Johann Alexander Bass v. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02380
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 MDR 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Johann Alexander Bass, No. CV-24-02380-PHX-JAT (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Arizona Motor Vehicle Division, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 Self-represented Plaintiff Johann Alexander Bass, who is proceeding in forma 16 pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was confined in 17 the Greene Correctional Facility in Coxsackie, New York, when he filed this action, but 18 has since been released. In a January 29, 2025 Order, the Court, among other things, 19 dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint because he had failed to state a claim and gave him an 20 opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies the Court identified. 21 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which the Court dismissed because 22 Plaintiff again failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to file a 23 second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in the Order and either pay 24 the balance of the filing fee or file a non-prisoner Application to Proceed in District Court 25 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. 26 Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), an 27 Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 17), and a 28 Request for Service (Doc. 18). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed, waive the 1 balance of the filing fee, dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action, and deny 2 as moot the Request for Service. 3 I. Application to Proceed 4 In his Application to Proceed, Plaintiff indicates he has insufficient funds to pay the 5 balance of the filing fee. The Court, in its discretion, will grant Plaintiff’s Application to 6 Proceed and waive the remaining balance of the filing fee. 7 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 8 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 9 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 10 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 11 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 12 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 13 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 14 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 15 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 16 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 17 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 18 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 19 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 20 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 21 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 22 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 23 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 25 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 26 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 27 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 28 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 1 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 2 must “continue to construe [self-represented litigant’s] filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 3 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a self-represented prisoner] 4 ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. 5 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 6 If the Court determines a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a 7 self-represented litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 8 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 9 III. Second Amended Complaint 10 In his Second Amended Complaint,1 Plaintiff sues two individuals employed by the 11 Arizona Motor Vehicle Division (MVD): Legal Compliance Agent John Doe 1 and Agent 12 John Doe 2 in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages; 13 his filing fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs; and an order directing Defendants to 14 “remove the crime” from Plaintiff’s motor vehicle record. 15 Plaintiff makes the following allegations. After being stopped by the South Dakota 16 Highway Patrol while driving a semi-truck in May 2021, Plaintiff was convicted of having 17 drug metabolites in his system. As a result, the South Dakota Department of Public Safety 18 sent the MVD a “Notice of Withdrawal and an Abstract of Operating Record” stating that 19 Plaintiff “used a motor vehicle to commit a felony.” 20 MVD sent Plaintiff a “Corrective Action Notice” informing him that his 21 Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) “was being withdrawn for using a vehicle to commit 22 a felony.” According to Plaintiff, the “facts and circumstances” of his South Dakota 23 conviction, if committed in Arizona, do not constitute a felony and do not require 24 withdrawal of his CDL because, in Arizona, it is a class-one misdemeanor to drive a 25 commercial motor vehicle with metabolites in one’s blood when not under the influence.2

26 1 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains improperly capitalized words and 27 misplaced or omitted punctuation. The Court, when quoting the Second Amended Complaint, has corrected these without specifically noting them. 28 2 Plaintiff alleges a blood draw indicated he was not “high on drugs, drunk or 1 Plaintiff requested a hearing to contest the withdrawal and received a document that 2 dismissed his request for an administrative hearing because the offense occurred in another 3 jurisdiction. Plaintiff called MVD regarding the dismissal and was told MVD “couldn’t 4 help him.” 5 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant John Doe 1 is responsible for complying 6 with Arizona legal standards and was required to “compare the elements of the South 7 Dakota conviction to Arizona law when making a determination to withdraw Plaintiff’s 8 CDL” to “ensure[] that the out-of-state convictions constitute[] grounds for the 9 withdraw[al] if committed in Arizona.” He contends Defendant John Doe 1 violated his 10 Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by failing to make the comparison before 11 withdrawing Plaintiff’s CDL. Plaintiff asserts this was “not a random and unauthorized 12 act” because Arizona delegated to Defendant John Doe 1 “the authority to deprive Plaintiff 13 of his CDL and the concomitant duty to initiate the comparison of the statutory elements 14 as a procedural safeguard to guard against unlawful deprivations of driver’s licenses and 15 CDLs.” 16 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendant John Doe 2 violated his Fourteenth 17 Amendment due process rights by not providing a post-deprivation administrative hearing 18 to contest the withdrawal of his CDL. He contends Arizona statutorily provides a post- 19 deprivation process. Plaintiff asserts the “deprivation of his CDL without a post- 20 deprivation hearing was not a random and unauthorized act” because Arizona delegated to 21 Defendant John Doe 2 “the authority to conduct . . . required post-deprivation hearings . . . 22 to contest the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s CDL” as a “procedural safeguard to guard against 23 unlawful deprivations of driver’s licenses and CDLs.” He claims that once Plaintiff 24 requested the hearing, Defendant John Doe 2 “had no discretion to deny the administrative 25 hearing provided by Arizona law.” 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28

