John C. Gager v. "Bob Seidel," Seidel's Restaurant

D.C. Circuit

John C. Gager v. "Bob Seidel," Seidel's Restaurant

320 F.2d 776, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4906

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJune 20, 1963

Docket17584

StatusPublished

This text of 320 F.2d 776 (John C. Gager v. "Bob Seidel," Seidel's Restaurant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

John C. Gager v. "Bob Seidel," Seidel's Restaurant, 320 F.2d 776, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4906 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Gager sued certain police officers and the present appellees to enjoin them from bringing criminal charges against him for parking in what he alleged to be a private alley, the owner of which had authorized him to park therein. He also sought damages. The District Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. On appeal we affirmed as to the police officers; but as to Seidel we held the complaint stated a cause of action which, if proved, would entitle Gager to recover, and remanded for “such further proceedings as the parties may be advised.” Gager v. “Bob Seidel,” 112 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 141, 300 F.2d 727, 733, cert. denied Gager v. Seidel, 370 U.S. 959, 82 S.Ct. 1612, 8 L.Ed.2d 825 (1962).

At the close of Gager’s evidence in the-trial following remand, the District Court directed a verdict for Seidel. On this appeal, Gager asserts the District Court erred in excluding a letter addressed to him by one Inspector Layton, and in directing a verdict against him.

To substantiate his claim against Seidel, it was necessary for Gager to prove (1) that the alley in question was private property on which he was authorized to park, and (2) that Seidel knew this when he caused him to be prosecuted for illegal parking. The abbreviated record filed in this court by the appellant reveals no proof on these points except a showing that on one occasion he was acquitted when tried on a criminal charge in Municipal Court. Gager seems to argue this was enough to show the alley was a private one in which he had a right to park, and that the Municipal Court’s judgment of acquittal is res judicata here. We do not agree. In our view, the record before us does not show he proved the two paints upon which his right to recover from Seidel depended. Hence, it does not appear that the District Court erred in directing a verdict for Seidel.

The excluded exhibit seems to have been a reply, dated March 15, 1960, to a letter written by the appellant under date of March 7, 1960. Inspector Layton summarized the outcome of certain parking violation eases against Gager which had been prosecuted in the Municipal Court. There was no showing that the Inspector’s letter was written on behalf of the appellee Seidel or that its contents could be said to constitute competent evidence binding upon the appellee. Even if on some theory the letter properly could have been received, its recitals were merely cumulative, and its exclusion in no way prejudiced the appellant.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Gager sued certain police officers and the present appellees to enjoin them from bringing criminal charges against him for parking in what he alleged to be a private alley, the owner of which had authorized him to park therein. He also sought damages. The District Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. On appeal we affirmed as to the police officers; but as to Seidel we held the complaint stated a cause of action which, if proved, would entitle Gager to recover, and remanded for “such further proceedings as the parties may be advised.” Gager v. “Bob Seidel,” 112 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 141, 300 F.2d 727, 733, cert. denied Gager v. Seidel, 370 U.S. 959, 82 S.Ct. 1612, 8 L.Ed.2d 825 (1962).

At the close of Gager’s evidence in the-trial following remand, the District Court directed a verdict for Seidel. On this appeal, Gager asserts the District Court erred in excluding a letter addressed to him by one Inspector Layton, and in directing a verdict against him.

To substantiate his claim against Seidel, it was necessary for Gager to prove (1) that the alley in question was private property on which he was authorized to park, and (2) that Seidel knew this when he caused him to be prosecuted for illegal parking. The abbreviated record filed in this court by the appellant reveals no proof on these points except a showing that on one occasion he was acquitted when tried on a criminal charge in Municipal Court. Gager seems to argue this was enough to show the alley was a private one in which he had a right to park, and that the Municipal Court’s judgment of acquittal is res judicata here. We do not agree. In our view, the record before us does not show he proved the two paints upon which his right to recover from Seidel depended. Hence, it does not appear that the District Court erred in directing a verdict for Seidel.

The excluded exhibit seems to have been a reply, dated March 15, 1960, to a letter written by the appellant under date of March 7, 1960. Inspector Layton summarized the outcome of certain parking violation eases against Gager which had been prosecuted in the Municipal Court. There was no showing that the Inspector’s letter was written on behalf of the appellee Seidel or that its contents could be said to constitute competent evidence binding upon the appellee. Even if on some theory the letter properly could have been received, its recitals were merely cumulative, and its exclusion in no way prejudiced the appellant.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

320 F.2d 776, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4906, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-c-gager-v-bob-seidel-seidels-restaurant-cadc-1963.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack