Joanne Mistler v. Lockheed Martin Corporation.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0739
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-739

JOANNE MISTLER

vs.

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2018, the plaintiff, Joanne Mistler, filed suit against

the defendant, Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin).

Mistler claimed that Lockheed Martin, a defense contractor and

her former employer, defamed her when it filed reports with the

Federal government claiming that she had mischarged her work

time and expenses. A judge denied Lockheed Martin's motion to

dismiss the case or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; a

different judge, however, allowed the renewed motion, and

summary judgment entered for Lockheed Martin on all of Mistler's

claims. Appealing from the grant of summary judgment, Mistler

failed to docket the appeal within fourteen days after receiving

the notice of assembly of record as required by Mass. R. A. P. 10 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1618 (2019). Ten days

after the deadline passed, she moved to docket her appeal late

pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b) (rule 14 [b]), as appearing in

481 Mass. 1626 (2019), and the single justice granted her

motion. After Lockheed Martin filed an opposition to the

motion, the single justice issued another order reaffirming her

earlier decision. Lockheed Martin appeals from the single

justice orders, primarily arguing that Mistler's failure to

timely docket her appeal was inexcusable neglect. We affirm.

"[W]e review the action of the single justice for errors of

law and, if none appear, for abuse of discretion." Troy Indus.

v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 581 (2010). "[A]

judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of

discretion where we conclude the judge made a clear error of

judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, such

that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted). L.L. v.

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). To prevail on a

motion to docket an appeal late pursuant to rule 14 (b), a

litigant must show "good cause," rule 14 (b), and that the issue

on appeal is "meritorious or substantial in the sense of

presenting a question of law deserving judicial investigation

and discussion." Commonwealth v. Barclay, 424 Mass. 377, 379

2 (1997), quoting Tisei v. Building Inspector of Marlborough, 3

Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379 (1975). "Good cause" equates to

"excusable neglect." See Troy Indus., supra.

The single justice did not abuse her discretion in granting

and reaffirming Mistler's motion, which was filed only ten days

after the docketing deadline. Mistler's counsel explained in

her affidavit that there had been a misunderstanding about the

process for docketing the appeal and that counsel, upon

realization of the error, promptly filed the motion. That

explanation was sufficient to establish excusable neglect,

particularly where Lockheed Martin was not prejudiced by the

ten-day delay. Nor do we agree with Lockheed Martin's claim

that Mistler failed to show a meritorious issue for appeal

because the judge's summary judgment decision was based on a

privilege specific to Federal government contractors that, it

contends, has been "consistently applied for over [fifty-seven]

years." Lockheed Martin does not cite any support of this

contention in its memorandum, and the authority relied on by the

judge in his summary judgment decision involves the application

of the privilege by courts outside Massachusetts in cases with

different facts from those presented here. See, e.g., Becker v.

Philco Corp., 372 F.2d 771, 776 (4th Cir. 1967) (defense

contractor immune from defamation claims where contractor

3 reported suspected confidentiality breaches of ex-employees

pursuant to contract with Federal government). "A meritorious

appeal is one that is worthy of presentation to a court, not one

which is sure of success" (quotation and citation omitted).

Barclay, 424 Mass. at 379. The immunity of a defense contractor

from its employees' claims for defamation arising from required

government reporting appears to be an issue of first impression

in Massachusetts, and we discern no error or abuse of discretion

in the single justice's decision allowing this appeal to

proceed.

Orders of single justice allowing plaintiff's motion to docket appeal late affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Smyth & Toone, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: March 17, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.