Joel Guillen v. City of Chula Vista, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: October 24, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01555
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOEL GUILLEN, Case No.: 25-cv-1555-RSH-MMP

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 14 CITY OF CHULA VISTA, et al., PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR 15 Defendants. ALTERNATIVELY FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 16

17 [ECF No. 8] 18 19 20 Before the Court is a motion to dismiss or alternatively for a more definite statement 21 filed by defendants City of Chula Vista (“City”) and Chula Vista Police Department officer 22 Federico Dominguez (“Dominguez”) (collectively “Defendants”). ECF No. 8. Pursuant to 23 Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the motion presented appropriate for resolution 24 without oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part 25 Defendants’ motion. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 28 The instant civil rights action arises from Plaintiff’s arrest in connection with 1 criminal proceedings brought against his brother. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 2 (ECF No. 7, “FAC”) alleges as follows. 3 1. Arrest of Plaintiff’s Brother 4 On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff’s brother, Daniel Guillen (“Daniel”), was arrested on 5 charges of assault, corporal injury to spouse, and spousal rape. FAC ¶ 22. The charges 6 stemmed from incidents that occurred in May 2023 and October 2023 between Daniel and 7 his wife, Y.G. Id. Defendant Dominguez served as the lead detective in this investigation. 8 Id. ¶ 32. 9 2. Telephone Calls 10 According to the FAC, after being placed in custody, Daniel called Plaintiff multiple 11 times and pressured him to reach out to Y.G. and persuade her to “drop the charges.” Id. 12 ¶¶ 26, 28–29. Plaintiff alleges Daniel told him to “act emotional,” suggested that he 13 personally appeal to Y.G. or ask other family members to convince her not to testify, and 14 instructed Plaintiff to take Y.G. to Tijuana if she would not recant her story. Id. ¶¶ 28, 41. 15 Plaintiff further alleges Daniel told him to “keep tabs” on Y.G., but that he refused to do 16 so. Id. ¶ 41. According to the FAC, Daniel also called Y.G. asking her to help get him out 17 of jail. Id. ¶ 40. The FAC alleges defendant Dominguez wrote a report indicating that Y.G. 18 agreed to try to help Daniel. Id. 19 3. January 29, 2024 Preliminary Hearing 20 On January 29, 2024, a preliminary hearing was held in Daniel’s case. Id. ¶ 30. 21 Plaintiff alleges that he picked Y.G. up and drove her to the courthouse. Id. According to 22 Plaintiff, Y.G. told him that she had been served with a criminal subpoena and he responded 23 that she should tell the truth regardless of whether this was helpful to his brother. Id. 24 During the preliminary hearing, Plaintiff sat with Y.G. in full view of attorneys and 25 police investigators, including defendant Dominguez. Id. ¶ 31. When Y.G. was called to 26 the stand, she invoked the marital privilege and refused to testify. Id. ¶ 33. Consequently, 27 the state court judge ordered her to speak to an attorney from the Office of the Alternate 28 Public Defender (“APD”) and a victim advocate from the District Attorney’s Office. Id. 1 Plaintiff was present in the public hallway with Y.G. as she waited for the attorney 2 and victim advocate. Id. The victim advocate spoke to Y.G. while Plaintiff was sitting 3 nearby. Id. ¶ 34. An attorney from the APD’s Office also approached Y.G. in the hallway 4 to speak with her. Id. ¶ 35. When the attorney asked Plaintiff to step away so that he could 5 speak with Y.G. privately, Plaintiff alleges that he did so without argument. Id. 6 The preliminary hearing then resumed with Y.G. now being represented by an 7 attorney from the APD’s Office. Id. ¶ 36. A victim advocate from the District Attorney’s 8 Office was seated next to Y.G. Id. Y.G. continued to invoke the marital privilege. Id. 9 The court recessed to allow counsel from the APD’s Office an additional opportunity 10 to confer with Y.G. Id. When proceedings resumed, Y.G. was eventually held in contempt 11 for refusing to respond to any further questions and ordered to return for contempt 12 proceedings. Id. She was also directed to meet with the District Attorney’s victim advocate 13 for additional counseling. Id.1 14 At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the court found sufficient evidence to 15 support the charges against Daniel. Id. ¶ 37. An information was filed against him on 16 January 30, 2024. Id. 17 4. February 2, 2024 Contempt Hearing 18 On February 2, 2024, Y.G. and an attorney from the APD’s Office appeared for her 19 contempt hearing. Id. ¶ 38. Y.G.’s counsel informed the court that her position remained 20 unchanged. Id. The court ordered Y.G. to return for the jury trial in Daniel’s case, but 21 declined to impose any sanctions. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was not present at these contempt 22 proceedings. Id. 23 /// 24 /// 25

26 27 1 Y.G. later had meetings with both the victim advocate and the prosecutor. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges he was not present at these meetings and made no attempts to prevent Y.G. 28 1 5. Criminal Charges against Plaintiff 2 According to the FAC, on March 7, 2024, defendant Dominguez obtained recordings 3 of the phone calls Daniel had made to Plaintiff and Y.G. Id. ¶ 39. Dominguez subsequently 4 signed a criminal complaint averring that Plaintiff had committed two separate violations 5 of California Penal Code section 136.1(b)(2) for attempting to dissuade a victim of a crime 6 from “[c]ausing a complaint, indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be 7 sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof” during two time periods: 8 (1) May 27, 2023 to January 16, 2024 (Count I); and (2) January 17, 2024 and March 26, 9 2024 (Count II). Id. ¶¶ 44–46. 10 On March 27, 2024, defendant Dominguez submitted an affidavit in support of 11 Plaintiff’s arrest, asserting that Plaintiff, at his brother’s direction, had prevented Y.G. from 12 testifying at the January 29, 2024 preliminary hearing. Id. ¶ 54. According to Plaintiff, the 13 affidavit contained multiple material misrepresentations, including that: Plaintiff had 14 discouraged Y.G. from testifying at the January 29, 2024 preliminary hearing and sent Y.G. 15 a text message demanding that she “drop the criminal charges.” Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 79. Plaintiff 16 alleges Dominguez also omitted several key facts in the affidavit, including that: Plaintiff 17 has told his brother he would not be following his instructions during one of the recorded 18 phone calls; that Plaintiff’s brother had told him to take Y.G. to Tijuana before the January 19 29, 2024 preliminary hearing and that Plaintiff had drove her to the hearing instead; and 20 that Y.G. had met with the D.A.’s Office victim advocate and her own attorney and 21 continued to refuse to testify at her own contempt hearing even without Plaintiff being 22 present. Id. ¶ 79. A warrant was issued thereafter for Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. ¶ 57. 23 6. Plaintiff’s Arrest and Preliminary Hearing 24 On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff was arrested at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San 25 Diego in the presence of his commanding officers and fellow Marine recruits. Id. On April 26 15, 2024, Plaintiff appeared at his arraignment and was denied bail. Id. Plaintiff alleges 27 that his court-appointed attorney was then informed that if Daniel pleaded guilty, any 28 charges against Plaintiff would be dismissed. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff remained in custody until 1 his preliminary hearing concluded on July 10, 2024. Id. ¶ 60. According to the FAC, the 2 state court dismissed the case against Plaintiff for lack of evidence. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. 3 B. Procedural Background 4 On June 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant action. ECF No. 1. On July 29, 2025, 5 Plaintiff filed his FAC, the operative pleading in this case. ECF No. 7. The FAC asserts 6 three causes of action against defendant Dominguez under 35 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious 7 prosecution, judicial deception, and unlawful seizure. FAC ¶¶ 65–91. The FAC 8 additionally asserts a cause of action for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 against 9 both Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 92–100. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 12 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 13 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 14 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 15 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 16 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[T]he non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ 17 and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim 18 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 19 The plausibility review is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 20 on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 21 Pleading facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of a 22 plausible entitlement to relief. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “[W]here the 23 well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 24 misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled 25 to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). A court “accept[s] factual 26 allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable 27 to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 28 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal 1 conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation 2 marks omitted). 3 B. Motion for a More Definite Statement under Rule 12(e) 4 Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading 5 to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the 6 party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “A Rule 12(e) motion 7 is considered in light of Rule 8’s liberal pleading standards.” Jercich v. Cnty. of Merced, 8 No. 1:06CV00232 OWWDLB, 2006 WL 3747184, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006); see 9 Advanced Hair Restoration LLC v. Bosley Inc., No. C23-1031-KKE, 2024 WL 4544930, 10 at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 22, 2024); Levy v. FCI Lender Servs., Inc., No. 18CV2725- 11 GPC(WVG), 2019 WL 6877596, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019). Rule 8 requires “a short 12 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 13 8(a)(2). 14 “In assessing a motion under Rule 12(e), a court considers whether the complaint 15 provides the defendant with a sufficient basis to frame a responsive pleading.” Levy, 2019 16 WL 6877596, at *10. “A motion for a more definite statement attacks the unintelligibility 17 of the complaint, not simply the mere lack of detail.” Hirschorn v. Kia Am., Inc., No. 24- 18 CV-1483-DMS-DDL, 2024 WL 5036656, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted); Media.net Advert. FZ-LLC v. NetSeer, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 20 1052, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Rule 12(e) motions are ordinarily restricted to situations 21 where a pleading suffers from unintelligibility rather than want of detail.”) (internal 22 quotation marks omitted). “Although motions for a more definite statement are viewed 23 with disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading requirements of the 24 Federal Rules, they are proper when a party is unable to determine how to frame a response 25 to the issues raised[.]” Hirschorn, 2024 WL 5036656, at *1 (internal quotation marks and 26 citations omitted). 27 /// 28 /// 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 A. Section 1983 Claims 3 Plaintiff asserts three § 1983 claims against defendant Dominguez for malicious 4 prosecution, judicial deception, and unlawful seizure. FAC ¶¶ 65–91. Defendants move to 5 dismiss all three causes of action for failure to state a claim and on qualified immunity 6 grounds. ECF No. 8-1 at 14–28, 30–32.2 The Court addresses these arguments, in turn, 7 below. 8 1. General 9 “The Civil Rights Act codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against 10 state officials who deprive a plaintiff of [his] federal constitutional rights.” Sinclair v. City 11 of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2023). “Section 1983 does not create any substantive 12 rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental 13 officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “To prove a case under 14 section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred ‘under color of 15 state law’ and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal 16 statutory right.” Id. 17 2. Judicial Deception (Claim 2) 18 In Claim 2 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges defendant Dominguez submitted an affidavit 19 in support of Plaintiff’s arrest containing multiple misrepresentations and omissions, which 20 the state court judge then relied upon in finding probable cause. FAC ¶¶ 77–85. Id.3 21 Defendants move to dismiss this claim, contending: (1) a judicial deception claim based on 22 the Fourteenth Amendment is improper under these facts; (2) Plaintiff has failed to 23 sufficiently allege defendant Dominguez made any misrepresentations or omissions 24

25 2 All citations to electronic case filing (“ECF”) entries refer to the ECF-generated page 26 numbers. 27 3 As Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against defendant Dominguez depend in large part on the affidavit used to secure his arrest warrant, the Court considers Plaintiff’s judicial 28 1 deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) even if the affidavit were 2 corrected, there would still be a substantial basis for the state court judge to have concluded 3 that probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest. ECF No. 8-1 at 19–25. 4 a. Fourteenth Amendment 5 Defendants first contend Plaintiff’s judicial deception claim should be dismissed to 6 the extent it is based upon a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 8-1 at 21. 7 The Court agrees. Here, Plaintiff’s judicial deception claim stems from his arrest, which 8 he alleges was unsupported by probable cause. This claim is more properly brought as an 9 alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 10 U.S. 357, 367 (2017) (“If the complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial 11 detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right allegedly infringed lies in the 12 Fourth Amendment.”). In contrast, a judicial deception claim brought under the Fourteenth 13 Amendment generally arises in child custody proceedings, as such proceedings invoke the 14 Fourteenth Amendment’s right to familial association. See David v. Kaulukukui, 38 F.4th 15 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[A]s part of the [Fourteenth Amendment] right 16 to familial association, parents and children have a right to be free from judicial deception 17 in child custody proceedings and removal orders.”). 18 b. Failure to State a Claim 19 Defendants next contend Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the elements of a 20 judicial deception claim. ECF No. 8-1 at 21–23. 21 “To be valid, a warrant for either search or arrest ‘must be supported by an affidavit 22 establishing probable cause.’” Morse v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 116CV00142DADSKO, 23 2017 WL 2958733, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2017) (quoting United States v. Stanert, 762 24 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1985)). “An officer effectively usurps a magistrate’s—or, in this 25 case, a state court judge’s—duty to conduct an independent evaluation of probable cause 26 where he provides ‘an incomplete and misleading recitation of the facts[.]’” Manko v. Cnty. 27 of Los Angeles, No. 2:23-CV-10709-MRA-SK, 2025 WL 1421910, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28 31, 2025) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017)). 1 “To maintain a false arrest claim for judicial deception, a plaintiff must show that 2 the officer who applied for the arrest warrant ‘deliberately or recklessly made false 3 statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable cause.’” Smith v. 4 Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 5 (9th Cir. 2004)); see Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2021) 6 (“To successfully allege a violation of the constitutional right to be free from judicial 7 deception, [a plaintiff] must make out a claim that includes (1) a misrepresentation or 8 omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth, that was (3) 9 material to the judicial decision.”). 10 As detailed above, here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Dominguez made multiple 11 misrepresentations and omissions in his affidavit in support of Plaintiff’s arrest. FAC ¶¶ 12 54–55, 79. Plaintiff also adequately alleges that Dominguez acted deliberately or with 13 reckless disregard for the truth. According to Plaintiff, Dominguez knowingly disregarded 14 the lack of evidence supporting Plaintiff’s arrest when signing his affidavit, doing so in 15 order to exert pressure on Plaintiff’s brother. Id. ¶¶ 94, 97. 16 Finally, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the misrepresentations and omissions 17 Dominguez made were material. “To determine the materiality of omitted facts, [courts] 18 consider whether the affidavit, once corrected and supplemented, establishes probable 19 cause. If probable cause remains after amendment, then no constitutional error has 20 occurred.” Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal 21 quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, at the pleading stage, the misrepresentations 22 and omissions Plaintiff alleges Dominguez made are the type a court would have deemed 23 material. For example, Plaintiff alleges Dominguez omitted that Plaintiff had told Daniel 24 in a recorded phone conversation he would not follow Daniel’s instructions—an omission 25 that, if included—would have undermined probable cause. See Perkins, 850 F.3d at 1117– 26 18 (“[A]n affiant can mislead a magistrate [b]y reporting less than the total story, [thereby] 27 . . . manipulat[ing] the inferences a magistrate will draw.”) (internal quotation marks 28 omitted). 1 Defendants respond Plaintiff’s allegations lack factual support. ECF No. 8-1 at 23. 2 At this early stage, however, “the record does not allow for consideration of all relevant 3 evidence.” Wheeler v. Broggi, No. C19-1410-JCC-MAT, 2020 WL 5350641, at *10 (W.D. 4 Wash. Feb. 11, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. C19-1410-JCC, 2020 WL 5 2111249 (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2020); see Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 6 1999) (“[D]efendant filed a motion to dismiss, not a summary judgment motion. We must 7 regard all the allegations in [plaintiff]’s complaint as true. Through that lens, the complaint 8 withstands a motion to dismiss.”); Baier v. City of San Diego, No. 24-CV-00893-AJB- 9 VET, 2025 WL 674575, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (“While the parties do not dispute 10 that probable cause is a defense to all of Plaintiff’s claim, the Court notes that determination 11 of this issue requires a fact-specific inquiry that is generally premature at the pleading 12 state.”); Ball v. City of Scottsdale, No. CV 19-05815-PHX-SPL (DMF), 2021 WL 13 2459844, at *9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2021) (“At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court must 14 accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, and, as alleged, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which 15 relief may be granted for judicial deception against Defendant[.]”).4 16 At this stage of the proceedings, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s allegations are 17 sufficient to state a claim for judicial deception against defendant Dominguez. Kastis v. 18

19 4 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument the state court’s eventual dismissal of his case 20 precludes Defendants from relitigating whether there was probable cause for his arrest. 21 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, “the mere fact a prosecution was unsuccessful does not mean it was not supported by probable cause.