STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
ilk FIRST CIRCUIT
2019 CA 0062
JOANN HARP AND GARY HARP
VERSUS
SUCCESSION OF BOBBY E. BRYAN AND JUANITA S. BRYAN
consolidated with
2019 CA 0063
CARYL WADE AND TOMMY WADE
2019 CA 0064
LINDA LEWIS AND HILLARY LEWIS
Judgment Rendered. SEP 0 3 2020
Appealed from the Seventeenth Judicial District Court Parish of Lafourche, State of Louisiana Docket No. 124637 c/ w 124737 c/ w 124738
The Honorable Walter I. Lanier, III, Judge Presiding
Mark D. Plaisance Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Marcus J. Plaisance Joann Harp, Gary Harp, Caryl Wade, Prairieville, Louisiana Tommy Wade, Linda Lewis, and Hillary Lewis
George J. Ledet, Jr. Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees Cut Off, Louisiana Succession of Bobby E. Bryan and Juanita S. Bryan
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., GUIDRY, McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, AND BURRIS,' JJ.
The Honorable William J. Burris, retired, is serving pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
I-' -" >`
r C7/ BURRIS, J.
The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases appeal the trial court' s judgment that
dismissed their claims for damages and enforcement of contracts for the transfer of
immovable property. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
During their marriage, Bobby and Juanita Bryan purchased immovable
property along Bayou Lafourche, in Leeville, Louisiana. In addition to living on the
property, they installed a bulkhead and operated Marsh Masters RV park and a
marina, from which Bobby operated a guide services business. Marsh Masters RV
Park was never incorporated. Rather, Bobby and Juanita ran the business together
as " a mom and pop operation," with Juanita handling the finances. Bobby and
Juanita operated the business from their community owned immovable property.
JoAnn and Gary Harp, Caryl and Tommy Wade, and Linda and Hillary Lewis
collectively referred to as " the plaintiffs") were friends of the Bryans and rented
trailer spots in the RV park. Gary and Tommy also operated their own fishing guide
business from the property, paying Bobby $ 100. 00 of the fee they earned for each
guided trip, and encouraged their clients to stay at the RV park. Additionally, they
assisted Bobby with his guide business. The Wades met the Bryans after renting
space at the RV park. The plaintiffs claim Bobby approached them with offers to
purchase contiguous waterfront lots in the RV park. Bobby provided contracts,
entitled " Lease/ Purchase of Immovable Property," which he and the plaintiffs
signed. Juanita was present when the contracts were signed but did not sign them
herself, except as a witness to the Lewises' contract.
Each contract contained a detailed description of the respective immovable
property and generally provided a ten- year lease term (March 2, 2004 through March
2, 2014), with a monthly rate of $250.00. The contracts further provided that in
consideration for an advance lump sum lease payment of $35, 000.00 in the case of
2 the Harps and the Lewises and $ 30, 000. 00 in the case of the Wades, " fee simple
title" would be transferred to the respective plaintiffs within twenty days of the lease
term' s expiration or the payoff of any mortgages on the property. Other terms of the
contracts included that the plaintiffs were entitled to utilize the RV park' s sewerage
and water utilities at no charge; that the plaintiffs were responsible for electricity and
any temporary or permanent improvements on the premises; that upon termination
and transfer of titles, the plaintiffs would begin paying $ 400. 00 annually for general
upkeep; and that the plaintiffs would be allowed a permanent right of ingress and
egress to and from the respective properties, which would be transferred to the
plaintiffs with the transfer of title in the nature of a predial servitude.
The Harps and Bobby signed the contract at a restaurant, with Juanita present.
The Harps gave Juanita a $ 35, 000.00 cashier' s check and believed that they paid for
the property up front, but that the Bryans had up to ten years to pay off the mortgage
and provide them with the title. After checking with the Bryans, the Harps built a
camp at the edge of the property that extended out over the adjacent water and
installed boat lifts. Pursuant to a verbal agreement, Bobby paid for the pile driving
work. Utilities for the camp were provided through the RV park. The Harps made
annual payments to the RV park of $400. 00 for water and sewerage and made
additional payments for electricity usage.
