Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 1 of 26
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 15-11384 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00163-CAR
JOHN ANTHONY ESPOSITO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________
(June 23, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, TJOFLAT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 2 of 26
In this capital case, John Esposito appeals the district court’s denial of his
federal habeas petition. Esposito was sentenced to death in Georgia following his
conviction for the murder of Lola Davis. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal
and collateral proceedings in Georgia state courts, Esposito filed a federal habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia,
which the district court denied. Esposito appeals the denial of his petition on three
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he contends that his trial counsel
were ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence that he was less
culpable than his codefendant, Alicia Woodward. Second, he contends that his
trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate and present in the penalty
phase of his trial mitigation evidence about his childhood abuse and history of
mental illness. Third, he contends that his trial counsel were ineffective in making
their closing argument in the penalty phase.
After a thorough review of the briefing and the record, and with the benefit
of oral argument, we affirm the denial of Esposito’s petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Esposito was convicted in Georgia of malice murder. A jury recommended
a death sentence, and the trial court accepted the recommendation. Below we
describe the events that led to Esposito’s conviction and sentence, as well as
evidence, as relevant here, presented at his state habeas proceedings.
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A. Factual Background
Esposito and his girlfriend, Alicia Woodward, abducted Davis, an elderly
woman, from a grocery store parking lot in North Carolina.1 Woodward
approached Davis in the parking lot and convinced Davis to give her a ride.
Woodward directed Davis to drive to a nearby location, where Esposito was
waiting. Esposito entered Davis’s car and forced her to move to the passenger
seat. With Woodward driving, Esposito took $1,000 and a checkbook from
Davis’s purse. Esposito and Woodward drove her to a local bank, where they
forced her to cash a check for $300. They then drove her to a remote location,
where Esposito led her into a hayfield, forced her to kneel, and beat her to death
with a tree limb. After Davis’s murder, Esposito and Woodward drove to
Alabama, where they disposed of Davis’s car and purse. When they ran out of
money, they abducted an elderly couple in Oklahoma, robbed them, and
bludgeoned them to death with a tire iron. Esposito v. State, 538 S.E.2d 55, 57
(Ga. 2000).
Esposito and Woodward were arrested in Colorado. Id. at 57–58. Esposito
gave two confessions to law enforcement. He made his first confession to FBI
agents on the day of his arrest. During the 45-minute interview, Esposito admitted
1 The facts come from the evidence adduced at trial, which was summarized by the Georgia Supreme Court in Esposito v. State, 538 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. 2000) (affirming Esposito’s conviction and death sentence on direct appeal). 3 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 4 of 26
that he forced Davis to get out of the car and kneel on the ground. He confessed to
hitting her several times with a tree limb. He also admitted to murdering the
Oklahoma couple, recounting that the murder “wasn’t too bad” because he “didn’t
get any brains on [his] face or anything.” Doc. 13-13 at 58.2 He told FBI agents
that after he bludgeoned the wife, she had brain matter on her face and one of her
eyes was coming out of her head.
A few days later, Esposito gave a more detailed confession in a videotaped
interview with a Georgia Bureau of Investigations agent. He again admitted to
murdering Davis. He confessed that he hit Davis with a tree limb and kicked her
with his shoe.
B. Motion to Suppress
Esposito was indicted in Georgia for Davis’s murder. The trial court
appointed two criminal defense attorneys, Roy Robinson Kelly III and W. Dan
Roberts, to represent him.
Before trial, Esposito’s counsel sought to suppress both of his confessions.
The trial court concluded that the first confession would be admissible in evidence
at trial. The court suppressed the second, videotaped confession, however, after
2 Citations in the form “Doc. #” refer to entries on the district court’s docket. Documents from the state habeas proceedings have been electronically filed; this opinion cites to the electronically-generated page numbers located on the top margin of each page. 4 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 5 of 26
determining that it violated Esposito’s Miranda 3 rights. In response, the state
argued that the videotaped confession nevertheless could be used for impeachment
or rebuttal purposes. After ruling that the illegally obtained confession could be
introduced only if Esposito testified, the court clarified that the state could use it
for impeachment or rebuttal purposes.