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 22 1189 (9th Cir. 1995); see Manuel, 580 U.S. at 368–69 (“Legal process did not expunge 23 [plaintiff]’s Fourth Amendment claim because the process he received failed to establish what that Amendment makes essential for pretrial detention—probable cause to believe he 24 committed a crime.”); Keel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 220CV02022CBMKES, 2020 WL 25 7231120, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020) (“The fact that the charges were later dropped, or that Plaintiff was later proved innocent, is irrelevant to whether Defendants had probable 26 cause at the time they arrested Plaintiff.”); McCrohan v. Richardson, No. C-94-0143 SI, 27 1996 WL 116824, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the fact that charges were later dropped against him necessarily negated the existence of 28 1 Alvarado, No. 118CV01325DADBAM, 2020 WL 2468389, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2 2020) (holding plaintiff had alleged a plausible judicial deception claim where plaintiff 3 “alleged facts—not merely conclusions—to show that defendant [] made deliberately false 4 statements or recklessly disregarded the truth in his search warrant affidavit and that those 5 misrepresentations and omissions were material to the reviewing state court judge’s 6 probable cause determination.”); Ball v. City of Scottsdale, No. CV 19-05815-PHX-SPL 7 (DMF), 2021 WL 2459844, at *9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2021); Sigal v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 8 No. 217CV04851RGKAGR, 2017 WL 10560532, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017) (holding 9 plaintiffs had alleged a plausible judicial deception claim where they identified the 10 “specific omissions and misrepresentations contained in [defendant social worker]’s 11 warrant application.”).5 12 c. Conclusion 13 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 2, to 14 the extent Claim 2 is based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment WITHOUT 15 LEAVE TO AMEND.6 The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 2 in all 16 other respects. 17 /// 18 19 20 5 In light of the Court’s holding, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for judicial 21 notice of documents submitted in support of Defendants’ probable cause argument. At this stage of the proceedings, the attached documents are not material to the Court’s decision. 22 See Jones v. Best Serv. Co., No. CV 14-9872 SS, 2017 WL 490902, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23 6, 2017) (denying request for judicial notice as unnecessary where documents were immaterial to the Court’s decision), aff’d, 700 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2017). 24 6 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be 25 granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., 26 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court does 27 not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. Here, the defect in Defendants alleged Fourteenth Amendment judicial deception claim cannot be 28 1 3. Malicious Prosecution (Claim 1) 2 In Claim 1 of the FAC, Plaintiff asserts a malicious prosecution claim against 3 defendant Dominguez. FAC ¶¶ 65–76. As with Plaintiff’s judicial deception claim, 4 Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is based on Dominguez’s submission of an affidavit 5 containing purportedly materially misleading statements and omissions in support of 6 Plaintiff’s arrest. Defendants move to dismiss Claim 1, arguing Plaintiff has wrongfully 7 imputed the actions of third parties to Dominguez. ECF No. 8-1 at 17–19. Plaintiff further 8 contends Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged malice and intent and that probable cause 9 existed to effectuate Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. at 15–17. 10 a. Elements 11 Federal courts look to state law to define the elements of a § 1983 malicious 12 prosecution claim. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) 13 (“We look to California law to determine the legal effect of the state court’s action because 14 we have incorporated the relevant elements of the common law tort of malicious 15 prosecution into our analysis under § 1983.”); see also Rezek v. City of Tustin, 684 F. App’x 16 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he elements of [plaintiff’s] malicious prosecution claims are 17 controlled by California state law.”); Womack v. Cnty. of Amador, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 18 1031 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is based on state law 19 elements.”). 20 Under California state law, “in order to establish a cause of action for malicious 21 prosecution a plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior proceeding, commenced by or 22 at the direction of the malicious prosecution defendant, was: (1) pursued to a legal 23 termination favorable to the plaintiff; (2) brought without probable cause; and (3) initiated 24 with malice.” Villa v. Cole, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1327, 1335 (Ct. App. 1992); see also Soukup 25 v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 292 (2006). 26 In the Ninth Circuit, “the general rule is that a claim of malicious prosecution is not 27 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system 28 to provide a remedy.” Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). “[A]n 1 exception exists to the general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the 2 intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject 3 a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 “Put simply, malicious prosecution under Section 1983 requires a constitutional hook.” 5 Krystal v. City of Carlsbad, No. 22-CV-1329-BAS-JLB, 2023 WL 3829718, at *6 (S.D. 6 Cal. June 5, 2023); see Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To maintain 7 a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the defendants 8 prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose 9 of denying her [a] specific constitutional right.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 b. Wrongful Imputation 11 Defendants first argue Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed 12 because it improperly imputes the actions of the prosecutor, U.S. Marshals, and judges in 13 his case to defendant Dominguez. ECF No. 8-1 at 17–19. 14 The Court does not agree. Here, the decisions of the prosecutor, U.S. Marshals, and 15 judge in prosecuting Plaintiff, arresting him, and making bail determinations do not shield 16 defendant Dominguez from potential liability. See Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th 17 Cir. 2011) (“A criminal defendant may maintain a malicious prosecution claim not only 18 against prosecutors but also against others—including police officers and investigators— 19 who wrongfully caused his prosecution.”). 20 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 21 2004), is instructive. In Awabdy, defendants—including a police officer—accused plaintiff 22 of embezzling public funds. Id. at 1065. Defendants argued they were not liable for 23 malicious prosecution because it was the District Attorney’s office who prosecuted 24 plaintiff. Id. at 1067. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding: 25 Ordinarily, the decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to 26 result from an independent determination on the part of the prosecutor, 27 and thus, precludes liability for those who participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation of 28 proceedings. However, the presumption of prosecutorial independence 1 does not bar a subsequent § 1983 claim against state or local officials who improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly 2 provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or 3 otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings. 4 5 Id. (internal citation omitted). 6 Here, as in Awabdy, the involvement of the prosecutor, U.S. Marshals, and judge in 7 Plaintiff’s case does not foreclose Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Dominguez, which is 8 based on Dominguez’s own actions in signing a criminal complaint and submitting an 9 affidavit in support of Plaintiff’s arrest. See id. at 1068 (holding plaintiff “may be able to 10 prove that the defendants’ knowingly false accusations and other similarly conspiratorial 11 conduct were instrumental in causing the filing and prosecution of the criminal 12 proceedings”); see also Trulove v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 16-050-YGR, 2016 13 WL 5930634, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2016) (“A claim for malicious prosecution may be 14 stated not only against prosecutors but also police officers and investigators who 15 wrongfully caused the plaintiff's prosecution, such as by knowingly providing 16 misinformation, concealing exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaging in wrongful 17 conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.”) 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 c. Probable Cause 20 Defendants next contend Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is barred because 21 defendant Dominguez had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant even when the alleged 22 deficiencies in his affidavit are corrected. ECF No. 8-1 at 17. The Court rejects this 23 argument for the same reasons set forth in its discussion of Plaintiff’s judicial deception 24 claim above. 25 d. Malice 26 Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that defendant Dominguez 27 acted with malice. ECF No. 8-1 at 15–17. Plaintiff responds that the FAC sufficiently 28 1 alleges that defendant Dominguez acted maliciously by instituting criminal proceedings 2 for purposes other than the administration of justice. ECF No. 10 at 11. 3 In the malicious prosecution context, malice “‘is not limited to actual hostility or ill 4 will toward [the] plaintiff,’ but also ‘exists when proceedings are instituted primarily for 5 an improper purpose’” such as when ‘the person initiating [the charges] does not believe 6 that his claim may be held valid.’” Myles v. United States, 47 F.4th 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 7 2022) (quoting Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 383 (1956)). 8 Here, as detailed above, the FAC alleges defendant Dominguez knowingly made 9 multiple misrepresentations and omissions in his affidavit supporting Plaintiff’s arrest for 10 the improper purpose of exerting pressure on Plaintiff’s brother. FAC ¶¶ 54–55, 79. At this 11 early stage of the proceedings, these allegations are sufficient to plead malice. See 12 Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 13 allegations defendant coroner recklessly disregarded truth and deliberately lied in his 14 autopsy report adequately supported a malicious prosecution claim); Greene v. Bank of 15 Am., 216 Cal. App. 4th 454, 464–65 (2013) (“[I]f the defendant had no substantial grounds 16 for believing in the plaintiff's guilt, but, nevertheless, instigated proceedings against the 17 plaintiff, it is logical to infer that the defendant’s motive was improper.”); see also Trulove, 18 2016 WL 5930634, at *8 (allegation officers acted to fabricate or suppress evidence which 19 was instrumental in causing initiation of murder prosecution sufficient to state a claim for 20 malicious prosecution). Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged that 21 defendant Dominguez signed the criminal complaint and submitted his affidavit with the 22 intent to deprive Plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Miller v. Schmitz, No. 1:12-CV- 23 00137-LJO, 2012 WL 1609193, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (holding “the same facts 24 showing” that an officer defendant “maliciously caused” a plaintiff “to be arrested and 25 prosecuted without probable cause” supported a showing that the officer “intended” to 26 violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). 27 e. Conclusion 28 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 1. 1 4. Unlawful Seizure (Claim 3) 2 In Claim 3 of the FAC, Plaintiff asserts an unlawful seizure claim against defendant 3 Dominguez based on Plaintiff’s arrest and pretrial detention. FAC ¶¶ 86–91. Defendants 4 move to dismiss Claim 3, arguing Plaintiff has wrongfully imputed the actions of the judge 5 and prosecutor in his case to Dominguez and that his arrest was supported by probable 6 cause. ECF No. 8-1 at 26–28. 7 “The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 8 persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.’” Manuel, 580 U.S. at 364 (quoting U.S. 9 Const. amend. IV). “[T]hose objecting to a pretrial deprivation of liberty may invoke the 10 Fourth Amendment when (as here) that deprivation occurs after legal process commences.” 11 Id. at 366. 12 Defendant first argues Plaintiff has improperly attributed the actions of the 13 prosecutor and judge in his case onto defendant Dominguez. This argument is unpersuasive 14 for the same reasons set forth above. The involvement of the prosecutor and judge in 15 Plaintiff’s case does not, by itself, insulate defendant Dominguez from § 1983 liability in 16 cases such as this one where Plaintiff has alleged the judge’s probable cause determination 17 was predicated on Defendant’s misleading representations and omissions. 18 As the Supreme Court has reasoned: 19 [A Fourth Amendment claim] can occur when legal process itself goes 20 wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. Then, too, a 21 person is confined without constitutionally adequate 22 justification. Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement. And 23 for that reason, it cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth 24 Amendment claim. 25 Manuel, 580 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added); see also Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. 26 Defendant next argues defendant Dominguez had probable cause to obtain an arrest 27 warrant even if any deficiencies in his affidavit were corrected. ECF No. 8-1 at 26–27. The 28 Court also rejects this argument for the same reasons already set forth above. 1 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 3. 2 5. Qualified Immunity 3 Defendants contend defendant Dominguez is entitled to qualified immunity on all of 4 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. ECF No. 8-1 at 30–32. Plaintiff responds the question of whether 5 Dominguez is entitled to qualified immunity is better resolved at a later stage on a more 6 developed record. ECF No. 10 at 20–23. In the context of the allegations here, the Court 7 agrees with Plaintiff. 8 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for 9 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 10 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. 11 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 12 (1982)). The doctrine of qualified immunity “is more than a ‘mere defense to liability,’” 13 but is “a complete immunity from suit” which is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously 14 permitted to go to trial.” Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in 15 original). To determine whether government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, 16 courts conduct a two-step inquiry. First, courts consider “whether the facts that a plaintiff 17 has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right[.]” Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 18 F.3d 1260, 1270 (9th Cir. 2019). Second, courts consider “whether that right was clearly 19 established at the time of the incident.” Id. Courts have discretion “in deciding which of 20 the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the 21 circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 22 Here, as a matter of pleading, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the violation of a 23 constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident. See Green v. 24 City & Cty. of S.F., 751 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It was established at the time of 25 the incident that individuals may not be subjected to seizure or arrest without reasonable 26 suspicion or probable cause[.]”); Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 393 (9th Cir. 2011) 27 (“[E]very reasonable official would have understood that [plaintiffs] had a constitutional 28 right to not be . . . arrested as a result of judicial deception.”); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 1 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a clearly established constitutional due 2 process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that 3 was deliberately fabricated by the government.”); Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387 4 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]f an officer submitted an affidavit that contained statements he knew 5 to be false or would have known were false had he not recklessly disregarded the truth and 6 no accurate information sufficient to constitute probable cause attended the false 7 statements, . . . he cannot be said to have acted in an objectively reasonable manner, and 8 the shield of qualified immunity is lost.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 The Court does not address the strength of the evidence supporting Defendants’ 10 qualified immunity defense at this stage. As the Ninth Circuit has held: 11 If the operative complaint contains even one allegation of a harmful act 12 that would constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, then plaintiffs are entitled to go forward with their claims. But 13 our decision at the motion-to-dismiss stage sheds little light on whether 14 the government actors might ultimately be entitled to qualified immunity were the case permitted to proceed, at least to the summary 15 judgment stage and the court is presented with facts providing context 16 for the challenged actions. 17 Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 18 omitted) (emphasis added). Under the circumstances of this case, where Defendant has 19 argued that there is insufficient factual evidence supporting Plaintiff’s allegations, ECF 20 No. 8-1 at 23, the question of whether defendant Dominguez is entitled to qualified 21 immunity is more appropriately reserved for a later stage of these proceedings. See O’Brien 22 v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Once an evidentiary record has been 23 developed through discovery, defendants will be free to move for summary judgment based 24 on qualified immunity.”); see also Young v. Williams, No. 22-CV-00125-AJB-KSC, 2025 25 WL 2200735, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (finding it “premature” to conduct a “fact 26 intensive” qualified immunity analysis at the motion to dismiss stage). 27 For these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 28 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds. 1 B. Bane Act Claim 2 In Claim 4 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges defendant Dominguez’s initiation of a 3 criminal prosecution without probable cause constitutes a violation of California’s Bane 4 Act, Section 52.1 of the California Civil Code. FAC ¶¶ 92–100.7 Defendants move to 5 dismiss Claim 4, arguing Plaintiff’s claim is time barred, that Defendants are immune from 6 Plaintiff’s claim under California Government Code § 820.2, and that Plaintiff has failed 7 to sufficiently plead Dominguez acted with the specific intent to violate Plaintiff’s 8 constitutional rights ECF No. 8-1 at 13–14, 28–30, 32. The Court addresses the arguments, 9 in turn, below. 10 1. Elements 11 The Bane Act “civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with 12 rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out by 13 threats, intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th 14 Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the 15 defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to 16 or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the 17 law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the 18 law.” Cornell v. City & Cty. of S.F., 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 791–92 (Ct. App. 2017) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted). “There are two distinct elements for a section 52.1 cause of 20 action.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (Ct. App. 2015). “A plaintiff 21 must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal 22 23 24 7 Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is asserted against both Dominguez and the City. See Gant 25 v. Cty. of L.A., 772 F.3d 608, 623 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Under California law, public entities are liable for actions of their employees within the scope of employment, but public entities 26 are immune from liability to the extent their employees are immune from liability[.]”) 27 (internal citations omitted); Astorga v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 321CV00463BENKSC, 2022 WL 1556164, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2022) (“[F]ederal courts have held that public 28 1 constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by 2 threats, intimidation or coercion.” Id. 3 2. Timeliness 4 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is time barred under California’s 5 Government Claims Act. ECF No. 8-1 at 13–14. 6 “The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) establishes certain conditions 7 precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a public entity.” Coble v. Ventura Cty. Health 8 Care Agency, 73 Cal. App. 5th 417, 421 (Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks 9 omitted). The Act provides that a claim for personal injury must be presented to the entity 10 not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Id.; Lehman v. Orange 11 Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, No. SA CV 24-2520-JLS (AGR), 2025 WL 2020061, at *6 (C.D. 12 Cal. Apr. 25, 2025) (“California’s Government Claims Act provides that a claim for 13 personal injury or property damages against a public entity must be presented to that entity 14 within six months of accrual.”). 