The Lewises signed their contract at the Bryans' home. Juanita was present
and signed as a witness. The Lewises gave Bobby a $ 35, 000. 00 check, who passed
it to Juanita. Like the Harps, the Lewises believed they were paying for the property
up front and that they would become owners. They then spent approximately
85, 000. 00 building a camp on the property, which extended over the waterway and
was equipped with boat lifts and an elevator. The Lewises also paid $ 400. 00
annually for water and sewerage and paid for electricity usage.
3 Mr. Wade recalled signing the contract at the Bryans' home. The Wades
provided a $ 30, 000.00 check, believing they would be given clear title to the land.
With the assistance of the Bryans' son, the Wades then built a deck with boat slips
and lifts. The Wades lived out of state and visited in their camper, which they parked
on the property. The Wades made payments of $400.00 annually for water and
sewerage and paid for electricity usage.
Bobby died prior to expiration of the contracts' ten-year terms and without
providing titles to the plaintiffs. In late 2013, Juanita sent letters to the plaintiffs
informing them that when the ten-year terms expired, they would be required to pay
750. 00 monthly for rent and $ 1, 500. 00 annually for water and sewerage. Believing
Juanita was not going to honor the contracts and transfer the titles, the plaintiffs filed
these suits against Juanita and Bobby' s succession ( collectively, " the defendants"),
seeking specific performance of the contracts and damages.
The defendants answered the petitions, denying the plaintiffs' allegation that
the parties signed the contract. The defendants admitted that Bobby signed the
contracts, but denied that Juanita did so. The defendants further asserted that the
plaintiffs' camps were not constructed on the properties described in the contracts
but were built above structures owned by the defendants over navigable waters. The
defendants averred the contracts were bond for deed contracts attained in
contravention of law, rendering them invalid, and that specific performance was
impossible. The defendants further asserted reconventional demands against the
plaintiffs, claiming the plaintiffs continued to occupy the defendants' property
without payment and were therefore liable for loss of rental revenues and expenses.
The plaintiffs answered, generally denying the claims asserted in the reconventional
demand and asserting affirmative defenses.
The Harps amended their petition to allege that prior to entering the contracts,
Bobby consulted with an attorney, who advised him the transaction would be
S unlawful and unenforceable. The Harps contended Bobby then acted in bad faith in
preparing the contracts and presenting them for signature. Alternative to their other
causes of action, they alleged they were entitled to all damages pursuant to Louisiana
Civil Code article 1997, which provides, " An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the
damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform."
The defendants answered and contended that the attorney was a customer who knew
all of the parties and informed them of problems with the legality and enforceability
of the contracts, and further denied having any particular knowledge of the contracts
that the plaintiffs lacked.
A bench trial was held on February 1, 2018. 2 The plaintiffs testified about
their understanding of the contracts and Juanita' s actions before and after Bobby' s
death. They also described the structures they built on the respective properties.
Juanita testified that Bobby told her about the agreements and that she " wasn' t for
it" because she did not want to transfer the property. She admitted she knew about
the camps constructed by the plaintiffs, but did not question the construction because
Bobby told her " he was letting them have that property to build over the water, not
the property, over the water because there was — it would take up part of our trailer
deal." She indicated that any transfer would probably only have been of
approximately fifteen feet of property from the bulkhead, and then only if the debts
secured by the mortgages were paid. Juanita stated the property was still
encumbered by multiple mortgages, two of which were granted after the contracts
were signed. She described the contracts as " strictly an agreement" for a ten- year
term. She testified that she increased the rental amount to follow the ten- year term,
because she continued to pay taxes and insurance premiums and her expenses had
increased.
2 Prior to trial, the trial court denied cross-motions for summary judgment and ordered the parties to participate in mediation.
5 The trial court took the matter under advisement, then issued written reasons
for judgment, stating it found the contracts to be invalid and unenforceable. Instead,
the trial court found the parties entered into verbal lease agreements that were
modified in 2013, when Juanita notified the plaintiffs of the changed amounts by letter. The trial court determined the plaintiffs' improvements on the property were
not subject to the verbal leases and that the plaintiffs retained full ownership of the
improvements, although their right to travel across the defendants' property and
receive utility services through the defendants had ceased. The trial court rendered
judgment, purporting to be in favor of the defendants, that dismissed all claims and
ordered each party to bear its own costs. The plaintiffs now appeal.