C. Trial
1. Guilt/innocence phase
At the guilt/innocence phase of Esposito’s trial, the state presented evidence
that Esposito and Woodward abducted Davis, stole from her, and drove her to a
remote area, where Esposito brutally murdered her. FBI Agent Ron Knight
testified that when he interviewed Esposito after the arrest, Esposito told him that
the murders were “all [him]. [Woodward] didn’t do anything.” Doc. 14-15 at 49.
Esposito admitted to kidnapping Davis from a grocery store parking lot, and when
Knight asked what happened next, Esposito responded “I killed her.” Id. at 53.
Esposito confessed to hitting Davis with a tree limb. During the interview,
Esposito told Knight, “I don’t have any remorse [about the murder]. I don’t have a
conscience.” Id. at 56. The state did not introduce into evidence the videotaped
confession.
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 5 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 6 of 26
A crime scene specialist testified that Davis’s car contained fingerprints,
palm prints, and footprints matching those belonging to Esposito and Woodward.
Also, a cigarette butt found in the car contained DNA that was consistent with
Esposito’s DNA. The state submitted photographs showing that a tree limb was
found at the murder site, and hair was found on the limb. A forensic analyst
testified that one branch contained 63 hairs that matched Davis’s hair. The tree
limb was never tested for DNA evidence.
The jury also heard testimony from the doctor who performed Davis’s
autopsy. The doctor testified that Davis died of blunt force trauma. He testified
that he could not be sure what type of object caused the trauma, but Davis’s
injuries were consistent with being hit by an item with bark on it, so it was possible
that a tree limb was the murder weapon.
The jury heard that Woodward was larger physically than Esposito:
Esposito weighed about 160 pounds and Woodward weighed about 180 pounds.
The jury learned, too, that Woodward: (1) booked and paid for their hotel rooms
during their crime spree, (2) drove Davis’s car, and (3) was the first to approach
Davis in the grocery store parking lot.
The state rested. The defense rested without calling any witnesses. In
closing argument, Esposito’s counsel emphasized that the tree limb had never been
tested for the presence of DNA.
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The jury found Esposito guilty of murdering Davis.
2. Penalty phase
At the penalty phase, the state introduced evidence about the murder of the
Oklahoma couple. The jury heard that Esposito had confessed to murdering the
couple and beating the wife until her brain matter appeared on the side of her face
and her eye popped out of her head.
Esposito called seven witnesses in mitigation. These witnesses testified
about Esposito’s disposition, background, and mental capacity. Specifically, the
jury heard from: the chief jailer for the Jasper County jail, who testified that
Esposito was a “model inmate” who “never caused any problems” while he was in
jail pending trial; Esposito’s high school teacher, who testified that Esposito was a
“follower” who had a “totally dysfunctional” and “aggressive” mother; Esposito’s
aunt, who recounted that Esposito was physically, verbally, and sexually abused as
a child; and Esposito’s General Education Development (GED) instructor, who
testified that Esposito was “very intelligent,” “high functioning” in academics, and
a “follower” who did not “initiate things by himself.” Docs. 14-20 at 72; 14-21 at
80–81; 14-23 at 46, 48. Two witnesses—a psychiatric nurse and therapist at a state
psychiatric hospital—testified that they were not convinced that Esposito was the
killer.
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Esposito’s final mitigation witness was Dr. Daniel Grant, a psychologist
who had examined Esposito, interviewed him, administered tests to him, and
reviewed his medical records. In contrast to the GED instructor’s testimony that
Esposito was “very intelligent,” Grant opined that Esposito had average to slightly
below average intelligence and a simplistic, naïve view of the world. Esposito
lacked confidence and was not good at making decisions. According to Grant,
Esposito was “passive, submissive, dependent[,] and self-conscious.” Doc. 14-24
at 24. Grant explained that Esposito had a history of five or six prior suicide
attempts and had engaged in self-mutilation. He also testified that Esposito had
“extreme reactivity and sensitivity.” Id. at 25. He noted that Esposito had reported
that he was sexually abused as a child and had, at one point, been forced to
perform oral sex on his stepfather.
