NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2555-23
JJ BADA 464 OPERATING CORP., d/b/a BADA STORY RESTAURANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ADVANCE SECURITY SYSTEMS, A DIVISION OF U.S. SECURITY SERVICES, INC., a/k/a ADVANCED SECURITY SYSTEMS, A DIVISION OF U.S. SECURITY SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent. _____________________________
Submitted September 8, 2025 – Decided September 15, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-3990-22.
Michael S. Kimm, attorney for appellant.
A-2555-23 1 Riker, Danzig, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Edwin F. Chociey, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; Siobhan A. Neary, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff JJ Bada 464 Operating Corp., d/b/a Bada Story Restaurant
(Bada), appeals from three orders, the effect of which dismissed its complaint
against Advanced Security Systems, a division of U.S. Security Services, Inc.
(Advanced). In that complaint, Bada alleged Advanced breached the parties'
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violated the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. We affirm in part and
remand in part.
I.
We detail only those facts and portions of the procedural history necessary
to resolve the issues before us. In December 2019, Bada leased space to operate
a restaurant. Prior to its tenancy, Advanced installed a commercial fire alarm
and provided monthly monitoring support for the previous tenant. Bada
informed Advanced it wished to continue the monitoring arrangement and
subsequently paid for the monitoring service in 2020, 2021, and part of 2022.
Bada provided its business phone number to Advanced and the name and
number of its outside counsel as its emergency contact. According to Bada, it
A-2555-23 2 routinely experienced problems with the fire alarm and monitoring service. It
specifically alleged the "equipment routinely triggered false alarms . . . with
absolutely no underlying reason (such as smoke or fire)."
Instead of first contacting its business number, Bada claimed the
monitoring service routinely called its outside counsel with "emergency 'fire
calls.'" These alleged "false alarms" frequently caused needless evacuations of
the restaurant during business hours and the unnecessary dispatch of emergency
services which purportedly cost the restaurant substantial time and money.
To rectify the problem, Advanced allegedly recommended upgrades to the
system. According to Bada, it incurred substantial expense in modifying and
upgrading the fire alarm consistent with Advanced's recommendations which
failed to solve the problem, as the restaurant continued to experience disruptive
false alarms. In approximately May 2020, Bada canceled the monitoring service
and enrolled in a new service. Since the switch, Bada claimed "the fire alarm
system has been trouble-free."
In its three-count complaint, Bada alleged Advanced breached the parties'
agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on
Advanced's purported failure to ensure the fire alarm system properly
functioned. Bada contended Advanced violated the CFA because it held "itself
A-2555-23 3 out to be an alarm monitoring company" but "failed to properly discharge its
role" and engaged in "unconscionable and 'fraudulent trade practices'" due to its
sale of defective products and services.
Advanced moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), and as to
Bada's CFA claim argued "even accepting all of the allegations as true . . . there
are no allegations that . . . Advance[d] engaged in any misleading or deceptive
conduct, or any conduct that could possibly constitute an unconscionable
commercial practice." Advanced further argued Bada was not the purchaser of
the fire alarm, it voluntarily continued to use service and even if Advanced
recommended Bada upgrade the system, nothing about its purported
recommendation was fraudulent or misleading. Advanced also contended that
Bada's CFA claim was deficient because it did not comply with Rule 4:5-8(a),
as "the complaint completely fails to specify the nature of Advance[d]'s alleged
fraudulent conduct to the extent that fraudulent conduct could even be discerned
from the complaint."
Advanced maintained Bada's breach of contract claim should be dismissed
because Bada did not purchase the alarm system, Advanced contended Bada
could not assert a breach of "contract claim arising from the sale of the system,"
nor did it provide the terms of any service or monitoring contracts that Advanced
A-2555-23 4 allegedly violated. With respect to Bada's breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing claim, Advanced maintained the "complaint is completely
devoid of any allegation that Advance[d] had any bad motive or intention in
entering any contracts with plaintiff" and the basis for the claim is impermissibly
duplicative as Bada's breach of contract claim.
The court granted, in part, Advanced's application, explained its decision
in a comprehensive sixteen-page written opinion, and issued a conforming order
on December 27, 2022. The court dismissed Bada's CFA claim without
prejudice and concluded Bada "failed to set forth with sufficient specificity the
unlawful conduct, any fraud or misrepresentation, to which loss is causally
connected." It explained "[s]imply alleging there was an 'unconscionable
business practice of holding itself [out] as an alarm monitoring company' is not
sufficient" and "alleging a defective product, without factual identification, is
not enough" as a "CFA violation . . . must be set forth with some specificity."
