Joelson v. United States

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 9, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-01568
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAXWELL JOELSON, and JUAN Case No.: 20-CV-1568 TWR (KSC) VALDEZ, on behalf of all others similarly 12 situated, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, RECONSIDERATION 14 v. 15 (ECF No. 17)

16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 17 Defendant. 18

19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs Maxwell Joelson and Juan Valdez’s Motion 20 for Reconsideration Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) on the D[ismissal] of Plaintiffs’ 21 Second Amended Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 17). Plaintiffs noticed the Motion to be 22 heard on January 10, 2022, without calling chambers to obtain a hearing date as required 23 under this District’s Local Rules and the undersigned’s Standing Order for Civil Cases. 24 Nonetheless, because this was action was dismissed prior to being served, the Court 25 determines that this matter is suitable for determination on the papers without oral 26 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons discussed below, the 27 Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion. 1 BACKGROUND 2 On August 13, 2020, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a putative class action 3 against Defendant United States of America and numerous federal judges and prosecutors. 4 (See generally “Compl.,” ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs asserted nineteen causes of action under 5 the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2674, and the Alien Tort 6 Claims Act (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, alleging misconduct in the post-trial and habeas 7 process by the named federal judges and prosecutors. Id. 8 On November 3, 2020, the Court issued an Order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to 9 Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (“Order,” ECF No. 6.) In the Order, the Court screened the 10 Complaint sua sponte, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Order at 2–8.) The Court 11 found that Plaintiffs’ claims were predicated on the actions of federal prosecutors and 12 judges, who were absolutely immune from liability. (Id. at 5–7.) The Court further found 13 that a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs would necessarily imply the invalidity of their 14 convictions or sentences, which had not been reversed, expunged, or invalidated, and 15 therefore Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Id. 16 at 7–8.) The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint. (Id. at 8.) 17 After filing a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12), Plaintiffs then filed a Second 18 Amended Complaint on August 26, 2021. (ECF No. 14.) Although Plaintiffs did not 19 request or receive leave to amend the First Amended Complaint, on November 12, 2021, 20 the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which the Court then dismissed with prejudice 22 on the same grounds as the original Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See 23 ECF No. 15.) The Clerk entered judgment accordingly, (see ECF No. 16), and the instant 24 Motion timely followed on November 30, 2021. (See generally ECF No. 17.) 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 District courts “may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, 27 order, or proceeding” under limited circumstances, such as where there exists “newly 1 Civ. P. 60(b). “The law in this circuit is that errors of law are cognizable under Rule 60(b).” 2 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Gila River 3 Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1966)). In the Southern District 4 of California, a party may apply for reconsideration “[w]henever any motion or any 5 application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any judge and has 6 been refused in whole or in part.” Civ. Local R. 7.1(i)(1). Under the Civil Local Rules, 7 the moving party must file for reconsideration within twenty-eight days after entry of the 8 ruling and provide an affidavit setting forth, among other things, “new or different facts 9 and circumstances” which previously did not exist at the time the previous motion was 10 filed. Id. 11 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 12 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 13 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Courts “should generally leave a previous decision 14 undisturbed absent a showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest 15 injustice.” Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) 16 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). A party 17 seeking reconsideration may not raise new arguments or present new evidence if it could 18 have reasonably raised them earlier. Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890 (citing 389 Orange St. 19 Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). Ultimately, whether to grant or 20 deny a motion for reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court. Navajo 21 Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 22 883). 23 ANALYSIS 24 Contending that the Court “misapplied and misapprehended federal law,” (see Mot. 25 at 1), Plaintiffs raise the following arguments for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal 26 of their Second Amended Complaint: (1) Even if the Court lacks jurisdiction over 27 Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages, the Court may entertain Plaintiffs’ requests for 1 tort claims, (see id. at 3–4); (2) Judicial and prosecutorial immunity should not apply in 2 Plaintiffs’ case because the federal judges and prosecutors exceeded their authority under 3 the United States, California, and Alaska Constitutions, (see id. at 4–7); (3) The 4 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) should apply to 5 Plaintiffs’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, (see Mot. at 7–10); and (4) The 6 Heck doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs’ causes of action for declaratory, injunctive, or 7 mandamus relief, (see Mot. at 10–12), and is not applicable to Plaintiffs’ claims for 8 damages related to procedural defects. (See id. at 12–14.) The Court addresses each in 9 turn. 10 First, “[t]he judicial or quasi-judicial immunity available to federal officers is not 11 limited to immunity from damages, but extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and 12 other equitable relief.” See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 13 (9th Cir. 1987). All of Plaintiffs’ federal claims are therefore subject to dismissal. See, 14 e.g., Lucore v. Bowie, No. 12-CV-1288 BEN WVG, 2012 WL 5863248, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 15 Nov. 16, 2012) (dismissing with prejudice claims for declaratory and injunctive relief 16 against federal judicial officer (citing Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1394)). As for Plaintiffs’ state 17 law claims, “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [state 18 law] claim[s] . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 19 jurisdiction[.]” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court determined that Plaintiffs’ 20 federal cases of action were subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the 21 Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any surviving state law causes of 22 action. See, e.g., Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district 23 court’s dismissal of surviving state law claims where the federal claims had been 24 dismissed). 25 Second, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was 26 in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject 27 to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mullis, 828 F.2d 1 356–57 (1978)). There is no indication that the judges and prosecutors here acted “in the 2 clear absence of all jurisdiction[;]” consequently, the Court does not have the discretion to 3 allow Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed in light of Plaintiffs’ argument that “prosecutorial 4 immunity should be the exception to the rule due to the rare and exceptional circumstances 5 surrounding the Plaintiffs’ judicial reviews.” (See Mot. at 4.) 6 Third, Plaintiffs cite no authority to support their proposition that “AEDPA’s 7 provisions should not only apply to the plaintiffs’ habeas process[,] but also to their Rule 8 []60(b)’s, §[ ]2241’s, and declaratory and mandamus relief requests,” nor do they explain 9 why the application of AEDPA would compel reconsideration of the Court’s prior 10 dismissal. (See Mot. at 8.) 11 Fourth and finally, Heck bars Plaintiffs’ claims “(absent prior invalidation)—no 12 matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s 13 suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that 14 action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” See 15 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (emphasis in original). As to Plaintiffs’ first 16 contention, then, Heck applies not only to Plaintiffs’ damages claims, but also to their 17 claims for equitable relief. See id. at 82–83. Regarding their second argument, Heck does 18 employ “a bright-line rule” to determine whether or not an action is barred, (cf. Mot. at 12), 19 and that line is whether success on Plaintiffs’ causes of action would necessarily 20 demonstrate the invalidity of their confinement or its duration. Here, Plaintiffs “seek[] to 21 relitigate issues already decided against [them] in the[ir] habeas proceeding[s], and thus to 22 challenge [their] underlying conviction[s].” See Moran v. Beale, No. SACV0701057- 23 MMM-RNBX, 2008 WL 11409861, at *6 n.31 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2008). Heck therefore 24 bars Plaintiffs claims.1 25

26 1 Even if Heck did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs claims are still doomed by judicial and prosecutorial 27 immunity. Further, because Plaintiffs essentially “attempt to litigate . . . successive habeas petition[s,]” dismissal is warranted on grounds of claim preclusions and under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 1 Because none of Plaintiffs’ arguments for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(6) have 2 ||merit, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for 5 || Reconsideration (ECF No. 17). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 ||Dated: December 9, 2021 [5 14 bre 9 Honorable Todd WwW. Robinson United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28