15 Defendants first contend that because Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is predicated on an 16 alleged act of judicial deception, it would have accrued on or about April 12, 2024—the 17 day after his arrest—when the underlying affidavit for his arrest became reasonably 18 available. ECF No. 8-1 at 13. On this basis, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is 19 time barred as Plaintiff did not file a claim with the City of Chula Vista until November 20 29, 2024—over seven months later. Id. at 14. It is true “judicial deception claims 21 begin accruing when the underlying affidavit is reasonably available.” Klein v. City of 22 Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, however, the record is silent 23 as to when Plaintiff obtained, or through reasonable diligence could have obtained, the 24 affidavit underlying his arrest. On the present record, the Court cannot therefore determine 25 whether Plaintiff’s judicial deception Bane Act claim is untimely. 26 The Court also agrees with Plaintiff that his Bane Act claim would not be untimely 27 to the extent it is based on malicious prosecution. “[M]alicious prosecution claims do not 28 accrue until the underlying prosecution terminates in favor of the plaintiff.” Braunstein v. 1 U.S. Postal Serv., No. 05-16390, 2007 WL 1112620, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2007); see 2 also RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] claim 3 of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the plaintiff is acquitted, because acquittal 4 is an element of the claim.”); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th 5 Cir. 1998) (“[Plaintiff]’s malicious prosecution claim did not accrue until his acquittal[.]”). 6 Here, the FAC indicates Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is at least partially based on malicious 7 prosecution. See e.g., FAC ¶¶ 93 (“This wrongful conduct also constitutes a malicious 8 prosecution and unlawful detention[.]”); 97 (“[Plaintiff] had the right to be free from 9 malicious prosecution[.]”). As Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim did not accrue until 10 around July 10, 2024, this claim is timely. 11 3. Immunity under California Government Code § 820.2 12 Defendants next argue they are immune from Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim under 13 California Government Code §§ 820.2 and 815.2. 14 “Sections 815.2 and 820.2 are a part of the California Tort Claims Act, and limit 15 public employees’ liability for claims arising out of that act.” Rattray v. City of Nat’l City, 16 51 F.3d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1994). Under California Government Code § 820.2, “a public 17 employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or 18 omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such 19 discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2. “Section 815.2 is derivative: [i]t provides 20 that if a public employee is immune from liability for a particular act or omission, the 21 public employer is similarly immune from liability.” Eng v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 22 CV0502686MMMSSX, 2006 WL 8442227, at *20 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2006). “[T]he 23 burden rests with government defendants to demonstrate that they are entitled to § 820.2 24 immunity[.]” AE v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 640 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 Here, Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating they are entitled to 26 § 820.2 immunity. As the Ninth Circuit has held in similar circumstances: 27 A workable definition of immune discretionary acts draws the line 28 between planning and operational functions of government. Immunity 1 is reserved for those basic policy decisions [which have] . . . been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government, and as to 2 which judicial interference would thus be unseemly. A police officer’s 3 decision to detain or arrest a suspect is not a basic policy decision, but only an operational decision by the police purporting to apply the law. 4 5 Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 6 citations omitted) (emphasis added); Gonzalez v. City of Alameda, No. 21-CV-09733- 7 DMR, 2023 WL 6232239, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2023) (“Section 820.2’s discretionary 8 immunity does not apply to the decision to arrest an individual when there is no probable 9 cause[.]”). 10 Defendants contend that a police officer’s decision to interfere with a person’s 11 liberty in a manner short of arrest constitutes a discretionary act under the California Court 12 of Appeal’s decision in Michenfelder v. City of Torrance, 28 Cal. App. 3d 202 (Ct. App. 13 1972). ECF No. 8-1 at 32. However, the facts of Michenfelder are distinguishable from the 14 instant case. In Michenfelder, the plaintiffs were in possession of a retail shop when 15 individuals entered their store without consent and removed and damaged certain items. 16 Michenfelder, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 204. The question before the California Court of Appeal 17 was whether the plaintiffs could state a claim against defendant police officers for their 18 alleged failure to take preventive action short of arrest. Id. at 206. In contrast, here, 19 defendant Dominguez allegedly prepared an affidavit in support of Plaintiff’s arrest 20 without probable cause. This act is more analogous to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 21 Liberal that an officer’s decision to arrest a suspect is operational than the conduct at issue 22 in Michenfelder. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim on 23 this basis.8 24 /// 25

26 27 8 Defendants also cite California Government Code § 820.8 as a source of immunity from Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim, but provide no explanation as to its applicability. See ECF 28 1 4. Failure to State a Claim 2 Defendants finally argue Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege defendant 3 Dominguez acted with requisite specific intent to support a Bane Act violation. ECF No. 4 8-1 at 28–30. 5 California Bane Act claims require “the specific intent to deprive a person of 6 constitutional rights[.]” Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1142 n.15 (9th Cir. 2019); see 7 Schmid v. City & Cty. of S.F., 60 Cal. App. 5th 470, 483 (Ct. App. 2021) (“Any arrest 8 without probable cause involves coercion, and where accompanied by evidence of specific 9 intent to violate the arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights, such an arrest may provide the 10 basis for a Bane Act claim.”); Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 801 (“[T]he egregiousness 11 required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting 12 officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable 13 seizure.”). 