The state successfully used cross-examination to bring out unfavorable
evidence about Esposito. The jury heard that: Esposito’s mother obtained a
restraining order against him, he had been involved in devil worship, he was placed
in a psychiatric facility after he assaulted and threatened to kill his family, he was
kicked out of a GED program after he threated to “kill . . . everybody,” and he
tortured animals and wrote letters about killing and raping. Doc. 14-23 at 50.
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In closing argument, the state emphasized the aggravating circumstances
that warranted the death penalty.4 Esposito’s counsel gave a brief closing
argument—filling just over four pages of transcript—in which he stated that “there
is no question that [Esposito] has . . . lots of problems,” complimented the
prosecutor, and noted that the “most popular thing” for the jury to do would be to
sentence Esposito to death. Doc. 14-25 at 2–3.
The jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death. The judge adopted
the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death sentence.
D. Direct Appeal and State Habeas Proceedings
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Esposito’s conviction and death
sentence on direct appeal. See Esposito, 538 S.E.2d at 60. Esposito then initiated
state habeas proceedings. In his counseled state habeas petition, he argued that his
trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective in failing to: (1) develop and present
evidence suggesting that Woodward, not Esposito, was the killer; (2) develop and
present in the penalty phase evidence about Esposito’s abuse as a child and his
mental illness; and (3) make an adequate closing argument during the penalty
phase.
4 The aggravating circumstances were that: (1) the murder was committed in the course of an armed robbery, (2) the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping with bodily injury, and (3) the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile because Davis was disfigured by the beating. 9 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 10 of 26
The state habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Esposito’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. At the hearing, Esposito’s habeas counsel
presented testimony from several witnesses, including Kelly and Roberts, the
investigator who worked on Esposito’s trial, and Esposito’s ex-girlfriend.
Kelly and Roberts testified about their legal experience and detailed their
investigation and preparation for Esposito’s capital trial. They both had worked on
multiple capital cases before Esposito’s trial, and they previously had worked
together on a death penalty case. In preparing for Esposito’s trial, they realized it
was likely that he would be found guilty; thus, their goal was to help him avoid the
death penalty.
Kelly testified that he and Roberts hired an investigator, Hector Guevara, to
do the investigation into possible mitigating evidence for the penalty phase.
During his investigation, Guevara regularly met with Kelly and Roberts. All three
visited Esposito, whom Guevara questioned about his background, on multiple
occasions. Guevara provided Kelly and Roberts with a list of more than 80 people
he had interviewed. Among those interviewed were Esposito’s family members,
friends, teachers, coaches, counselors, psychiatrists, social workers, and army
recruiters. Guevara also interviewed people who knew about Woodward’s past,
including her former employers, friends, and family members. Guevara provided
Kelly and Roberts with written reports summarizing his findings.
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Trial counsel testified that they were aware that Esposito had mental health
issues and obtained his mental health records as part of their trial preparation.
They also consulted a DNA expert to assist them in cross-examining the state’s
forensic expert. Kelly explained that part of their trial strategy was to show that no
evidence—other than the confession—connected Esposito to the murder weapon
because the state failed to gather DNA evidence from the tree limb.
Dr. Jonathan Arden, a forensic pathologist, testified that he reviewed Davis’s
autopsy report, photographs of the autopsy, and crime scene photographs. Arden
opined that the shape of her injuries indicated that she had been struck with a man-
made object, not a tree limb. When asked if it were possible that Davis was
murdered with a tree limb, Arden responded that he did not know because “almost
anything in the world is possible.” Doc. 17-9 at 42.
