1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 ----oo0oo---- 12 13 JOCELYNN FRIEDMAN, an No. 2:26-cv-1636 WBS SCR individual, 14 Plaintiff, 15 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 16 CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, 17 LLC; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19
20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff Jocelynn Friedman brought this action against 22 defendant Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, in connection with 23 defendant’s allegedly unlawful debt-collection efforts on a 24 reverse mortgage and the eventual foreclosure on plaintiff’s 25 home. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 1) at 19.) 26 Plaintiff brings claims for (1) violation the Homeowner Bill of 27 Rights, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924.17(a)-(b) (“HBOR”); (2) violation 28 1 of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. 2 Code § 1788 et seq. (“the Rosenthal Act”); (3) wrongful 3 foreclosure; (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition 4 Law; and (5) declaratory relief. (Id.) Defendant moves to 5 dismiss all claims. (Docket No. 3.) 6 I. Background 7 This action arises from a reverse mortgage obtained by 8 plaintiff’s grandmother, Jimmie Bolter, in 2008, secured by a 9 deed of trust on her home. (FAC ¶ 1.) The deed of trust was 10 reassigned several times until eventually it came into the 11 service of defendant. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff inherited the home 12 upon her grandmother’s death in 2019 through a quitclaim deed; 13 she was unaware of the deed of trust at the time of her 14 inheritance. (Id. ¶ 17.) 15 In 2024, plaintiff began receiving correspondences from 16 defendant, who requested monthly payments on the loan, “despite 17 no monthly payments being due since the Loan was a reverse 18 mortgage.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant also sent plaintiff monthly 19 statements on the loan, which allegedly listed inaccurate and 20 contradictory amounts due. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff did not pay 21 off any portion of the principal due on the mortgage; defendant 22 subsequently issued a notice of default, a notice of trustee’s 23 sale, and initiated foreclosure proceedings. (Id. ¶ 23-34.) A 24 nonjudicial foreclosure sale was conducted on September 10, 2025. 25 (Id. ¶ 34.) 26 II. The HBOR Claim 27 Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the HBOR, 28 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924.17(a)-(b), because the assignment of the 1 deed of trust, notice of default, and notice of trustee’s sale 2 were “not accurate or supported by competent and reliable 3 evidence” as required by the statute, and because defendant 4 failed to follow the statutorily required procedure prior to 5 foreclosure. (FAC at 25.) Defendant argues that plaintiff does 6 not have standing to sue under the HBOR because she is not a 7 borrower. (Docket No. 3 at 7.) 8 Defendant’s argument is in accord with the well- 9 established principle that “only ‘borrowers’ have standing to 10 assert claims for violation of HBOR.” Green v. Cent. Mortg. Co., 11 No. 14-CV-04281-LB, 2015 WL 5157479, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 12 2015) (collecting cases). Plaintiff nowhere argues that she is a 13 borrower on the loan, only that she is a successor in interest to 14 the property. However, “being a successor-in-interest does not 15 necessarily mean one is a borrower,” and plaintiff does not 16 otherwise explain how she would qualify as a borrower under the 17 HBOR. Ogilvie v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 23-cv-6156 MWF, 2023 WL 18 8259274, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2023). When asked at oral 19 argument to identify authority supporting plaintiff’s standing 20 under HBOR, plaintiff’s counsel cited none. 21 Plaintiff is therefore not the proper party in interest 22 under the HBOR, and defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted 23 as to this claim. See Austin v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 24 14-cv-0970 JAM, 2014 WL 3845182, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) 25 (dismissing HBOR claim on standing grounds “because Plaintiff is 26 not the borrower”). 27 III. The Rosenthal Act Claim 28 “The Rosenthal Act was enacted ‘to prohibit debt 1 collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices 2 in the collection of consumer debts.’” Davidson v. Seterus, 3 Inc., 21 Cal. App. 5th 283, 295 (2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4 1788 et seq.). Citing cases, defendant argues that plaintiff 5 cannot sue under the Rosenthal Act because mortgage servicers are 6 not “debt collectors” as defined in the Act, and that 7 “foreclosure is not debt collection activity” under the Act. 8 (Docket No. 3 at 9 (collecting cases).) 