JURISDICTION
A threshold inquiry in any case is whether there is a basis for jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an
action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties and to grant the relief
to which they are entitled. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1. We have a duty to
examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the litigants do not raise
the issue.' Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 17-
1250 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 20/ 18), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046 ( en Banc).
This court' s appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments. See La. Code
Civ. Pro. art. 2083A. A final judgment determines the merits of an action, in whole
or in part. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1841. In contrast, an interlocutory judgment does
not determine the merits, but decides only preliminary matters in the course of an
action. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1841. An interlocutory judgment is appealable only
when expressly provided by law. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 2083C.
3 The jurisdiction issue was raised during oral arguments before this court and the parties were afforded the opportunity to address it in supplemental briefs. 6 A valid judgment must be " precise, definite, and certain." Moreover, a final
appealable judgment must contain decretal language and name the party in favor of
whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the
relief that is granted or denied. These determinations should be evident from the
language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. The
specific nature and amount of damages should be determinable from a judgment so
that a third person is able to determine from a judgment the amount owed without
reference to other documents. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions, 268 So. 3d
at 1046.
The trial court' s judgment provides:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court grants a judgment in favor of the defendants, Succession of Bobby E. Bryan and Juanita Bryan and against the plaintiff[s], Joann and Gary Harp, Caryl S. and Tommy Wade and Linda R. And Hillary A. Lewis dismissing all claims and order[ s] that each parry will bear its own costs[.]
The judgment was issued after a trial on the merits. There is no indication
that any issues remained outstanding. Although the judgment does not specifically
address the reconventional demand, the judgment dismisses " all claims." This
language is sufficiently specific to encompass dismissal of the claims asserted in the
reconventional demand. Furthermore, silence in a judgment as to any issue that was
placed before the trial court is deemed a rejection of the claim. Roper v. City of
Baton Rouge/Parish ofEast Baton Rouge, 16- 1025, 16- 1026, 16- 1027, 16- 1028, 16-
1029, 16- 1030 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 15/ 18), 244 So. 3d 450, 470 n.9, writ denied, 18-
0854 ( La. 9/ 28/ 18), 252 So. 3d 926; see also Williams v. Richardson, 16- 1430 ( La.
App. 1 Cir. 11/ 1/ 17), 2017WL4946749, * 1 n. l, writ denied, 17- 1995 ( La. 2/ 9/ 18),
236 So. 3d 1261 ( deeming silence in the trial court' s judgment on an issue raised in
a defendant' s reconventional demand as a rejection of that demand).
7 We note that the judgment additionally states that it was rendered in favor of
the defendants. Although the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims is a judgment in
favor of the defendants, the judgment does not affirmatively grant the defendants
any relief. Nonetheless, this referenced language does not form part of the decretal
language as the judgment ultimately dismisses all claims. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has held that an otherwise complete and valid judgment is not invalid merely
because it contains surplus language. See Hinchman v. Int' l Brotherhood of Elec.
Workers, Local Union No. 130, 292 So. 2d 717, 719 ( La. 1974); John M. Floyd &
Associates, Inc. v. Ascension Credit Union, 19- 0574 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 27/ 19), 292
So. 3d 922, 924. Thus, we find this language has no bearing on the validity of the
judgment.
The judgment constitutes a valid final judgment and this court has appellate
jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in finding the contracts invalid and
unenforceable. They contend that Juanita' s actions reflect her concurrence with the
contracts and that her signature was not required. The defendants counter that the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof at trial.
To resolve the issues raised on appeal, we first consider the nature and effect
of the contracts, if any. See Giroir v. Thomas, 17- 1021 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 29/ 18),
2018WL1556193, * 2. A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby
obligations are created, modified, or extinguished. La. Civ. Code art. 1906.
Contracts may be either nominate or innominate. Nominate contracts are those
given a special designation, such as sale, lease, loan, or insurance; innominate
contracts are those with no special designation. La. Civ. Code art. 1914. The proper
interpretation of a contract is a question of law. When considering legal issues, the reviewing court accords no special weight to the trial court, but conducts a de novo
review and renders judgment on the record. Giroir, 2018WL1556193 at * 2.
