Joanne Stucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 10, 2024
DocketPH-0752-18-0227-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Joanne Stucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Joanne Stucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joanne Stucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JOANNE M. STUCKER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-18-0227-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 10, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Kimberly D. Borland , Esquire, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

M. Creston Rice , Esquire, Bedford, Massachusetts, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On petition for review, the appellant reasserts that she was entitled to chapter 75 and regulatory appeal rights because she met the definition of employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

(i); her termination was without merit; and the agency committed harmful procedural error by denying her minimum due process. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to address the appellant’s challenge to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i), we AFFIRM the initial decision. The appellant recognizes that, in Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 47 F.3d 409, 411-12 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the Federal Circuit held that section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) applies only to initial appointments pending conversion to the competitive service. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 7. Under this provision, an individual in the excepted service (other than a preference eligible) “who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service” has a right to appeal to the Board. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i). The court in Forest interpreted this language to find that “[s]ection 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) covers only excepted service employees serving ‘under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service,’ provided they are not serving a probationary or trial period under such an appointment.” Forest, 47 F.3d at 412. The appellant reargues that 3

the Board should not rely on the Federal Circuit’s construction of the statutory provision because it was overly restrictive and not in accordance with the plain language of the statute. Id. at 6-8. Specifically, she asserts that “[i]nstead of giving the plain meaning to the words of the statute in the order it was written, the [c]ourt juxtaposed two phrases and added the qualifier ‘provided[,]’ completely changing the plain language of the statute.” She reasserts that, instead, it is more appropriate to interpret section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) as applying to excepted-service positions generally, such as hers. Id. at 6-7. The appellant’s argument regarding the court’s interpretation of section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) is well-taken. However, the Board is bound by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Forest. See Hoover v. Department of the Navy, 57 M.S.P.R. 545, 552 (1993); Fairall v. Veterans Administration, 33 M.S.P.R. 33, aff’d, 844 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding that decisions of the Federal Circuit are controlling authority for the Board). The appellant has not shown that the Federal Circuit has reversed or otherwise modified its decision in Forest, nor has she explained why that decision is not controlling precedent in this case. It is undisputed that the appellant was not serving an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 11. Thus, when applying the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i), the appellant did not meet the definition of employee under that provision. See Forest, 47 F.3d at 411-12. Accordingly, the appellant has not provided a basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s finding that she lacked chapter 75 appeal rights. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision at 4.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

2 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 4

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

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Related

Patricia A. Fairall v. Veterans Administration
844 F.2d 775 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
Warren S. Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board
47 F.3d 409 (Federal Circuit, 1995)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Joanne Stucker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joanne-stucker-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.