J.K. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 29, 2015
• Docket: 49A02-1504-JV-231
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Oct 29 2015, 9:50 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Megan Shipley Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Karl M. Scharnberg Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J. K., October 29, 2015 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1504-JV-231 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Marilyn A. Appellee-Petitioner. Moores, Judge The Honorable Scott Stowers, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D09-1412-JD-2876

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 1 of 10 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, J.K., appeals the trial court’s order of restitution

following his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for the offense of theft,

which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, Ind. Code §

§ 35-43-4-2(a).

[2] We affirm in part and remand in part.

ISSUE

[3] J.K. raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the

following single issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering

J.K. to pay $800.00 in restitution as a condition of his probation.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On September 28, 2014, fourteen-year-old J.K. grabbed an iPod out of a

schoolmate’s hands while they were riding the school bus, and he refused to

return it upon the owner’s request. After the theft was reported, the

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) made contact with

J.K.’s mother, who explained that she had confiscated an iPod from J.K. after

discovering it in his possession. The stolen iPod was turned over to the IMPD. 1

On December 4, 2014, the State filed a petition alleging J.K. to be a delinquent

child. Specifically, the petition charged that J.K. had committed Count I, theft,

1 The IMPD also recovered several other electronic devices, which had been reported stolen following an earlier break-in at the same schoolmate’s home, from J.K.’s bedroom.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 2 of 10 a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A); and Count

II, theft, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a).

[5] On March 3, 2015, the State and J.K. entered into an Admission Agreement,

whereby J.K. admitted to the allegation of Count II, theft as a Class A

misdemeanor if committed by an adult, in exchange for the State’s dismissal of

Count I, theft as a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. The Admission

Agreement further provided that the State would recommend a disposition of

formal probation, and J.K. “agree[d] to make restitution to the victim(s) for the

following amount: parties stipulate the amount [of] $800.00. Parties left the

ability to pay to [the] court.” (Appellant’s App. p. 48). On March 31, 2015, the

trial court conducted a dispositional hearing and accepted the Admission

Agreement, placing J.K. on probation until September 29, 2015. As a special

condition of probation, the trial court ordered J.K. to “[p]ay to the Clerk

$800.00 restitution to be withdrawn by [the theft victim and his father].”

(Appellant’s App. p. 10).

[6] J.K. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[7] A restitution order is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and our

court will reverse only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. M.L. v.

State, 838 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We

will find an abuse of discretion if “the trial court’s determination is clearly

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 3 of 10 reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. J.K.

claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering J.K. to pay $800.00

in restitution “because the evidence establishes that J.K. is indigent and cannot

pay restitution.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 3).

[8] A juvenile court is authorized to “[o]rder the child to pay restitution if the

victim provides reasonable evidence of the victim’s loss, which the child may

challenge at the dispositional hearing.” I.C. § 31-37-19-5(b)(4). “The purpose

behind an order of restitution is to impress upon a juvenile delinquent the

magnitude of the loss he has caused and to defray costs to the victim caused by

the delinquent act.” M.M. v. State, 31 N.E.3d 516, 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, J.K. specifically agreed in his plea

agreement that he owed restitution in the amount of $800.00, contingent upon

the trial court’s determination that he has the ability to make such a payment.

The issue of whether J.K. is able to pay $800.00 in restitution “is a question of

fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.” M.L., 838 N.E.2d at 530.

[9] “Equal protection and fundamental fairness concerns require that a juvenile

court inquire into a juvenile’s ability to pay before the court can order

restitution as a condition of probation.” J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2011). This inquiry is intended “to prevent indigent [juveniles] from

being imprisoned because of their inability to pay.” Id. (alteration in original).

While the trial court must decide whether the defendant is able to pay the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 4 of 10 amount of restitution ordered, “the [restitution] statute[ 2] does not specify the

extent to which the trial court must inquire to determine the defendant’s

financial status.” Smith v. State, 990 N.E.2d 517, 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),

trans. denied. However, “[o]ur decisions envision at least a minimal inquiry into

the defendant’s ability to pay restitution.” Kays v. State, 963 N.E.2d 507, 510

(Ind. 2012). In general, the inquiry should entail a consideration of factors

including the defendant’s financial status, health, and employment history.