9 Defendant’s cited authority, however, predates the 10 Davidson case, which determined that “the Rosenthal Act’s 11 definition of ‘debt collector’ applies to a mortgage servicer,” 12 and that the Act applies to “debt collection practices in 13 attempting to obtain repayment of mortgage debt.” Davidson, 21 14 Cal. App. 5th at 289-305. Defendant’s cases also predate the 15 2020 amendment to the Rosenthal Act, which provided that “the 16 term ‘consumer debt’ includes a mortgage debt.” Cal. Civ. Code § 17 1788.2(f); see also Dantzler v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 2:23-cv- 18 10562 MRA MAR, 2024 WL 5379405, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2024) 19 (following the definition of “debt collector” in Davidson and 20 noting the Act “explicitly states that ‘[t]he term ‘consumer 21 debt’ includes a mortgage debt’”); Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 22 LLC, 64 Cal. App. 5th 568, 578 (2021) (holding that activities 23 connected to “nonjudicial foreclosure[s]” constitute “indirect 24 attempt[s] to collect a debt” within the meaning of the Act). 25 Plaintiff’s complaint contains plausible allegations to 26 support her Rosenthal Act claim. Plaintiff alleges defendant 27 sent monthly statements in the lead-up to the foreclosure that 28 inaccurately described the loan’s terms, including the amount 1 due, interest rate, and balances owed. (FAC ¶ 18.) Those 2 allegations -- misrepresenting both the amount of the debt and, 3 by sending monthly statements reflecting amounts due on a reverse 4 mortgage, its character -- state a claim under the Rosenthal Act, 5 which incorporates the FDCPA’s prohibition on false or misleading 6 representations under the “least sophisticated debtor” standard. 7 Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 8 2007). 9 Because defendant is a debt collector under the Act and 10 plaintiff has otherwise stated a claim, defendant’s motion will 11 be denied as to plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claim. 12 IV. The Wrongful Foreclosure Claim 13 Defendant argues that plaintiff has not stated a claim 14 for wrongful foreclosure because there has been no illegal, 15 fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of the property. 16 (Docket No. 3 at 6.) The complaint alleges that defendant 17 provided misleading monthly statements, mischaracterized the 18 mortgage loan, and refused to engage with plaintiff’s requests to 19 pay off the outstanding balance. (FAC ¶¶ 19-26.) These 20 allegations sufficiently support plaintiff’s claim that the 21 foreclosure was willfully oppressive. See Miles v. Deutsche Bank 22 Nat’l Trust Co. 236 Cal. App. 4th 394, 408-09 (2015) (reversing 23 dismissal where the loan servicer misrepresented borrower’s 24 obligations and mishandled the loan before foreclosing). 25 Because defendant has failed to show that plaintiff has 26 inadequately pled her wrongful foreclosure claim, defendant’s 27 motion will be denied as to that claim. 28 V. The UCL Claim 1 Defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim 2 on the grounds that “the underlying causes of action” and 3 “statutory violation[s]” all fail, and therefore “the Section 4 17200 claim necessarily fails.” (Docket No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 ----oo0oo---- 12 13 JOCELYNN FRIEDMAN, an No. 2:26-cv-1636 WBS SCR individual, 14 Plaintiff, 15 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 16 CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, 17 LLC; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19
20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff Jocelynn Friedman brought this action against 22 defendant Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, in connection with 23 defendant’s allegedly unlawful debt-collection efforts on a 24 reverse mortgage and the eventual foreclosure on plaintiff’s 25 home. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 1) at 19.) 26 Plaintiff brings claims for (1) violation the Homeowner Bill of 27 Rights, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924.17(a)-(b) (“HBOR”); (2) violation 28 1 of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. 2 Code § 1788 et seq. (“the Rosenthal Act”); (3) wrongful 3 foreclosure; (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition 4 Law; and (5) declaratory relief. (Id.) Defendant moves to 5 dismiss all claims. (Docket No. 3.) 6 I. Background 7 This action arises from a reverse mortgage obtained by 8 plaintiff’s grandmother, Jimmie Bolter, in 2008, secured by a 9 deed of trust on her home. (FAC ¶ 1.) The deed of trust was 10 reassigned several times until eventually it came into the 11 service of defendant. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff inherited the home 12 upon her grandmother’s death in 2019 through a quitclaim deed; 13 she was unaware of the deed of trust at the time of her 14 inheritance. (Id. ¶ 17.) 