Jin Qin Lin v. U.S. Attorney General

154 F. App'x 809
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 16, 2005
Docket05-10615; BIA A77-340-550
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 154 F. App'x 809 (Jin Qin Lin v. U.S. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jin Qin Lin v. U.S. Attorney General, 154 F. App'x 809 (11th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Jin Qin Lin, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Lin contends that the Immigration Judge and BIA erred because she demonstrated past persecution and a well-founded fear of persecution by presenting evidence of her refusal to undergo sterilization. She also argues that she is entitled to relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. We deny in part and dismiss in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2000, Lin’s sister, who had already had two children, was pregnant with a third child in violation of the family planning policy in China. Family planning officers came to the home of Lin’s parents to arrest and sterilize Lin’s sister, but Lin helped her sister escape through a back door while family planning officers searched other parts of the home. The family planning officers threatened to arrest and sterilize Lin the next time they came if they could not find her sister. Two weeks later, the family planning officers returned to the home and attempted to arrest Lin because she looked like her sister. Lin escaped to her aunt’s home and then to her uncle’s home. Family planning officials looked for her at both locations, but did not enter the homes to search for her. In January 2001, Lin escaped to the United States.

At the removal hearing, Lin conceded removability, but argued that she was eligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding because the IJ found “the facts could have happened.” The IJ, however, deemed Lin to be “somewhat implausible” because Lin’s sister and her brother-in-law have not been found or sterilized. The IJ also emphasized that the lack of formal accusations or other documents supporting Lin’s allegations diminished Lin’s credibility. Thus, the IJ denied Lin’s application for asylum and withholding of removal because Lin had not met her burden to establish eligibility. Lin appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA, but the BIA affirmed the IJ without opinion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s analysis as if it were the analysis of the BIA. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.2001). We review de novo the legal determinations of the IJ and BIA. Id. We review findings of fact by the IJ and BIA for substantial evidence because “[administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Mazariegos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir.2001).

III. DISCUSSION

Lin argues that she is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the *811 coercive population control provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. She also argues that she is entitled to relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. We discuss each argument in turn.

A. Lin Is Not Eligible for Asylum

The IJ and BIA concluded that Lin failed to establish eligibility for asylum. An applicant has the burden to prove eligibility for asylum. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.2005). To apply for asylum, an alien must be a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is any person who is unable to return to his home country “because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). To be eligible for asylum, Lin had the burden to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and on each issue, Lin’s application failed.

1. Lin Has Not Suffered Past Persecution.

Line had to establish past persecution in one of three ways. Under the coercive population provision of the INA, an applicant may establish “past persecution” on account of political opinion if the applicant (1) has been forced to undergo sterilization, (2) has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo forced sterilization, or (3) has been persecuted for “other resistance” to a coercive population control program. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B); see Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1202-05 (11th Cir.2005). “Persecution” is an “extreme concept” that requires more than a “few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (internal citations omitted).

The record does not compel the conclusion that Lin established past persecution. Lin was not forcibly sterilized. She also was not “persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo” forced sterilization because the actions of the family planning officers do not rise to the level of “persecution.” Lin’s allegations that officers threatened to sterilize her forcibly, if true, amount to no more than isolated instances of “verbal harassment.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231. Lin was never subject to a pattern of arrests, fines, or beatings. See Yang, 418 F.3d at 1203 (stating that a single fine does not constitute “persecution”); Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (concluding that death threats over the telephone and a restaurant bombing do not compel reversal of the IJ’s findings that no persecution occurred). Lin also was not persecuted for “other resistance” to a coercive program of population control. Cf. Yang, 418 F.3d at 1205 (stating that the removal of an intrauterine device against family planning policy may constitute “other resistance” because it is “punishable as a crime in China”). Thus, substantial evidence supports the finding of the IJ that Lin failed to establish past persecution.

2. Lin Has Not Demonstrated a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution.

Lin has also failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. A well-founded fear of future persecution requires a showing of a reasonable possibility of personal persecution that cannot be avoided by relocating within the subject country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2). The fear of persecution must be both “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” AI Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289.

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154 F. App'x 809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jin-qin-lin-v-us-attorney-general-ca11-2005.