Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-10564 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-81260-WPD
JOHN A. TOTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PETER ANTONACCI, In individual and official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 7, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 2 of 8
John Toth, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
dismissal of his amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, various Florida statutes, and the Florida Constitution. We agree with
the district court that Toth’s amended complaint is an impermissible shotgun
pleading that must be dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 and 10. As a result, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Toth’s federal claims and remand with instructions to dismiss his state
claims without prejudice.
I.
In his amended complaint, 1 Toth asserts that the defendants—a group that
includes the judge who presided over his state criminal case, two assistant state
attorneys in Palm Beach County, five deputies in the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s
Office, a Palm Beach County fire investigator, and Toth’s criminal defense
attorney—acted “alone or in combination” with each other to violate his rights in
the course of Toth’s state prosecution for burglary, arson, and obstructing the
extinguishment of a fire. Although he does not separate his amended complaint by
defendant or cause of action, Toth seems to allege: (1) the deputies covered up
1 The magistrate judge struck Toth’s original complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 and ordered him to file an amended complaint with “a short and plain statement of a claim, a basis for federal jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.”
2 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 3 of 8
exculpatory evidence and coerced Toth into making a self-incriminating statement,
which was then used to “deceive” a magistrate judge into issuing a warrant for
Toth’s arrest; (2) the fire investigator “fraudulently concealed” an evidentiary
report; (3) Toth’s attorney took only four depositions, negotiated—and then
possibly retracted—a plea deal without Toth’s knowledge, and failed to move to
suppress evidence despite Toth’s urging; and (4) the judge knew, or should have
known, about the unconstitutional actions of the other defendants. Toth seeks
$855,000 in damages.
A month after Toth filed his amended complaint, the magistrate judge
assigned to the case issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending
the district court dismiss Toth’s case with prejudice. The magistrate judge stated
that his review of the complaint was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A,
which together instruct the district court to conduct an initial screening of all
complaints “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.” § 1915A(a); see § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The magistrate judge first recommended dismissal of the amended complaint as a
“quintessential shotgun pleading” in that it is “virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Although the
magistrate judge said the amended complaint was “subject to dismissal on that
basis alone,” he proceeded to analyze Toth’s federal claims on the merits pursuant
3 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 4 of 8
to § 1915(e)(2)(B) and found they failed as a matter of law. The magistrate judge
also found, in the alternative, that Toth’s claims against the deputies were barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), which prevents
prisoners from asserting claims under § 1983 “if the adjudication of the civil action
in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply that his conviction or sentence was
invalid unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.” Morrow v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 610 F.3d 1271,
1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364). Toth
objected to the R&R and, following de novo review, the district court adopted the
R&R in whole.
II.
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on grounds of shotgun
pleading for an abuse of discretion. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291,
1294 (11th Cir. 2018); see Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358
(11th Cir. 2018). Although we hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys, we may not “rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,
1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted); see Arrington v. Green, 757
F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished).
4 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 5 of 8
III.
A so-called “shotgun pleading” is a complaint that violates Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b), or both. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s
Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Although we have sometimes used
“shotgun pleading” to refer to any “poorly drafted complaint,” we have recently set
forth some guardrails that cabin our ability to dismiss complaints on these grounds.
See id. at 1321–23 (setting forth the four types of shotgun pleadings). Shotgun
pleadings violate Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement” requirement by failing
“to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests.” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1294–95 (citing Weiland,
792 F.3d at 1323). In addition, they typically run afoul of Rule 10(b)’s
requirement that allegations should be set forth in numbered paragraphs and
discrete claims should be separated by count. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. The
district court’s “inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt
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Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-10564 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-81260-WPD
JOHN A. TOTH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PETER ANTONACCI, In individual and official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 7, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 2 of 8
John Toth, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
dismissal of his amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, various Florida statutes, and the Florida Constitution. We agree with
the district court that Toth’s amended complaint is an impermissible shotgun
pleading that must be dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 and 10. As a result, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Toth’s federal claims and remand with instructions to dismiss his state
claims without prejudice.
I.
In his amended complaint, 1 Toth asserts that the defendants—a group that
includes the judge who presided over his state criminal case, two assistant state
attorneys in Palm Beach County, five deputies in the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s
Office, a Palm Beach County fire investigator, and Toth’s criminal defense
attorney—acted “alone or in combination” with each other to violate his rights in
the course of Toth’s state prosecution for burglary, arson, and obstructing the
extinguishment of a fire. Although he does not separate his amended complaint by
defendant or cause of action, Toth seems to allege: (1) the deputies covered up
1 The magistrate judge struck Toth’s original complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 and ordered him to file an amended complaint with “a short and plain statement of a claim, a basis for federal jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.”
2 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 3 of 8
exculpatory evidence and coerced Toth into making a self-incriminating statement,
which was then used to “deceive” a magistrate judge into issuing a warrant for
Toth’s arrest; (2) the fire investigator “fraudulently concealed” an evidentiary
report; (3) Toth’s attorney took only four depositions, negotiated—and then
possibly retracted—a plea deal without Toth’s knowledge, and failed to move to
suppress evidence despite Toth’s urging; and (4) the judge knew, or should have
known, about the unconstitutional actions of the other defendants. Toth seeks
$855,000 in damages.
