John C. Young v. Los Angeles Police Department

District Court, C.D. California·Decided December 29, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-11087·Unknown

Opinion

JOHN C. YOUNG CASE NO. CV20-11087-CBM-KK Hon. Judge Consuelo B. Marshall Plaintiff, Hon. Mag. Judge Kenly Kiya Kato

vs. [NOTE CHANGES BY COURT] STIPULATED Defendants. PROTECTIVE ORDER

1. A. PURPOSES & LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. This action involves Los Angeles Police Department Officers. Plaintiff is seeking materials and information that Defendants, all of whom are Los Angeles Police Department officers, and their employers contend are confidential. As such, it is the defense contention that this action is likely to involve the discovery of confidential official government information and information contained within police officers’ personnel files that is therefore privileged under the common law of California, California statutes and certain privileges afforded under Federal common law, including the “official information,” “self-critical analysis,” the “deliberative process,” and the “law enforcement investigatory privileges.” The defense contends that discovery in this action is likely to involve information protected by the police officers’ right of privacy and to be protected by third parties’ right to privacy. The Los Angeles Police Department has not publicly released the materials and information referenced above except under a protective order or pursuant to a court order, if at all. These materials and information are of the type that has been used to initiate disciplinary action against Los Angeles Police Department officers and has been used as evidence in disciplinary proceedings, where the officers’ conduct was considered to be contrary to LAPD policy. Defendants and the Los Angeles Police Department contend that absent a protective order delineating the responsibilities of nondisclosure by one or more of the attorneys, secretaries, law clerks, paralegals and expert witnesses involved in this case, as well as the corollary risk of embarrassment, harassment and professional and legal harm on the part of the LAPD officers referenced in the materials and information. unfettered disclosure of the materials and information, absent a protective order, would allow the media to share this information with potential jurors in the area, impacting the rights of the Defendants to receive a fair trial. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonably necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, the defense contends, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. Plaintiff does not agree with the analysis stated above in this ¶ 1.B., and asserts that the material is not confidential but that under the First Amendment and other constitutional principles as set forth in Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006), and other caselaw, the material is public material. The court has already determined that some of the material sought to be designated as confidential is not confidential. ECF No. 46. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: this pending federal lawsuit. 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in the Good Cause Statement. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party, and includes support staff. 2.11 Party: any party to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this Action. 2.13 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., photocopying, videotaping, translating, preparing exhibits or demonstrations, and organizing, storing, or retrieving data in any form or medium) and their employees and subcontractors. 2.14 Protected Material: any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated as “CONFIDENTIAL.” from a Producing Party. 3. SCOPE The protections conferred by this Stipulation and Order cover not only Protected Material (as defined above), but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. Any use of Protected Material at trial shall be governed by the orders of the trial judge. This Order does not govern the use of Protected Material at trial. 4. DURATION Once a case proceeds to trial, all of the information that was designated as confidential or maintained pursuant to this protective order becomes public and will be presumptively available to all members of the public, including the press, unless compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings to proceed otherwise are made to the trial judge in advance of the trial. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu,

John C. Young v. Los Angeles Police Department, (C.D. Cal. 2021).

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Related

Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)