1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ASHISH JOBANPUTRA, et al., No. 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR 11 Plaintiffs, 12 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 13 CITY OF ANDERSON, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 INTRODUCTION OF CASE 17 Before this Court is the City of Anderson’s (“the City”) and 18 Anderson Fire Protection District’s (collectively, “Defendants”) 19 motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) by Ashish 20 Jobanputra, Manish Thakkar, and Classic Hospitality, LLC 21 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See ECF Nos. 17 and 18. 22 Plaintiffs filed an opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 28. 23 Defendants replied. See Reply Briefs, ECF Nos. 31 and 32. For 24 the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to 25 dismiss.1 26
27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for November 19, 2024. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2 This case concerns a red-tagging incident which led to the 3 closure of a hotel undergoing construction. In 2019, Plaintiffs 4 purchased the Baymont Inn and Suites hotel property (“the 5 property”) in Anderson, California with the intention of 6 renovating the hotel to increase its value and profitability. 7 Compl. ¶ 18. According to Plaintiffs, the hotel was a 8 “dilapidated, dangerous” structure in need of serious 9 maintenance. Id. Soon after purchase, Plaintiffs obtained 10 necessary documentation and permitting to begin renovations, 11 which occurred without incident over the next few years into 12 2021. See generally, Compl. ¶¶ 19-23. 13 However, Plaintiffs allege that in March of 2022, the 14 relationship between Plaintiffs and the City became strained when 15 the City’s new building inspector demanded additional documents 16 and permits for the second phase of the remodel. See Compl. 17 ¶ 25. Plaintiffs’ engineers submitted new documentation in April 18 2022, but the City was unsatisfied, which “caus[e]d delays for 19 the remodeling.” See Compl. ¶ 28. Ultimately, this led to an 20 inspection by the fire marshal and subsequent red-tagging of the 21 hotel property for “unsafe conditions” on May 17, 2022. See 22 Compl. ¶ 31, 32. Two years and three days after the hotel 23 property was red-tagged, Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 24 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging two causes of action under the Fourteenth 25 Amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees. See 26 Compl., ECF No. 1. 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. OPINION 2 A. Analysis 3 1. Legal Standard 4 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 5 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 6 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the plausibility 7 pleading standard set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 8 (2007), a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss by alleging 9 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 10 its face.” At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must accept 11 all nonconclusory factual allegations of the complaint as true 12 and construe those facts and the reasonable inferences that 13 follow in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Id.; see 14 also Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 16 factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 17 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In the event dismissal is 18 warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear 19 the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. 20 Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 2. Timeliness of Plaintiffs’ Claims 22 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred 23 because Plaintiffs filed their complaint three days after the 24 statute of limitations had accrued. See ECF No. 18 at 7. In 25 support of their argument, Defendants cite RK Ventures, Inc. v. 26 City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), which held 27 that a § 1983 statute of limitations period commences when a 28 city makes an “operative decision” to take action. In response, 1 Plaintiffs do not raise any tolling arguments but instead argue 2 that their filing is timely because the statute of limitations 3 is measured at “completion” of the red-tagging or when final 4 action had occurred. See Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 2-3. 5 The applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action 6 under § 1983 is the statute of limitations established by the 7 forum state for personal injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 8 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); see also Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San 9 Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). In California, 10 the relevant statute of limitations is two years. Cal. Civ. 11 Proc. Code § 335.1. For § 1983 claims in particular, a statute 12 of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, 13 which is when the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the 14 injury that is the basis of their action. Cabrera v. City of 15 Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). 16 Because Plaintiffs repeatedly allege in their complaint 17 that on May 17, 2022, city and fire officials red-tagged the 18 hotel property, “effectively shutting down the business and 19 forcing the immediate eviction of all guests, workers, and 20 employees,” the Court finds that Plaintiffs knew or should have 21 known that a constitutional violation occurred on May 17, 2022 22 and that the two-year statute of limitations period for their 23 § 1983 claims began to accrue on that date. Compl. ¶ 45. 