Jo Ellen Peters v. Amazon Services

669 F. App'x 487
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 13, 2016
Docket14-35294
StatusUnpublished

This text of 669 F. App'x 487 (Jo Ellen Peters v. Amazon Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jo Ellen Peters v. Amazon Services, 669 F. App'x 487 (9th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Jo Ellen Peters and Ken Lane appeal the district court’s order compelling arbitration of their claims against Amazon Services LLC (“Amazon”). We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). We review de novo the district court’s order compelling arbitration. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 417 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2005).

The district court did not err in concluding that Lane and Peters agreed to arbitrate their disputes with Amazon. The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” 9 U.S.C. § 2, and the FAA mandates that courts compel arbitration as to issues encompassed by valid arbitration agreements, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). Lane and Peters agreed to Amazon’s Business Solutions Agreement (“BSA”), which contains an unambiguous agreement to arbitrate “[a]ny dispute ... or claim relating in any way” to the BSA or use of Amazon’s services. The BSA, as “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” is subject to the FAA and must be enforced. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.

Lane and Peters counter that Amazon’s Marketplace Participation Agreement (“MPA”), which contains a forum selection clause, mandates litigation, not arbitration. They argue that the MPA, as one of Amazon’s “Program Policies,” takes precedence over the BSA and makes the arbitration clause unenforceable. This argument fails because the MPA falls within the BSA’s definition of a “Seller Agreement,” and therefore does not constitute one of Amar zon’s separately defined “Program Policies.”

Lane also argues that, regardless of what happens to Peters or the purported class, his individual claims are governed exclusively by the MPA because they arise out of an account formed prior to the BSA’s existence. However, Lane did sign the BSA, which represents the parties’ “entire agreement” and supersedes all pri- or agreements, and the BSA’s broad arbitration clause covers “[a]ny dispute ... or claim” and is not limited to prospective disagreements.

Accordingly, the district court did not err when it compelled arbitration.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
669 F. App'x 487, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jo-ellen-peters-v-amazon-services-ca9-2016.