Jody Carr v. David Nye

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 18, 2023
• Docket: 22-36052
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JODY R.O. CARR, No. 22-36052

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00332-JCC

v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID C. NYE, Judge; B. LYNN WINMILL, Judge; JOSH TEWALT, Director IDOC; MARK KUBINSKI, IDOC Official; AMANDA GENTRY; RACHAEL ALTIG; BARNEY; McKEY; NICODEMUS; CHRISTENSEN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 12, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Idaho state prisoner Jody R.O. Carr appeals pro se from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Carr’s claims against the district judges

as barred by judicial immunity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,

1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to the determination of whether

an act is judicial in nature and subject to absolute judicial immunity).

The district court properly dismissed Carr’s claims against the prison

officials because Carr failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.

See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se

pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a

plausible claim); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010)

(setting forth the elements of a § 1983 conspiracy claim); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408

F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the elements of a First Amendment

retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,

490 (1969) (“[T]he State may impose reasonable restrictions and restraints upon

the acknowledged propensity of prisoners to abuse both the giving and the seeking

of assistance in the preparation of applications for relief . . . .”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

because further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of

2 22-36052 review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would

be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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