Rel: June 12, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0708 _________________________
Joey M. Parker
v.
Jennifer Parker
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (DR-22-900158)
BOWDEN, Judge.
Joey M. Parker ("the husband") appeals from a judgment entered
by the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the circuit court") that divorced him and
Jennifer Parker ("the wife"), in part, on the grounds of cruelty and
domestic violence and that awarded alimony to the wife, awarded sole CL-2025-0708
legal custody and sole physical custody of the parties' minor children to
the husband -- but did not require the wife to pay child support -- and
divided the parties' marital property. We reverse the judgment to the
extent that it awarded alimony because the judgment does not contain
the express findings of fact required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57.
Because we reverse the alimony award, we also reverse the judgment to
the extent that it divides the parties' marital property because those two
issues are interrelated. We affirm the judgment insofar as it divorced the
parties on fault grounds and did not require the wife to pay child support
or otherwise be financially responsible for the expenses of the parties'
minor children.
Procedural History
On February 4, 2022, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce
from the wife in the circuit court on the bases of incompatibility of
temperament and abuse. On that same date, the husband also filed a
motion for custody of the parties' two minor children and possession of
the martial home. The wife filed an answer to the husband's complaint
and a counterclaim for a divorce on February 7, 2022. In her
counterclaim, the wife alleged that the parties suffered from
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incompatibility of temperament and that the husband had subjected her
to cruelty and acts of domestic violence. On that same date, the wife also
filed a motion for the exclusive possession of the parties' marital home.
On February 16, 2022, the wife filed a motion for pendente lite
spousal support. On October 4, 2022, the circuit court entered an order
reflecting an agreement that the parties had reached. The order stated
that the parties would share joint custody of their minor children;
awarded the husband exclusive possession of the marital home and a
separate condominium; ordered the husband to continue to pay for
marital expenses and for the wife's rent, cell-phone bill, automobile-
insurance premium, and health-insurance premium; ordered the
husband to pay the wife $4,000 per month effective October 1, 2022, until
trial; and ordered the parties to submit to a custodial evaluation with a
counselor.
On October 17, 2023, the wife filed a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement that she averred the parties had reached in September 2023.
She averred that the settlement agreement provided that the parties
would share joint legal custody and joint physical custody of their minor
children. The wife stated that the parties appeared on September 7, 2023,
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for their scheduled depositions and entered the settlement agreement
into the record; however, neither party had signed a copy of the
agreement. The wife stated that counsel for the husband had sent an
email to counsel for the wife that stated that the husband did not intend
to honor the settlement agreement. The wife requested that the
settlement agreement be enforced and incorporated into the final divorce
judgment. The circuit court granted the wife's motion on November 15,
2023, following a hearing.
On November 22, 2023, the husband filed a motion to suspend the
wife's parenting time because of her alleged alcohol abuse, pending the
entry of an order directing that she submit to drug and alcohol testing
and setting forth other protective measures for the minor children. The
motion included an affidavit prepared by Dr. Amy Hollimon Phillippi, a
psychologist, who stated that the husband was concerned about a recent
incident between the wife and one of the children and recommended that
the wife seek inpatient addiction treatment and psychiatric care. On
November 27, 2023, the husband filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the parties' minor children. The circuit court appointed a
guardian ad litem on November 28, 2023.
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On December 7, 2023, the wife filed a motion to require the husband
to pay for her inpatient treatment. The husband filed a response to the
wife's motion on December 8, 2023, in which he argued that the wife's
chosen treatment facility was "opulent" and that she could seek care at
another facility that would be covered by her health insurance. The
husband also requested that the circuit court set aside the order
awarding the parties joint custody and that the circuit court award him
sole legal custody and sole physical custody of the parties' minor children.
On December 18, 2023, the circuit court granted the husband's motion to
suspend the wife's parenting time following a hearing on the same date.
On February 7, 2024, the circuit court entered a temporary order
continuing the suspension of the wife's parenting time because the wife
was in a rehabilitation facility. The circuit court ordered Dr. Phillippi,
Jennifer Starling, who is another counselor, and the guardian ad litem to
coordinate on a graduated parenting plan for the wife following
treatment.
On February 22, 2024, the husband filed a motion to modify the
pendente lite order requiring him to pay the wife $4,000 per month as
well as pay for her rent. On the same date, the husband filed an
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amendment to his motion, but his request remained the same -- that the
circuit court hold a hearing to recalculate the amount of support and
maintenance to be paid to the wife.
