Joe Bryan v. THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: June 3, 2026
• Docket: 2025-000237
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Joe Bryan, Respondent,

v.

THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC d/b/a Riverside Health and Rehab, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2025-000237

Appeal From Charleston County Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge,

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-261 Submitted May 21, 2026 – Filed June 3, 2026

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, James D. Gandy, III, Donald Jay Davis, Jr., and Ted Ashton Phillips, III, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Bert Glenn Utsey, III, Christina Rae Fargnoli, Laura Kell Wilkes-D'Amato, all of Clawson Fargnoli Utsey, LLC, and Samuel Richard Clawson, Jr., all of Charleston, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC d/b/a Riverside Health and Rehab (the Facility) appeals the circuit court's order denying its motion to compel to arbitration the claims of Joe Bryan. On appeal, the Facility argues the circuit court erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying the Facility's motion to compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement did not merge. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them."); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Christianson, 377 S.C. 210, 214, 659 S.E.2d 209, 211 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]e apply South Carolina law to the initial determination of arbitrability but look to federal law for additional guidance."); Wilson v. Willis, 426 S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an arbitration agreement may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a matter subject to de novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by Bayne v. Fundamental Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49, 885 S.E.2d 144, 149 (Ct. App. 2023) (finding the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge after considering (1) the admission agreement provided it was governed by South Carolina law and the arbitration agreement provided it was governed by federal law, (2) the arbitration agreement recognized the two documents were separate by stating the arbitration agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were separately paginated and had their own signature pages, and (4) signing the arbitration agreement was not a precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that by the documents' own terms, language in the admission agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of [the arbitration agreement] and the admission agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration agreement to "be disclaimed within thirty days of signing while the admission agreement could not" indicated the parties' intention "that the common law doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d 292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an admissions agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge because the fact "the [a]dmissions [a]greement indicated it was governed by South Carolina law, whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated it was governed by federal law[,]" "each document was separately paginated and had its own signature page[,]" and "the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition to admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the documents be construed as separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law; (2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) the Facility acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to admission to the Facility. Thus, the Admission Agreement and Arbitration Agreement did not merge.

Second, because we find the agreements did not merge—a controlling consideration in whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Bryan—we decline to reach the Facility's remaining arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885 S.E.2d at 149 (determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied); Coleman, 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here, appellants' equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court."); Hodge, 422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would only apply if documents were merged").

AFFIRMED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.