Laker v. State, 869 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[10] At the dispositional hearing, J.K. testified that he is unemployed and does not

possess a work permit, and he does not have a bank account or any money

saved. He stated that he sometimes receives an allowance of $10.00 from his

mother, but “not very often.” (Tr. p. 11). Although he voluntarily performs

community services such as sweeping the parking lot of a local barber shop and

assisting at a food bank and with Toys for Tots, these are unpaid positions.

[11] J.K. argues that this case is analogous to T.H. v. State, 33 N.E.3d 374, 376 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2015), in which our court reversed the trial court’s order for a fifteen-

year-old to pay $1,500.00 in restitution as a condition of his probation. In T.H.,

we found the undisputed evidence established that the fifteen-year-old “did not

2 Except for Indiana Code section 31-37-19-5(b)(4), “[n]o other applicable provision of the juvenile code on delinquency discusses restitution imposed during a delinquency proceeding.” M.M., 31 N.E.3d at 519-20. Nonetheless, we have previously held that the adult restitution statute, Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3, “is instructive when the juvenile [restitution] statute is silent.” Id. at 520. In addition, we also look to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6), which specifically discusses restitution as a condition of probation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 5 of 10 have a work permit, did not have a job, did not have a bank account, did not

have any money in savings, owned no property, and did not have anything else

in his name.” Id. T.H. further suffered from “a list” of disabilities for which he

received $700.00 in monthly SSI disability benefits; however, T.H.’s mother

relied on this income to support T.H. and his six siblings. Id. at 375-76.

Despite T.H.’s testimony “that he would ‘try to’ get a job when he reached the

age of sixteen,” he was unemployed at the time of the dispositional hearing,

and we found “no evidence in the record whatsoever that remotely tends to

establish that T.H. is able to pay restitution in any amount, much less an

aggregate amount of $1,500.” Id. at 376.

[12] Although we agree with J.K. that T.H. is factually similar to the case at hand,

we nevertheless find important distinctions. First, although J.K. suggests that

“[t]here was no realistic possibility” that he could earn the money based on his

age and diagnoses of Asperger’s Syndrome and Disruptive Behavior Disorder,

he admitted during the dispositional hearing that he does not suffer from any

disability that would prevent him from working. (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). Based

on the fact that J.K. has already been working in several non-paid positions, it

is clear that he is able-bodied, willing to work, and capable of following the

instructions of would-be employers. Second, J.K. specifically testified that he

“wouldn’t have a problem doing” odd jobs around the neighborhood to earn

income, such as cleaning up trash, shoveling snow, or mowing grass. (Tr. p.

12). The trial court specifically questioned J.K.’s mother as to whether J.K.

would be “capable of earning some bucks in the neighborhood? You said he

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 6 of 10 likes to sweep the barber shop, things like that. Any reason why he couldn’t go

out and earn some money of his own?” (Tr. p. 16). While J.K.’s mother noted

that “[m]ost [of] the people in our neighborhood have . . . lawn services and all

that[,]” she indicated that nothing would preclude him from seeking

opportunities in the neighborhood to earn income. (Tr. p. 16). Third, in T.H.,

the plea agreement “made no mention of restitution.” T.H., 33 N.E.3d at 375.

Here, however, J.K. specifically agreed that he owed $800.00 in restitution to

the victim(s) of his crime. While J.K. preserved the right to have the trial court

determine his ability to pay this restitution, the trial court clearly considered

several factors in determining that J.K. should “be responsible for paying” and

was capable of doing so in due course. (Tr. p. 16). Thus, we cannot say that

the trial court abused its discretion in determining J.K.’s ability to pay

restitution.

[13] Notwithstanding J.K.’s ability to pay the ordered restitution, J.K. contends that

a remand is necessary because the trial court failed to “fix the manner of

performance” as required by Indiana Code section 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6).