15 In 2024, plaintiff began receiving correspondences from 16 defendant, who requested monthly payments on the loan, “despite 17 no monthly payments being due since the Loan was a reverse 18 mortgage.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant also sent plaintiff monthly 19 statements on the loan, which allegedly listed inaccurate and 20 contradictory amounts due. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff did not pay 21 off any portion of the principal due on the mortgage; defendant 22 subsequently issued a notice of default, a notice of trustee’s 23 sale, and initiated foreclosure proceedings. (Id. ¶ 23-34.) A 24 nonjudicial foreclosure sale was conducted on September 10, 2025. 25 (Id. ¶ 34.) 26 II. The HBOR Claim 27 Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the HBOR, 28 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924.17(a)-(b), because the assignment of the 1 deed of trust, notice of default, and notice of trustee’s sale 2 were “not accurate or supported by competent and reliable 3 evidence” as required by the statute, and because defendant 4 failed to follow the statutorily required procedure prior to 5 foreclosure. (FAC at 25.) Defendant argues that plaintiff does 6 not have standing to sue under the HBOR because she is not a 7 borrower. (Docket No. 3 at 7.) 8 Defendant’s argument is in accord with the well- 9 established principle that “only ‘borrowers’ have standing to 10 assert claims for violation of HBOR.” Green v. Cent. Mortg. Co., 11 No. 14-CV-04281-LB, 2015 WL 5157479, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 12 2015) (collecting cases). Plaintiff nowhere argues that she is a 13 borrower on the loan, only that she is a successor in interest to 14 the property. However, “being a successor-in-interest does not 15 necessarily mean one is a borrower,” and plaintiff does not 16 otherwise explain how she would qualify as a borrower under the 17 HBOR. Ogilvie v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 23-cv-6156 MWF, 2023 WL 18 8259274, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2023). When asked at oral 19 argument to identify authority supporting plaintiff’s standing 20 under HBOR, plaintiff’s counsel cited none. 21 Plaintiff is therefore not the proper party in interest 22 under the HBOR, and defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted 23 as to this claim. See Austin v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 24 14-cv-0970 JAM, 2014 WL 3845182, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) 25 (dismissing HBOR claim on standing grounds “because Plaintiff is 26 not the borrower”). 27 III. The Rosenthal Act Claim 28 “The Rosenthal Act was enacted ‘to prohibit debt 1 collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices 2 in the collection of consumer debts.’” Davidson v. Seterus, 3 Inc., 21 Cal. App. 5th 283, 295 (2018) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4 1788 et seq.). Citing cases, defendant argues that plaintiff 5 cannot sue under the Rosenthal Act because mortgage servicers are 6 not “debt collectors” as defined in the Act, and that 7 “foreclosure is not debt collection activity” under the Act. 8 (Docket No. 3 at 9 (collecting cases).) 9 Defendant’s cited authority, however, predates the 10 Davidson case, which determined that “the Rosenthal Act’s 11 definition of ‘debt collector’ applies to a mortgage servicer,” 12 and that the Act applies to “debt collection practices in 13 attempting to obtain repayment of mortgage debt.” Davidson, 21 14 Cal. App. 5th at 289-305. Defendant’s cases also predate the 15 2020 amendment to the Rosenthal Act, which provided that “the 16 term ‘consumer debt’ includes a mortgage debt.” Cal. Civ. Code § 17 1788.2(f); see also Dantzler v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 2:23-cv- 18 10562 MRA MAR, 2024 WL 5379405, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2024) 19 (following the definition of “debt collector” in Davidson and 20 noting the Act “explicitly states that ‘[t]he term ‘consumer 21 debt’ includes a mortgage debt’”); Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 22 LLC, 64 Cal. App. 5th 568, 578 (2021) (holding that activities 23 connected to “nonjudicial foreclosure[s]” constitute “indirect 24 attempt[s] to collect a debt” within the meaning of the Act). 25 Plaintiff’s complaint contains plausible allegations to 26 support her Rosenthal Act claim. Plaintiff alleges defendant 27 sent monthly statements in the lead-up to the foreclosure that 28 inaccurately described the loan’s terms, including the amount 1 due, interest rate, and balances owed. (FAC ¶ 18.) Those 2 allegations -- misrepresenting both the amount of the debt and, 3 by sending monthly statements reflecting amounts due on a reverse 4 mortgage, its character -- state a claim under the Rosenthal Act, 5 which incorporates the FDCPA’s prohibition on false or misleading 6 representations under the “least sophisticated debtor” standard. 7 Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 8 2007). 