The court rejected Advanced's request to dismiss the remaining counts in
the complaint because it found "the facts presented provide a sufficient basis to
support a claim of breach of the contract by alleging [a] failure to provide
appropriate services, failure to provide contracted equipment, and failure to
attend to the faulty alarms, as supposedly agreed upon by the parties." The court
A-2555-23 5 also determined the facts pled, i.e., that Advanced "fail[ed] to attend to the faulty
system while accepting monies and recommending additional products or
upgrades[,]" were sufficient to support a claim for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
Advanced subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment and
supported its application with a Rule 4:46-2(a) statement of material facts which
detailed the instances in which the local fire department responded to the
restaurant, for reasons unrelated to purported failures of the monitoring system.
Bada opposed the motion and supported its opposition with a certification of
counsel, and a Rule 4:46-2(b) counterstatement of material facts.
The court granted Advanced's summary judgment application with respect
to Bada's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim, denied summary
judgment as to its breach of contract claim, explained its decision in an oral
opinion, and issued an appropriate order on January 12, 2024. The court found
there was "simply no evidence before the [c]ourt that indicates that there was
any breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing with regard to the
formation and/or performance of th[e] contract." It explained Advanced "tried
to perform" but that a breach of good faith and fair dealing claim "simply cannot
be a repeat of the same allegations to support the breach of contract."
A-2555-23 6 As to the breach of contract claim, the court found it was undisputed "there
was a contractual relationship . . . between . . . Bada and Advance[d] . . . to
provide, in part, . . . fire security system services to . . . Bada," the local fire
department was dispatched on at least two occasions that were "indicated to be
false alarms," and Advanced serviced the alarm to rectify any issues. Based on
the motion record, the court concluded there was a genuine dispute of material
fact with respect to whether the fire alarm's "issues were . . . resolved" which
would benefit from the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses and the "breach of
contract issue . . . should be presented to a trier of fact for ultimate
determination."
Advanced moved for reconsideration. The court considered the
application without oral argument and granted Advanced's application. It
accordingly vacated that portion of the summary judgment order with respect to
the breach of contract claim and dismissed the claim with prejudice. In support
of its decision, the court issued a March 11, 2024 order that included a notation
explaining, "[o]pposition untimely. Moreover, opposition cites to the wrong
rule, as reconsideration is of an interlocutory order (not a final order) and
contains no substantive opposition whatsoever." Based on the record before us,
A-2555-23 7 it does not appear the court otherwise explained the factual or legal basis for its
decision. This appeal followed.
II.
Bada contends the court erred in dismissing its CFA claim because the
"complaint provided ample notice" as well as the "basis of invoking the CFA."
It claims paragraphs three through sixteen of the complaint sufficiently alleged
Advanced "engaged in unconscionable conduct in the sale of its repair service
and alarm monitoring service, by deceptive, false representations that caused
[Bada]'s reliance and resulted in numerous false fire alarms disruptive to the
business, even after [Advanced] allegedly 'repaired' the problem."
Next, Bada argues that Advanced's "suggest[ion] that alleging the
'particulars of fraud' requires a doctoral dissertation type of pleading" is
unnecessary as "scienter and intent to deceive are not required elements of
pleading, and thus […] not required." Bada maintains the "complaint rather
plainly states that [Advanced]'s actions were 'unconscionable' business
practice[s]," sufficient to invoke the CFA and thus, because the "complaint and
[] all favorable inferences must be deemed true, [Advanced]'s attempt to re-
characterize the allegations should have been rejected." Finally, Bada claims
Advanced's "statements that it had the professional skills to repair and maintain
A-2555-23 8 the fire alarm system so as to protect a restaurant's operations and avoid false
alarms, if proved false, shows unconscionable business-related acts" and thus
"glossing over these facts warrants reversal and remand."
We first address, sua sponte, a threshold issue: the interlocutory nature of
the orders under review. As noted, the court dismissed Bada's CFA claim
without prejudice, presumably so Bada could replead the claim. See Mason v.
Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 263, 267-68 (App. Div. 1989). Bada,
however, never replead that claim and as such, the court never addressed that
claim on the merits and hence never issued a final judgment.
