IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
EDWARD A. JOBES, § § Defendant Below, § No. 529, 2018 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1510004414 § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: January 11, 2019 Decided: February 25, 2019
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Edward Jobes, appeals from the Superior Court’s denial
of his first motion for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm
the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Jobes’s
opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that on December 7, 2015, a grand jury indicted
Jobes for Rape Third Degree, following his arrest for engaging in sexual intercourse
with a fourteen-year-old girl. On February 24, 2016, Jobes pleaded guilty to the
lesser-included offense of Rape Fourth Degree. The parties agreed on an open sentencing and a presentence investigation was conducted. On May 24, 2016, the
Superior Court sentenced Jobes to fifteen years’ incarceration, suspended after four
years for decreasing levels of supervision. Jobes did not file a direct appeal.
(3) In July 2016, Jobes filed a motion for modification of sentence. That
motion was denied. On July 18, 2016, Jobes filed a motion for postconviction relief
under Superior Court Rule 61. Jobes argued, among other things, that (i) the
prosecution committed misconduct by withholding favorable evidence and not
offering him a plea to unlawful sexual contact; (ii) there was insufficient evidence
to indict or convict him; (iii) his counsel was ineffective because she did not fully
review discovery materials with Jobes, did not sufficiently investigate and present
mitigating evidence at sentencing, and provided him insufficient advice in
connection with his guilty plea; (iv) the State violated the Fourth Amendment by
seizing his cell phone and computer and extracting data from them, and his counsel
should have sought suppression of that evidence; and (v) the police coerced his
confession. A Superior Court Commissioner recommended that Jobes’s motion for
postconviction relief should be denied, reasoning that his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel did not provide a basis for relief because Jobes voluntarily
pleaded guilty; his counsel’s representation was well within the range of
reasonableness required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); during
his plea colloquy Jobes stated he was satisfied with defense counsel’s representation;
2 and Jobes failed to make concrete allegations that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness. The Commissioner determined that Jobes’s other claims
were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because they were not asserted before his
conviction.1 The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and denied the
motion. Jobes now appeals to this Court.
(4) On appeal, Jobes argues that (i) the prosecution committed misconduct
by withholding favorable evidence and not offering him a plea to unlawful sexual
contact; (ii) there was insufficient evidence to indict or convict him; (iii) his counsel
was ineffective because she did not fully review discovery materials with Jobes; and
(iv) the State violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing his cell phone and computer
and extracting data from them, and his counsel should have sought suppression of
that evidence.2 We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.3
(5) As an initial matter, the Superior Court correctly recognized that Rule
61(i)(3) barred Jobes’s claims that did not implicate the effectiveness of his counsel
because he did not raise those claims during the guilty plea proceeding and did not
1 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3) (barring “any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court,” unless the defendant shows “[c]ause for relief from the procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights”). 2 To the extent Jobes raises other issues on appeal, they were not raised in the Superior Court, and we therefore decline to address them. See SUPR. CT. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for review . . . .”). 3 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
3 demonstrate cause for the procedural default.4 A successful claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel can constitute “cause” under Rule 61(i)(3).5 But to prevail on
such a claim within the context of a guilty plea, a movant must show that (i) his
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there
is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors of counsel, the movant
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.6 A
defendant must make concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to
substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7 Although not
insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was
professionally reasonable.8
(6) In this case, Jobes’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
supported by the record. The evidence against Jobes included his confession to the
police that he engaged in sexual conduct with a fourteen-year-old girl. If Jobes had
gone to trial on the charge of Rape Third Degree, which is a Class B felony, he risked
the imposition of a prison sentence of at least two years and up to twenty-five years.9
By pleading guilty to Rape Fourth Degree, which is a Class C felony, he ensured a
4 SUPER. CT. R. 61(i)(3); see also Fields v. State, 2017 WL 4607424 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017). 5 Cook v. State, 2000 WL 1177695 (Del. Aug. 14, 2000). 6 Duffy v. State, 2019 WL 459982 (Del. Feb. 5, 2019); Fields, 2017 WL 4607424. 7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 8 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 9 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (providing for a term of Level V incarceration for a Class B felony of “not less than 2 years up to 25 years”); 11 Del. C. § 771 (establishing rape in the third degree as a Class B felony).
4 much lower maximum term of incarceration and eliminated the minimum term of
incarceration.10 Under these circumstances, Jobes cannot demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his case would have been better for him if he had
gone to trial rather than enter into a plea agreement. We therefore conclude, as did
the Superior Court, that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without
merit.
(7) To the extent that Jobes contends that his other claims of error warrant
reversal separate from his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, those claims
are waived by his guilty plea. Jobes could have raised the claims at trial if he had
gone to trial, but he did not. Instead, he chose to enter into the plea agreement.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
EDWARD A. JOBES, § § Defendant Below, § No. 529, 2018 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1510004414 § Plaintiff Below, § Appellee. §
Submitted: January 11, 2019 Decided: February 25, 2019
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Edward Jobes, appeals from the Superior Court’s denial
of his first motion for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion to affirm
the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Jobes’s
opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that on December 7, 2015, a grand jury indicted
Jobes for Rape Third Degree, following his arrest for engaging in sexual intercourse
with a fourteen-year-old girl. On February 24, 2016, Jobes pleaded guilty to the
lesser-included offense of Rape Fourth Degree. The parties agreed on an open sentencing and a presentence investigation was conducted. On May 24, 2016, the
Superior Court sentenced Jobes to fifteen years’ incarceration, suspended after four
years for decreasing levels of supervision. Jobes did not file a direct appeal.