On November 20, 2024, the husband filed a motion to suspend the
wife's visitation with the parties' minor children, alleging that the wife
had relapsed since completing her addiction-treatment program. The
husband alleged that it was not in the best interest of the minor children
to be around the wife. On December 26, 2024, the circuit court entered
an order that left the pendente lite suspension of the wife's parenting
time in place. The circuit court stated again that the counselors involved
and the guardian ad litem should coordinate on a graduated parenting
plan for the wife to eventually return to an unsupervised parenting
schedule.
On May 6, 2025, following a trial held on February 5, 2025,
February 6, 2025, and April 2, 2025, the circuit court entered the divorce
judgment, which stated, in pertinent part:
"It is ORDERED:
"1. That the bonds of matrimony previously existing between [the husband] and [the wife] are dissolved and they are forever divorced from each other on the grounds of
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incompatibility of temperament, irreconcilable differences, cruelty, and domestic violence.
"....
"4. That pursuant to an agreement which was read and acknowledged in open court by the Parties, the Husband shall be awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the minor children ....
"6. That the Wife shall not be required to pay child support at this point in time due to her present inability to produce income which would be over and above the amounts required to meet the expectations of the parenting plan and mental health rehabilitation testified by Dr. Phillippi.
This wavier of child support is a deviation from Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration.
"9. That the Husband shall be responsible for all expenses of the minor children.
"10. That the Husband shall pay the Wife, permanent periodic alimony, in the amount of Six Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($6,000.00) per month. The Husband’s alimony obligation shall begin May 1, 2025. This award is not rehabilitative alimony.
"11. That the Husband shall be awarded possession, right, title and interest to [the marital home]. That the Wife shall be awarded possession right, title and interest to the real property located at ... (hereinafter referred to as the 'River House'). The Husband shall make the River House available
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for the Wife within sixty (60) days from the date of the entry of this Final Judgment of Divorce.
"12. That the Court finds the real property located at ... (hereinafter referred to as the 'Cotton Bayou Property') was separate property owned by the Husband, and therefore the Husband shall be awarded all possession, right, title and interest to the Cotton Bayou Property.
"13. That the Wife shall be awarded one-half (1/2) of the value of the Husband’s interest in (i) the real property located at ... (hereinafter referred to as the 'Lulu’s Lot') in the name of Splitting Queens, LLC and (ii) the real property located at ... (hereinafter referred to as the 'Gulf Front Lot') in the name of JPEM, LLC. The Husband shall pay the Wife her portion of the interest within forty-five (45) days of the date of the entry of this Final Judgment of Divorce.
"16. That the Husband shall be responsible for the costs of all the Wife's debts and credit cards existing up to the date of trial.
"17. That the Irrevocable Trust created ... by the Husband with the sale of the Cotton Bayou Property shall be used solely for the benefit of the minor children, and no other purpose.
"19. That the Parties shall equally divide all of their retirement accounts. The Court reserves jurisdiction to issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ('QDRO') in order to divide the Parties' retirement consistent with the provisions herein.
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"20. That the Husband shall pay the Wife's attorney's fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($20,000.00). This payment may include any amounts charged on the Wife's credit cards."
(Capitalization in original.)
On June 3, 2025, the husband filed a postjudgment motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the divorce judgment pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 59.
The wife filed a response to the husband's postjudgment motion and a
motion for an interim award of attorney's fees on July 18, 2025. On
August 5, 2025, following a hearing on July 22, 2025, the circuit court
denied the husband's postjudgment motion and the wife's motion for
attorney's fees. The husband timely appealed.
Standard of Review
"When this court reviews a divorce judgment entered after the presentation of ore tenus evidence, we will presume that the trial court's findings on disputed facts are correct, and we will not reverse its judgment based on those findings unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 386 So. 3d 42, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). The presumption of correctness of factual findings under the ore tenus rule 'is based on the trial court's unique position to observe the witnesses and to assess their demeanor and credibility.' Glazner v. Glazner, 807 So. 2d 555, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)."
Perry v. Perry, [Ms. CL-2025-0409, Jan. 16, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.
