NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 22-3180 ___________
JODI ANN CHUTE, Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-00877) District Judge: Hon. Alan N. Bloch ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on September 5, 2023
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 13, 2023)
____________
OPINION * ____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Jodi Chute appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the denial of her claim
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The District
Court found that substantial evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s finding
that Chute was not disabled during the relevant period. It also found that Chute’s new
evidence was not material. We will affirm.
I
Chute worked for more than 20 years as a Comcast customer service
representative. Until 2008, her job involved “sitting the entire time” and did not require
lifting or carrying anything of meaningful weight. AR 41. Starting in 2008, however, she
had to stand in the lobby for much of the day and carry equipment weighing up to 50
pounds. Chute quit her job in 2015 or 2016, allegedly due to her ailments, including
orthostatic tremors and osteoarthritis.
Chute first applied for disability benefits in 2017, but her application was denied,
and she did not appeal. She filed her present application in 2019, asserting that several
conditions limited her ability to stand and walk. She was denied disability benefits again,
both initially and on reconsideration. Chute then requested a hearing before an ALJ. The
ALJ held a hearing and denied her application, finding her not disabled.
Chute submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council, which denied her request
for review after finding that it was not reasonably probable that the new evidence would
change the ALJ’s decision. The Council’s denial made the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner.
Chute appealed the decision to the District Court. The District Court granted
judgment for the Commissioner. Chute filed this appeal.
2 II 1
A
Chute challenges the ALJ’s finding at step four of the Social Security
Administration’s five-step sequential process for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a). She says the ALJ erred in finding that because she had the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work with restrictions, she could perform
past relevant work. We hold that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
Several of Chute’s arguments rely on the evidence she submitted to the Appeals
Council after the ALJ made her finding—specifically, an assessment conducted two
weeks after the ALJ issued her decision. But we cannot consider evidence not before the
ALJ when reviewing whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011). Chute therefore misses the
mark in alleging that this extra evidence shows the ALJ “unfairly discounted” her
physical limitations. Chute Br. 7.
Chute asserts two other errors in the ALJ’s decision. First, she claims the ALJ
“direct[ly] contradict[ed]” herself by finding, at step two of the analysis, that Chute’s
orthostatic tremors and osteoarthritis are severe impairments limiting her ability to do
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We, like the District Court, review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). We cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions; we must uphold a decision that is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 3 certain “basic work activities,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), and then, at step four of the
analysis, that Chute’s RFC shows she can perform her past sedentary work. Chute Br. 9.
We reject this argument. Step four’s comparison of the claimant’s RFC to the
requirements of her past relevant work necessarily incorporates the step-two
determination of severe impairment: an ALJ never reaches step four unless a severe
impairment has been found at step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (c), (e). And that
Chute cannot do some basic work activities does not mean that her past relevant work
involved those activities. So the ALJ’s finding of severe impairment at step two did not
require a finding at step four that Chute could not perform her past relevant work.
Second, Chute accuses the ALJ of not considering her impairments in
combination, as the Social Security Act regulations require. But the ALJ thoroughly
reviewed the record before her and expressly considered Chute’s impairments in
combination in finding that Chute had “the residual functional capacity to perform
sedentary work” with listed restrictions. AR 20; see also AR 16 (acknowledging that
regulations require holistic consideration). The ALJ found that Chute’s orthostatic
tremors and osteoarthritis were severe impairments and explained the extent to which her
reflux condition, enlarged thyroid, fractured finger, and mental health conditions, though
not severe, limited certain work activities, and the ALJ accounted for this in her RFC
finding. We accordingly reject this argument too.
Applying our highly deferential standard of review, see Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.
Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019), we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
that Chute was not disabled.
4 B
Chute also argues that the Appeals Council erred by not remanding the matter to
the ALJ in light of Chute’s supplemental evidence and that the District Court erred in not
remanding to the Commissioner for similar reasons. District courts may enter a “sentence
six” remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) when a claimant shows good cause for not putting
new and material information before the agency. Kadelski v. Sullivan, 30 F.3d 399, 401
(3d Cir. 1994). The District Court determined that Chute’s new documentation was not
material because it was not reasonably probable that it would have changed the ALJ’s
decision. See Szubak v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 22-3180 ___________
JODI ANN CHUTE, Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-00877) District Judge: Hon. Alan N. Bloch ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on September 5, 2023
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 13, 2023)
____________
OPINION * ____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Jodi Chute appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the denial of her claim
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The District
Court found that substantial evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s finding
that Chute was not disabled during the relevant period. It also found that Chute’s new
evidence was not material. We will affirm.
I
Chute worked for more than 20 years as a Comcast customer service
representative. Until 2008, her job involved “sitting the entire time” and did not require
lifting or carrying anything of meaningful weight. AR 41. Starting in 2008, however, she
had to stand in the lobby for much of the day and carry equipment weighing up to 50
pounds. Chute quit her job in 2015 or 2016, allegedly due to her ailments, including
orthostatic tremors and osteoarthritis.
