John D. Kalmbach and Wife, Frances M. Kalmbach v. Seminole Pipeline Company
This text of John D. Kalmbach and Wife, Frances M. Kalmbach v. Seminole Pipeline Company (John D. Kalmbach and Wife, Frances M. Kalmbach v. Seminole Pipeline Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
BACKGROUND
Seminole owns and operates two common-carrier natural gas liquid pipelines in Texas, running from Gaines to Mont Belvieu. The first pipeline was constructed in 1981; the second pipeline constructed in 1992 is the subject of this litigation. The scope of Seminole's 1992 project extended from Gaines near the border of New Mexico to Mont Belvieu near the Gulf Coast, and required the acquisition of over 500 miles of right-of-way easements from landowners across Texas.
The Kalmbachs own 150 acres of farm and pasture land in Lee County, Texas. On March 7, 1981, the Kalmbachs conveyed a fifty-foot wide easement to Seminole for the operation of a single pipeline. The easement traversed the tract southeasterly a distance of 110.48 rods or 1822.92 feet (one rod equals 16.5 feet). A portion of the acreage was situated to the northeast of the easement, and the remainder was situated to the southwest. In connection with the easement, there were no fences or above-ground appurtenances interfering with the Kalmbachs' farming and ranching operations on the entire 150-acre tract.
Seminole determined a necessity for a second pipeline from Gaines to Mont Belvieu to be situated wholly within the existing easement, parallel and immediately adjacent to its first pipeline. In 1992, Seminole attempted to acquire the rights to operate the second pipeline through negotiations with the Kalmbachs. Negotiations were unsuccessful and on November 17, 1992, following statutory condemnation procedures, Seminole exercised its eminent domain authority in taking the easement.
Pursuant to the Texas Property Code, special commissioners were appointed to assess the Kalmbachs' damages as a result of the taking. Seminole's expert, Larry Kokel appraised the Kalmbachs' total damages at $3820. The special commissioners assessed total damages in the amount of $7524, and the Kalmbachs appealed to the district court.
At trial, the Kalmbachs claimed damages of $504,168. Their expert, George Reed, assessed damages of $447,444. Reed's appraisal excluded additional construction and trespass damages claimed by appellants. By its answers to the special issues submitted, the jury found that the decrease in the market value of the permanent easement, immediately before and immediately after the taking was $66,288; that the decrease in the market value of the temporary construction easement immediately before and immediately after the taking was $650; that the market value of the remainder immediately before and immediately after the acquisition of the permanent easement and the temporary construction easement was $7306; and that the amount of construction damages was $5678. Seminole moved for judgment n.o.v. with regard to three issues; however the trial court sustained the motion only as to the $66,288 decrease in market value of the permanent easement finding the evidence insufficient to support this award.
In granting Seminole's motion, the trial court modified the jury's verdict of $66,288 in response to Special Issue Number 1 and substituted Kokel's appraisal of $1170 as the decrease in value of the permanent easement immediately before and immediately after the taking. Judgment was entered accordingly and it is from this judgment that the Kalmbachs appeal. There is no question raised as to the right of Seminole to take the property or as to the procedure followed. The only question before us concerns the market value of the property taken by condemnation. The Kalmbachs, the plaintiffs below, predicate this appeal on two points of error and challenge the judgment of the trial court by asserting that the court erred in (1) entering judgment n.o.v. because there was sufficient evidence of probative force to support the jury's findings on all special issues; and (2) excluding the comparable sales testimony of appellants' expert regarding sales of easement rights in established pipeline corridors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 provides for a judgment n.o.v. in such instances where a directed verdict would have been proper. We will uphold a trial court's judgment n.o.v. only if there is no evidence to support the jury's verdict. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1990); Fisher v. Evans, 853 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. App.--Waco 1993, writ denied). If more than a scintilla of evidence exists supporting the jury's verdict, we will reverse a judgment n.o.v. Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228. In determining whether more than a scintilla exists, we review only the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id. at 227. Thus we must consider the evidence and inferences as they tend to support the verdict and not with a view toward supporting the judgment. Id. at 228. More than a scintilla of evidence exists if the record reveals some probative evidence to support the verdict, "no matter how small." Ellis County State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 801 (Tex. 1994) (emphasis added).
DISCUSSION
We first address the Kalmbachs' challenge to the judgment n.o.v. based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Kalmbachs assert that the record contains ample evidence of probative force to support the jury's findings on all special issues. Seminole challenged the jury's findings in a motion requesting that the trial court render judgment n.o.v. and disregard findings on special issues one, three, and four. Although Seminole's motion contained thirty-two numbered paragraphs, it asserts the single ground that there was no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to support the jury's findings on each of the issues presented.
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