extraneous acts to have any probative value, it must show that the accused acted with the same intent when he committed the acts complained of. Id.

Appellant argues that the record contains no direct evidence (such as evidence of comments, smiles, or looks, etc.) that the specific acts with which he was charged were committed with the requisite intent. In addition, he asserts that the testimony as to any other events occurring outside those with which he was expressly charged raises extraneous matters that are not sufficiently similar to the charged acts to be of any probative value in determining intent. Specifically, he contends that there is no evidence that the extraneous acts were committed with the intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire, so it cannot be shown that he committed the charged acts with that same intent. We disagree.

The circumstances surrounding the charged acts do not necessarily have to be immediate and concurrent in time with those acts. Thus, where the accused was charged with indecency with a child, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "evidence is admissible if it establishes either the probability that the accused committed the offense or that he paid unnatural attention, or displayed an unnatural attitude toward the victim, or had lascivious intent toward the victim." Lewis v. State, 676 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); see Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 404(b). As this Court recently stated:

The sexual passion or desire of X for Y is relevant to show the probability that X did an act realizing that desire. On the principle set out above, this desire at the time in question may be evidenced by proof of its existence at a prior or subsequent time. Its existence at such other time may, of course, be shown by any conduct which is the natural expression of such desire.

Blakeney v. State, 911 S.W.2d 508, 515 (Tex. App.Austin 1995, no pet.) (quoting Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).

In the instant case, the surrounding circumstances relevant to determining intent include the frequency with which appellant took the complainant into the hall and his usual actions there; the comments he made on other occasions such as, "Well, what about sex?"; asking to see the complainant on weekends; inquiring whether she would ever see a married man; offering to be her "coach" behind locked doors; and asking her friend Chris whether the complainant was "any good" after remarking in front of his class that Chris and the complainant were sleeping together. We hold that, in order to place the offense in context, the State was entitled to show the ongoing interaction between appellant and the complainant.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the events relayed in the complainant's testimony were "bad" acts, we conclude that the record presents sufficient evidence to infer an intent to arouse and gratify appellant's sexual desire in each of those events, such that his intent on those occasions is relevant in determining his intent when he committed the charged acts. We conclude that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's intent when he committed the charged acts was to arouse or gratify his own sexual desire. We overrule points of error one and two.

When the court of appeals conducts a factual-sufficiency review, it views all the evidence equally, including the testimony of defense witnesses and the existence of alternate hypotheses. The court does not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution as it does in legal-sufficiency review. The court should set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis v. State, No. 450-94, (Tex. Crim. App. January 31, 1996); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.Austin 1992, pet. ref'd untimely filed).

Appellant was the only witness for the defense at trial. He gave a few very cursory statements, the only one of substance being that he did not touch the complainant's breasts. He offered no other explanations for his actions. Although there was some evidence that it was a common occurrence for appellant to take other students out into the hall, there was also evidence that the students were mainly female. This evidence does not outweigh the evidence in the record supporting conviction. Thus, after viewing the evidence outside the prism of "the light most favorable to the prosecution," we cannot say that the jury's verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscious, or clearly demonstrate bias. See Stone, 823 S.W.2d at 381. We overrule points of error three and four.

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant's points of error and affirm the judgment of conviction.

J. Woodfin Jones, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Jones and B. A. Smith

Affirmed

Filed: March 27, 1996

Do Not Publish

1.   This offense took place before September 1, 1994 and is governed by the law in effect at the time the offense occurred. Because the code amendments effective September 1, 1994 have no substantive effect on this offense, we cite to the current code for convenience.

amily: CG Times"> The sexual passion or desire of X for Y is relevant to show the probability that X did an act realizing that desire. On the principle set out above, this desire at the time in question may be evidenced by proof of its existence at a prior or subsequent time. Its existence at such other time may, of course, be shown by any conduct which is the natural expression of such desire.

Blakeney v. State, 911 S.W.2d 508, 515 (Tex. App.Austin 1995, no pet.) (quoting Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).

In the instant case, the surrounding circumstances relevant to determining intent include the frequency with which appellant took the complainant into the hall and his usual actions there; the comments he made on other occasions such as, "Well, what about sex?"; asking to see the complainant on weekends; inquiring whether she would ever see a married man; offering to be her "coach" behind locked doors; and asking her friend Chris whether the complainant was "any good" after remarking in front of his class that Chris and the complainant were sleeping together. We hold that, in order to place the offense in context, the State was entitled to show the ongoing interaction between appellant and the complainant.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the events relayed in the complainant's testimony were "bad" acts, we conclude that the record presents sufficient evidence to infer an intent to arouse and gratify appellant's sexual desire in each of those events, such that his intent on those occasions is relevant in determining his intent when he committed the charged acts. We conclude that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's intent when he committed the charged acts was to arouse or gratify his own sexual desire. We overrule points of error one and two.

When the court of appeals conducts a factual-sufficiency review, it views all the evidence equally, including the testimony of defense witnesses and the existence of alternate hypotheses. The court does not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution as it does in legal-sufficiency review. The court should set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis v. State, No. 450-94, (Tex. Crim. App. January 31, 1996); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.Austin 1992, pet. ref'd untimely filed).

Appellant was the only witness for the defense at trial. He gave a few very cursory statements, the only one of substance being that he did not touch the complainant's breasts. He offered no other explanations for his actions. Although there was some evidence that it was a common occurrence for appellant to take other students out into the hall, there was also evidence that the students were mainly female. This evidence does not outweigh the evidence in the record supporting conviction. Thus, after viewing the evidence outside the prism of "the light most favorable to the prosecution," we cannot say that the jury's verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscious, or clearly demonstrate bias. See Stone, 823 S.W.2d at 381. We overrule points of error three and four.

We overrule appellant's points of error and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Before Justices Powers, Jones