Specifically, J.K. asserts that the trial court did not establish a time frame or

payment plan for the payment of the restitution. In Laker, 869 N.E.2d at 1221,

our court noted that as part of its obligation to fix the manner of performance,

the trial court was required to “identify the manner and time frame in which [the

defendant] must pay [the ordered] restitution” (emphasis added). In this case,

the trial court ordered a six-month period of probation and instructed J.K. to

“[p]ay to the Clerk $800.00 restitution to be withdrawn by [the theft victim and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 7 of 10 his father].” (Appellant’s App. p. 10). While the trial court did not articulate

that the restitution was to be paid in full during J.K.’s probationary period, our

court has recently clarified that, as a matter of law, a juvenile’s restitution

obligation does “not terminate upon his discharge from probation.” M.M., 31

N.E.3d at 521-22. Rather, restitution is considered an “‘independent

disposition[]’ which survive[s] the expiration of the period of probation” so

“action can be taken either during or after the probationary period to recover

restitution which was made a condition of the probation.” Id. (quoting

Wininger v. Purdue Univ., 666 N.E.2d 455, 457-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh’g

denied, trans. denied). Nonetheless, it is neither judicially efficient nor fair to the

victim to permit a defendant to prolong his obligation to pay for an indefinite

period of time. Therefore, we remand with instructions for the trial court to fix

a reasonable deadline for J.K. to satisfy his restitution obligation.

[14] Lastly, J.K. contends that the trial court “improperly considered J.K.’s mother’s

ability to pay and assumed J.K. would pay her back.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8).

As J.K. correctly asserts, “it is the juvenile’s ability [to pay restitution] which is

relevant” because a juvenile’s “parents are not liable for [the juvenile’s]

restitution obligation.” J.H., 950 N.E.2d at 735; M.L., 838 N.E.2d at 530 n.10.

In particular, J.K. argues that the following colloquy between the trial court and

J.K.’s mother demonstrates that “the court was improperly focused on the

mother’s ability to pay” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9):

[COURT]: If [J.K.] owed a bunch of money, how would he get it?

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 8 of 10 [MOTHER]: If he owed a bunch of money? [COURT]: Yeah. [MOTHER]: He would have to get it from me. [COURT]: What about mowing yards, things like that? He’s capable of doing those sorts of things? [MOTHER]: I don’t know if he know, we have a tractor lawn mower. I don’t know that he knows about push mowers. [COURT]: Well . . . [MOTHER]: . . . I guess he’d be capable if he was taught how to use it. [COURT]: Would you make him work off some if you paid it? Would you make him work off some money if you paid it? [MOTHER]: If I paid. [COURT]: He’s going to owe some restitution. I’m curious . . . [MOTHER]: . . . Uh huh . . . [COURT]: . . . You said that you’d pay it, well how’s he going to pay you back? [MOTHER]: He would have no way to pay me back. [COURT]: What about free manual labor around the house? Can he do chores? [MOTHER]: He does chores now, yes. [COURT]: Is he capable of earning some bucks in the neighborhood? You said he likes to sweep the barber shop, things like that. Any reason why he couldn’t go out and earn some money of his own? [MOTHER]: No, not if somebody gonna pay him to do something around the neighborhood. [COURT]: Alright. [MOTHER]: Most the people in our neighborhood have everything paid for. They have lawn services and all that . . . [COURT]: . . . Alright. . . [MOTHER]: . . . But, yeah. If someone’s willing to pay him to clean up something or . . . [COURT]: . . . He committed a theft and there are people that are harmed because of it. Shouldn’t he be responsible for paying? [MOTHER]: Yeah.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 9 of 10 (Tr. pp. 15-16) (ellipsis in original).

[15] We find that it was J.K.’s mother—not the trial court—who first suggested that

she would have to pay the restitution if it was ordered. In response, the trial

court focused on the fact that the restitution was J.K.’s responsibility and

geared its questions to J.K.’s mother as to J.K.’s ability to earn money.

Accordingly, we find no merit in J.K.’s contention that the trial court

improperly inquired into J.K.’s mother’s ability to pay the restitution on behalf

of J.K.

CONCLUSION

[16] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its

discretion in ordering J.K. to pay $800.00 in restitution, but we remand with

instructions for the trial court to fix a deadline by which J.K. must satisfy his

obligation.

[17] Affirmed in part and remanded in part.

[18] Brown, J. and Altice, J. concur

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-231 | October 29, 2015 Page 10 of 10