NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0386-24
JOHN D'ANGELO, individually and derivatively on behalf of CSDM TRANSPORT, a New Jersey Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DIESEL ED, a New Jersey Limited Liability Company, and EDWARD ROACH,
Defendants,
and
MIDDLESEX COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted January 14, 2026 – Decided March 25, 2026
Before Judges Currier and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2545-24. Markenstein Law, LLC, attorney for appellant (Susan M. Markenstein, of counsel and on the brief).
Convery, Convery & Shihar, PC, attorneys for respondent (Clark W. Convery, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After plaintiff, John D'Angelo's Mack Dump Truck experienced total
engine failure, he contacted defendants Edward Roach and his company Diesel
Ed, LLC to diagnose the issue and repair the engine. Two months passed and
the repairs had not been completed. When plaintiff arrived at the yard to retrieve
the truck, defendants refused to release it. Plaintiff sought judicial intervention
and obtained a writ of possession for the truck and all of its parts. Defendants
were uncooperative when defendant Middlesex County Sheriff's Office (MCS)
attempted to execute the writ.
Further motion practice ensued and when the truck was still not returned,
plaintiff amended the complaint to assert a claim for amercement against MCS.
The court granted MCS summary judgment on August 26, 2024. After careful
review, we conclude the trial court correctly found MCS did not fail to perform
its duty regarding the execution of the writ of possession and subsequent orders.
Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to amercement. We affirm.
A-0386-24 2 We add a few details for the reader's context leading to this litigation.
After the truck was towed to defendants' repair yard in Monmouth Junction,
defendants advised plaintiff the truck needed a complete engine rebuild. The
parties negotiated the cost of the project and plaintiff requested an itemized
invoice/estimate. That was never provided. Several weeks later, according to
plaintiff, he learned defendants were not doing the rebuild themselves and Roach
advised him the "engine was in the possession of someone located in Millstone,
Monmouth County." Plaintiff stated defendants refused to disclose the precise
location of the engine or the name of the entity or person who was performing
the work, but admitted the repairs were not complete. Thereafter, plaintiff
instructed defendants to stop working on the truck and to disclose its location so
plaintiff could have the repairs finished by another mechanic. Defendants
refused to disclose any information.
When plaintiff arrived at defendants' yard, they found a forklift parked in
front of their truck, preventing its removal from the premises. The truck was
gutted of its engine. When they returned to the yard a second time and
encountered the same circumstances, they called the police. When the officer
asked Roach to move the forklift, Roach stated it was dead and would need to
be repaired before it could be moved.
A-0386-24 3 Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause "seeking
immediate injunctive relief ordering [d]efendant[s] to return the truck, disclose
the whereabouts of the engine and return the engine, and preventing [defendants]
from asserting a garage keeper's lien on the truck." On the return date of the
order to show cause, the court ordered that plaintiff was entitled to "retain
immediate possession of [the truck] . . . its engine and all component parts."
Defendants were required to "disclose to [p]laintiff's attorney . . . the location
of the engine removed . . . and the identity of the party in possession of same."
The court also issued a writ of possession directing MCS to recover the truck
and its parts from defendants' repair yard.
In the letter from plaintiff's counsel to MCS enclosing the order and writ,
counsel requested MCS contact her to "schedule the execution of the writ"
because "[p]laintiff needs to arrange to have a tow truck there at the time of
execution."
When MCS officers arrived at defendants' property to execute the writ,
they observed the truck had no engine and was blocked by "large construction
equipment with a flat tire" which "could not be moved under its own power."
The officers stated Roach "refused to cooperate; he refused to release anything
A-0386-24 4 identified in the [w]rit." Furthermore, although plaintiff was present at the
location, he did not have a tow truck with him.
Plaintiff moved for enforcement of litigant's rights regarding the writ and
requested the court to instruct "law enforcement attempting to execute [the]
court's order and writ to arrest and take into custody . . . [Roach] should he refuse
to comply with the terms of the court's order and companion writ."
The court emailed defendants, directing them to comply with the prior
order and return the truck, engine, and all component parts by a certain date.
The court warned that failure to abide by its directive could "result in the
imposition of sanctions." Defendants did not comply and the court subsequently
ordered Roach to appear before the court and show cause as to why he should
not be held in contempt. Thereafter, default judgment was entered against
defendants, and they were again ordered to return the truck and engine to
plaintiff. The order stated that "[MCS] shall take necessary and reasonable steps
to take possession of the truck and engine." However, the court denied plaintiff's
request "to grant permission to any law enforcement officers enforcing [the]
[c]ourt's orders to arrest [Roach]." Subsequent motion practice ensued between
plaintiff and defendants, and ultimately final default judgment was entered in
favor of plaintiff against defendants.
