NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2536-19 A-2882-19
J&M INTERIORS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CENTERTON SQUARE OWNERS, LLC, CENTERTON SQUARE MANAGER, CORP., PRESTIGE PROPERTIES & DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., BURLINGTONCOAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE, CORPORATION, d/b/a BURLINGTON STORES, INC., d/b/a BURLINGTON, d/b/a BCF, d/b/a BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY, d/b/a BURLINGTON STORE, d/b/a BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE OF NEW JERSEY, INC., d/b/a BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY DIRECT CORPORATE, UNITED RENTALS (North America) J.R. PRISCO, INC., and BREAKER ELECTRIC, INC.,
Defendants, and
PETORE ASSOCIATES, INC., d/b/a PETORE CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
UNITED RENTALS (North America), INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
HARVEY ONORE, THEODORE VITALE a/k/a TED VITALE and MARY ANN VITALE,
Third-Party Defendants. _______________________________
BREAKER ELECTRIC, INC., 488 MONMOUTH ROAD, CLARKSBURG, NJ 08510,
PETORE ASSOCIATES, INC., d/b/a PETORE CONSTRUCTION, 1518 HIGHWAY 138, WALL, NJ 07719,
A-2536-19 2 and
BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE CORPORATION, 1830 ROUTE 130 NORTH BURLINGTON, NJ 0016, and CENTERTON SQUARE OWNERS, LLC, 546 FIFTH AVENUE, 15TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10036,
Defendants. _______________________________
Submitted February 22, 2021 – Decided May 18, 2021
Before Judges Messano, Hoffman, and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket Nos. L-1045-18 and L-1125-18
Davidson, Eastman, Munoz, Paone, PA, attorneys for appellants (James A. Paone, II, of counsel and on the briefs; Herschel P. Rose, on the briefs).
Kreiser & Associates, PC, attorneys for respondent J&M Interiors, Inc. (Travis L. Kreiser, on the brief)
Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman, PC, attorneys for respondent Breaker Electric, Inc. (George E. Pallas, Ashling A. Ehrhardt and Sydney Pierce, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A-2536-19 3 These two related appeals arise out of two breach of contract actions
separately brought by subcontractors J&M Interiors, Inc. (J&M) and Breaker
Electric, Inc. (Breaker) (collectively, plaintiffs) against defendant Petore
Associates, Inc., seeking payment of outstanding balances for work on a
construction project.
In A-2536-19, defendant appeals from the October 25, 2019 order
awarding J&M $107,285.80 plus interest and fees and the December 20, 2019
order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration. In A-2882-19, defendant
appeals the December 20, 2019 order awarding Breaker $209,939.09 plus
interest and fees and the February 14, 2020 order denying defendant’s motion
for reconsideration. In both appeals, defendant raises essentially identical
arguments regarding identical contract provisions, contending the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment and abused its discretion in declining to
reconsider. Following our review, we are satisfied that defendant's arguments
lack substantive merit. Accordingly, we consolidate these appeals for the
purposes of this opinion and affirm.
I.
In November 2017, Burlington Coat Factory (Burlington) hired defendant
as a general contractor to perform renovations at multiple retail stores.
A-2536-19 4 Defendant hired plaintiffs separately to perform certain work at Burlington's
store at the Centerton Mall in Mount Laurel.
Appeal A-2882-19 (Breaker)
On November 11, 2017, defendant entered into a written subcontract
agreement with Breaker, wherein Breaker agreed to perform certain electrical
work at the Centerton Mall store for $275,000. The subcontract provided that
"[r]eceipt of payment for Subcontractors work from [Burlington] by [defendant]
shall be a condition precedent to the right of the Subcontractor to receive
payment from [defendant]" and Breaker "expressly waives and releases all
claims or rights to recover lost profit (except for profit on work actually
performed) . . . and any other indirect damages, costs or expenses . . . arising out
of or related to the Agreement, including the breach thereof by [defendant]."
