Johanna Immelt v. Dee Sharp

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2023
• Docket: 22-35249
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHANNA M. IMMELT, No. 22-35249

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05617-BHS

v. MEMORANDUM* DEE SHARP, in her official capacity as Program Director; TAMBRA MCCOWAN, in her official capacity as Professional Licensing Manager,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING REAL ESTATE APPRAISER PROGRAM,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 21, 2023**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Johanna Immelt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

in her action alleging due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo, see, e.g., Holz v. Nenana City Public School Dist.,

347 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to the individual state

officials. Any claims against the officials, sued in their official capacities and

seeking money damages, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst

State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984).

Any claims against the officials, sued in their official capacities and seeking

prospective injunctive relief, were also barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

because Immelt did not establish that the state regulations at issue were

unconstitutional, or otherwise conflicted with federal authority. Id.

The district court properly determined that the officials were entitled to

qualified immunity for any claims against them in their individual capacity,

because Immelt failed to establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (qualified immunity shields state officials from

money damages unless plaintiff shows, among other things, that the official

violated a constitutional right).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Immelt’s motion to

2 reconsider, because Immelt failed to establish any colorable basis for

reconsideration. See, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940, 945 (9th Cir.

2003) (motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered

evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

controlling law; it may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the

first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation).

AFFIRMED.