24 Regardless of the successive actions the City or fire department 25 took, the “operative decision” to shut down the hotel property 26 occurred when the inspectors and fire marshal ordered the 27 immediate eviction of all guests, workers, and employees on May 28 17, 2022. 1 Plaintiffs attempt to artificially extend the statute of 2 limitations period by contending that hotel guests continued to 3 be evacuated on the morning of May 18, 2022, that the City did 4 not provide an official notice of reasons for the red-tagging 5 until May 18, 2022, and that a ruling rescinding the red-tagging 6 occurred on June 10, 2022. However, none of these facts are 7 alleged in the First Amended Complaint and instead appear for 8 the first time in Plaintiffs’ opposition papers. Even if the 9 Court were to assume these unalleged facts and credit 10 Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in RK 11 Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle is clear that subsequent 12 actions falling within the limitations period which are merely 13 the “effect of [the initial] decision” do not constitute 14 separately unconstitutional acts. RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d 15 at 1058. It follows that any actions resulting from the initial 16 evacuation and red-tagging are simply the natural consequences 17 of the City’s decision to temporarily close the hotel property 18 and do not counteract the fact that the City’s alleged 19 unconstitutional action took place the day they ordered the 20 hotel to shut down.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ASHISH JOBANPUTRA, et al., No. 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR 11 Plaintiffs, 12 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 13 CITY OF ANDERSON, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 INTRODUCTION OF CASE 17 Before this Court is the City of Anderson’s (“the City”) and 18 Anderson Fire Protection District’s (collectively, “Defendants”) 19 motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) by Ashish 20 Jobanputra, Manish Thakkar, and Classic Hospitality, LLC 21 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See ECF Nos. 17 and 18. 22 Plaintiffs filed an opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 28. 23 Defendants replied. See Reply Briefs, ECF Nos. 31 and 32. For 24 the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to 25 dismiss.1 26
27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for November 19, 2024. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 2 This case concerns a red-tagging incident which led to the 3 closure of a hotel undergoing construction. In 2019, Plaintiffs 4 purchased the Baymont Inn and Suites hotel property (“the 5 property”) in Anderson, California with the intention of 6 renovating the hotel to increase its value and profitability. 7 Compl. ¶ 18. According to Plaintiffs, the hotel was a 8 “dilapidated, dangerous” structure in need of serious 9 maintenance. Id. Soon after purchase, Plaintiffs obtained 10 necessary documentation and permitting to begin renovations, 11 which occurred without incident over the next few years into 12 2021. See generally, Compl. ¶¶ 19-23. 13 However, Plaintiffs allege that in March of 2022, the 14 relationship between Plaintiffs and the City became strained when 15 the City’s new building inspector demanded additional documents 16 and permits for the second phase of the remodel. See Compl. 17 ¶ 25. Plaintiffs’ engineers submitted new documentation in April 18 2022, but the City was unsatisfied, which “caus[e]d delays for 19 the remodeling.” See Compl. ¶ 28. Ultimately, this led to an 20 inspection by the fire marshal and subsequent red-tagging of the 21 hotel property for “unsafe conditions” on May 17, 2022. See 22 Compl. ¶ 31, 32. Two years and three days after the hotel 23 property was red-tagged, Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 24 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging two causes of action under the Fourteenth 25 Amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees. See 26 Compl., ECF No. 1. 27 /// 28 /// 1 II. OPINION 2 A. Analysis 3 1. Legal Standard 4 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 5 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 6 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the plausibility 7 pleading standard set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 8 (2007), a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss by alleging 9 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 10 its face.” At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must accept 11 all nonconclusory factual allegations of the complaint as true 12 and construe those facts and the reasonable inferences that 13 follow in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Id.; see 14 also Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 15 However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 16 factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 17 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In the event dismissal is 18 warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear 19 the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. 20 Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 2. Timeliness of Plaintiffs’ Claims 22 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred 23 because Plaintiffs filed their complaint three days after the 24 statute of limitations had accrued. See ECF No. 18 at 7. In 25 support of their argument, Defendants cite RK Ventures, Inc. v. 26 City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), which held 27 that a § 1983 statute of limitations period commences when a 28 city makes an “operative decision” to take action. In response, 1 Plaintiffs do not raise any tolling arguments but instead argue 2 that their filing is timely because the statute of limitations 3 is measured at “completion” of the red-tagging or when final 4 action had occurred. See Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 2-3. 