(3) In July 2016, Jobes filed a motion for modification of sentence. That
motion was denied. On July 18, 2016, Jobes filed a motion for postconviction relief
under Superior Court Rule 61. Jobes argued, among other things, that (i) the
prosecution committed misconduct by withholding favorable evidence and not
offering him a plea to unlawful sexual contact; (ii) there was insufficient evidence
to indict or convict him; (iii) his counsel was ineffective because she did not fully
review discovery materials with Jobes, did not sufficiently investigate and present
mitigating evidence at sentencing, and provided him insufficient advice in
connection with his guilty plea; (iv) the State violated the Fourth Amendment by
seizing his cell phone and computer and extracting data from them, and his counsel
should have sought suppression of that evidence; and (v) the police coerced his
confession. A Superior Court Commissioner recommended that Jobes’s motion for
postconviction relief should be denied, reasoning that his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel did not provide a basis for relief because Jobes voluntarily
pleaded guilty; his counsel’s representation was well within the range of
reasonableness required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); during
his plea colloquy Jobes stated he was satisfied with defense counsel’s representation;
2 and Jobes failed to make concrete allegations that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness. The Commissioner determined that Jobes’s other claims
were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because they were not asserted before his
conviction.1 The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and denied the
motion. Jobes now appeals to this Court.
(4) On appeal, Jobes argues that (i) the prosecution committed misconduct
by withholding favorable evidence and not offering him a plea to unlawful sexual
contact; (ii) there was insufficient evidence to indict or convict him; (iii) his counsel
was ineffective because she did not fully review discovery materials with Jobes; and
(iv) the State violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing his cell phone and computer
and extracting data from them, and his counsel should have sought suppression of
that evidence.2 We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.3
(5) As an initial matter, the Superior Court correctly recognized that Rule
61(i)(3) barred Jobes’s claims that did not implicate the effectiveness of his counsel
because he did not raise those claims during the guilty plea proceeding and did not
1 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3) (barring “any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court,” unless the defendant shows “[c]ause for relief from the procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights”). 2 To the extent Jobes raises other issues on appeal, they were not raised in the Superior Court, and we therefore decline to address them. See SUPR. CT. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for review . . . .”). 3 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).
3 demonstrate cause for the procedural default.4 A successful claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel can constitute “cause” under Rule 61(i)(3).5 But to prevail on
such a claim within the context of a guilty plea, a movant must show that (i) his
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there
is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors of counsel, the movant
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.6 A
defendant must make concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to
substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7 Although not
insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was
professionally reasonable.8
(6) In this case, Jobes’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
supported by the record. The evidence against Jobes included his confession to the
police that he engaged in sexual conduct with a fourteen-year-old girl. If Jobes had
gone to trial on the charge of Rape Third Degree, which is a Class B felony, he risked
the imposition of a prison sentence of at least two years and up to twenty-five years.9
By pleading guilty to Rape Fourth Degree, which is a Class C felony, he ensured a
4 SUPER. CT. R. 61(i)(3); see also Fields v. State, 2017 WL 4607424 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017). 5 Cook v. State, 2000 WL 1177695 (Del. Aug. 14, 2000). 6 Duffy v. State, 2019 WL 459982 (Del. Feb. 5, 2019); Fields, 2017 WL 4607424. 7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 8 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 9 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (providing for a term of Level V incarceration for a Class B felony of “not less than 2 years up to 25 years”); 11 Del. C. § 771 (establishing rape in the third degree as a Class B felony).
4 much lower maximum term of incarceration and eliminated the minimum term of
incarceration.10 Under these circumstances, Jobes cannot demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his case would have been better for him if he had
gone to trial rather than enter into a plea agreement. We therefore conclude, as did
the Superior Court, that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without
merit.
(7) To the extent that Jobes contends that his other claims of error warrant
reversal separate from his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, those claims
are waived by his guilty plea. Jobes could have raised the claims at trial if he had
gone to trial, but he did not. Instead, he chose to enter into the plea agreement. A
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to
challenge any errors occurring before the entry of the plea.11
(8) In this case, having reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea
proceeding, the Court has no doubt that Jobes entered his plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. During the colloquy with Jobes, the Superior Court
made sure that Jobes understood the charges against him and what the guilty plea
would mean for him. Jobes expressed no reservation whatsoever when entering his
plea. He indicated he understood that he was waiving certain trial rights by pleading
10 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(3) (providing for a term of Level V incarceration for a Class C felony of “up to 15 years”); 11 Del. C. § 770 (establishing rape in the fourth degree as a Class C felony). 11 Fields, 2017 WL 4607424; Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004).
5 guilty, including his right to require the State to prove each element of the charges
against him beyond a reasonable doubt. He also indicated that no one had coerced
him into entering the plea, and he expressed satisfaction with his counsel’s
representation. Jobes acknowledged that he was pleading guilty to Rape Fourth
Degree because he was in fact guilty of Rape Fourth Degree. Absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, Jobes is bound by his sworn representations
during the guilty plea colloquy.12
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT: /s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. Chief Justice
12 Palmer v. State, 2002 WL 31546531 (Del. Nov. 13, 2002).