Over the course of the project, Breaker and defendant entered into change
orders to amend the subcontract, adjusting the total value to $331,089. By
January 8, 2018, Breaker completed all work set forth in the subcontract and
subsequent change orders.
Breaker submitted six invoices to defendant, totaling $331,089; defendant
made three payments to Breaker, totaling $88,458. For the second and third
payments, Breaker signed a "Partial Lien Waiver" and "Subcontractor/Supplier
A-2536-19 5 Partial Waiver of Liens & Release" (the waivers), wherein it "acknowledged that
the amount of payments received to the date of the waiver represents the current
amount agreed to be due" and that it "[had] no claims for additional work,
damages, or for any other reasons whatsoever." In addition, Breaker waived and
released
all liens or rights to lien, claims, and demands of every kind whatsoever now existing for work, labor or materials furnished to Owner and acknowledges that all payments heretofore and/or contemporaneously received have been and are accepted in full satisfaction of the liens or right to lien waived hereunder and all the work performed up to the Date of Requisition.
After the third payment, Breaker received no further payments toward the
remaining balance of $209,939.09. On May 31, 2018, Breaker filed suit against
defendant, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of the
Prompt Payment Act (PPA), N.J.S.A. 2A:30A-2.
On November 22, 2019, Breaker moved for summary judgment against
defendant before Judge Aimee Belgard. Opposing summary judgment,
defendant argued Breaker waived its claims to the full payment and nonetheless
was not entitled to full payment until defendant received full payment from
Burlington. By this time, Burlington had paid defendant the full contract price,
A-2536-19 6 except for a contractually designated ten percent retainage. Defendant opted to
accept the judge's tentative decision in lieu of arguing the motion.
On December 20, 2019, the judge issued an order granting Breaker's
motion in its entirety. In a well-reasoned written opinion, the judge rejected
each of defendant's arguments, finding (1) the plain language of the waivers do
not release defendant's obligation to pay the full amount; (2) no mutual intent
for the waivers to amount to accord and satisfaction; and (3) defendant’s
payment from Burlington satisfied the condition precedent to trigger full
payment of Breaker by defendant. The judge awarded Breaker $209,939.09 plus
interest, reasonable costs, and attorney's fees, pursuant to the PPA.
On January 13, 2020, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the
summary judgment order. On February 14, 2020, Judge Belgard issued an order
denying defendant’s motion and provided an additional written opinion, finding
no basis to alter her original decision. This appeal followed. 1
1 Defendant's appeal of the December 20, 2019 summary judgment order is untimely. Rule 2:4-1(a) requires appeals from final judgments "be taken within 45 days of their entry." Rule 2:4-3(e) provides that the time to appeal is tolled by "the timely filing and service" of a motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the forty-five days for appealing the summary judgment order began running on December 20, 2019 but tolled when defendant filed its reconsideration motion on January 13, 2020; at that time, twenty-four of the allotted forty-five days had elapsed. The time to appeal resumed when Judge Belgard denied the
A-2536-19 7 Appeal A-2536-19 (J&M)
On November 15, 2017, defendant entered into a written subcontract
agreement with J&M, wherein J&M agreed to perform certain carpentry work
at the Centerton Mall store for $203,000. The relevant provisions of J&M's
subcontract are materially identical to those in Breaker's subcontract. Over the
course of the project, J&M and defendant entered into change orders to amend
the subcontract, adjusting the total value to $221,576.20. By February 15, 2018,
J&M had completed all work set forth in the subcontract and subsequent change
orders.
J&M submitted five invoices to defendant, totaling $221,576.20;
defendant made three payments to J&M, totaling $114,290. For each of the
three payments, J&M signed partial waivers of liens. The relevant provisions
of the partial waivers are materially identical to those signed by Breaker.
