KUNZIG, Judge.
Appellant John B. Arnold (Arnold) seeks review of a district court decision dismissing as moot his constitutional attack on a Massachusetts statute dealing with persons charged with drunken driving. Arnold alleges that since only persons convicted of drunken driving
after a trial
(such as Arnold) lose their licenses, the statutory scheme places a penalty upon exercising the right to a trial. However, we agree with the district court that the reinstatement of Arnold’s license moots this action and therefore affirm.
Under Massachusetts law, the license of a defendant convicted after a trial of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is to be revoked for one year. Mass.G.L. ch. 90, § 24(l)(b), (c)
2;
Commonwealth v,
LeRoy, - Mass.
-, 380 N.E.2d 128 (1978). A defendant who does not demand a trial, but rather admits to sufficient facts to support a conviction (generally referred to in Massachusetts as a “disposition without a finding”) does not suffer automatic license revocation. Mass.G.L. ch. 90, § 24E
;
LeRoy, supra.
Arnold was charged in state court in July 1975 with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
He pleaded not guilty in the district court, was tried, and was found guilty. On August 11,1975, Arnold’s request for a disposition “without a finding” of guilt was denied,
since Arnold had been found guilty
after a trial. His ease was continued until September 9, 1975, in order to allow him additional time to decide if he wanted to exercise his right to a trial
de novo
in superior court.
Robert A. Panora, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Registrar), revoked Arnold’s license on September 7, 1975. Two days later, Arnold exercised his right to a trial
de novo. See
note 5,
supra.
On November 24, 1975, Arnold was found not guilty by the superior court
and the next day his license was reinstated. Arnold made an unsuccessful request to have the Registrar expunge the record of his conviction on February 18, 1976.
While the above sequence of events was taking place in state court, Arnold also sought relief in federal court. On August 26, 1975, he commenced a class action against the Registrar, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief due to the alleged unconstitutionality of these Massachusetts statutes. Arnold sought to file á supplemental complaint on November 19, 1975, further alleging that his July conviction was unconstitutional in that the state court judge had refused to decide whether the state statutes involved violated the United States Constitution.
In March 1976, the Registrar moved to dismiss the federal complaint on the ground
inter alia
of mootness. In November 1976, Arnold moved to certify the class. The three-judge district court that had been convened then remanded this action to the single district judge for determination of the issue of mootness. On February 27, 1978, the district judge allowed plaintiff’s November 19, 1975 motion to file a supplemental complaint,
but then dismissed the entire ease as moot.
At this point the
state
court case has been closed for over two years, and now the
federal
case is dismissed as moot. Arnold appeals from that dismissal and we affirm.
The district court was correct in holding this case to be moot since Arnold’s license had been reinstated. Arnold attempts to circumvent this hurdle by claiming that there are collateral consequences emanating from the revocation that require expungement and preclude mootness. In simple language, he feels the matters involved are far from moot with regard to himself. Relying on
Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), Arnold argues that damage to his reputation and possible economic discrimination at the hands of automobile insurance companies
will occur unless the record of his conviction and license revocation is expunged.
Arnold’s reliance on
Sibron
is misplaced.
Sibron
turned on the fact that
legal
collateral consequences were involved. Here the possibility of any adverse
legal
consequences is precluded by the fact that Arnold had been found not guilty by the state court. It is, of course, true that Arnold may be called upon to state that he was once convicted. However, that he may have to answer a question in a certain way, and then qualify the answer with an explanation of his subsequent acquittal, is not a
legal collateral consequence.
Legal collateral consequences as used in
Sibron
relate to consequences “imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.” 392 U.S. at 57, 88 S.Ct. at 1900. However, Arnold has already successfully challenged his conviction in the state courts.
Arnold next relies on
Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), for supporting his argument that his cause is not moot. In
Bradford,
a prisoner claimed that a state was obligated to provide him certain procedural rights in considering his eligibility for parole. Before the case was argued before the Court, the prisoner received a complete release and thus had no further interest in the controverted state procedures. As in the present case, the party seeking to avoid mootness relied on the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine.
The Court, applying the test of
Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), noted that, in the absence of a certified class, this doctrine is “limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.”
Bradford, supra,
423 U.S. at 149, 96 S.Ct. at 349. Neither element is found in Arnold’s case.
It is true that Arnold’s license was suspended for less than three months. However, the shortness of the period was due to the fact that Arnold was eventually cleared. A full one-year revocation would provide enough time to'litigate this issue.
See Le-Roy, supra.
Furthermore, where the driver is never cleared, and thus the conviction remains, the “collateral consequences,” which Arnold lacks, would still be present.
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KUNZIG, Judge.
Appellant John B. Arnold (Arnold) seeks review of a district court decision dismissing as moot his constitutional attack on a Massachusetts statute dealing with persons charged with drunken driving. Arnold alleges that since only persons convicted of drunken driving
after a trial
(such as Arnold) lose their licenses, the statutory scheme places a penalty upon exercising the right to a trial. However, we agree with the district court that the reinstatement of Arnold’s license moots this action and therefore affirm.
Under Massachusetts law, the license of a defendant convicted after a trial of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is to be revoked for one year. Mass.G.L. ch. 90, § 24(l)(b), (c)
2;
Commonwealth v,
LeRoy, - Mass.