Rule 2:2-3(a)(1) permits an appeal as of right to our court only from a
final judgment. "To be a final judgment, an order generally must 'dispose of all
claims against all parties.'" Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545,
549 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 317
N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998)). "If an order is not a final judgment, a
party must be granted leave to appeal by the Appellate Division," Janicky, 396
N.J. Super. at 550, unless the order falls within the limited class of interlocutory
orders that may be appealed as of right, see Rule 2:2-3(a)(3). The order
dismissing Bada's CFA claim without prejudice is not a final order for which an
appeal of right may be taken under Rule 2:2-3(a)(3).
A-2555-23 9 Instead, Bada has challenged an interlocutory order without leave of court.
See Grow Co. v. Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 460 (App. Div. 2008) (explaining
a "dismissal without prejudice of unadjudicated claims that have not been
concluded in fact but are left to be resurrected in a new suit" does not constitute
a final judgment allowing appellate review as of right); CPC Int'l, Inc. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 316 N.J. Super. 351, 366 (App. Div. 1998)
(finding a dismissal of a claim without prejudice is not a means "to foist
jurisdiction [over an interlocutory order] upon this court").
In appropriate cases, the court may grant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc.
R. 2:4-4(b)(2); see e.g., Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 209 (App. Div.
1974) (granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc "in the interest of prompt
disposition of the matter"). However, such relief is not automatic and should
not be presumed as granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc is "most extraordinary
relief[.]" Hallowell v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 297 N.J. Super. 314, 318 (App.
Div. 1997) (quoting Frantzen v. Howard, 132 N.J. Super. 226, 227-28 (App.
Div. 1975)).
Under the circumstances, we have concluded the most appropriate course
is to grant leave to appeal nunc pro tunc to address the issues raised by this
appeal. We grant this extraordinary relief for the following reasons.
A-2555-23 10 First, we do so to avoid any further delay in the prosecution of this matter
and the remanded proceedings and to address, to the extent possible on the
current record, the merits of the court's rulings. Second, we choose this path
because neither party has contended that Bada improperly filed a direct appeal
from an interlocutory order, and the parties have fully addressed the merits.
Finally, we understand the Clerk's office advised the parties the appeal would
proceed despite both the interlocutory nature of the December 22, 2022 order,
and Bada's incorrect statement in its Notice of Appeal regarding the finality of
the court's orders.
We next address the merits of the court's order dismissing without
prejudice Bada's CFA claim by addressing the applicable procedural and
substantive legal principles. "Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted are reviewed de novo." Baskin
v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos
v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108
(2019)). When considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, "[a] reviewing court must
examine 'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,'
giving the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid.
(quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). "The essential test [for determining
A-2555-23 11 the adequacy of a pleading] is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested"
by the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451-52 (2013) (quoting
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "At
this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned with the
ability of [the] plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint."
Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746.
To survive a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, the plaintiff must present "the essential
facts supporting plaintiff's cause of action [, and] . . . conclusory allegations are
insufficient in that regard." Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188,
193 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 768). "It is
not enough for [the] plaintiffs to assert . . . that any essential facts that the court
may find lacking can be dredged up in discovery." Printing Mart-Morristown,
116 N.J. at 768.
"To prevail on a CFA claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: '1)
unlawful conduct by defendant; 2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and 3) a
causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.'"
Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 222 (2014) (quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge,
Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009)). Under the CFA, an unlawful practice is defined
as:
A-2555-23 12 The act, use or employment by any person of any commercial practice that is unconscionable or abusive, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.]
Additionally, when a plaintiff alleges fraud—under the CFA or the
common law—the heightened pleading requirement under Rule 4:5-8(a)
mandates that "all allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, mistake, breach of
trust, willful default or undue influence, particulars of the wrong, with dates and
items if necessary, must be stated insofar as practicable." "Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be alleged generally."
State, Dep't of Treasury, of Inv.ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc.,
387 N.J. Super. 469, 484 (App. Div. 2006); see also Hoffman v. Hampshire
Labs, Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 105, 112 (App. Div. 2009) ("[b]ecause a claim under
the CFA is essentially a fraud claim, the rule requires that such claims be pled
with specificity to the extent practicable").
A-2555-23 13 We are satisfied the court did not err in dismissing Bada's CFA claim on
a without prejudice basis. Bada asserted only conclusory statements insufficient
to establish it was the victim of illegal, unfair, or deceptive business practices
sufficient to withstand a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion. As noted, in its complaint, Bada
asserted Advanced's "unconscionable business practice" included "holding itself
out to be an alarm monitoring company, but fail[ing] to properly discharge its
role." It did not, however, explain with necessary particularity how Advanced's
purported failure to "discharge its role" constitutes unlawful conduct under the
CFA or how such conduct caused an ascertainable loss.