Chute first applied for disability benefits in 2017, but her application was denied,
and she did not appeal. She filed her present application in 2019, asserting that several
conditions limited her ability to stand and walk. She was denied disability benefits again,
both initially and on reconsideration. Chute then requested a hearing before an ALJ. The
ALJ held a hearing and denied her application, finding her not disabled.
Chute submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council, which denied her request
for review after finding that it was not reasonably probable that the new evidence would
change the ALJ’s decision. The Council’s denial made the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner.
Chute appealed the decision to the District Court. The District Court granted
judgment for the Commissioner. Chute filed this appeal.
2 II 1
A
Chute challenges the ALJ’s finding at step four of the Social Security
Administration’s five-step sequential process for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a). She says the ALJ erred in finding that because she had the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work with restrictions, she could perform
past relevant work. We hold that the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
Several of Chute’s arguments rely on the evidence she submitted to the Appeals
Council after the ALJ made her finding—specifically, an assessment conducted two
weeks after the ALJ issued her decision. But we cannot consider evidence not before the
ALJ when reviewing whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2011). Chute therefore misses the
mark in alleging that this extra evidence shows the ALJ “unfairly discounted” her
physical limitations. Chute Br. 7.
Chute asserts two other errors in the ALJ’s decision. First, she claims the ALJ
“direct[ly] contradict[ed]” herself by finding, at step two of the analysis, that Chute’s
orthostatic tremors and osteoarthritis are severe impairments limiting her ability to do
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We, like the District Court, review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). We cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions; we must uphold a decision that is supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 3 certain “basic work activities,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), and then, at step four of the
analysis, that Chute’s RFC shows she can perform her past sedentary work. Chute Br. 9.
We reject this argument. Step four’s comparison of the claimant’s RFC to the
requirements of her past relevant work necessarily incorporates the step-two
determination of severe impairment: an ALJ never reaches step four unless a severe
impairment has been found at step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (c), (e). And that
Chute cannot do some basic work activities does not mean that her past relevant work
involved those activities. So the ALJ’s finding of severe impairment at step two did not
require a finding at step four that Chute could not perform her past relevant work.
Second, Chute accuses the ALJ of not considering her impairments in
combination, as the Social Security Act regulations require. But the ALJ thoroughly
reviewed the record before her and expressly considered Chute’s impairments in
combination in finding that Chute had “the residual functional capacity to perform
sedentary work” with listed restrictions. AR 20; see also AR 16 (acknowledging that
regulations require holistic consideration). The ALJ found that Chute’s orthostatic
tremors and osteoarthritis were severe impairments and explained the extent to which her
reflux condition, enlarged thyroid, fractured finger, and mental health conditions, though
not severe, limited certain work activities, and the ALJ accounted for this in her RFC
finding. We accordingly reject this argument too.
Applying our highly deferential standard of review, see Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.
Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019), we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding
that Chute was not disabled.
4 B
Chute also argues that the Appeals Council erred by not remanding the matter to
the ALJ in light of Chute’s supplemental evidence and that the District Court erred in not
remanding to the Commissioner for similar reasons. District courts may enter a “sentence
six” remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) when a claimant shows good cause for not putting
new and material information before the agency. Kadelski v. Sullivan, 30 F.3d 399, 401
(3d Cir. 1994). The District Court determined that Chute’s new documentation was not
material because it was not reasonably probable that it would have changed the ALJ’s
decision. See Szubak v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984).
We agree.
Chute argues that remand was warranted because her attorney informed the ALJ
that Chute would see a specialist after the hearing. But that exchange does not suggest
materiality. Chute also argues that the Appeals Council “fail[ed] to consider” the new
evidence. Chute Br. 7. Yet the Council “considered [Chute’s] reasons” for disagreeing
with the ALJ’s decision and consulted Chute’s new evidence. AR 1–2. Nor was the
Council’s decision not to exhibit the new evidence an error: only evidence that is judged
material need be marked. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(a)(5), 404.976(b).
And we do not agree with Chute that the new evidence shows her “condition got
worse” after the ALJ’s decision. Chute Br. 17. A physical examination report dated from
late December 2020—nearly two months after the ALJ hearing—indicates that Chute’s
back spasms had improved, that she reported low musculoskeletal pain scores from the
past month, that her joint and muscle sensory input had improved, and that she made
5 advancements in hip extension and foam walking. The occupational therapist who
summarized Chute’s updated assessment observed that Chute “demonstrates the ability to
perform activities within a Sedentary physical category,” AR 111, and is “capable of
performing activities that fall in the sedentary category,” AR 115. That opinion does not
disturb the ALJ’s finding.
On our review of the record, it is not reasonably probable that the updated
assessment would have changed the ALJ’s finding that Chute can perform sedentary
work. We therefore agree with the District Court that Chute’s new documentation did not
justify a sentence six remand because it was not material. For the same reason, the
Appeals Council did not err in declining to remand the matter to the ALJ.
* * *
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment for these reasons.