Civ. App. 2026). Additionally,
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" ' "[m]atters of property division rest soundly within the trial court's discretion and its determination regarding those matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless its discretion was plainly and palpably abused. Goodwin v. Estate of Goodwin, 632 So. 2d 500 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). A division of marital property in a divorce case does not have to be equal, only equitable, and a determination of what is equitable rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Pride v. Pride, 631 So. 2d 247 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). When dividing marital property, a trial court should consider several factors, including the length of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the future prospects of the parties; the source, type, and value of the property; the standard of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and the fault of the parties contributing to the breakup of the marriage. Hartzell [v. Hartzell, 623 So. 2d 323 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)]." '
"Yokley v. Yokley, 231 So. 3d 355, 360 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (quoting Golden v. Golden, 681 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996))."
Morgan v. Morgan, 322 So. 3d 531, 538 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020).
Analysis
I. Whether the circuit court erred in awarding periodic alimony to the wife without making the statutorily required findings
The husband argues, among other things, that the circuit court did
not make the express findings required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57, in
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the provision of the divorce judgment that awarded the wife periodic
alimony. Section 30-2-57 provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:
"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or her separate estate is insufficient to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) The other party has the ability to supply those means without undue economic hardship.
"(3) The circumstances of the case make it equitable.
"(b) If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a), the court shall award alimony in the following priority:
"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) In cases in which the court expressly finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good- faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith rehabilitation only enables the party to partially acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent
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possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage, the court shall award the party periodic installments of alimony for a duration and an amount to allow the party to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage as provided in subsection (g)."
This court has consistently held that "[t]he legislature has clearly
required that an alimony award be either rehabilitative alimony or
periodic alimony and that, to award either type of alimony, the trial court
must make certain express findings after considering the various factors
described in § 30-2-57 ...." Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2021). That requirement includes making express findings as
to the elements set forth in § 30-2-57(a) "and, if a periodic-alimony award
is to be made, a finding 'that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible,' § 30-
2-57(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975, based upon the trial court's consideration of
the various factors described in § 30-2-57(d) & (f), Ala. Code 1975." Lopez
v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 3d 455, 461 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). When a judgment
of the trial court has lacked the express findings required by § 30-2-57,
we have consistently reversed the judgment and remanded the case. See
Patrick v. Patrick, 419 So. 3d 555, 557 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024); Robinson v.
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Robinson, 422 So. 3d 1121, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 2025); White v. Jones,
397 So. 3d 569, 571 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).
In this case, the provision of the divorce judgment that awarded the
wife alimony stated "[t]hat the Husband shall pay the Wife, permanent
periodic alimony, in the amount of Six Thousand and 00/100 Dollars
($6,000.00) per month. The Husband’s alimony obligation shall begin
May 1, 2025. This award is not rehabilitative alimony." This provision
clearly awarded periodic alimony without an express finding that
rehabilitative alimony would not be feasible. The provision also lacks the
findings required by § 30-2-57(a) -- (1) that the wife lacked a separate
estate or that her separate estate was insufficient to enable her to
preserve, to some extent, the economic status quo of the parties as it
existed during the marriage; (2) that the husband had the ability to
supply alimony without undue economic hardship; and (3) that the
circumstances of the case made it equitable to award alimony. As a
result, the alimony award is due to be reversed, and the cause must be
remanded for the circuit court to make the required findings. This court
cannot properly review the alimony award otherwise. Merrick, 352 So. 3d
at 775.
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Additionally,
"[i]n light of our reversal on the alimony issue, we pretermit any discussion regarding the equity of the marital property award because '[t]he issues of property division and alimony are interrelated, and they must be considered together on appeal.' Turnbo v. Turnbo, 938 So. 2d 425, 430 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). Instead, the trial court is to reconsider the marital- property division in conjunction with any alimony determination."
Lopez, 379 So. 3d at 462. Therefore, the circuit court is directed to
reconsider on remand the division of marital property, including its
award of attorney's fees,1 along with its determination of the alimony
issue, and we pretermit discussion of other issues raised by the husband
on appeal regarding the division of the martial property -- (1) the
propriety of the monetary award to the wife representing half of the
husband's interest in two limited-liability companies; (2) the propriety of
the provision in the divorce judgment related to the enforcement of the
trust; (3) the propriety of the division of the parties' retirement accounts;
(4) the propriety of the attorney's fee award to the wife; (5) the propriety
1See Friend v. Friend, 385 So. 3d 53, 58 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) ("Considering our reversal of the trial court's alimony award and property division in their entirety, the party's financial circumstances are undetermined, and we direct the trial court to further consider the issue of an attorney fee award on remand.")