Courtney Veach, Esposito’s ex-girlfriend, testified that she witnessed
firsthand the abuse inflicted on Esposito by his mother. She testified that he had
bruises on his body from his mother’s beatings. She further testified that his
mother engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior. For instance, she would have
loud sex when Veach and Esposito were in her home, and she tried to get them to
have sex there. Veach testified that Esposito told her that when he was younger his
mother made him watch her have sex with different men. Veach recounted that
she was supposed to testify at Esposito’s trial. Guevara was supposed to meet her
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at the airport; however, they could not find each other there. When she finally
arrived at the courthouse, defense counsel told her that they would not call her as a
witness because they did not have time to prepare her to testify.
Besides the testimony described above, Esposito presented the habeas court
with affidavits from other potential fact witnesses. Esposito’s kindergarten and
fourth grade teachers swore that they would have testified at trial about the abuse
inflicted on him by his mother and stepfather. Both teachers would have testified
that, when Esposito was in the fourth grade, he reported to school employees that
he was molested by a man while walking to school. Esposito’s stepfather, Wayne
Deese, swore by affidavit that Esposito would occasionally “shake uncontrollably
and beat his head on the floor,” and to make him stop his mother would stick his
head under the faucet. Doc. 17-21 at 77. Deese’s sister, Cynthia Massari,
submitted an affidavit attesting that when Esposito was three years old, his mother
threw him against the wall and threatened to punch him after he spilled his milk.
Lastly, Esposito submitted affidavits from witnesses who would have
testified about Woodward’s violent tendencies and her negative influence on him.
Those witnesses included Heather Bryan, Woodward’s ex-girlfriend, who
described Woodward as possessive and violent and recounted a time when
Woodward threatened her with a butcher knife; Robert Noble III, Woodward’s ex-
boyfriend, who said Woodward stalked him and tried to run him over with a car;
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and Patricia Holliman, Esposito’s former landlord, who swore that before he met
Woodward, Esposito was quiet, responsible, and attended church regularly, but
after he met Woodward, “[e]verything changed,” and he stopped going to church
and would disappear for days at a time. Doc. 17-22 at 29.
The state habeas court denied Esposito’s petition. The Georgia Supreme
Court denied Esposito’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the
state habeas court’s order.
E. Federal Habeas Proceedings
After he had exhausted his state appeals, Esposito filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court, raising the same ineffective assistance of
counsel claims he raised in state court. The district court denied Esposito’s
petition but granted him a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on two issues: first,
whether trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence
to support the defense theory that Esposito was less culpable than Woodward; and
second, whether trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate and present
in the penalty phase mitigating evidence of his childhood abuse and mental illness.
We expanded Esposito’s COA to include his claim that his trial counsel were
ineffective in presenting penalty phase closing argument.
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“When reviewing a district court’s grant or denial of habeas relief, we
review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings
of fact for clear error.” Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 717 F.3d 886, 899
(11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). When we review state habeas
court decisions in federal habeas, we “look through” unreasoned decisions of state
appellate courts and presume that they adopted the reasoning of the last related
state court decision, unless the state shows that the appellate court relied, or most
likely relied, on different grounds. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Here, because the Georgia Supreme Court’s denial was a summary one, we review
the state habeas court’s decision.
When a state court denies habeas relief on the merits, we review that
decision under the standards set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–03 (2000).
Generally, AEDPA bars federal courts from granting habeas relief to a petitioner
on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s
adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
14 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 15 of 26
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “‘[C]learly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is
the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the
time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72
(2003). With respect to § 2254(d)(2), “[s]tate court fact-findings are entitled to a
presumption of correctness unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear
and convincing evidence.” Conner v. GDCP Warden, 784 F.3d 752, 761 (11th Cir.
2015).
“Where we have determined that a state court decision is an unreasonable
application of federal law under [] § 2254(d), we are unconstrained by § 2254’s
deference and must undertake a de novo review of the record.” McGahee v. Ala.
Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of trial counsel in his criminal proceedings. 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984). Counsel renders ineffective assistance, warranting vacatur of a
conviction or sentence, when his performance falls “below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” taking into account prevailing professional norms, and when the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense, meaning that “there is a reasonable
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probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 688, 694. A “reasonable
probability” of a different outcome is “a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. The petitioner bears the burden of proving
his ineffective assistance claim, and he must meet his burden on both Strickland
prongs—performance and prejudice—to succeed. Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d 778,
789 (11th Cir. 2010). We “need not address the performance prong if the
defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa.” Holladay v. Haley,
209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). When analyzing
a claim of ineffective assistance under § 2254(d), this Court’s review is “doubly”
deferential on counsel’s performance. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, under § 2254(d), “the question is
not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is
any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”
Id.
We now turn to Esposito’s individual ineffective assistance claims. 5
5 We note at the outset that Esposito contends that the state habeas court applied the wrong prejudice standard in rejecting his ineffective assistance claims. He argues that the court required him not only to meet the Strickland prejudice standard but also to show that the “result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Supp. Appellant’s Br. at 14 (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)); see Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (holding in Part IV that Lockhart did not modify or supplant the Strickland standard). We disagree. Despite arguably having suggested initially that Esposito had to clear an additional hurdle to show
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A. Failure to Investigate and Present Evidence of Relative Culpability
Esposito first contends that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to
investigate and present evidence about his culpability in the murder relative to
Woodward’s. He explains that counsel’s defense strategy was to cast doubt on his
culpability by highlighting Woodward’s potential culpability. Namely, counsel
intended to show that Woodward was “the driving force behind the crimes and
may well have committed the murders,” while Esposito was a follower who was
coerced into committing the crimes. Appellant’s Br. at 13. He argues that counsel
were deficient in pursuing this strategy at trial because they failed to:
(1) investigate and present forensic evidence suggesting that the tree limb was not
the murder weapon, which would have cast doubt on his confession that he, not
Woodward, killed Davis, and (2) properly investigate and present evidence of
Woodward’s background and character.
The state habeas court rejected these arguments, concluding that Esposito’s
counsel’s performance was not unconstitutionally deficient because they
adequately investigated Woodward’s role and elicited testimony about her relative
culpability at trial. The court further concluded that even if counsel’s performance
prejudice, a review of the court’s order shows that it never actually applied the heightened prejudice standard. Throughout its order, the court explained that Esposito was required to show a “reasonable probability” that, absent his counsel’s deficiencies, the “outcome of [his] trial” would have been different. Doc. 27-39 at 29, 35, 42. Thus, the court applied the correct prejudice standard from Strickland. 17 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 18 of 26
were deficient, there was no reasonable probability that additional evidence
regarding Woodward’s culpability would have affected the outcome of the trial.
We consider these arguments in turn.
1. Failure to investigate or present forensic evidence to undermine Esposito’s confession
Esposito argues that his counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate
and present forensic evidence casting doubt on whether the tree limb was the
murder weapon. First, we must review counsel’s performance under AEDPA
deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under § 2254(d)(1), the state habeas
court’s rejection of Esposito’s deficient performance contention was neither
contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Id. Defense
counsel retained a DNA expert in preparation for trial, cross-examined the state’s
forensic expert about the state’s failure to test the tree limb for DNA evidence, and
emphasized the lack of DNA evidence in closing argument. Esposito argues that
they should have hired an expert to opine that Davis’s injuries were caused not by
a tree limb, but by a man-made object—as Arden did at the evidentiary hearing on
Esposito’s state habeas petition. But the mere fact that counsel called no such
expert does not mean their performance had to have been deficient. Counsel
instead focused on attacking the state’s forensic evidence or lack of it by retaining
an expert to prepare them to challenge the state’s evidence, including through
cross-examination of its witnesses. They then reinforced their points in closing 18 Case: 15-11384 Date Filed: 06/23/2020 Page: 19 of 26
argument. Counsel were permitted to make the strategic decision not to call an
expert and instead challenge the state’s forensic evidence through other means, and
we cannot now second guess that strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690
(“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .”); Conklin v. Schofield,
