John Butler v. Kanjorski

Third Circuit

John Butler v. Kanjorski

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·Decided February 11, 2026·No. 25-1195·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

CLD-072 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-1195

JOHN BUTLER,

Appellant

v.

MAJOR KANJORSKI, SCI-Mahanoy; KELLY, SCI-Mahanoy Mailroom Employee;

SHUETTLER, SCI-Mahanoy Librarian;

JANE DOE, works in inmate accounts at SCI-Mahanoy

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-01905)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

Submitted on Appellant’s Motions to Reopen and Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 on January 22, 2026

Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 11, 2026)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

John Butler, a prisoner at SCI-Mahoney, sought to file a complaint in forma pau-

peris (“IFP”) in the District Court. He alleged that, while he was in the Restricted Hous-

ing Unit (“RHU”), he needed to file a response to meet a deadline in Butler v. Pierson,

W.D. Pa. No. 1:22-cv-00091. Accordingly, he wished to visit the law library and to ob-

tain his legal materials from his property held elsewhere in the prison. He learned then

that the RHU library did not have any law books; he was told that he had to use the com-

puter there instead. Butler told a corrections officer that he did not know how to use the

computer. The officer communicated Butler’s concern to the librarian and told Butler the

librarian’s response: “He better learn!” ECF No. 1 at 2. Butler’s subsequent request for

training was denied. Butler had to argue his case orally in the District Court without hav-

ing consulted his own documents or any other legal materials, and the District Court

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Additionally, Butler alleged that,

at the time he filed his complaint, he wanted to respond to a motion to dismiss filed in

Butler v. Harry, W.D. Pa. No. 1:24-cv-00079, but he was still not able to access his legal

property or law books. Butler sought preliminary and other injunctive relief.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

The District Court granted Butler’s IFP application and screened his complaint un-

der 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e). After screening, the District Court dismissed But-

ler’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted and denied Butler’s requests for injunctive relief. The District Court also pro-

vided Butler leave to amend within 30 days of the order of dismissal. In doing so, the

District Court notified him that if he did not file an amended complaint within that time

frame, the case would be dismissed. Butler did not file an amended complaint. Because

the complaint had not stated a claim for relief and Butler had not amended his original fil-

ing, the District Court entered another order dismissing the action under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and closing the case. Butler filed a timely notice of appeal, noting

therein that he chose not to amend his complaint because he is standing on his original al-

legations.

Because Butler did not pay the filing and docketing fees or file an IFP application,

the Clerk entered an order dismissing his appeal for failure to prosecute. Butler subse-

quently filed a motion for leave to file a motion to reopen this appeal and a motion to reo-

pen this appeal. He explained why the Court had not received the IFP documents previ-

ously. He also submitted an IFP application. We deny his motion for leave to file a mo-

tion to reopen as unnecessary, and we grant his motion to reopen, see 3d Cir. L.A.R.

Misc. 107.2(a), and his IFP application, Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976).

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We exercise ple-

nary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.2 See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d

220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Upon review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s

judgment because no substantial issue is presented on appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;

3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Butler’s complaint implicated the right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Ca-

sey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 354-55 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818, 828 (1977).

But Butler did not state a claim for a violation of the right of access. An inmate raising

an access-to-the-courts claim must allege that he lost a chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or

1 The District Court did not specify whether its later order was with or without prejudice. However, under the circumstances, it appears clear that the District Court intended a dismissal with prejudice. See Millhouse v. Heath, 866 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (“An unqualified dismissal for failure to state a claim is presumed to operate with prejudice; the addition of the words ‘with prejudice’ to modify such a dismissal is simply not necessary .”) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020). (Even if the final dismissal had been without prejudice, we would still have jurisdiction because Butler has made it clear that he wishes to stand on his complaint . See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).) Although we review the dismissal order, we will not review the denial of preliminary injunctive relief , because this appeal is moot to the extent that Butler challenges that ruling. See Hankins v. Temple Univ., 829 F.2d 437, 438 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987). 2 The dismissal order reads, in part, like a dismissal for failure to prosecute because it turned not only on the failure to state a claim in the original complaint, but also on Butler ’s failure to amend. Ordinarily, we review dismissals for failure to prosecute for abuse of discretion. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008). And, usually, we require District Courts to consider various factors before dismissing an action for failure to prosecute. See id. at 258 (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)). However, here, the District Court reviewed the initial complaint on the merits and notified Butler that his complaint was subject to dismissal if he did not file an amended complaint within the time provided. Essentially, the District Court rendered final its earlier dismissal for failure to state a claim. And our review remains plenary.

arguable claim challenging his conviction or conditions of confinement. See Monroe v.

Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In pleading an access-to-the-

courts claim, an inmate must state, inter alia, the underlying claim in accordance with

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “just as if it were being independently

pursued.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002). “The complaint must de-

scribe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere

hope,’ and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06 (quoting

Harbury, 536 U.S. at 416-17). Butler failed to include these necessary allegations. And

he chose not to amend his complaint after the District Court explained that these allega-

tions were required.

For these reasons, after denying Butler’s motion for leave to file a motion to reo-

pen as unnecessary, reopening this appeal on his motion to reopen, and granting IFP sta-

tus to Butler,3 we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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