5 The applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action 6 under § 1983 is the statute of limitations established by the 7 forum state for personal injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 8 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); see also Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San 9 Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). In California, 10 the relevant statute of limitations is two years. Cal. Civ. 11 Proc. Code § 335.1. For § 1983 claims in particular, a statute 12 of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, 13 which is when the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the 14 injury that is the basis of their action. Cabrera v. City of 15 Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). 16 Because Plaintiffs repeatedly allege in their complaint 17 that on May 17, 2022, city and fire officials red-tagged the 18 hotel property, “effectively shutting down the business and 19 forcing the immediate eviction of all guests, workers, and 20 employees,” the Court finds that Plaintiffs knew or should have 21 known that a constitutional violation occurred on May 17, 2022 22 and that the two-year statute of limitations period for their 23 § 1983 claims began to accrue on that date. Compl. ¶ 45. 24 Regardless of the successive actions the City or fire department 25 took, the “operative decision” to shut down the hotel property 26 occurred when the inspectors and fire marshal ordered the 27 immediate eviction of all guests, workers, and employees on May 28 17, 2022. 1 Plaintiffs attempt to artificially extend the statute of 2 limitations period by contending that hotel guests continued to 3 be evacuated on the morning of May 18, 2022, that the City did 4 not provide an official notice of reasons for the red-tagging 5 until May 18, 2022, and that a ruling rescinding the red-tagging 6 occurred on June 10, 2022. However, none of these facts are 7 alleged in the First Amended Complaint and instead appear for 8 the first time in Plaintiffs’ opposition papers. Even if the 9 Court were to assume these unalleged facts and credit 10 Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in RK 11 Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle is clear that subsequent 12 actions falling within the limitations period which are merely 13 the “effect of [the initial] decision” do not constitute 14 separately unconstitutional acts. RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d 15 at 1058. It follows that any actions resulting from the initial 16 evacuation and red-tagging are simply the natural consequences 17 of the City’s decision to temporarily close the hotel property 18 and do not counteract the fact that the City’s alleged 19 unconstitutional action took place the day they ordered the 20 hotel to shut down. Plaintiffs make no attempt to distinguish 21 RK Ventures, Inc., which clearly mandates the result in this 22 case. 23 While Plaintiffs’ filing is only a few days past the 24 statute of limitations period, as Defendants point out, claims 25 are barred even when actions are filed one day date. See United 26 States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985); Caglia v. Berryhill, 27 No. 1:19-cv-1376-JLT, 2020 WL 897174 at [*2] (E.D. Cal. March 3, 28 2020); Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:17-cv- 1 0760 -JLT, 2019 WL 1556659 at [*4] (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2019). 2 Moreover, “[i]t should not be forgotten that time-limitations 3 provisions themselves promote[] important interests; ‘the period 4 allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value 5 judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of 6 protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in 7 prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.’” Delaware State 8 College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259–60 (1980) (quoting Johnson 9 v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975)). 10 Thus, the Court finds that the red-tagging on May 17, 2022 11 was the operative constitutional violation and that the statute 12 of limitations ended two-years later on May 17, 2024. Because 13 May 17, 2024 fell on a Friday and did not fall on a weekend or 14 holiday, Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 15 6(a) are inapplicable. Accordingly, the Court dismisses with 16 prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims as untimely. 17 III. ORDER 18 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 19 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the 20 Court is directed to close this case. 21 Additionally, the Court imposes a $550 sanction on 22 Plaintiffs’ counsel for violations of the specified page limits 23 for memoranda of law in support of or opposition to motions and a 24 $200 sanction on Defendants Anderson Fire Protection District and 25 Steven Allred’s counsel pursuant to the Order Regarding Filing 26 Requirements, ECF No. 8-2. Counsel shall pay these sanctions to 27 the clerk of the Court within five (5) days of this Order. Under 28 the same filing requirements, Plaintiffs’ additional reply nen enn nen een non nn nn nn no nn nn nn nee NN
1 briefs, ECF Nos. 34 and 35, are also stricken. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: Dated: December 20, 2024
SA Dt JOHN A. MENDEZ 6 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28