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of the division of the wife's debts; (6) the overall weight of the evidence to
support the circuit court's property-division awards; and (7) his argument
concerning the successor judge's denial of his postjudgment motion.2
II. Whether the circuit court erred in granting a divorce on fault grounds
The husband argues that the circuit court's entry of a divorce based
on fault grounds is due to be reversed because the judgment lacks any
express findings of fact. He further argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the entry of a fault-based divorce. As to the
husband's first point, he cites no statute or caselaw requiring the circuit
court to make express findings of fact in entering a judgment based on
fault grounds. As a result, this portion of his argument is waived.
See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.3
2We note that the husband did not raise any concerns under Ala. R.
Civ. P. 63 before the circuit court. Indeed, at the hearing on the husband's postjudgment motion, counsel for the husband requested that the successor judge rule on the motion without raising any issue concerning Rule 63. Rule 63 provides that a successor judge may proceed "upon certifying familiarity with the record and determining that the proceedings in the case may be completed without prejudice."
3We have previously held:
" ' "Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of 15 CL-2025-0708
As to the husband's argument that the evidence was insufficient to
support the entry of a fault-based divorce, we disagree that the circuit
court could not have reasonably found that the evidence was sufficient.
"A divorce will be granted to either party to the marriage when the other
has committed actual violence on his or her person, attended with danger
to life or health, or when, from his or her conduct, there is reasonable
apprehension of such violence." Atkins v. Atkins, 268 Ala. 428, 429, 108
facts and relevant legal authorities that support the party's position. If they do not, the arguments are waived. Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 849 So. 2d 914, 923 (Ala. 2002); Arrington v. Mathis, 929 So. 2d 468, 470 n. 2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460, 486 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). 'This is so, because " 'it is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument.' " ' Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 20 (Ala.2003), quoting in turn Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994))." '
"Braden Furniture Co. v. Union State Bank, 109 So. 3d 625, 630-31 (Ala. 2012) (quoting White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008))."
Hooks v. Pettaway, 142 So. 3d 1151, 1157-58 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). 16 CL-2025-0708
So. 2d 166, 167 (1959). We have found evidence to be sufficient to support
a trial court's entry of divorce based on cruelty when the spouse against
whom cruelty was alleged assaulted the complaining spouse to the extent
of leaving bruises and admitted to spanking the complaining spouse.
Sanders v. Sanders, 55 Ala. App. 72, 74, 313 So. 2d 194, 195 (1975).
In this case, the record contains evidence from which the circuit
court could have determined that the parties' relationship involved
physical altercations and abusive conduct. Critically, the circuit court
heard ore tenus testimony on this issue, which means that it was in the
best position to assess credibility and make necessary findings of fact
supporting its judgment on this point. The wife testified that the husband
was physically violent during the marriage beginning in 2015. She
alleged that he would come home drunk during the night, drag her from
bed, and spank her. She testified that, on Memorial Day in 2018, the
husband pushed her, causing her to fall and break her arm. The wife also
testified that the husband struck her and broke her nose on another
occasion. She also testified that the husband put battery acid on her
genitals. The wife further testified that, the night before the husband
filed for a divorce, he came home drunk, slammed her into a cabinet,
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threw her on the floor, and kicked her. The record does contain conflicting
testimony as to instances of violence between the parties. Although the
husband now alleges that the only evidence of violence was on the part of
the wife, that is not the case. To the extent that there was evidence
indicating that the parties both initiated physical altercations and
instances of violence, the circuit court was in the best position to assess
and weigh that evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the circuit court
exceeded its discretion in granting the parties a divorce based, in part,
on cruelty.
III. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering the husband to pay all expenses for the minor children and declining to order the wife to pay child support
The husband argues that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in
failing to require the wife to pay child support or otherwise contribute to
the expenses of the minor children, which, he argues, was contrary to the
best interest of the children. In support of his argument, the husband
cites only Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 32(C)(1), which provides, in pertinent part,
that "[t]he court may use its discretion in determining child support in
circumstances where combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
uppermost levels of the [child-support] schedule." He cites to no other
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authority to support the actual crux of his argument; therefore, the
argument is waived. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; note 3, supra.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment to the extent that
it divorced the parties on fault grounds and ordered the husband to pay
all the expenses for the minor children and declined to order the wife to
pay child support. We reverse the judgment to the extent that it awarded
alimony and divided the parties' marital property, and we remand the
cause to the circuit court to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.