A-0386-24 5 In the meantime, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint asserting an
amercement and constitutional law claim as to MCS. Later, MCS moved for
summary judgment. On August 26, 2024, the court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint against MCS.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in granting summary
judgment because he presented disputed issues of material fact regarding the
claim of amercement and other constitutional issues. We are unconvinced.
We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk
v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). We consider "whether the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); Palmer v. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp.,
481 N.J. Super.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0386-24
JOHN D'ANGELO, individually and derivatively on behalf of CSDM TRANSPORT, a New Jersey Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DIESEL ED, a New Jersey Limited Liability Company, and EDWARD ROACH,
Defendants,
and
MIDDLESEX COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted January 14, 2026 – Decided March 25, 2026
Before Judges Currier and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2545-24. Markenstein Law, LLC, attorney for appellant (Susan M. Markenstein, of counsel and on the brief).
Convery, Convery & Shihar, PC, attorneys for respondent (Clark W. Convery, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After plaintiff, John D'Angelo's Mack Dump Truck experienced total
engine failure, he contacted defendants Edward Roach and his company Diesel
Ed, LLC to diagnose the issue and repair the engine. Two months passed and
the repairs had not been completed. When plaintiff arrived at the yard to retrieve
the truck, defendants refused to release it. Plaintiff sought judicial intervention
and obtained a writ of possession for the truck and all of its parts. Defendants
were uncooperative when defendant Middlesex County Sheriff's Office (MCS)
attempted to execute the writ.
Further motion practice ensued and when the truck was still not returned,
plaintiff amended the complaint to assert a claim for amercement against MCS.
The court granted MCS summary judgment on August 26, 2024. After careful
review, we conclude the trial court correctly found MCS did not fail to perform
its duty regarding the execution of the writ of possession and subsequent orders.
Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to amercement. We affirm.
A-0386-24 2 We add a few details for the reader's context leading to this litigation.
After the truck was towed to defendants' repair yard in Monmouth Junction,
defendants advised plaintiff the truck needed a complete engine rebuild. The
parties negotiated the cost of the project and plaintiff requested an itemized
invoice/estimate. That was never provided. Several weeks later, according to
plaintiff, he learned defendants were not doing the rebuild themselves and Roach
advised him the "engine was in the possession of someone located in Millstone,
Monmouth County." Plaintiff stated defendants refused to disclose the precise
location of the engine or the name of the entity or person who was performing
the work, but admitted the repairs were not complete. Thereafter, plaintiff
instructed defendants to stop working on the truck and to disclose its location so
plaintiff could have the repairs finished by another mechanic. Defendants
refused to disclose any information.
When plaintiff arrived at defendants' yard, they found a forklift parked in
front of their truck, preventing its removal from the premises. The truck was
gutted of its engine. When they returned to the yard a second time and
encountered the same circumstances, they called the police. When the officer
asked Roach to move the forklift, Roach stated it was dead and would need to
be repaired before it could be moved.
A-0386-24 3 Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause "seeking
immediate injunctive relief ordering [d]efendant[s] to return the truck, disclose
the whereabouts of the engine and return the engine, and preventing [defendants]
from asserting a garage keeper's lien on the truck." On the return date of the
order to show cause, the court ordered that plaintiff was entitled to "retain
immediate possession of [the truck] . . . its engine and all component parts."
Defendants were required to "disclose to [p]laintiff's attorney . . . the location
of the engine removed . . . and the identity of the party in possession of same."
The court also issued a writ of possession directing MCS to recover the truck
and its parts from defendants' repair yard.
In the letter from plaintiff's counsel to MCS enclosing the order and writ,
counsel requested MCS contact her to "schedule the execution of the writ"
because "[p]laintiff needs to arrange to have a tow truck there at the time of
execution."
When MCS officers arrived at defendants' property to execute the writ,
they observed the truck had no engine and was blocked by "large construction
equipment with a flat tire" which "could not be moved under its own power."
The officers stated Roach "refused to cooperate; he refused to release anything
A-0386-24 4 identified in the [w]rit." Furthermore, although plaintiff was present at the
location, he did not have a tow truck with him.