After the third payment, J&M received no further payment from defendant
toward the remaining $107,285.80 balance. On May 18, 2018, J&M filed suit
reconsideration motion on February 14, 2020; with twenty-one days remaining, defendant was required to appeal the summary judgment order no later than March 6, 2020. Defendant filed this appeal on March 23, 2020. Nonetheless, we address the merits of this summary judgment order on appeal. A-2536-19 8 against defendant, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation
of the PPA.
On September 26, 2019, J&M moved for summary judgment against
defendant, which was followed by defendant's cross-motion for summary
judgment. On October 22, 2019, Judge Belgard heard oral argument on the
motions. On October 25, 2019, the judge issued an order, accompanied by
another well-reasoned written opinion, granting J&M's motion for essentially
the same reasons she granted Breaker's motion – any conditions precedent for
defendant to pay J&M were met and J&M did not waive its right to full payment.
The judge awarded J&M $107,285.80 plus interest, reasonable costs, and
attorney's fees, pursuant to the PPA.
On November 22, 2019, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of
the summary judgment order. On December 20, 2019, Judge Belgard issued an
order denying defendant’s motion and provided an additional written opinion,
finding that defendant "failed to satisfy its burden to demonstrate the [c]ourt
entered its decision on palpably incorrect or irrational basis or show the [c]ourt
A-2536-19 9 either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative,
competent evidence." This appeal followed. 2
In this consolidated opinion, we restate the issues raised on these appeals
as follows: (1) whether the subcontracts conditioned defendant's obligation to
pay plaintiffs on defendant receiving full payment from Burlington; (2) whether
plaintiffs waived their rights to full payment and to assert PPA claims in the
subcontracts; and (3) whether plaintiffs' execution of partial waivers of liens and
defendant providing partial payment created a valid accord and satisfaction.
II.
We review the trial court's grants of summary judgment de novo,
"applying the same standard governing the trial court." Brennan v. Lonegan,
454 N.J. Super. 613, 618 (2018) (citing Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.,
219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014)). R. 4:46-29(c) provides that the court should grant
summary judgment:
[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law. An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the
2 Defendant's appeal of the October 25, 2019 summary judgment order is similarly untimely. See R. 2:4-1(a), (e). Nonetheless, we also address the merits of this summary judgment order. A-2536-19 10 burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.
The court need only submit an issue to the trier of fact when the non-moving
party has presented sufficient evidence such that a "rational factfinder" could
"resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). However, "[i]f there
exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that
issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a 'genuine' issue of material
fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2." Ibid. Ultimately, "when the evidence 'is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,' the trial court should
not hesitate to grant summary judgment." Ibid. (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
We review the trial court's denial of motion for reconsiderations under an
abuse of discretion standard. Cypress Point Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Adria
Towers, L.L.C., 441 N.J. Super. 369, 372 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd, 226 N.J.403
(2016) (citing Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996)).
The court should only grant a motion for reconsideration when "1) the Court has
expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2)
A-2536-19 11 it is obvious that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the
significance of probative, competent evidence[,]" or 3) "if a litigant wishes to
bring new or additional information to the Court's attention which it could not
have provided on the first application[.]" Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384
(quoting D'Atria v. D'atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). The court
should not reconsider its decision "merely because of [a litigant's] dissatisfaction
with a decision of the Court." D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401. Rather, the
"litigant must initially demonstrate that the Court acted in an arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable manner, before the Court should engage in the actual
reconsideration process." Ibid.
A.
We first address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in
interpreting the following provision in plaintiffs' subcontracts: "Receipt of
payment for Subcontractors work from [Burlington] by [defendant] shall be a
condition precedent to the right of the Subcontractor to receive payment from
[defendant]." Defendant contends this provision conditioned defendant's
obligation to pay plaintiffs on Burlington's full payment to defendant.