Contracts have the effect of law between the parties and the courts are to
interpret them according to the common intent of the parties. See La. Civ. Code arts.
1983, 2045. If the words of the contract are clear, unambiguous, and lead to no
absurd consequences, the court need not look beyond the contract language to
determine the parties' true intent. See La. Civ. Code art. 2046. Whether a contract
is ambiguous is a question of law. Hoffman v. Travelers Indem. Co. ofAmerica, 13-
1575 ( La. 5/ 7/ 14), 144 So. 3d 993, 997- 98.
The subject contracts are entitled " Lease/ Purchase of Immovable Property,"
which the plaintiffs characterize as bond for deed contracts. A bond for deed is a
contract through which the immovable property owner agrees to deliver title to the
property to a purchaser after the purchaser has paid a specified purchase price in the
form of installment payments. See La. R.S. 9: 2941; Keen v. Webeland, Inc., 19-
0708 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 2020WL862500, * 1 n. 2. The contracts resemble
bond for deed contracts because they specified title would not be immediately
delivered. However, bond for deed contracts must meet certain statutory
requirements, including the designation of a bank to serve as escrow agent to receive
payments from the purchaser and any mortgage holder' s guarantee to the purchaser
that it will release the mortgage when paid in full. See La. R.S. 9: 2942 and 2943;
Giroir, 2018WL1556193 at * 2. The subject contracts do not contain such provisions
and thus do not meet the statutory requirements of bond for deed contracts.
A contract may be treated as a bond for deed despite its failure to comply with
certain particulars of the bond for deed statutes, especially where the party for whom
the omitted provisions are designed does not protest their absence. Giroir,
2018WL1556193 at * 2. The label put on the transaction is not determinative; rather,
it is the nature of the obligations created, rather than the parties' characterization,
0 which governs the classification of a contract. Giroir, 2018V L1556193 at * 2; see
also Montz v. Theard, 01- 0768 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 27/ 02), 818 So. 2d 181, 187.
Moreover, the contracts may be valid innominate contracts even if not classified as
bond for deeds. Giroir, 2018WL1556193 at * 2. The subject contracts obligated the
defendants to transfer ownership of immovable property upon either satisfaction of
the mortgages or the passage of ten years. Thus, they may constitute contracts to
sell. See La. Civ. Code art. 2623. Whether classified as an innominate contract or
a contract to sell, the contracts are subject to the form requirements of a sale of
immovable property. See La. Civ. Code art. 2623.
A transfer of immovable property or a contract to sell immovable property
must be in the form of an authentic act or act under private signature, or meet the
requirements for an oral transfer.' See La. Civ. Code arts. 1839 and 2623. The
subject contracts were not notarized and there is no dispute that the contracts are not
in the form of authentic acts. See La. Civ. Code art. 1833 ( providing that an authentic
act is a writing executed before a notary public or other officer authorized to perform
that function, in the presence of two witnesses, and signed by each party who
executed it, by each witness, and by each notary public before whom it was
executed). However, an act that fails to be an authentic act due to a defect of form
may still be valid as an act under private signature. La. Civ. Code art. 1834.
An act under private signature is one executed by the parties themselves
without the intervention of a public officer such as a notary public. Rainey v. Entergy
GulfStates, Inc., 09- 572 ( La. 3/ 16/ 10), 35 So. 3d 215, 225 ( citing 5 Saul Litvinoff,
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise —The Law of Obligations, § 12. 26 ( 2d ed. 2001)). An
act under private signature need not be written by the parties, but must be signed by
them. La. Civ. Code art. 1837. A jurisprudential exception to this statutory
4 An oral transfer is valid between the parties when the property has been actually delivered and the transferor recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath. La. Civ. Code art. 1839.
10 requirement exists when only one party has signed an agreement and the other party
has availed himself of the agreement or taken actions evidencing his acceptance thereof. See La. Civ. Code art. 1837 - 1984 Revision Comment (b); Stevens Constr.