Plaintiff moved for enforcement of litigant's rights regarding the writ and
requested the court to instruct "law enforcement attempting to execute [the]
court's order and writ to arrest and take into custody . . . [Roach] should he refuse
to comply with the terms of the court's order and companion writ."
The court emailed defendants, directing them to comply with the prior
order and return the truck, engine, and all component parts by a certain date.
The court warned that failure to abide by its directive could "result in the
imposition of sanctions." Defendants did not comply and the court subsequently
ordered Roach to appear before the court and show cause as to why he should
not be held in contempt. Thereafter, default judgment was entered against
defendants, and they were again ordered to return the truck and engine to
plaintiff. The order stated that "[MCS] shall take necessary and reasonable steps
to take possession of the truck and engine." However, the court denied plaintiff's
request "to grant permission to any law enforcement officers enforcing [the]
[c]ourt's orders to arrest [Roach]." Subsequent motion practice ensued between
plaintiff and defendants, and ultimately final default judgment was entered in
favor of plaintiff against defendants.
A-0386-24 5 In the meantime, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint asserting an
amercement and constitutional law claim as to MCS. Later, MCS moved for
summary judgment. On August 26, 2024, the court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint against MCS.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in granting summary
judgment because he presented disputed issues of material fact regarding the
claim of amercement and other constitutional issues. We are unconvinced.
We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk
v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). We consider "whether the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); Palmer v. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp.,
481 N.J. Super. 465, 479 (App. Div. 2025); R. 4:46-2.
The statutory remedy of amercement states that:
If a sheriff or acting sheriff fails to perform any duty imposed upon him by law in respect to writs of execution resulting in loss or damage to the judgment creditor, he shall be subject to amercement in the amount of such loss and damage to and for the use of the judgment creditor.
A-0386-24 6 [N.J.S.A. 40A:9-109.]
In discussing amercement, we have stated it is a "'money penalty in the
nature of a fine imposed upon an officer for some misconduct or neglect of duty.'
. . . [t]he term has traditionally been ascribed to fines imposed on officers of the
court for failing or neglecting to perform statutory functions such as levies and
executions." Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Braney, 265 N.J. Super. 362, 364 (App.
Div. 1993) (citation omitted) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 81 (6th ed.
1990)). A "sheriff is not liable to amercement until he shall have disobeyed
positive, reasonable, lawful direction." Id. at 365 (quoting Kemble v. Harris, 36
N.J.L. 526 (E. & A. 1873)).
The court found its order was clear that "it was [p]laintiff's obligation to
supply the means to remove the heavy equipment [they] wished to recover," and
plaintiffs were not entitled to amercement because they did not have a tow truck
present on the day of the execution of the writ. It stated: "Without a tow truck,
the items could not be recovered." Furthermore, because plaintiff "offered no
evidence in opposition" to MCS's summary judgment motion as to the
amercement claim, the court found that was an "independent basis to grant
summary judgment in favor of [MCS]."
A-0386-24 7 We are satisfied the actions taken by MCS cannot be characterized as
neglectful or as a failure to carry out its legal duty to execute the writ of
possession. After receiving the writ of possession, plaintiff's counsel sent the
writ to MCS, explicitly stating "[p]laintiff needs to arrange to have a tow truck
there at the time of execution." MCS personally served the writ of possession
on defendants but could not retrieve the truck and its parts because D'Angelo
did not bring a tow truck to the repair yard to take back his truck. The sheriff's
officer contacted the supervisor who in turn sought guidance from the court.
The officer was subsequently instructed to return to headquarters.
After these events, the court again directed defendants to comply with the
writ and return plaintiff's property. The letter stated that "plaintiff shall make
arrangements to remove/tow the truck, engine, and component parts from
defendant's place of business."
These facts demonstrate MCS's efforts to execute the writ of possession
within the confines of its policies and the law. MCS served the writ and
attempted to execute it. Its efforts were thwarted by plaintiff's failure to provide
a tow truck and defendants' noncooperation. Moreover, the court denied
plaintiff's request to authorize MCS to arrest Roach for his continued
disobedience of its orders. There was nothing more for MCS to do under these
A-0386-24 8 circumstances. Plaintiff has not established MCS failed to execute its legal duty
regarding the writ. Plaintiff was not entitled to amercement.
To the extent we have not commented on them specifically, all other
points plaintiff raises on appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0386-24 9