366 F.3d 1191, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Which witnesses, if any, to call, and when
to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that [this Court]
will seldom, if ever, second guess.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any
event, counsel were not required to pursue every forensic theory “until it [bore]
fruit.” Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 402 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
But even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Esposito’s argument still
fails because he cannot show he was prejudiced by that deficiency. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. We see no reasonable probability that additional forensic
evidence about the murder weapon would have led to a different result. Even if the
jury had heard expert testimony that a man-made object could have caused Davis’s
injuries, it would be obliged to weigh that evidence against contradictory evidence
suggesting that Davis was murdered with the tree limb. See Johnson v. Alabama,
256 F.3d 1156, 1172 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “federal courts must defer to
the judgment of the jury in assigning credibility to the witnesses and in weighing
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the evidence”). This evidence included Knight’s testimony that Esposito confessed
during a post-arrest interview to having murdered Davis with a tree limb, the
state’s forensic analyst’s testimony that Davis’s hairs were found on the tree limb,
and the autopsy doctor’s testimony that her injuries were consistent with being hit
by an item with bark on it. Indeed, Arden could not rule out the possibility that a
tree limb caused Davis’s injuries. And uncontradicted evidence—including
footprints, palm prints, fingerprints, and a cigarette butt—placed Esposito at the
murder scene. Given this strong evidence of guilt, there is no reasonable
probability that additional forensic evidence would have made a difference in the
outcome of Esposito’s trial. See Fortenberry v. Haley, 297 F.3d 1213, 1228 (11th
Cir. 2002) (the failure to present exculpatory evidence is more likely to be
prejudicial when the conviction is based on little evidence of guilt). Accordingly,
Esposito cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s failure to present the testimony
of a forensic expert.
2. Deficient investigation and presentation of evidence related to Woodward’s background and character
Next, Esposito asserts that his counsel were deficient for failing to discover
and present evidence showing that Woodward had a dominating and aggressive
personality and was physically larger than Esposito—all of which would have
supported their theory that she coerced Esposito to commit the murders. He points
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to the affidavits he presented in his habeas proceedings indicating that while he
was a follower, Woodward was domineering, possessive, and violent.
The state habeas court reasonably applied Strickland in concluding that
Esposito failed to show that trial counsel conducted a deficient investigation into
Woodward’s background. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688. The record shows that Kelly and Roberts hired Guevara, who investigated
Woodward’s past by speaking with her friends, family, and employers. He also
interviewed Esposito’s friends and family about her. The fact that Guevara could
have discovered other witnesses who knew Woodward is not enough to establish
that counsel’s investigation was deficient. See Solomon, 735 F.2d at 402.
Esposito also contends that his counsel’s presentation of evidence related to
Woodward’s culpability was deficient. He argues that they made only minimal
efforts to present evidence that Woodward was more culpable due to their concern
about opening the door for the state to use his videotaped confession as rebuttal
evidence. He argues that counsel’s efforts to avoid admission of the videotaped
confession in rebuttal were unreasonable because the confession was inadmissible
for that purpose.
Esposito is correct that the videotaped confession would have been
inadmissible for rebuttal purposes because the confession was obtained in violation
of his Miranda rights. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S 307 (1990) (recognizing that
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an illegally obtained confession may be introduced only for purposes of
impeaching the defendant and not for rebutting defense witness testimony). But
even assuming that counsel’s mistaken belief about the admissibility of the
confession rendered their representation deficient, Esposito has failed to show that
he was prejudiced by that deficiency. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. He cannot
show prejudice because the jury did, in fact, hear evidence that highlighted
Woodward’s relative culpability in the crime. For instance, the jury heard that
Woodward was larger physically than Esposito, approached Davis initially, drove
Davis to the murder site, and booked and paid for their hotel rooms during the
crime spree. And for what it’s worth, the jury heard from witnesses (Esposito’s
psychiatric nurse and therapist) who were unconvinced that Esposito—and not
Woodward—murdered Davis. In short, because the jury heard testimony about
Woodward’s physical dominance and leadership role in the crime, we cannot say it
was reasonably probable that any additional evidence of that nature would have
made a difference in the outcome of the trial. See id. This is particularly so given
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, including his confession to Knight. See
United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding, in a
direct appeal, that the defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to
call additional witnesses because the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming).
