John Betts v. Richard Hoffman

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 30, 2008
• Docket: CA-0007-1054
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-1054

JOHN WAYNE BETTS

VERSUS

RICHARD HOFFMAN, MARGARET HOFFMAN, CHERYL McENDREE, AND JAMES HOFFMAN

**********

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, DOCKET NO. C-2007-0045-B HONORABLE HERMAN I. STEWART, DISTRICT JUDGE

JAMES T. GENOVESE JUDGE

Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Scott Westerchil 101 South 1st Street Leesville, Louisiana 71446 (337) 239-9076 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: John Wayne Betts

Leslie R. Leavoy, Jr. Post Office Box 1055 DeRidder, Louisiana 70634 (337) 462-6051 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: Richard Hoffman, Margaret Hoffman, Cheryl McEndree, and James Hoffman GENOVESE, Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant, John Wayne Betts (Mr. Betts), filed a Rule to Evict

Tenants against Richard Hoffman, Margaret Hoffman, Cheryl McEndree, and James

Hoffman (Defendants). Defendants filed Exceptions of Misuse of Summary Process;

No Right and No Cause of Action, asserting that questions of ownership existed and

contending that this matter must be adjudicated as an ordinary proceeding. The trial

court granted Defendants’ Exception of Misuse of Summary Process and dismissed

Mr. Betts’s eviction proceeding. Mr. Betts appeals. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 4, 2007, Mr. Betts sent, via certified mail, a Notice to Vacate to his

step-father, Richard Hoffman, his mother, Margaret Hoffman, and his step-siblings,

Cheryl McEndree and James Hoffman.1 Mr. Betts, as alleged owner, sought to evict

Defendants, as occupants, from property on which he and each of the Defendants live

and apparently share. On January 12, 2007, Mr. Betts filed a Rule to Evict Tenants

against Defendants in the Thirty-sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard,

State of Louisiana, seeking a judgment of eviction due to Defendants’ failure to

vacate the property after receiving legal notice to do so. Attached to his pleading was

a purported Act of Donation which Mr. Betts contends proved his ownership of the

property at issue herein. The alleged donation was executed by his step-father,

Richard Hoffman, and his mother, Margaret Hoffman, on February 22, 2002, in the

state of Ohio. However, said donation was not accepted by Mr. Betts and not filed

into the conveyance records of Beauregard Parish until December 20, 2006, over four

1 The record indicates that Defendants received said certified notices on January 5, 2007.

1 years later.

On March 14, 2007, Defendants filed Exceptions of Misuse of Summary

Process; No Right and No Cause of Action against Mr. Betts. In their exceptions,

Defendants asserted: “Eviction is not a legal cause of action for . . . [Mr. Betts] in

that he and the [D]efendants . . . have resided on the same piece of property on and

off during the last ten (10) years. The actions of possession or ownership are

appropriate.” Defendants, specifically Richard Hoffman and Margaret Hoffman,

further alleged that it was never their intention to donate the property at issue herein

to Mr. Betts. Defendants also asserted that Mr. Betts “has never accepted the alleged

donation which he full well knew was in fact a power of attorney so that [Mr. Betts]

could deal with his mother’s and step-father’s property while they were hospitalized

[in Ohio]. The donation was never intended to vest full ownership in the property to

[Mr. Betts].”

On March 14, 2007, a hearing on the rule for eviction was held wherein the

trial court found that questions of ownership did, in fact, exist; therefore, this matter

could not legally “be determined in a summary proceeding.” The trial court granted

Defendants’ Exception of Misuse of Summary Process and dismissed Mr. Betts’s

eviction suit.2 Mr. Betts appeals.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Mr. Betts contends that the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ Exception

of Misuse of Summary Process which resulted in the dismissal of his eviction suit.

2 Though Defendants’ exception is labeled “Exception of Misuse of Summary Process,” said exception is actually a “Dilatory Exception of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding” as set forth in La.Civ.Code art. 926(A)(3) and will be addressed accordingly. The trial court did not rule on Defendants’ Peremptory Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action.

2 STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of appellate review of factual findings in a civil action is the manifest error/clearly wrong standard, and factual findings should not be reversed absent manifest error or unless they are clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). If the trial court’s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the reviewing court may not reverse. Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). Consequently, when there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Id.

Moncrief v. Succession of Armstrong, 05-1584, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 939

So.2d 714, 720.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Mr. Betts claims that he acquired ownership of the property at issue herein

pursuant to a donation from Richard and Margaret Hoffman in 2002. Mr. Betts

contends that he, as the property’s owner, was legally entitled to evict Defendants,

who were occupants,3 pursuant to the summary process provisions of La.Code Civ.P.

art. 4701, et seq.

Mr. Betts asserts that the form of the Act of Donation complied with

La.Civ.Code art. 1536 which provides: “An act shall be passed before a notary public

and two witnesses of every donation inter vivos of immovable property or incorporeal

things, such as rents, credits, rights or actions, under the penalty of nullity.” Mr.

Betts also contends that the donation was legally binding upon his acceptance and

subsequent filing of the Act of Donation into the conveyance records of Beauregard

3 According to La.Code Civ.P. art. 4704, the definition of “‘[o]ccupant’ includes a sharecropper; half hand; day laborer; former owner; and any person occupying immovable property by permission or accommodation of the owner, former owner, or another occupant, except a mineral lessee, owner of a mineral servitude, or a lessee of the owner[.]”