Design, LLC v. Hillman, 19- 1329 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 12/ 20), 2020WL3109444,
3. A party against whom an act under private signature is asserted must
acknowledge his signature or deny that it is his. In the case of denial, any means of
proof may be used to establish that the signature belongs to that party. La. Civ. Code
art. 1838. A signature can be proven in open court, in the same manner as any other
material and relevant circumstance. See Louisiana State Mineral Bd. v. Abadie, 164
So. 2d 159, 174 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1964).
The defendants admitted in their answer that Bobby signed the contracts. This
judicial admission establishes that the contracts were, in fact, acts under private
signature. However, the trial court found the contracts were invalid, noting they
purported to alienate immovable community property and were signed only by 111
Each spouse, acting alone, may manage, control, or dispose of community
property unless otherwise provided by law. La. Civ. Code art. 2346. Under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2347, the concurrence of both spouses is required for
the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community immovables. When the
concurrence of the spouses is required by law, the alienation, encumbrance, or lease
of community property by a spouse is relatively null unless the other spouse has
renounced the right to concur. La. Civ. Code art. 2353. A contract that is only
relatively null may be confirmed, either tacitly or expressly. La. Civ. Code arts.
1842 and 2031.
The contracts at issue were not signed by Juanita as seller and do not reflect
her concurrence. See Solet v. Brooks, 09- 0568 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 16/ 09), 30 So. 3d
96, 100; see also South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Eisman, 430 So. 2d 256, 258-
11 59 (La. App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 437 So. 2d 1154 ( La. 1983). There was no evidence
presented that Juanita renounced the right to concur. Consequently, the contracts
were relatively null and subject to confirmation. See La. Civ. Code art. 2031.
Rather than finding the contracts to be relatively null, the trial court found the
contracts to be invalid and unenforceable. The trial court stated it was following
Solet v. Brooks, in which this court found that a contract signed by only one of the
spouses could not operate to transfer or as an option to sell immovable property. See
Solet, 30 So. 3d at 100. However, this court' s analysis in Solet was specific to the
issues raised in that appeal. Notably, those issues did not include renunciation,
concurrence, or ratification of the contract by the non -signing spouse. Under the
particular facts presented in that case, the contract signed by only one spouse was
invalid. Although stated in broad terms, the holding in Solet is limited to its facts
and does not apply to render relatively null contracts absolutely null in contravention
of the Civil Code. The trial court committed legal error to the extent it relied on
Solet to find the subject contracts to be invalid and unenforceable, rather than relative
nullities.
When the appellate court finds a reversible legal error or manifest error of
material fact, it is required, if it can, to review the record de novo and render a
judgment on the merits. See Arias v. Stolthaven New Orleans, L.L.C., 08- 1111 ( La.
5/ 5/ 09), 9 So. 3d 815, 818; St. James Behavioral Health Hosp., Inc. v. Gopalam, 16-
0170 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 28/ 16), 199 So. 3d 639, 644- 45, writ denied, 16- 1696 ( La.
1/ 9/ 17), 214 So. 3d 864. Therefore, we consider the evidence presented to determine
if Juanita' s actions constituted confirmation sufficient to cure the relatively null
contracts.
Confirmation of a contract involves making the contract valid by formal
assent. Zeller v. Webre, 09- 45 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 5/ 26/ 09), 17 So. 3d 55, 58. One
court has explained:
12 That assent can be evidenced through the typical actions signifying ratification of a defective contract.... While no clear definition exists in the statutes or case law as to what confirmation acts validate a relatively null contract, jurisprudence makes it clear that acts sufficient to ratify a contract will act as confirmation of the contract. Confirmation and ratification are used almost interchangeably, or as non- exclusive
actions. When a contract is ratified through the subsequent actions of the parties, that contract is confirmed by that ratification.
Rowan v. Town ofArnaudville, 02- 0882 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/ 11/ 02), 832 So. 2d 1185,
11.90; see also Meaghan Frances Hardcastle Tr. v. Fleur De Paris, Ltd., 04- 1371
La. App. 4 Cir. 6/ 29/ 05), 917 So. 2d 448, 451 ( quoting Rowan, 832 So. 2d at 1190).
Whether the actions of the spouse who did not sign amount to confirmation is a fact -
specific inquiry. Cf. Thomassee v. Thomassee, 15- 0127 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 21/ 15),
2015WL5547483, ** 34; Zeller, 17 So. 3d at 59- 60.