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Esposito therefore failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s presentation
of evidence related to Woodward’s culpability.
B. Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence
Esposito next argues that his counsel were ineffective for failing to properly
investigate and present in the penalty phase of his trial mitigation evidence that
may have convinced the jury not to recommend a death sentence. He explains that
counsel should have discovered and presented testimony from additional witnesses
who could have corroborated his claims of physical, verbal, and sexual abuse while
he was a child, as well as the psychological damage inflicted by that abuse. He
contends that had the jury received an accurate picture of his abuse and mental
illness, there was a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted
to impose a sentence less than death, resulting in a recommended sentence of life
imprisonment. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31(c). In rejecting this claim, the state
habeas court concluded that Esposito’s trial counsel’s investigation and
presentation of the evidence were adequate, and their failure to uncover every
potential witness did not render their representation deficient.
Esposito has failed to show that the state habeas court’s denial of this claim
was an unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The
record shows that, in preparation for the mitigation portion of the trial, counsel
hired an investigator, Guevara, who conducted an extensive investigation into
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Esposito’s background by interviewing over 80 witnesses, including his family
members, friends, teachers, psychiatrists, and social workers. Guevara presented
his findings from these interviews to counsel in thorough written reports that
detailed Esposito’s childhood abuse and psychological issues. Given this extensive
investigation, it was reasonable for the state habeas court to conclude that counsel
were not deficient in investigating potential mitigation evidence for the penalty
Nor was it unreasonable for the state court to conclude that there was no
deficiency in counsel’s presentation of the mitigation evidence. Counsel were
permitted to make strategic decisions about which witnesses to call. See Conklin,
366 F.3d at 1204. The witnesses counsel called in mitigation described the
physical and sexual abuse Esposito suffered, as well as his attendant psychological
issues. Esposito contends that it was unreasonable for counsel not to call Veach,
but we disagree. Although counsel had intended to call Veach and planned to pick
her up at the airport, the plan went awry when she could not be found, and as a
result she arrived at the courthouse at the end of the penalty phase. By then,
counsel had no time to prepare her to testify. At that point, counsel’s decision not
to call her as a witness was not unreasonable. That counsel may have been able to
avoid the mishap with more careful planning and execution does not make their
performance deficient under Strickland.
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Counsel’s decisions to call certain witnesses but not others were made after
a thorough investigation into Esposito’s childhood abuse and mental illness.
Esposito thus has failed to show that the state habeas court’s rejection of this claim
was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
C. Inadequate Closing Argument in Penalty Phase
Lastly, Esposito argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
during the penalty phase because his counsel’s brief closing argument was
inadequate. He explains that the closing argument failed to reference the
mitigating circumstances in evidence and “gave jurors no cogent basis on which to
impose a sentence less than death.” Appellant’s Br. at 70. The state habeas court
summarily rejected this claim.
Esposito has failed to show that there was no reasonable basis for the state
habeas court to reject this claim. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98 (“Where a state
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s
burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state
court to deny relief.”). Even if counsel’s closing argument was deficient, Esposito
has not shown that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. See id. Esposito asserts
that he was prejudiced by the inadequate closing argument because it “was the
culmination of counsel’s many failures up to that point and independently
harmful.” Appellant’s Br. at 73. This cumulative prejudice argument fails for the
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same reason as his other claim of ineffective assistance in the penalty phase—that
is, counsel’s performance in investigating and presenting evidence in mitigation
was not deficient under Strickland. Esposito advances no argument explaining
how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s closing argument alone. Accordingly, he
is entitled to no relief on this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the district court’s denial of Esposito’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.