Additionally, Bada's assertion paragraphs three through sixteen of its
complaint sufficiently describe the factual bases for its CFA claim is
unpersuasive as those paragraphs merely consist of background information and
similar conclusory assertions that Advanced's faulty fire alarm negatively
impacted the business. Bada alleged Advanced sold "obviously defective
product[s] and service[s]" but did not further explain how the purportedly
defective system was the result of Advanced's unlawful acts or how those
unidentified acts specifically resulted in damage to its business.
It further claimed Advanced recommended upgrades to the system, which
failed to rectify the false alarm issue, but likewise did not identify which
A-2555-23 14 upgrades were implemented, when such upgrades occurred, or how Advanced's
actions in connection with the purported upgrades constituted unlawful conduct
under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. The complaint was thus devoid of "particulars of the
wrong" as required by Rule 4:5-8(a) and, therefore, failed to satisfy that
heightened pleading standard. Much like the plaintiff in Hoffman, Bada's
allegations under the CFA were "merely statements of a legal conclusion . . . [as
it] did not plead specific facts that would allow a fact-finder to draw that
conclusion." 405 N.J. Super. at 114.
Our analysis is not complete, however. Indeed, despite dismissing the
matter without prejudice, Bada never filed an amended pleading addressing the
court's well-founded concerns regarding the CFA claim, and we cannot discern
from the record if Bada's inaction reflected its abandonment of the claim nor can
we address the viability of any revised CFA claim without an amended pleading,
and necessary factual findings and legal conclusions in the event there is a
challenge to the sufficiency of that pleading.
Accordingly, on remand, Bada shall clearly and unequivocally inform the
court if it intends to assert a CFA claim. If it does, it shall file an amended
pleading within a time period prescribed by the court. The parties can address
the propriety of any amended complaint as appropriate. Nothing in our opinion
A-2555-23 15 should be construed as a reflection of our views on the merits of any proposed
amended complaint.
III.
We next address Bada's contention the court incorrectly dismissed its
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. Bada maintains the "dismissal
was contradictory to the retention of the contract claim," and further asserts the
court improperly resolved disputed genuine and factual questions that "[d]espite
repeated . . . false alarm triggers, [Advanced] . . . claimed [the system] . . . had
been properly repaired and that it is functioning properly, which [was] clearly
false." We are unpersuaded by these arguments.
We review the disposition of a summary judgment motion de novo,
applying the same standard used by the motion judge. Townsend v. Pierre, 221
N.J. 36, 59 (2015). Like the motion judge, we view “the competent evidential
materials presented . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, [and
determine whether they] are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve
the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Town of Kearny
v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)); see also R. 4:46-2(c). If ''the evidence 'is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,'" courts will "not
A-2555-23 16 hesitate to grant summary judgment." Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
"Every party to a contract . . . is bound by a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in both the performance and enforcement of the contract." Brunswick
Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 224
(2005). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing "mandates that 'neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right
of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract." Seidenberg v. Summit
Bank, 348 N.J. Super. 243, 253 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Sons of Thunder v.
Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997)).
"Proof of 'bad motive or intention' is vital to an action for breach of the
covenant." Brunswick Hills, 182 N.J. at 225 (quoting Wilson v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 168 N.J. 236, 251 (2001)). The party alleging a breach of the covenant
"must provide evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that the party alleged
to have acted in bad faith has engaged in some conduct that denied the benefit
of the bargain originally intended by the parties." Ibid. (internal citations
omitted).
After reviewing the record against the above-cited legal principles, we are
convinced the court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Bada's
A-2555-23 17 breach of the implied contract of good faith and fair dealing claim because the
competent proofs failed to raise a genuine and material dispute of fact
supporting Bada's contention that Advanced's actions were animated by a bad
motive or that it acted in bad faith to deny Bada the benefit of the bargain
originally contemplated by the parties. Instead, Bada asserted only that frequent
false alarms continued despite paying for repairs and ongoing service. "Without
bad motive or intention, discretionary decisions that happen to result in
economic disadvantage to the other party are of no legal significance. " Wilson,
168 N.J. at 251. As such, Bada was required to prove that Advanced acted with
bad faith and deprived plaintiffs of rights or benefits under the contract. Stated
differently, Bada was required to submit competent proofs creating a genuine
and material factual dispute that Advanced destroyed its "reasonable
expectations and right to receive the fruits of the contract." Sons of Thunder,
148 N.J. at 420. Bada failed to meet this burden.
IV.
