John Allen Crosthwait v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 16, 2010
Docket02-09-00377-CR
StatusPublished

This text of John Allen Crosthwait v. State (John Allen Crosthwait v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
John Allen Crosthwait v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

02-09-375 THRU 278-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 02-09-00375-CR
          02-09-00376-CR
          02-09-00377-CR
          02-09-00378-CR

JOHN ALLEN CROSTHWAIT

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

STATE

------------

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]

I.  Introduction

          In two points, Appellant John Allen Crosthwait appeals his convictions and punishment for possession of child pornography and possession with intent to promote child pornography.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.26(a), (e) (Vernon 2003).  We affirm.

II.  Factual and Procedural History

          A tip from America Online (AOL) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children about an image of child pornography being transmitted from a Texas-based AOL account eventually led to a jury finding Crosthwait guilty of three counts of possession of child pornography and five counts of possession of child pornography with intent to distribute.[2]  The jury assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement for each possession conviction and twenty years’ confinement for each possession-with-intent-to-distribute conviction.  The trial court sentenced him accordingly, setting the ten-year sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the twenty-year sentences, which run concurrently with each other.  This appeal followed.

III.  Challenge to Facial Unconstitutionality

          In his first point, Crosthwait argues that penal code section 43.26 is facially unconstitutional because it is vague and overbroad, constituting a violation of the First Amendment.  However, he acknowledges that he did not challenge the facial constitutionality of the child pornography statute at trial.  Contending that the court of criminal appeals’s statement in Karenev v. State, that “a defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute,” is dicta, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), he claims that he may now raise this challenge for the first time on appeal.  See id.

We disagree.  In Karenev, the majority expressly addressed the question of “whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the harassment statute may be raised for the first time on appeal” and expressly answered the question, “We hold that it may not.”  Id. at 429.  And in a more recent case, the court cited to Karenev for this proposition.  See, e.g., Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Karenev for the proposition that “defendant may not raise for first time on appeal a facial challenge to constitutionality of a statute” and re-emphasizing rule by observing that Estrada failed to preserve his facial constitutional challenges for review).  Because we are bound by court of criminal appeals precedent, we conclude that Crosthwait failed to preserve his first point for our review.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; State v. Stevenson, 993 S.W.2d 857, 867 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (“Because a decision of the court of criminal appeals is binding precedent, we are compelled to comply with its dictates.”); see also Gonzales v. State, 190 S.W.3d 125, 130 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (“[A]s an intermediate appellate court, we must follow the binding precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1000 (2006).  We overrule Crosthwait’s first point.

IV.  Punishment Evidence

          In his second point, Crosthwait complains that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence depicting bestiality during the punishment phase of his trial because the degree of unfair prejudice of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.  Crosthwait argues that the bestiality evidence had no probative value, that it was inflammatory and inherently prejudicial, that it served to distract the jurors from the proper issue—punishment for his child pornography-related convictions—and that presenting evidence on actions unrelated to the charged offense was a waste of time.  See Tex. R. Evid. 403.

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Related

Kotteakos v. United States
328 U.S. 750 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Solomon v. State
49 S.W.3d 356 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2001)
King v. State
953 S.W.2d 266 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Karenev v. State
281 S.W.3d 428 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Gonzales v. State
190 S.W.3d 125 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Coggeshall v. State
961 S.W.2d 639 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
State v. Stevenson
993 S.W.2d 857 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Motilla v. State
78 S.W.3d 352 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Estrada v. State
313 S.W.3d 274 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Johnson v. State
967 S.W.2d 410 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
John Allen Crosthwait v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/john-allen-crosthwait-v-state-texapp-2010.