14 “The specific intent inquiry for a Bane Act claim is focused on two questions: First, 15 ‘[i]s the right at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of 16 the case,’ and second, ‘[d]id the defendant commit the act in question with the particular 17 purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that 18 right?’” Sandoval v. Cty. of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 520 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cornell, 19 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803). “So long as those two requirements are met, specific intent can 20 be shown ‘even if the defendant did not in fact recognize the unlawfulness of his act’ but 21 instead acted in ‘reckless disregard’ of the constitutional right.” Id. 22 Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that Dominguez made multiple material 23 misrepresentations and omissions in an affidavit supporting Plaintiff’s arrest—while 24 deliberately disregarding the lack of evidence supporting Plaintiff’s arrest—for the purpose 25 of exerting pressure on Plaintiff’s brother. FAC ¶¶ 54–55, 79, 94. At this stage of the 26 proceedings, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Dominguez 27 acted with reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Freeman v. 28 Stater Bros. Markets, No. CV 24-1604-KK-MAAX, 2025 WL 574696, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 1 Jan. 23, 2025) (holding plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a Bane Act claim premised upon 2 allegations that defendants had lied and conspired to effectuate his unlawful detention and 3 arrest); Luna v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 21-0467 JGB (SPX), 2023 WL 7803386, at 4 *15 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2023) (“Effectuating an arrest, while knowing there is no longer 5 probable cause, shows a reckless disregard for Plaintiff's right to be free of unreasonable 6 seizure.”); Redick v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 121CV00358NONESABPC, 2021 7 WL 3418728, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2021) (“Liberally construed Plaintiff has stated a 8 cognizable Bane Act violation against [defendant] based on the alleged false accusation 9 that he committed a crime . . . which lead to his arrest and detention.”); Holland v. City of 10 San Francisco, No. C10-2603 TEH, 2013 WL 968295, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) 11 (reasoning that “an arrest without probable cause” is “brought about by intentional 12 conduct”). 13 5. Conclusion 14 For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 4. 15 C. Doe Defendants 16 Defendants request that the Court dismiss the Doe defendants from this case. ECF 17 No. 8-1 at 33. Plaintiff argues that the dismissal of any Doe defendants in this case is 18 premature before Plaintiff has had an opportunity to take discovery. ECF No. 10 at 24–25. 19 “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” 20 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit 21 has recognized that “situations arise . . . where the identity of alleged defendants will not 22 be known prior to the filing of a complaint.” Id. “In such circumstances, the plaintiff should 23 be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is 24 clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be 25 dismissed on other grounds.” Id. 26 “To plead a claim against a [D]oe defendant in the Section 1983 context, a plaintiff 27 must specifically identify individual conduct that led to an alleged constitutional violation.” 28 Clinton v. Allen, No. 3:23-CV-01471-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 1447389, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 1 20, 2025); see Lomeli v. Cty. of San Diego, 637 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2022) 2 (“Plaintiffs may refer to unknown defendants as ‘Does’ at this stage, [but] must 3 nevertheless allege specific facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated 4 [their] rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Keavney v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 5 319CV01947AJBBGS, 2020 WL 4192286, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2020) (“’A plaintiff 6 may refer to unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and 7 so on, but he must allege specific facts showing how each particular [D]oe defendant 8 violated his rights.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 Here, Plaintiff’s only allegations against the Doe defendants are that they are “law 10 enforcement officers or other individuals whose actions or omissions violated [Plaintiff]’s 11 constitutional rights and caused him injury or harm by facilitating [his] malicious 12 prosecution.” FAC ¶ 21. These allegations are too vague and conclusory to plausibly 13 demonstrate how any particular Doe defendant personally participated in or caused the 14 alleged constitutional violation. See Est. of Bergner v. San Mateo Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 15 24-CV-08596-CRB, 2025 WL 1707289, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2025) (“Though a 16 plaintiff is entitled to plead causes of action in the alternative, a plaintiff cannot create a 17 chimera of a Doe defendant—especially not without any factual allegations in support. If 18 Plaintiffs want to sue defendants whose names are yet unknown, they must identify a 19 specific factual basis for doing so.”); Lomeli, 637 F. Supp. 3d at 1058 (holding allegations 20 that a group of doe defendants had “detained [plaintiff] without reasonable suspicion and 21 arrested him without probable cause” and another group had deprived plaintiff of his rights 22 under “Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment by acting with gross negligence and with 23 reckless and deliberate indifference to the rights and liberties of the public in general” were 24 insufficient). 25 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Doe 26 defendants from this case WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 27 /// 28 /// 1 MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 2 Defendants also alternatively request that Plaintiff be ordered to provide a more 3 || definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). ECF No. 8-1 at 33. Aside 4 ||from this conclusory request, however, Defendants provide no supporting argument or 5 citation in support. In the absence of any meaningful argument, the Court DENIES 6 || Defendants’ alternative request. CONCLUSION 8 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as 9 || follows: 10 1. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 1. 11 2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 2, to the extent 12 Claim 2 is based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment WITHOUT LEAVE TO 13 || AMEND. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 2 in all other respects. 14 3. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 3. 15 4. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 4. 16 5. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Doe defendants from 17 case WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 18 6. The Court DENIES Defendant’s alternative motion for a more definite 19 || statement. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 || Dated: October 24, 2025 Jekut C / ‘ 22 33 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

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