With respect to the dismissal of its breach of contract claim, Bada
contends the court erred in changing course and dismissing its claim on
reconsideration. It argues because of the "unrepaired fire alarm triggers that
were being actively experienced by [Bada] . . . the denial of summary judgment
A-2555-23 18 was clearly warranted." It further contends the "mere fact that the Fire
Department was not dispatched in every instance does not show that the
restaurant was not disrupted since fire alarm triggers within the restaurant
necessarily create havoc." Thus, "[b]ecause [Advanced]'s motion sought to
ignore [Bada]'s proofs, the [court] correctly decided against [Advanced]" with
respect to count two.
Bada also maintains the court should have denied the motion as untimely
because "Rule 4:49-2 requires any reconsideration motion be filed within
[twenty] days of [the] order." It asserts Advanced filed its motion for
reconsideration thirty-four days after the court granted partial summary
judgment, and, therefore, it "was unreasonable and unfair to [Bada] because
[Advanced], represented by a big law firm, with unlimited resources to make
motion after motion seeking dismissal after dismissal, received special
treatment." Additionally, Bada argues the court should have denied
reconsideration because deciding the motion without oral argument was "unfair
and [it was] unsupported by anything other than [Advanced]'s own, unilateral
papers."
We review a trial judge's decision on whether to grant or deny a motion
for rehearing or reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. JPC Merger Sub
A-2555-23 19 LLC v. Tricon Enters., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 160 (App. Div. 2022) (citing
Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382
(App. Div. 2015)). "Where the order sought to be reconsidered is interlocutory,
as was in this case, Rule 4:42-2, governs the motion." Ibid. Under Rule 4:42-
2, "interlocutory orders 'shall be subject to revision at any time before the entry
of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice.'"
Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021).
Bada's first procedural argument is unpersuasive. Rule 4:49-2 requires a
party seeking reconsideration of a "judgment or final order" to file its motion
within twenty days of the service of that final judgment or order. The summary
judgment order was clearly interlocutory as it did not dispose of all claims
against all parties. See Janicky, 396 N.J. Super. at 549-552. Therefore, under
Rule 4:42-2, the interlocutory summary judgment order was "subject to revision
at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court
in the interest of justice." Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 134.
As noted, Bada also argues the court erred in granting reconsideration
without oral argument. Under Rule 1:6-2(d), "no motion shall be listed for oral
argument unless a party requests oral argument in the moving papers or in
timely-filed answering or reply papers, or unless the court directs." Although
A-2555-23 20 there is some dispute whether Bada requested oral argument, Advanced did so
in its notice of motion in which it sought reconsideration.
On an opposed civil motion that is not a pre-trial discovery motion or
directly addressed to the calendar, oral argument must be granted as of right. R.
1:6-2(d). Notwithstanding Rule 1:6-2(d), a trial court can dispense with a
request for oral argument if the record sets forth "special or unusual
circumstance[s.]" Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 306 (App. Div. 1997).
With respect to the substance of the court's reconsideration order, as
noted, the record before us reveals the court provided limited insight into its
reasoning for vacating its earlier denial, and subsequent award, of summary
judgment on Bada's breach of contract claim. As best we can discern, the court's
entire analysis is found at bottom of the March 11, 2024 order, in which it merely
included a statement noting Bada's untimely opposition, its citation to the
incorrect court Rule, and failure to oppose substantively the reconsideration
application.
Our ability to resolve an appeal is largely dependent on the trial court's
compliance with its Rule 1:7-4 obligation to "'state clearly [its] factual findings
and correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the
appellate courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose]
A-2555-23 21 conclusion[s].'" Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594-95
(App. Div. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J.
Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 1986)); Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980)
("Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4."). Without a
clear statement of reasons, "we are left to conjecture as to what the judge may
have had in mind." Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990).
These principles are particularly applicable here, as we cannot discern
from the court's brief notation on the order, the substantive bases for its decision
to dismiss the breach of contract claim, particularly considering the court's
previous denial of that claim under Rules 4:6-2(e) and 4:46-2. We are therefore
convinced further illumination by the court is necessary. Accordingly, on
remand, the trial court shall hear oral argument, or state its reasons for rejecting
the request, and decide the motion anew, issuing either a written or oral
statement of reasons "stat[ing] clearly [its] factual findings and correlat[ing]
them with relevant legal conclusions." Avelino-Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. at
594-95 (quoting Monte, 212 N.J. Super. at 565).
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of the parties'
arguments, it is because we have concluded they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-2555-23 22