Joan Kathryn Wenger v. Frank Dreesen, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01965
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2

3 Joan Kathryn Wenger, Case No. 2:23-cv-01965-CDS-DJA

4 Petitioner Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

5 v.

6 Frank Dreesen, et al., [ECF No. 29]

7 Respondents

8 9 This habeas corpus action, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was initiated pro se on 10 November 28, 2023, by Joan Kathryn Wenger, who was then incarcerated at Nevada’s Florence 11 McClure Women’s Correctional Center serving a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of 12 parole after ten years on a conviction of vehicular homicide, entered following her guilty plea, in 13 Nevada’s Ninth Judicial District Court (Douglas County). See ECF Nos. 1, 1-1, 1-2. The Court 14 appointed counsel for Wenger, and, with counsel, Wenger filed an amended habeas petition on 15 November 18, 2024. ECF Nos. 3, 5, 13. On June 11, 2025, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss, 16 contending in relevant part that this action should be dismissed on the ground of the fugitive 17 disentitlement doctrine because Wenger escaped from prison on September 14, 2024, and remains 18 a fugitive, out of state custody. ECF No. 29. Wenger’s counsel filed an opposition to that motion 19 on Wenger’s behalf on August 11, 2025, and the respondents replied on October 10, 2025. ECF Nos. 20 31, 34. 21 Wenger states in her first amended habeas petition, filed on November 18, 2024: 22 On September 16, 2024, the Nevada Department of Corrections reported that two days earlier, Joan Wenger “walked away from Jean Conservation Camp,” 23 where she had been incarcerated. . . . 24 ECF No. 13 at 1, n.1. This is undisputed. It is also undisputed that, as of the date of this order, 25 Wenger remains a fugitive. See https://ofdsearch.doc.nv.gov/form.php (Search: Offender ID 26 1250827). 1 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine recognizes that “escape from custody is inconsistent 2 with the pursuit of judicial remedies and constitutes a voluntary waiver of any pending judicial 3 review of a criminal conviction.” United States v. Murgia-Oliveras, 421 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2006), 4 citing Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.2003). The Supreme Court has sustained 5 the authority of a court applying the doctrine to dismiss an appeal in a criminal matter when the 6 party seeking relief becomes a fugitive. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996). The doctrine 7 is a “discretionary device by which courts may dismiss criminal appeals or civil actions by or 8 against individuals who are fugitives from justice,” and “[i]t has been applied not only in criminal 9 appeals, but in civil cases as well, including inter alia, habeas and other collateral challenges to a 10 criminal conviction.” Frank v. Yates, 887 F.Supp.2d 958, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (internal citations 11 omitted) (citing examples). The doctrine is severe in that it mandates dismissal of a habeas action 12 without adjudicating the merits of the petitioner’s claims, “[b]ut when circumstances warrant, it 13 serves several important interests.” Antonio-Martinez., 317 F.3d at 1091. The doctrine “discourages the 14 felony of escape and encourages voluntary surrenders.” Degen, 517 U.S. at 824. The doctrine 15 “promotes the efficient, dignified operation of the courts.” Id. In addition, “[f]light frustrates the 16 execution of judgment should the government prevail; by invoking the doctrine, we ‘avoid making 17 decisions that could not be enforced.’” Id., quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th 18 Cir.2002), and citing Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). 19 In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, Wenger points out, correctly, that the 20 doctrine is a “discretionary device.” ECF No. 31 at 2. She goes on to argue that the Court should 21 exercise its discretion to decline application of the doctrine; her entire argument in this regard is as 22 follows: “To do otherwise means that Wenger’s valid and timely raised claims will never be heard, 23 prejudicing her.” Id at 3. But the entire point of the doctrine is the fugitive petitioner’s waiver of 24 claims before they are adjudicated on their merits. Wenger points to no legitimate reason why the 25 fugitive disentitlement doctrine should not apply in her case. All the policies behind the doctrine 26 1}|support its application. The Court will apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and will grant 2||the respondents’ motion to dismiss. 3 I therefore order that respondents’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 29] is GRANTED. This 4||action is dismissed. Because reasonable jurists would not find this ruling debatable or wrong, the 5 || petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter 6||judgment accordingly, and to close this case. “| 7 Dated: November 14, 2025 J, /

9 Cristina D. Silva United States District Judge 10 / ; ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26