Defendant further contends the condition triggering payment to plaintiffs never
occurred because Burlington never paid defendant the full contract price, and
A-2536-19 12 therefore defendant was not required to perform. At the very least, defendant
maintains, this provision is ambiguous, and the trial court erroneously
determined its meaning on summary judgment.
The interpretation and construction of a contract is a question of law,
"subject to de novo review by an appellate court." Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J.
213, 222 (2011). "The interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a legal question
for the court and may be decided on summary judgment unless 'there is
uncertainty, ambiguity or the need for parol evidence in aid of interpretation[.]'"
Celanese Ltd. v. Essex County Imp. Authority, 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App.
Div. 2009) (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495,
502 (App. Div. 2000)).
When parties dispute the meaning of a contract, it is the court's task to
"discern and implement the common intention of the parties." Globe Motor Co.
v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 483 (2016) (quoting Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258,
266 (2007)). "In interpreting a contract, a court must try to ascertain the
intention of the parties as revealed by the language used, the situation of the
parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects the parties were striving to
attain." Celanese, 404 N.J. Super. at 528. When a contract's terms are clear and
unambiguous, the court must enforce those terms as written, using their plain
A-2536-19 13 and ordinary meaning, as those "words presumably will reflect the parties'
expectations." Kieffer, 205 N.J. at 223.
"An ambiguity in a contract exists if the terms of the contract are
susceptible to at least two reasonable alternative interpretations[.]" Schor v.
FMS Financial Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nester v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 210 (App. Div.
1997)). "The court should examine the document as a whole and the 'court
should not torture the language of [a contract] to create ambiguity." Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Nester, 301 N.J. Super. at 210).
Applying these principles and viewing the subcontracts in the light most
favorable to defendant, defendant's argument fails. The subcontracts condition
defendant's obligation to pay plaintiffs on defendant's "[r]eceipt of payment . . .
from [Burlington]." Nothing in the subcontracts' plain language requires
defendant to receive full or final payment from Burlington before paying
plaintiffs. At most, the subcontracts condition defendant's payment to plaintiffs
on defendant's receipt of total payment for plaintiffs' work. Plaintiffs performed
all work under their subcontracts. Defendant received total payment for the
plaintiffs' work, as the only money not paid by Burlington to defendant was the
A-2536-19 14 contractually designated retainage. Therefore, defendant was obligated to make
full payment to plaintiffs.
B.
Next, we address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in
interpreting the following provision in the plaintiffs' subcontracts: "[plaintiffs]
expressly waives and releases all claims or rights to recover lost profit (except
for profit on work actually performed) . . . and any other indirect damages, costs
or expenses in any way arising out of or related to the Agreement, including the
breach thereof by [defendant]." Defendant contends plaintiffs' claims under the
PPA are claims for "indirect damages . . . arising out of" the subcontracts and,
therefore, plaintiffs waived their claims when they signed their subcontracts.
Defendant further contends the provision is at least ambiguous regarding this
waiver of rights, and the trial court erroneously construed this ambiguity in favor
of plaintiffs instead of defendant.
The PPA grants subcontractors a right to sue if their general contractor
fails to pay "within [ten] calendar days of the receipt of each periodic payment,
final payment or receipt of retainage monies, the full amount received for the
work of the subcontractor . . . based on the work completed . . . under the
applicable contract." N.J.S.A. 2A:30A-2(b). That said, "individuals may waive
A-2536-19 15 a right, without regard to whether its source is constitutional, statutory,
contractual, or otherwise, so long as the individual had full knowledge of the
right and intentionally surrendered it." General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Cahill, 375 N.J. Super. 553, 566 (App. Div. 2005). "[U]nder New Jersey law,
any contractual 'waiver-of-rights provision must reflect that [the party] has
agreed clearly and unambiguously' to its terms." Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services
Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 443 (2014) (quoting Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J.
293, 302 (2003)).
