J.J.J. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, Criminal Records Depository, and Circuit Court of Gasconade County, Gasconade County Prosecuting Attorney, Missouri Director of Revenue, Gasconade County Sheriff's Office, Hermann Police Department, and Missouri Department of Corrections

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 21, 2025
• Docket: ED112467
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FIVE

J.J.J., ) No. ED112467 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Gasconade County vs. ) ) Honorable Ryan J. Helfrich MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, ) CRIMINAL RECORDS REPOSITORY, ) ) Appellant, ) ) and ) ) CIRCUIT COURT OF GASCONADE ) COUNTY, GASCONADE COUNTY ) PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, MISSOURI ) DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, GASCONADE ) COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, ) HERMANN POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) and MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF ) CORRECTIONS, ) ) Respondents. ) FILED: January 21, 2025

The Missouri State Highway Patrol (“MSHP”) appeals the judgment granting J.J.J.’s

petition to expunge his conviction for furnishing pornographic material to minors. We agree with

MSHP that this offense is ineligible for expungement because it requires registration as a sex

offender. The judgment is reversed. Background

J.J.J. (“Petitioner”) sought expungement of his criminal records under section 610.1401

relating to his misdemeanor conviction for furnishing pornographic material to minors. Pursuant

to section 589.400.1(2)2 of Missouri’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), a person

convicted of that offense must register as a sex offender, and Petitioner had been doing so since

2012. MSHP objected to Petitioner’s request, arguing that the offense is ineligible for

expungement under section 610.140.2(3) because it “requires registration as a sex offender.”

Petitioner countered that, because he had previously been granted an exemption under section

589.400.9(2)(c) and was no longer required to register for the offense, it is not one that “requires

registration” as a sex offense under section 610.140.2(3) and is therefore eligible for expungement.

After a hearing, the circuit court agreed with Petitioner, finding that he was no longer required to

register as a sex offender under SORA or the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Act (“SORNA”) and that he met the other criteria for expungement set forth in section 610.140.

The circuit court entered its judgment expunging the records relating to Petitioner’s conviction.

MSHP now appeals.

Discussion

In its sole point on appeal, MSHP contends that, irrespective of Petitioner’s personal

exemption, the offense of furnishing pornographic material to minors “requires registration as a

sex offender” and is therefore categorically ineligible for expungement under section 610.140.2(3).

Petitioner maintains that an offense is ineligible for expungement under that provision only if the

offender is required to register for the offense at the time he or she petitions to have it expunged.

1 All references to section 610.140 are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2021). Subsequent amendments to the expungement statute became effective January 1, 2025. 2 All references to the provisions of SORA, sections 589.400-.425, are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2018), unless otherwise noted.

2 Resolution of this case turns on statutory interpretation, a question of law that we review de novo.

R. H. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Crim. Recs. Repository, 578 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Mo. App.

E.D. 2019).

In relevant part, section 610.140 provides that a person may apply to have the records

relating to one or more offenses expunged “so long as all such offenses . . . are not excluded under

subsection 2 of this section.” Section 610.140.1. Subsection 2 lists the categories of offenses,

violations and infractions that “shall not be eligible for expungement.” Section 610.140.2(1)-(11).

Our courts have repeatedly found the language of section 610.140.2 to be “clear and unambiguous”

and have given the “words and phrases in the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” R. H.,

578 S.W.3d at 403; see also L.F.W. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Crim. Recs. Repository, 585

S.W.3d 846, 850 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019); D.K.R. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Crim. Just. Info.

Servs., 694 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024).

Section 610.140.2(3) clearly and unambiguously states that “[a]ny offense that requires

registration as a sex offender” is ineligible for expungement. SORA’s registration requirements

“shall apply to . . . [a]ny person . . . convicted of . . . furnishing pornographic material to minors.”

See section 589.400.1(2). Thus, according to the plain meaning of the words in section

610.140.2(3), that offense “requires registration as a sex offender” and is ineligible for

expungement.

Petitioner argues that “offenses” themselves do not require registration under SORA; in his

view, the registration requirements are personal and apply only when the offender has committed

a registerable offense and is not exempt. Petitioner posits that the legislature intended section

610.140.2(3) to provide those individuals who are exempt under SORA an opportunity for

expungement, claiming that when the phrase “offense that requires registration” is read in the

3 “person-based” context of SORA it can only mean an offense that currently requires the person to

register. To be sure, SORA’s registration requirements do not apply to offenders who have been

removed or exempted from the registry. See section 589.400.3(3). And the legislature amended

SORA in 2018 to expressly allow offenders who are on the registry for furnishing pornographic

material to minors (and certain other offenses) to petition the court for such an exemption using

the procedure set forth in section 589.401. Section 589.400.9(2)(c). But the exemption provided

in section 589.400.9 is not automatic, and notably, the legislature did not delete “furnishing

pornographic material to minors” from the list of offenses in section 589.400.1(2) to which the

registration requirements apply. In other words, while a person on the registry for that offense

may seek relief from SORA’s registration requirements by way of an exemption, the offense still

remains one that “requires registration as a sex offender.” See section 610.140.2(3).

Giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words as they are written in section

610.140.2(3), all offenses that currently carry a sex offender registration requirement are ineligible

for expungement—without regard to whether the offender is exempt from that requirement at the

time he or she seeks to have the offense expunged. This conclusion does not lead to an illogical

result nor does it defeat the purpose of the relief afforded by either statute. An exemption under

SORA relieves the offender of just one of the consequences of committing a sex offense—the

burden of having to continue registering as a sex offender. When an offense is expunged, however,

it is as if it never happened; expungement has the effect of restoring the offender “to the status he

or she occupied prior to [the] arrests, pleas, trials, or convictions as if such events had never taken

place.” Section 610.140.8. By deeming offenses that require registration as a sex offender

ineligible for expungement under section 610.140.2(3), the legislature has categorically rejected

the notion that such offenses should be treated as if they never occurred. There is nothing illogical

4 about providing an offender relief from SORA’s registration requirements by way of an

exemption, while disallowing that offender from having his or her underlying offense erased from

existence by expungement.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed.

_______________________________ MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Thomas C. Clark, II, C.J., concurs. S. Cotton Walker, Sp.J., concurs.