A month after Toth filed his amended complaint, the magistrate judge
assigned to the case issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending
the district court dismiss Toth’s case with prejudice. The magistrate judge stated
that his review of the complaint was based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A,
which together instruct the district court to conduct an initial screening of all
complaints “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.” § 1915A(a); see § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The magistrate judge first recommended dismissal of the amended complaint as a
“quintessential shotgun pleading” in that it is “virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Although the
magistrate judge said the amended complaint was “subject to dismissal on that
basis alone,” he proceeded to analyze Toth’s federal claims on the merits pursuant
3 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 4 of 8
to § 1915(e)(2)(B) and found they failed as a matter of law. The magistrate judge
also found, in the alternative, that Toth’s claims against the deputies were barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), which prevents
prisoners from asserting claims under § 1983 “if the adjudication of the civil action
in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply that his conviction or sentence was
invalid unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.” Morrow v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 610 F.3d 1271,
1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364). Toth
objected to the R&R and, following de novo review, the district court adopted the
R&R in whole.
II.
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on grounds of shotgun
pleading for an abuse of discretion. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291,
1294 (11th Cir. 2018); see Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358
(11th Cir. 2018). Although we hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys, we may not “rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,
1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted); see Arrington v. Green, 757
F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished).
4 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 5 of 8
III.
A so-called “shotgun pleading” is a complaint that violates Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b), or both. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s
Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Although we have sometimes used
“shotgun pleading” to refer to any “poorly drafted complaint,” we have recently set
forth some guardrails that cabin our ability to dismiss complaints on these grounds.
See id. at 1321–23 (setting forth the four types of shotgun pleadings). Shotgun
pleadings violate Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement” requirement by failing
“to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds
upon which each claim rests.” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1294–95 (citing Weiland,
792 F.3d at 1323). In addition, they typically run afoul of Rule 10(b)’s
requirement that allegations should be set forth in numbered paragraphs and
discrete claims should be separated by count. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320. The
district court’s “inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt
resolution of lawsuits . . . includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on shotgun
pleading grounds.” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295 (quotation marks omitted). “In
the special circumstance of non-merits dismissals on shotgun pleading grounds, we
have required district courts to sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy
such deficiencies.” Id.
5 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 6 of 8
We agree with the district court that Toth’s amended complaint is an
impermissible shotgun pleading. The amended complaint combines two of our
categories of shotgun pleadings: it is “replete with conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; and it
does not separate “each cause of action or claim for relief” into a different count.
See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322–23. Although the amended complaint enumerates
the legal rights of which Toth was allegedly deprived and which principles each
defendant allegedly violated, it does not separate his claims by cause of action,
draw any clear lines between the legal and factual bases for his claims, or set forth
the elements of any of his claims. Given these numerous problems, we agree the
defendants “could not reasonably be expected to frame a responsive pleading.”
Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358. The complaint thus warrants dismissal.
We will also not give Toth another chance to amend his complaint. At the
time the district court dismissed his amended complaint, Toth was on notice that
his pleadings were infirm. The magistrate judge struck Toth’s original complaint
for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 but, as required under our precedent,
gave Toth leave to replead. See Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295 (stating that, upon
striking shotgun pleading, the district court must “instruct counsel to replead the
case” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Walters v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
743 F. App’x 401, 402 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (remanding
6 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 7 of 8
case so pro se plaintiff could replead). The magistrate judge instructed Toth to
“separate all claims based upon differing sets of circumstances” and “provid[e] a
short and plain statement of [his] claim[s]” in an amended complaint. The
magistrate judge also gave Toth a form § 1983 complaint and instructed him to use
it. While Toth’s amended complaint is considerably shorter than his original
complaint, he did not follow any of the magistrate judge’s instructions. Toth’s
“halfhearted[]” attempt to cure the defects in his original complaint is not enough
to bring him into compliance with Rules 8 and 10. See Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358–
59. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his amended
complaint.
Toth’s appeal does not challenge the dismissal of his complaint on shotgun
pleading grounds. Instead, his appellate brief rehashes his merits arguments in the
form of five questions to our court. Because we agree it was proper for the district
court to dismiss Toth’s amended complaint on shotgun pleading grounds, we need
not reach any of the merits issues in this case.
IV.
When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, a district court should
typically dismiss the pendent state claims as well. See United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966). “Although it is
possible for the district court to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
7 Case: 19-10564 Date Filed: 10/07/2019 Page: 8 of 8
these [pendent] claims, if the district court instead chooses to dismiss the state law
claims, it usually should do so without prejudice as to refiling in state court.” Vibe
Micro, 878 F.3d at 1296 (citation omitted).
The district court’s dismissal of Toth’s amended complaint did not analyze
the merits of Toth’s claims under Florida statutory or constitutional law. 2
Nevertheless, the district court dismissed Toth’s entire complaint with prejudice.
In such a circumstance, we have found it necessary to have the district court
clarify, to the extent an impermissible shotgun pleading contains state claims that
were not subject to merits analysis, “the dismissal should have been without
prejudice as to refiling in state court.” Id. at 1296–97. This clarification is needed
here.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Toth’s
amended complaint for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10. We affirm the
dismissal with prejudice of Toth’s claims arising under federal law. We remand
the case to the district court for the limited purpose of clarifying that the dismissal
of his state claims is without prejudice as to refiling in state court.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.
2 Although the magistrate judge’s R&R contains a section entitled “State Claims of False Arrest/Malicious Prosecution,” this section only reaches Toth’s federal claims under § 1983.