In order for a party to agree to a waiver-of-rights provision clearly and
unambiguously, a party must "have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent
to surrender those rights." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 (quoting Knorr v. v. Smeal,
178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003)). The waiving party must also be aware of the
ramifications of waiving his or her rights. Id. at 443. Further, a "clause
depriving a citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose " and
its language should be clear and unambiguous. Id. at 444, 445 (quoting
Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124,
132 (2001)). When a court interprets a waiver-of-right provision, "contractual
language alleged to constitute a waiver will not be read expansively." Garfinkel,
168 N.J. at 132 (quoting Red Bank Reg'l Educ. Ass'n v. Red Bank Reg'l High
A-2536-19 16 Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 122, 140 (1978)). Such provision need not "list every
imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of
rights" but should at least inform the waiving party that it agrees to waive all
statutory claims arising out of the contractual relationship. Garfinkel, 168 N.J.
at 135. It should also be noted that a "[w]aiver of a statutory right . . . will not
be allowed where it 'would violate a public policy expressed in the statute.'"
Cahill, 375 N.J. at 566 (quoting City Hall Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. of Newark v.
Florence Realty Co., 110 N.J. Eq. 12, 14 (Ch. 1932).
Here, even if a complete waiver of the right to sue is permissible on public
policy grounds, the provision in question fails to constitute an unambiguous and
clear waiver of plaintiffs' statutory rights. The waiver provision in the
subcontract did not specifically state that plaintiffs waived their rights to any or
all statutory rights associated with the subcontracts. We are satisfied the record
lacks any evidence to support defendant's claim that plaintiffs knowingly or
intentionally waived their statutory rights under the PPA. These provisions are
not ambiguous, and the trial court appropriately determined their meaning as a
matter of law on summary judgment.
C.
A-2536-19 17 Finally, we address defendant's argument that plaintiffs waived their
rights to full payment by signing the partial waivers of release. Plaintiffs each
signed waivers releasing "all liens or rights to lien, claims, and demands of every
kind whatsoever now existing for work, labor or material furnished to the
Owner" and "acknowledging that the amount of payments received to the date
of this waiver represents the current amount agreed to be due to it in accordance
with its agreement and work completed[.]"
Defendant contends that, on summary judgment, the trial court should
have interpreted plaintiffs' signing of the partial waivers as accepting less
payment than owed and waiving all claims. Defendant maintains that the plain
language of these waivers released defendant of its obligations to make full
payment under the subcontracts. In addition, defendant contends that the trial
court erred in declining to consider the accord and satisfaction argument raised
in its motion for reconsideration because defendant properly brought it to the
court's attention in its opposition to plaintiffs' summary judgment motions.
Defendant's arguments lack merit. Generally, any agreement to modify
an existing contract "must be based upon new or additional consideration" from
both parties. County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 100 (1998) (citing Ross
v. Orr, 3 N.J. 277, 282 (1949)); see also Decker v. George W. Smith & Co., 88
A-2536-19 18 N.J.L. 630, 632, 96 A. 915 (E. & A. 1916) ("A consideration is necessary to
render an accord and satisfaction valid."). "[A] promise to perform a pre-
existing duty" is insufficient consideration to modify the terms of a contract.
Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 253 (2012) (citing Williston on Contracts § 7:37
(4th ed. 2008)). In other words, a subsequent promise to fulfil an oblig ation
already required in a contract cannot be considered new or additional
consideration.
Here, defendant did not provide new or additional consideration in
exchange for plaintiffs' partial waivers. Plaintiffs agreed to release of their liens,
but plaintiffs did not "'get something' out of the exchange." Oscar v. Simeonidis,
352 N.J. Super. 476, 484 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Continental Bank of
Pennsylvania v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., 93 N.J. 153, 170 (1983).
Therefore, the waivers do not alter defendant’s obligation to pay plaintiffs under
the subcontracts.
The trial court appropriately granted summary judgment and we find no
error in the denial of defendant's motion for reconsideration.
Affirmed.
A-2536-19 19