-, 380 N.E.2d 128 (1978). A defendant who does not demand a trial, but rather admits to sufficient facts to support a conviction (generally referred to in Massachusetts as a “disposition without a finding”) does not suffer automatic license revocation. Mass.G.L. ch. 90, § 24E
;
LeRoy, supra.
Arnold was charged in state court in July 1975 with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
He pleaded not guilty in the district court, was tried, and was found guilty. On August 11,1975, Arnold’s request for a disposition “without a finding” of guilt was denied,
since Arnold had been found guilty
after a trial. His ease was continued until September 9, 1975, in order to allow him additional time to decide if he wanted to exercise his right to a trial
de novo
in superior court.
Robert A. Panora, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Registrar), revoked Arnold’s license on September 7, 1975. Two days later, Arnold exercised his right to a trial
de novo. See
note 5,
supra.
On November 24, 1975, Arnold was found not guilty by the superior court
and the next day his license was reinstated. Arnold made an unsuccessful request to have the Registrar expunge the record of his conviction on February 18, 1976.
While the above sequence of events was taking place in state court, Arnold also sought relief in federal court. On August 26, 1975, he commenced a class action against the Registrar, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief due to the alleged unconstitutionality of these Massachusetts statutes. Arnold sought to file á supplemental complaint on November 19, 1975, further alleging that his July conviction was unconstitutional in that the state court judge had refused to decide whether the state statutes involved violated the United States Constitution.
In March 1976, the Registrar moved to dismiss the federal complaint on the ground
inter alia
of mootness. In November 1976, Arnold moved to certify the class. The three-judge district court that had been convened then remanded this action to the single district judge for determination of the issue of mootness. On February 27, 1978, the district judge allowed plaintiff’s November 19, 1975 motion to file a supplemental complaint,
but then dismissed the entire ease as moot.
At this point the
state
court case has been closed for over two years, and now the
federal
case is dismissed as moot. Arnold appeals from that dismissal and we affirm.
The district court was correct in holding this case to be moot since Arnold’s license had been reinstated. Arnold attempts to circumvent this hurdle by claiming that there are collateral consequences emanating from the revocation that require expungement and preclude mootness. In simple language, he feels the matters involved are far from moot with regard to himself. Relying on
Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), Arnold argues that damage to his reputation and possible economic discrimination at the hands of automobile insurance companies
will occur unless the record of his conviction and license revocation is expunged.
Arnold’s reliance on
Sibron
is misplaced.
Sibron
turned on the fact that
legal
collateral consequences were involved. Here the possibility of any adverse
legal
consequences is precluded by the fact that Arnold had been found not guilty by the state court. It is, of course, true that Arnold may be called upon to state that he was once convicted. However, that he may have to answer a question in a certain way, and then qualify the answer with an explanation of his subsequent acquittal, is not a
legal collateral consequence.
Legal collateral consequences as used in
Sibron
relate to consequences “imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.” 392 U.S. at 57, 88 S.Ct. at 1900. However, Arnold has already successfully challenged his conviction in the state courts.
Arnold next relies on
Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), for supporting his argument that his cause is not moot. In
Bradford,
a prisoner claimed that a state was obligated to provide him certain procedural rights in considering his eligibility for parole. Before the case was argued before the Court, the prisoner received a complete release and thus had no further interest in the controverted state procedures. As in the present case, the party seeking to avoid mootness relied on the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine.
The Court, applying the test of
Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), noted that, in the absence of a certified class, this doctrine is “limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.”
Bradford, supra,
423 U.S. at 149, 96 S.Ct. at 349. Neither element is found in Arnold’s case.
It is true that Arnold’s license was suspended for less than three months. However, the shortness of the period was due to the fact that Arnold was eventually cleared. A full one-year revocation would provide enough time to'litigate this issue.
See Le-Roy, supra.
Furthermore, where the driver is never cleared, and thus the conviction remains, the “collateral consequences,” which Arnold lacks, would still be present.
Nor is there a reasonable expectation that Arnold will again be subject to the alleged unconstitutional statutory procedure. Arnold would have to be again arrested for drunken driving, and he has provided no evidence that such an event is likely to happen. Arnold’s case does not escape mootness by falling within this exception.
Arnold next argues that even if moot as to him, the case is not moot as to the other members of his class. Since Arnold’s claim became moot prior to certification of the class, dismissal of the complaint was required.
Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 399, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). Arnold argues that an exception should be made here, since the time period involved was so short that certification would always be precluded.
See Sosna, supra,
419 U.S. at 402 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 559. However, the full-year suspension, not to mention any later collateral effects, would provide sufficient time for a member of the class to file suit and seek certification.
Arnold’s second claim, raised in his supplemental complaint, that his conviction was unconstitutional because of the state court judge’s refusal to decide the constitutionality issue, has also been mooted by his subsequent acquittal.
See Costerelli v. Massachusetts,
421 U.S. 193, 196, 95 S.Ct. 1534, 44 L.Ed.2d 76 (1975).
Accordingly, we hold, upon careful consideration of all the briefs and submissions, and after oral argument, that dismissal of the complaint as moot was correct. The district court decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.