3 Parish (four years later) on December 20, 2006. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 15404 and

La.Code Civ.P. art. 1554.5 In his brief, Mr. Betts cites Rutherford v. Rutherford, 346

So.2d 669 (La.1977), in support of his argument that the donation is legally binding

according to the terms of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1540, claiming that “notice of

acceptance is effective upon the donors upon recordation of the instrument in the

records of the Office of the Clerk of Court in which the property is situated.” Finally,

Mr. Betts argues that Defendants’ Exception of Misuse of Summary Process made no

specific allegation of fraud; therefore, the trial court improperly considered parole

evidence which led to its erroneous decision. According to Mr. Betts, the trial court

“should have excluded any mention or consideration of parole evidence in making a

decision on [Defendants’] Exception of Misuse of Summary Proceedings”; and, since

it did not, the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ dilatory exception and its dismissal

of Mr. Betts’s eviction suit against Defendants should, therefore, be reversed.

Defendants assert that the trial court’s judgment was proper considering their

assertion that issues relative to ownership were existent. In brief, Defendants,

specifically Richard and Margaret Hoffman, contend that it was never their intention

4 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1540 provides:

A donation inter vivos shall be binding on the donor, and shall produce effect only from the day of its being accepted in precise terms.

The acceptance may be made during the lifetime of the donor by a posterior and authentic act, but in that case the donation shall have effect, with regard to the donor, only from the day of his being notified of the act establishing that acceptance. 5 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1554 provides:

When the donation affects an immovable or rights thereto, the act of donation, as well as the act of acceptance, whether the acceptance be made by the same or a separate act, must be filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located.

4 to donate the property at issue herein to Mr. Betts. Instead, they allege that it was

their intention to grant to Mr. Betts a power of attorney so that Mr. Betts could “take

care of their property in Beauregard Parish” while they “were ill, and [were]

hospitalized, and were being taken care of by relatives in Ohio.” These assertions

were set forth in their exception, and Defendants argue that the trial court’s reliance

upon their implications of fraud6 in order to grant judgment in their favor was not

error. We agree.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 1848 (emphasis added) provides

Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate or vary the contents of an authentic act or an act under private signature. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, that evidence may be admitted to prove such circumstances as a vice of consent, or a simulation, or to prove that the written act was modified by a subsequent and valid oral agreement.

We find that Defendants’ allegations meet the threshold for the trial court’s

consideration of parol evidence.

The vices of consent are error, fraud, and duress. La.Civ.Code art. 1948. Our jurisprudence has also recognized that parol evidence is admissible between the contracting parties: (1) to prove fraud, mistake, want or failure of consideration, and illegality; (2) to explain an ambiguity when such explanation is consistent with the written terms; or (3) to show that the writing is only a part of an entire oral contract between the parties. Scafidi v. Johnson, 420 So.2d 1113 (La.1982).

Myles v. Consol. Cos., Inc., 05-192, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 906 So.2d 677, 681,

writ denied, 05-2245 (La. 2/17/06), 924 So.2d 1019.

We find Mr. Betts’s reliance upon Rutherford misplaced. Rutherford dealt with

the issue of whether the donee’s acceptance was valid. Contrary to his assertions, the

issue in the case at bar is not whether Mr. Betts’s acceptance was valid; rather, the

6 Louisiana Civil Code Article 1948 provides, “Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress.”

5 issue is whether the donation, as a whole, is valid. Defendants allege that a necessary

element to the donation at issue herein, the donors’ intent, was lacking. Further,

Defendants’ implications are such that the purported Act of Donation was procured

by Mr. Betts through fraud, an element which vitiates consent. See La.Civ.Code art.

1948. Therefore, pursuant to the discretion afforded by La.Civ.Code art. 1848, we

do not find error with the trial court’s consideration of Defendants’ implication that

it was not their intent to effectuate a donation to Mr. Betts.

Ordinary proceedings require the use of four types of pleadings: petitions,

exceptions, written motions, and answers. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 852. “Summary

proceedings are those which are conducted with rapidity, within the delays allowed

by the court, and without citation and the observance of all the formalities required

in ordinary proceedings.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 2591.

An eviction is a summary proceeding. A challenge to a donation requires the

formalities of an ordinary civil proceeding. Because there was a challenge to Mr.

Betts’s ownership of the property on the basis that Defendants did not intend to

donate the property, the trial court concluded that fraud, or ill practices, asperse the

purported donation. Therefore, the legal issues of whether or not Mr. Betts owns the

property and can legally evict Defendants effectively remove this matter from a

summary proceeding and rightfully relegate it to an ordinary proceeding. We find a

reasonable factual basis in the record for the trial court’s decision to render judgment

dismissing Mr. Betts’s eviction suit. Consequently, we find no manifest error by the

trial court. The trial court’s grant of Defendants’ Exception of Misuse of Summary

Process and its dismissal of Mr. Betts’s eviction suit are therefore affirmed in all

respects.

6 DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Defendants’

Exception of Misuse of Summary Process and its dismissal of Mr. Betts’s Rule to

Evict Tenants. Plaintiff-Appellant, John Wayne Betts, is assessed with all costs of

this appeal.