9 Because defendant is a debt collector under the Act and 10 plaintiff has otherwise stated a claim, defendant’s motion will 11 be denied as to plaintiff’s Rosenthal Act claim. 12 IV. The Wrongful Foreclosure Claim 13 Defendant argues that plaintiff has not stated a claim 14 for wrongful foreclosure because there has been no illegal, 15 fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of the property. 16 (Docket No. 3 at 6.) The complaint alleges that defendant 17 provided misleading monthly statements, mischaracterized the 18 mortgage loan, and refused to engage with plaintiff’s requests to 19 pay off the outstanding balance. (FAC ¶¶ 19-26.) These 20 allegations sufficiently support plaintiff’s claim that the 21 foreclosure was willfully oppressive. See Miles v. Deutsche Bank 22 Nat’l Trust Co. 236 Cal. App. 4th 394, 408-09 (2015) (reversing 23 dismissal where the loan servicer misrepresented borrower’s 24 obligations and mishandled the loan before foreclosing). 25 Because defendant has failed to show that plaintiff has 26 inadequately pled her wrongful foreclosure claim, defendant’s 27 motion will be denied as to that claim. 28 V. The UCL Claim 1 Defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim 2 on the grounds that “the underlying causes of action” and 3 “statutory violation[s]” all fail, and therefore “the Section 4 17200 claim necessarily fails.” (Docket No. 3 at 11.) 5 “California’s Unfair Competition Law prohibits business 6 practices that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent.” Penaloza v. 7 Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 14-cv-2571 PA, 2014 WL 8 12580050, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014). “A violation of the 9 UCL may be established under any of the three prongs.” Slaughter 10 v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-7652 PA, 2014 WL 12570167, 11 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2014). 12 Plaintiff has adequately alleged her UCL claim under 13 the unlawful and fraudulent prongs. Under the unlawful prong, 14 the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as 15 unlawful practices” that are “independently actionable.” Cel- 16 Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 17 163, 180 (1999). As the court has explained, plaintiff has 18 adequately alleged a violation of the Rosenthal Act, which 19 supplies a predicate for the unlawful prong. 20 As to the fraudulent prong, a business practice is 21 “fraudulent” within the meaning of the UCL if “members of the 22 public are likely to be deceived.” Comm. on Children’s 23 Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 211. 24 Misleading and inaccurate communications about a borrower’s loan 25 fall within the fraudulent prong. See Boschma v. Home Loan 26 Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 230, 250-52 (borrowers 27 adequately alleged a fraudulent-prong UCL claim based on the 28 lender's misleading and inaccurate loan disclosures). The court 1 has found adequate plaintiff’s allegations of defendant’s 2 misleading representations leading up to foreclosure. 3 Because plaintiff has adequately plead her UCL claim 4 under the unlawful and fraudulent prongs, the court will deny 5 defendant’s motion as to plaintiff’s UCL claim. 6 VI. Declaratory Relief 7 In its argument that plaintiff’s claim for declaratory 8 relief should be dismissed, defendant largely echoes its 9 arguments on the merits of plaintiff’s other claims before 10 stating that “the claim necessarily fails since the underlying 11 claims fail.” (Docket No. 3 at 12.) 12 “Declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act 13 is not a cause of action in and of itself, but rather, a remedy.” 14 Gilliam v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 17-cv-1296 DOC, 2018 WL 15 6537160, at *16 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2018) (collecting cases). As 16 such, it is “derivative of underlying claims,” and “a request for 17 declaratory relief” will survive a motion to dismiss “if one of 18 the substantive causes of action survives such a motion.” Id. 19 Because the court has found that plaintiff’s Rosenthal 20 Act and wrongful foreclosure claims survive, plaintiff’s request 21 for declaratory relief survives as well. Defendant’s motion will 22 therefore be denied as to the claim for declaratory relief. 23 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 24 dismiss (Docket No. 3) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to 25 claim II for violation of the Homeowner Bill of Rights. The 26 motion is DENIED in all other respects. 27 Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of 28 this Order to file her amended complaint, if she can do so ee mI IEE IE IU DIE III IIR III II IIE IGE EOS IIE EE
1 | consistent with this Order. 2] Dated: June 10, 2026 ttle aw Ve Ad hE 3 WILLIAMB.SHUBB ©. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28