Joaquin Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 15, 2023
DocketDE-0752-21-0134-A-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Joaquin Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security (Joaquin Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joaquin Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOAQUIN CAPESTANY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-0752-21-0134-A-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: December 15, 2023 SECURITY, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jeffrey H. Jacobson , Tucson, Arizona, for the appellant.

Eric McNeilus , Tucson, Arizona, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the addendum initial decision, which denied his attorney fee petition. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, REVERSE the addendum initial decision, and award the requested fees in the amount of $81,830.00.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND ¶2 On February 19, 2021, the agency removed the appellant on a charge of inability to perform the essential duties of his position due to a medical condition. Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-21- 0134-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. The appellant filed a Board appeal on March 3, 2021. Id. Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the agency failed to prove its charge. IAF, Tab 41, Initial Decision (ID). In reaching that finding, the administrative judge determined that the medical opinions of E.N., Psy.D., whose reports the appellant had provided the agency prior to its final decision, and I.L., M.D., whose reports were submitted for the first time on appeal, were due more weight than the opinion of B.M., M.D., which the agency had relied upon in taking the removal action. ID at 26-29. The initial decision became final on January 31, 2022, when neither party filed a petition for review. ¶3 On March 28, 2022, the appellant filed a petition for attorney fees. Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-21- 0134-A-1, Attorney Fee File (AFF), Tab 1. He claimed fees in the amount of $79,130.00 and argued that an award of fees was in the interest of justice under Allen categories (2) and (5). 2 Id. at 6-10, 12. The agency responded to the appellant’s motion, and the appellant replied to the agency’s response, amending his fee request to include an additional $2,250.00, for a total amount of $81,830.00. AFF, Tabs 3-4. ¶4 On June 29, 2022, the administrative issued an initial decision denying the appellant’s fee petition. AFF, Tab 7, Addendum Initial Decision (AID). The

2 In Allen v. U.S. Postal Service, 2 M.S.P.R. 420, 434-35 (1980), the Board listed several examples of circumstances in which an attorney fee award would be warranted in the interest of justice: (1) the agency engaged in a prohibited personnel practice; (2) the agency action was clearly without merit or wholly unfounded, or the employee was substantially innocent of the charges; (3) the agency initiated the action in bad faith; (4) the agency committed gross procedural error; or (5) the agency knew or should have known that it would not prevail on the merits. 3

administrative judge determined that the only issue in dispute was whether an award of fees was in the interest of justice and that only Allen categories (2) and (5) were pertinent to that inquiry. AID at 2-3. With regard to Allen category (2), the administrative judge found that only the “clearly without merit” subcategory was applicable to removals based on medical inability to perform. AID at 4-7. He further found that the removal action was not “clearly without merit,” because his decision to reverse the action was based primarily on the report and testimony of Dr. I.L., and “[a]t the time of [the appellant’s] removal, the agency did not have the benefit of [Dr. I.L.’s] opinion.” AID at 7-8. The administrative judge went on to find that an award of fees was not warranted under Allen category (5), because there was credible, probative evidence supporting the agency’s charge at the time it took the action. AID at 9-10. ¶5 On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in his analysis of both Allen category (2) and category (5). Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5. The agency has filed a response, to which the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 9-10.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶6 To establish entitlement to an award of attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1), an appellant must show that (1) he was the prevailing party; (2) he incurred attorney fees pursuant to an existing attorney-client relationship; (3) an award of fees is warranted in the interest of justice; and (4) the amount of fees claimed is reasonable. Driscoll v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 7 (2011). The agency has stipulated that an attorney-client relationship existed, that the appellant incurred fees, and that the appellant was the prevailing party. IAF, Tab 3 at 7. As to the amount of fees incurred, the administrative judge found that that the itemized charges and hours, as well as the hourly rate, were reasonable on their face, and the agency does not dispute that finding on review. AID at 3 n.2. Hence, the only issue in dispute is whether a fee award is 4

warranted in the interest of justice. The appellant contends that a fee award is warranted in the interest of justice under Allen category (2), which applies where the agency action was clearly without merit or wholly unfounded, or the employee was substantially innocent of the charge; and category (5), which applies where the agency knew or should have known that it would not prevail on the merits. Allen v. U.S. Postal Service, 2 M.S.P.R. 420, 434-35 (1980). ¶7 We find that a fee award is warranted under Allen category (2) because the appellant was “substantially innocent” of the charge on which the removal action was based. It is well settled that substantial innocence, in itself, is an adequate ground for the allowance of fees even in a close case where the charges may not have been “clearly without merit” or “wholly unfounded.” See Boese v. Department of the Air Force, 784 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Van Fossen v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 788 F.2d 748, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that the court’s cases “make it clear that ‘substantial innocence’ is an operative Allen guideline in and of itself”). Our precedent also makes clear that the substantial innocence standard is not limited to charges of misconduct. See Social Security Administration v. Goodman, 33 M.S.P.R. 325, 331 (1987) (awarding fees under the substantial innocence standard where the agency sought to remove an administrative judge for alleged low productivity and the Board did not uphold the charge); Young v. Department of the Air Force, 29 M.S.P.R. 589, 590-91 (1986) (awarding fees where the appellant was substantially innocent of the charge that she failed to meet the performance requirements for her position).

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788 F.2d 748 (Federal Circuit, 1986)

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Joaquin Capestany v. Department of Homeland Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joaquin-capestany-v-department-of-homeland-security-mspb-2023.