In this case, Juanita was physically present when each contract was signed.
Juanita admitted that she knew of the contracts and signed one of them as a witness.
She testified that she told Bobby she " wasn' t for it," but did not return the money
because " it was up to him. He was the leader of my family. And what he wanted to
do is what got done at the time." When asked if Bobby told her that he would sell
the property whether she liked it or not, she responded "[ m] ore or less, yes." She
equivocated as to whether she thought the contracts were sales, agreeing she knew
there was a transfer of property, but later explaining " it was strictly an agreement,
more or less," and "[ i] t was ... a ten year agreement with them." She denied
negotiating the checks for the lump sum payments, but testified she cashed or
deposited them and that she and Bobby used the money to develop a third row of
RV spots. She admitted that she saw the plaintiffs building the camps on the
property and did nothing to stop them. When asked specifically about the ten-year
term and whether she understood the property was to be transferred upon its
expiration, she responded, " If it was clear and free. If the property was clear."
13 In Thomassee, this court considered the validity of an oral sale of an interest
in immovable property by the husband alone. The wife acknowledged that she knew
of the transaction and that the husband gave her proceeds from the sale to upgrade
her wedding ring. Noting the wife did not object to or contest the transaction, this
court concluded the wife' s acceptance of proceeds from the sale was sufficient to
establish her tacit confirmation of the transaction so as to cure its relative nullity. See Thomassee, 2015VVL5547483 at * 4.
We find no material distinction between the facts presented in Thomassee and
those presented herein. Juanita knew of the contracts. Though she may have
privately voiced some disagreement to her husband, she admitted that she deferred
to her husband' s decision. She then participated in investing the plaintiffs' payments
in the community business. Juanita' s actions were sufficient to establish her tacit
confirmation of the transactions so as to cure the relative nullities. Cf. Thomassee,
2015WL5547483 at * 4. The trial court erred in finding the contracts to be invalid
and unenforceable.
Upon an obligor' s failure to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not to
do an act, or to execute an instrument, the court shall grant specific performance plus
damages for delay if the obligee so demands. If specific performance is
impracticable, the court may allow damages to the obligee. La. Civ. Code art. 1986.
Because the trial court found the contracts to be invalid and unenforceable, it did not
reach the issues of damages and whether specific performance is impracticable. The
record before us raises questions as to both issues; therefore, we remand this matter
to the trial court to consider these issues in the first instance and render judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court' s August 3, 2018 judgment that dismissed all claims is
reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions that it render
14 judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the
Succession of Bobby E. Bryan and Juanita Bryan.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
15 STATE OF LOUISIANA
FIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2019 CA 0062
GUIDRY, J. dissents with reasons.
GUIDRY, J. dissenting.
The proper interpretation of a contract is a question of law subject to de novo
review on appeal. Montz v. Theard, 01- 0768, p. 5 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2/ 27/ 02), 818
So. 2d 181, 185. When considering legal issues, the reviewing court accords no
special weight to the trial court but conducts a de novo review of questions of law
and renders judgment on the record. Moritz, 01- 0768 at p. 5, 818 So. 2d at 185.
The agreements at issue, each entitled " Lease/ Purchase of Immovable
Property," list MarshMasters as lessor, contain a detailed description of the leased
1 property, provide for a lease term of ten years, and an agreement by each set of
lessees to pay monthly rent in the amount $250.00 per month, payable in a lump sum
to lessor in the amount of $35, 000. 00 for the Harps and Lewises and $ 30, 000. 00 for
the Wades at the time of execution of the lease. Additionally, as consideration for
the lump sum advance lease payment, lessor agrees and obligates itself to transfer a
fee simple title in and to the described property, good and clear, to lessee within
twenty days of the expiration of the ten year lease term. The agreements further
provide that lessees shall be entitled to use water and sewer facilities on lessor' s
property at no charge, that lessees shall be responsible for all charges for electricity
used on the leased premises during the term of the lease, and upon termination of the
lease, lessees shall begin to pay to lessor $400.00 per year for general upkeep of the
property and grounds servicing lessee' s property. Each agreement was signed by
Bobby Bryan, as authorized agent for lessor, MarshMasters.
