John Charles Prenderville v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 9, 2018
• Docket: 45A04-1712-CR-2838
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this May 09 2018, 7:49 am Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK Indiana Supreme Court purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals and Tax Court collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE P. Jeffrey Schlesinger Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Henry A. Flores, Jr. Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Charles Prenderville, May 9, 2018

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No. 45A04-1712-CR-2838 v. Appeal from the Lake Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell, Judge Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No. 45G03-1701- F6-16

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 1 of 10 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, John Charles Prenderville (Prenderville), appeals his one-

year sentence after he pleaded guilty to domestic battery, a Class A

misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES [3] Prenderville presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether Prenderville was entitled to credit time for time served on pre-trial

electronic monitoring; and

(2) Whether Prenderville’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the

offense and his character.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] On January 20, 2017, Prenderville and his ex-wife, Mary Pimental (Pimental),

were celebrating Prenderville’s birthday at a bar in Lake County, Indiana.

Prenderville became intoxicated and “obnoxious and began harassing

[Pimental] and belittling her” by “calling her stupid and a dumb bitch, and

using other profanities.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7). At around 2:30 a.m.,

the pair left the bar in a vehicle driven by Pimental. On the drive home,

Prenderville became more “irate and continued to yell” at Pimental.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7). In the process, Prenderville, who had a “to go

beer cup from the bar,” tossed the beer at Pimental. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 2 of 10 p. 7). Pimental became scared of Prenderville’s actions, and she used her cell

phone to “record his yelling.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7). Prenderville

then “punched the vehicle’s [rear-view] mirror, punched the dashboard, and

punched . . . Pimental in the face while she was driving.” (Appellant’s App.

Vol. II, p. 30). Pimental reacted and punched Prenderville “in the stomach and

told him to leave her alone.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7). She also

indicated that she was driving to the police station to report the incident. Upon

hearing that, Prenderville “grabbed the steering wheel” and he “tried to steer

the vehicle, causing it to move erratically.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7).

Prenderville continued to threaten Pimental by claiming that he was going to

“beat her ass” and he called her a “bitch and a whore.” (Appellant’s App. Vol.

II, p. 7). When they arrived home, Pimental went inside her house leaving

Prenderville inside the vehicle. Prenderville “began to blow the horn and when

[Pimental] did not come out[,] he entered the house” and he “threatened to beat

her up.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7). The Lake County Police Department

was contacted, and Prenderville was arrested.

[5] On January 21, 2017, in Cause Number 45G03-1701-F6-00016(F6-16), the

State charged Prenderville with Count I, intimidation, a Level 6 felony; Count

II, domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony; Count

III, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; Count IV, criminal recklessness,

a Class B misdemeanor; and Count V, criminal mischief, a Class B

misdemeanor. Prenderville spent four days in jail and was placed on electronic

monitoring on February 13, 2017.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 3 of 10 [6] On September 18, 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Prenderville agreed to

plead guilty to Count III, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and the

State agreed to dismiss all other Counts. The agreement provided that

Prenderville would admit to violating his probations in Cause Numbers 45G03-

1208-FB-00086 (FB-86), and 45G03-1512-F6-235(F6-235). While the parties

agreed that sentencing for the Class A misdemeanor domestic battery offense in

F6-16, as well as any sentences imposed pursuant to the petitions to revoke

probation under FB-86 and F6-235, would be left open to the trial court, they

also agreed that any of the sentences imposed shall run consecutively. Lastly,

as part of the written plea agreement, Prenderville specifically agreed that he

was not entitled to credit time served while on electronic monitoring.

[7] That same day, a guilty plea hearing was conducted and the trial court

determined that a factual basis existed for Prenderville’s charged offense and it

accepted Prenderville’s plea. On November 6, 2017, the trial court conducted a

sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Prenderville to one year for the

Class A misdemeanor domestic battery charge in Lake County Community

Corrections. With regard to credit time served while on pretrial electronic

monitoring, Prenderville requested the trial court to award him all of the 255

days spent on electronic monitoring, plus an additional one-quarter of 255 days

as good time credit. In response, the State argued that

I don’t recall personally any case as I sit here right now where the [c]ourt ordered all of the days plus one-quarter. My recollection was that it was one-quarter only.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 4 of 10 (Sent. Tr. Vol. II, p. 19). At the close of the hearing, the trial court determined

that Prenderville served four days in jail. For each of those four days he spent

in confinement, Prenderville earned one day of credit-time, totaling eight days.

In addition, the trial court awarded Prenderville a quarter of the 255 days spent

on electronic monitoring, i.e., sixty-four days, as good time credit. In sum, the

trial court awarded Prenderville a total of seventy-two days of good time credit

toward his sentence.

[8] Prenderville now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Credit Time for Time Served on Pretrial Electronic Monitoring

[9] Prenderville argues that he is entitled to 255 days of pretrial credit time served

while on he was on electronic monitoring. “Credit for time served” is defined

as “the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives for time actually served.”

Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1999). “Good time credit” is “the

additional credit a prisoner receives for good behavior and educational

attainment.” Id. Prenderville appeals the trial court’s decision on credit time

served while on pre-trial electronic monitoring.