otherwise impaired at the time of his arrest.” 1 IV. Failure to State a Claim 2 A claim against an individual in his or her official capacity is “only another way of 3 pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of 4 Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her 5 official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s 6 office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t 7 of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). 8 A. Official Capacity Claims 9 Plaintiff cannot maintain a lawsuit for damages against MVD employees in their 10 official capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (“State officers sued for 11 damages in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the suit because they 12 assume the identity of the government that employs them.”); see also Gilbreath v. Cutter 13 Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] state is not a ‘person’ for 14 purposes of section 1983. Likewise[,] ‘arms of the State’ . . . are not ‘persons’ under section 15 1983.”) (citation omitted). 16 Plaintiff may maintain a lawsuit against MVD employees in their official capacity 17 for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. 18 Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff is seeking prospective injunctive 19 relief, but he is not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks—“an order directing the 20 defendants to remove the crime from Plaintiff’s motor vehicle record.” See Miranda v. 21 City of Casa Grande, 15 F.4th 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2021) (“‘A violation of procedural 22 rights requires only a procedural correction, not the reinstatement of a substantive right 23 . . . .’” (quoting Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991))). 24 Even if Plaintiff was entitled to the prospective injunctive relief he seeks, he has 25 failed to state an official capacity claim. “[I]n an official-capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy 26 or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 27 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 39 28 (2010) (the “‘policy or custom’ requirement [in Monell] applies in § 1983 cases 1 irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective.”). A plaintiff must 2 allege, as a matter of law, that the policy or custom caused him to suffer constitutional 3 injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s allegations fail 4 to plausibly show any policy, practice, or custom of any entity resulted in his alleged 5 injuries. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. 6 B. Individual Capacity Claims 7 “It has long been understood that ‘the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation 8 of a driver’s license by the State.’” Miranda, 15 F.4th at 1225 (quoting Dixon v. Love, 431 9 U.S. 105, 112 (1977)). However, the “Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a 10 negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” 11 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Even unauthorized and intentional 12 deprivations of property do not constitute a violation of procedural requirements of the Due 13 Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. Hudson 14 v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The availability of a common-law tort suit against a 15 state employee constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Id. at 534-35. 16 Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his due process rights by violating statutory 17 requirements to properly determine whether he was disqualified from driving a commercial 18 vehicle and provide him with an opportunity to be heard. Their actions were either 19 negligent or unauthorized and intentional. Cf. Miranda, 15 F.4th at 1226-27 (concluding 20 an officer allegedly lying at an administrative hearing contesting a driver’s license 21 suspension was “conduct [that] can only be described as ‘unauthorized’ under Hudson” 22 and “the conclusion that [the officer’s] conduct was unauthorized is, if anything, stronger 23 here than in Hudson itself because [the officer] engaged in alleged wrongdoing 24 notwithstanding the fact that Arizona had put in place various pre-deprivation safeguards 25 for driver’s license suspensions—procedures whose adequacy [the plaintiff] does not 26 challenge here”). And Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy; he can bring 27 28 1 state law claims against Defendants. See id. at 1227.3 The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s 2 individual capacity claims. 3 V. Dismissal without Leave to Amend 4 “Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to 5 dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 6 The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has 7 previously been permitted to amend his complaint. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. 8 United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is 9 one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires granting leave to 10 amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 11 Plaintiff has made multiple efforts at crafting a viable complaint. The Court finds 12 further opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will 13 dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 14 IT IS ORDERED: 15 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees 16 and Costs (Doc. 17) is granted. The remaining balance of the filing fee is waived. 17 (2) The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) is dismissed for failure to state 18 a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 19 accordingly. 20 (3) Plaintiff’s Request for Service (Doc. 18) is denied as moot. 21 . . . . 22 . . . . 23 . . . . 24 . . . . 25

26 3 Plaintiff raised state law claims against Defendants in his original and First Amended Complaints, the Court dismissed them without prejudice, and Plaintiff did not 27 replead them in his Second Amended Complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (claims raised in a prior complaint and voluntarily 28 dismissed or dismissed without prejudice are waived if not alleged in an amended complaint). 1 (4) The docket shall reflect that the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § □□□□□□□□□□ 2| and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), has considered whether an appeal 3 of this decision would be taken in good faith and finds Plaintiff may appeal in forma 4] pauperis. 5 Dated this 13th day of January, 2026. 6

9 James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28