The evidence admitted at the trial of this matter demonstrates that the three
pieces of property at issue were purchased by Bobby and Juanita during their
marriage and as such are community property. Furthermore, Juanita confirmed that
while she and her husband named the RV park MarshMasters, the business was not
incorporated, the property at issue was not transferred to MarshMasters, and the
property at all times remained community property owned by Bobby and Juanita.
According to La. C. C. art. 2347, the concurrence of both spouses is required
for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of community immovable property. When
the concurrence of the spouses is required by law, the alienation, encumbrance, or
lease of community property by a spouse is relatively null unless the other spouse
has renounced the right to concur. La. C. C. art. 2353. Furthermore, a transfer of
immovable property must be made by authentic act or act under private signature.
La. C. C. art. 1839.
2 In the instant case, while there are several deficiencies with the written
agreements, each agreement purports to transfer ownership of the subject,
community properties to the Harps, Wades, and Lewises upon expiration of their
ten-year lease terms. As such, the concurrence of both Bobby and Juanita was
required to validly alienate and/or transfer the community immovable property.
Furthermore, because the agreements purport to transfer ownership of immovable
property, they must be authentic acts or acts under private signature. See La. C. C.
art. 1839.
It is undisputed that Juanita did not sign any of the agreements as " lessor" and
only signed the Lewis agreement as a witness. The agreements were not executed
before a notary public and therefore, they are not authentic acts. Furthermore, while
they could be considered acts under private signature, they are not signed by both
spouses. As correctly noted by the majority, the failure of one of the spouses to
concur in the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of a community immovable creates
only a relative nullity, which generally may be cured through ratification and/ or
confirmation. See Thomassee v. Thomassee, 15- 0127 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 21/ 15),
2015WL5547483 * 3 ( unpublished opinion) ( citing Zeller v. Webre, 09- 45, p. 6 ( La.
App. 5th Cir. 5/ 26/ 09), 17 So. 3d 55, 58- 59). In finding Juanita' s failure to sign the
agreements at issue created a relative nullity, the majority concluded, relying on
Thomassee, that Juanita' s actions were sufficient to establish her tacit confirmation
of the transactions so as to cure the relative nullities. However, the majority' s
reliance on this court' s previous decision in Thomassee is misplaced.
In Thomassee, this court found, citing Zeller, at p. 6, 17 So. 3d at 58- 60, that
a spouse, who never expressly concurred in her husband' s sale of a one- half interest
in a piece of community immovable property, tacitly confirmed the oral transaction
by accepting funds that she knew came from the sales transaction to purchase a
diamond ring. Thomassee, 2015WL5547483 at * 4. However, Thomassee involved
3 an oral agreement to transfer immovable property, as contemplated by La. C. C. art.
1839, which provides that "[ A] n oral transfer is valid between the parties when the
property has been actually delivered and the transferor recognizes the transfer when
interrogated on oath." Both spouses in Thomassee recognized the sale under oath,
and this court found that the property had been delivered. Thomassee,
2015WL5547483 at * 4 and 5. As such, a signature was not required in Thomassee
to have a valid transfer of immovable property.
In the instant case, however, the agreements transferring immovable
community property were written agreements, and as such, the law proscribes that
such a transfer of an immovable must be by authentic act or by act under private
signature. See La. C. C. art. 1839. Accordingly, while the agreements may be
relatively null because one spouse failed to concur, they are also subject to the form
requirements for transfers of immovable property. Because the agreements
transferring community immovable property purport to be acts under private
signature, the agreements required the signature of both spouses in order to be
considered valid transfers of community immovable property. See Solet v. Brooks,
09- 0568, p. 6 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 16/ 09), 30 So. 3d 96, 100. Accordingly, Juanita' s
failure to sign the agreements at issue renders those agreements invalid.
M STATE OF LOUISIANA
tfC, j WHIPPLE, C.J., concurring.
Despite the imprecise language of the judgment stating that " all claims" were
dismissed (which arguably could be read to encompass Juanita' s reconventional and
amended claims, even though judgment was rendered in her favor), I agree with the
ultimate ruling by the majority herein on the merits. Accordingly, I concur in the
result.