[10] Following his release from jail, Prenderville was placed on electronic

monitoring. At his sentencing hearing, Prenderville had been on electronic

monitoring for a total of 255 days. However, in September of 2017, the parties

entered into a plea agreement, and Prenderville specifically agreed that he was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 5 of 10 not entitled to pretrial credit time for the time served while on electronic

monitoring.

[11] A plea agreement is contractual in nature, and binds the defendant, the State,

and the trial court. Valenzuela v. State, 898 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008), trans. denied. All parties are bound to the terms of a plea agreement

accepted by the court, but the plea agreement will only be valid if it was

knowingly and willingly agreed to. Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind.

2008)). Absent any claim that a defendant’s guilty plea was not knowingly or

voluntarily entered, a defendant is bound by the terms of the plea agreement.

See State v. Holloway, 980 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Prenderville

makes no argument that his plea was involuntary. We also find that in

accepting the plea agreement, Prenderville agreed that he was not entitled to

pretrial credit time for the time served on electronic monitoring. Accordingly,

we hold that Prenderville’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to award him 255 days of pretrial credit time spent on electronic

monitoring toward his sentence is without merit.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[12] Prenderville claims that his one-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers

us to independently review and revise sentences authorized by statute if, after

due consideration, we find the trial court’s decision inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 6 of 10 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007). The “nature of offense” compares the defendant’s

actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged

offense, while the “character of the offender” permits a broader consideration of

the defendant’s character. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008);

Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An appellant bears

the burden of showing that both prongs of the inquiry favor a revision of his

sentence. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we

regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to

others, and a myriad of other considerations that come to light in a given case.

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Our court focuses on “the length of the aggregate

sentence and how it is to be served.” Id.

[13] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016,

1019 (Ind. 2012). For his Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, Prenderville

faced a maximum sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Here, the trial court

imposed the maximum sentence.

[14] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the

commission of the offense and the defendant’s participation. Croy v. State, 953

N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Prenderville and his ex-wife were at a

bar celebrating Prenderville’s birthday. Prenderville became intoxicated and

obnoxious and he demeaned Pimental by calling her abusive names. Although

the parties were divorced at the time, Pimental was housing Prenderville since

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 7 of 10 he did not have a place to stay. As the pair left the bar in a vehicle driven by

Pimental, Prenderville sat in the passenger seat and he continued to harangue

Pimental with insults. Eventually, Prenderville tossed his beer at Pimental,

broke the rearview mirror, cracked the windshield, and punched Pimental in

her face. When Pimental threatened to drive to the police station, Prenderville

grabbed the steering wheel, which caused the vehicle to move erratically.

When they arrived at Pimental’s residence, Pimental went inside her house

leaving Prenderville inside the vehicle. Prenderville “began to blow the horn”

and when Pimental did not come out, he entered the house and “threatened to

beat her up.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 7). From the foregoing facts, we are

not persuaded that anything about the nature of Prenderville’s offense warrants

a reduction in the imposed sentence.

[15] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the

defendant’s criminal history. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2007). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s

character varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in

relation to the current offense. Id. While a record of arrests may not be used as

evidence of criminal history, it can be “relevant to the trial court’s assessment of

the defendant’s character in terms of the risk that he will commit another

crime.” Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005). Prenderville has

amassed multiple criminal convictions and a record of arrests in Indiana and

Illinois. His Illinois criminal history includes battery, possession of a controlled

substance, unlawful use of a concealed handgun, driving while suspended,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 8 of 10 operating a motor vehicle without insurance, and driving under the influence.

Prenderville was arrested in Indiana for his first offense in 2004 for intimidation

with a deadly weapon. His other Indiana arrests and convictions include

driving while suspended (multiple), intimidation, invasion of privacy, criminal

trespass, aggravated battery causing bodily injury, battery committed by means

of deadly a weapon, criminal recklessness, and driving under the influence

(multiple). We note that some of Prenderville’s past offenses are alcohol

related. While committing the instant offense, Prenderville became intoxicated

and punched Pimental in her face while she was driving.

[16] Finally, Prenderville argues that he took responsibility when he pleaded guilty

to the offense of domestic battery. However, Prenderville received a substantial

benefit by pleading guilty. Due to Prenderville’s plea of guilty, the State

dismissed two other felony charges and two misdemeanor charges. Moreover,

Prenderville committed the instant offense while serving probation in two other

Causes: under FB-86, Prenderville was serving four years of probation for his

criminal recklessness conviction; and in F6-235, Prenderville was serving one

year of probation for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Prenderville’s

criminal history and prior stints in jail have not deterred him from breaking the

law. For all of the above reasons, Prenderville has failed to meet his burden in

persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

CONCLUSION [17] In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to

award Prenderville 255 days of pretrial credit time spent on electronic Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 9 of 10 monitoring; and that Prenderville’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and his character.

[18] Affirmed.

[19] May, J. & Mathias, J. concur

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1712-CR-2838 | May 9, 2018 Page 10 of 10