Jimmy Torres v. Segway, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Delaware
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00140
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 JIMMY TORRES, Case No. 25-cv-05005-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. TRANSFER; AND TRANSFERRING CASE TO THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 10 SEGWAY, INC., FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 11 Defendant. [Re: ECF No. 30]

12 13 Before the Court is Defendant Segway Inc.’s (“Segway”) motion to transfer or stay this 14 case pursuant to the first-to-file rule in light of three actions currently pending in the United States 15 District Court for the District of Delaware. ECF No. 30 (“Mot.”); see also ECF No. 38 (“Reply”). 16 Plaintiff Jimmy Torres (“Torres”) opposes the motion. ECF No. 35 (“Opp.”). The Court held a 17 hearing on the motion on December 18, 2025. ECF No. 42. 18 Torres’s opposition includes a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. See Opp. at 3–5. 19 And, at the hearing, Torres requested jurisdictional discovery in connection with this challenge. 20 The Court granted Mr. Torres’s request to take a limited-scope deposition of Segway’s General 21 Counsel and ordered supplemental briefing on the jurisdictional issue. ECF No. 43. The Parties 22 then submitted simultaneous supplemental briefs. See ECF Nos. 46 (“Pl. Supp.”), 47 (“Def. 23 Supp.”). 24 For the reasons stated by the Court on the record at the hearing and those that follow, the 25 Court GRANTS Segway’s motion to transfer the case and TRANSFERS this case to the United 26 States District Court for the District of Delaware.1 27 I. BACKGROUND 1 The above-captioned case arises out of the allegedly defective folding mechanism of the 2 Segway Ninebot Max G30P and G30LP KickScooters (collectively, “KickScooters”). Mot. at 1. 3 Segway seeks to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 4 where three similar lawsuits, Cicero v. Segway Inc., No. 25-cv-00369-GBW, Sabu v. Segway Inc., 5 No. 25-cv-00394-GBW, and Rzewuski et al v. Segway, Inc., No. 25-cv-0463-GBW, have been 6 consolidated. Mot. at 3. 7 A. The Delaware Actions 8 1. The Cicero Case 9 On March 25, 2025, Barton Cicero, a Massachusetts resident, filed a putative class action 10 against Segway in the District of Delaware. Declaration of Anna Boyle in Support of Defendant 11 Segway, Inc.’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Transfer or Stay Case (“Boyle Decl.”), ECF 12 No. 30-1, Ex. 1 (“Cicero Compl.”). Cicero sued Segway because of a “nationwide recall 13 instructing its customers to stop using [KickScooters] because the folding mechanism can fail and 14 cause the handlebars or stem to fold while the scooter is in use, posing a fall hazard to consumers.” 15 Cicero Compl. ¶ 1. Cicero alleged that the recall of the KickScooters was an inadequate remedy 16 for the alleged defect. Id. ¶ 39. Cicero brought three causes of action under Massachusetts law: 17 (1) violations of Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93A, § 2; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3) fraud. Id. ¶¶ 51– 18 86. Cicero sought to represent several classes, including a nationwide class of all KickScooter 19 purchasers, a “Multi-State Implied Warranty Class” and a “Multi-State Consumer Protection 20 Class.” Id. ¶ 42. The latter two proposed classes include those who purchased a KickScooter in 21 California. Id. 22 2. The Sabu Case 23 On March 31, 2025, plaintiffs Aaron John Sabu, a California resident, and Christopher 24 Holmes, a New York resident, filed a putative class action against Segway in the District of 25 Delaware. See Boyle Decl. Ex. 2 (“Sabu Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 7, 9. These plaintiffs both purchased 26 KickScooters, which they allege are defective because “the folding mechanism can fail . . . while 27 the scooter is in use.” Id. ¶ 1. They further allege the recall was inadequate. Id. ¶¶ 40–43. 1 Plaintiffs bring seven causes of action: (1) violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law 2 (“UCL”); (2) violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); (3) violation of 3 California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (4) violations of New York General Business 4 Law (“GBL”) § 349; (5) violations of New York GBL § 350; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) fraud 5 by omission / intentional misrepresentation. Id. ¶¶ 53–107. The class definition proposes multiple 6 classes, including a nationwide class, a “Multi-State Consumer Protection Class” that includes 7 California, and a California subclass of “all people who purchased [KickScooters] in California.” 8 Id. ¶ 44. 9 3. The Rzewuski Case 10 On April 15, 2025, plaintiffs Mary Rzewuski, an Illinois resident, and Edward Steven 11 Heymer, a California resident, filed a putative class action against Segway in the District of 12 Delaware. See Boyle Decl. Ex. 3 (“Rzewuski Compl.”) ¶¶ 11–12. They allege that “the folding 13 mechanism can fail and cause the handlebars or stem to fold while the scooter is in use, posing a 14 fall hazard to consumers.” Id. ¶ 20. The complaint further alleges that the recall was inadequate 15 and led to plaintiffs’ “sustain[ing] economic injuries.” Id. ¶¶ 24–28. The Rzewuski action alleged 16 seven causes of action: (1) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (including 17 California’s Song-Beverly Act); (2) violations of state consumer fraud acts (including Cal. Bus. & 18 Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.); (3) violation of Illinois’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices 19 Act; (4) violation of the California UCL; (5) violation of the California CLRA; (6) violation of 20 California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”); and (7) unjust enrichment/quasi-contract. Id. ¶¶ 71– 21 153. 22 The plaintiffs sought to represent a national class of KickScooter purchasers. Id. ¶ 59. In 23 the alternative, they sought to represent several, more specific classes, including a California 24 subclass of “[a]ll persons in California who purchased [KickScooters],” a “Multi-State Implied 25 Warranty” subclass that includes California purchasers, and a “Multi-State Consumer Fraud” 26 subclass that includes California purchasers. Id. 27 4. Consolidation into In re Segway Scooter Recall Litigation 1 to consolidate their cases and to appoint interim class counsel. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion 2 for Consolidation and Appointment of Interim Co-Lead Counsel, Boyle Decl. Ex. 4. Plaintiffs 3 contended that consolidation was warranted on the grounds that the cases “raise identical legal and 4 factual issues concerning duty and breach, name the same Defendant, arise from the same recall, 5 and involve similar injuries and economic damages.” Id. at 7. The Court in the District of 6 Delaware granted plaintiffs’ motion on October 6, 2025. See Order Granting Motion, Boyle Decl. 7 Ex. 5. The cases were consolidated into In re Segway Scooter Recall Litigation. Id. at 2. 8 On October 27, 2025, the Delaware plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint 9 incorporating the allegations and causes of action from each case. See Consolidated Class Action 10 Complaint, Boyle Decl. Ex. 6 (“Del. CAC”). The Consolidated Complaint seeks relief for 11 multiple classes and subclasses of plaintiffs, including a nationwide class, a California subclass, a 12 “Multi-State Implied Warranty Class” that includes California residents, and a “Multi-State 13 Consumer Protection Class,” that includes California residents for the alleged folding mechanism 14 defect. Id. ¶¶ 23–25, 53. 15 B. The Torres Action 16 On May 6, 2025, Torres filed a putative class action against Segway in the Superior Court 17 of California for the County of Monterey. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 ¶ 1; see also ECF No. 1, 18 Ex. A (“Compl.”). Segway removed this action to the Northern District of California on June 12, 19 2025. See Notice of Removal. 20 Torres alleges that he purchased a defective KickScooter because the “folding mechanism 21 that keeps the [KickScooter] upright has a propensity to fail,” which can cause “the handlebars or 22 stem to fold while the scooters are in use.” Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff further alleges that the “remedy” 23 Segway “offers consumers who receive notice of the Recall” is “inadequate.” Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 24 Plaintiff brings five causes of action: (1) breach of implied warranties; (2) violation of the Song- 25 Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (3) violation of the California CLRA; (4) violation of the 26 California UCL; and (5) violation of the California FAL. Id. ¶¶ 74–143. Torres seeks to represent 27 a class that consists of “all persons who purchased [KickScooters] in the State of California for II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 1 In opposition to Segway’s motion to transfer, Torres argues that the Court lacks subject 2 matter jurisdiction over this case because there is not diversity of citizenship of the parties. Opp. 3 at 3–5; Pl. Supp. Before it can reach the merits, the Court must first determine whether it has 4 jurisdiction. 5 A. Legal Standard 6 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 7 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They may only adjudicate those cases that the Constitution and 8 Congress authorize, such as those involving diversity of citizenship or a federal question, or to 9 which the United States is a party. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006); see also 10 Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016). If it appears at any time before final 11 judgment that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the 12 action to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 13 Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), federal courts have original 14 jurisdiction over state law actions where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 15 $5,000,000 (exclusive of interest and costs), the number of members of all proposed plaintiff 16 classes in the aggregate is more than 100, and any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 17 State different from any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). A corporation is a citizen of both the 18 state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place of business—the 19 corporation’s “nerve center.” See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). 20 The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving diversity of citizenship. 21 Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). Removal jurisdiction premised on diversity is 22 determined as of the time the complaint is filed and removal effected. Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. 23 Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). The party seeking removal “has the burden to 24 prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. 25 v. Est. of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010). “This burden is particularly stringent 26 for removing defendants because ‘[t]he removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about 27 the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.’” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 1 Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773–74 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 2 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009)). 3 B. Discussion 4 As an initial matter, all appear to agree that the proposed class exceeds 100 members, 5 Segway is a citizen of Delaware (the state where it is incorporated), and the amount in controversy 6 is satisfied. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 4, 19, 28. The Parties disagree on the location of Segway’s 7 principal place of business, and thus its second state of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 8 Torres asserts that both he and Segway are citizens of California, so diversity is lacking. See Pl. 9 Supp. He argues that statements on Segway’s website and Segway’s assertions in prior litigation 10 amount to a “garbled mess” that do not tell a clear story about Segway’s nerve center. Pl. Supp. 11 at 4. In response, Segway contends that its principal place of business is in Texas, including 12 because its chief executive and a majority of its high-level employees operate from Texas and its 13 headquarters are likewise located there. See Def. Supp. 14 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), a corporation’s principal place of business “refers to the 15 place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's 16 activities,”—the so-called “nerve center.” Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 80–81. “In practice,” the 17 nerve center “should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters— 18 provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination.” Id. 19 at 93. 20 Contrary to Torres’s assertions, Segway provides a straightforward discussion of its nerve 21 center and has submitted considerable evidence in support thereof. In early 2024, Segway began 22 to consider relocating its headquarters from Arcadia, California to Texas. Deposition of Wei 23 Zhao, ECF No. 46-2 (“Zhao Depo.”) at 18:17–19:20. Segway acquired an office in Plano, Texas, 24 began hiring employees there, and transferred other employees from California to Texas. Zhao 25 Depo. at 23:21–24:20. By August 2024, a majority of Segway’s employees were based in Texas, 26 and Segway’s Board passed an official resolution moving Segway’s headquarters from California 27 to Texas, effective November 18, 2024. Zhao Depo. at 26:8–27:4; see also Board Resolution, 1 Depo. at 49:6–7. 2 Segway’s chief executive and sole officer is its President, Wei (“Wayde”) Zhao. Zhao 3 Depo. at 20:17–24. He has lived and worked in Texas since being hired in late 2023. Id. at 21:3– 4 22:23, 30:4–9. Wayde Zhao is also a director. Zhao Depo. at 27:7–8. Segway’s evidence further 5 demonstrates that many of its other high-level employees are based out of the Texas headquarters. 6 Segway’s second director is located in the Plano, Texas office. Zhao Depo. at 29:2–20. So is 7 Segway’s Head of Customer Service, Head of IT, Head of Logistics, and the sole Human 8 Resources employee. Zhao Depo. at 30:11–32:5. In sum, Segway has submitted evidence 9 illustrating that its nerve center—its headquarters and the place where business decisions are 10 made—is in Texas. See Galarpe v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 17-cv-06514-EMC, 2018 WL 11 348161, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) (finding that the defendant had shown that its nerve center 12 was the location of its decision-making headquarters and high-level officers). 13 Torres refers the Court to other evidence that, it contends, undermines the credibility of 14 Segway’s assertion that its nerve center is in Texas. For example, Segway’s website “highlights” 15 the company’s California connections. Pl. Supp. at 2 (quoting Segway’s “About Us” page, ECF 16 No. 46-3, which describes regional headquarters in Los Angeles and Dallas). Segway’s privacy 17 policy lists a mailing address in California, and that same privacy policy calls for arbitration in 18 Los Angeles, California. Segway Corporate Website Privacy Policy, ECF No. 46-4 at 18–19. 19 Torres points out that in a May 2024 stipulated remand in another lawsuit, Segway described its 20 headquarters and principal place of business as having “recently” transferred to Arcadia, CA. 21 Stipulation to Remand, ECF No. 46-6 ¶ 5. Torres also identifies information from LinkedIn 22 illustrating Segway’s ties to California, including that its General Counsel is based in the Los 23 Angels Metropolitan Area. Opp. at 4 (citing ECF Nos. 35-2, 35-3, and 35-5). 24 The Court finds that none of Torres’s evidence undermines the conclusion that, at the time 25 the complaint was filed in May 2025, Segway’s nerve center was located in Texas. Torres does 26 not cite any authority in support of his contention that a privacy policy mailing address or chosen 27 forum for arbitration shed light on a corporation’s nerve center. Nor do Torres’s submissions 1 has provided evidence that, as of the date the complaint was filed, its sole officer, two directors, 2 high-level employees, and headquarters were all located in Texas. Furthermore, the May 2024 3 filing that described Segway as having headquarters in California is not in conflict with the 4 timeline put forth by Segway, which describes a late 2024 move to Texas. 5 To the extent that Torres argues that “no statement about the location of [Segway’s] nerve 6 center is credible in light of the other statements it has made about its operations,” Pl. Supp. at 5, 7 the Court disagrees. To the contrary, Segway’s evidence demonstrates clearly that, following a 8 period of transition, its principal place of business is in Texas. Because Texas is “home to a 9 plurality of its officers with strategic, decision-making, and financial authority,” Segway has 10 shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its principal place of business is in Texas. 11 Colmendares v. Paedae, Inc., No. 21-cv-5221-DMG, 2021 WL 4934976, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 12 2021). Accordingly, the Court finds that Segway is a citizen of Texas, not California, and the 13 parties are diverse. The Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction. 14 III. MOTION TO TRANSFER 15 Having determined that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the Court considers 16 whether transfer is appropriate. 17 A. Legal Standard 18 The first-to-file rule is “a judicially created doctrine of federal comity, which applies when 19 two cases involving substantially similar issues and parties have been filed in different districts.” 20 In re Bozic, 888 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 21 “Under that rule, the second district court has discretion to transfer, stay, or dismiss the second 22 case in the interest of efficiency and judicial economy.” Id. at 1051–52 (internal quotation marks 23 and citation omitted). “When applying the first-to-file rule, courts should be driven to maximize 24 economy, consistency, and comity.” Kohn Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787 F.3d 25 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining 26 whether to apply the first-to-file rule, a court “analyzes three factors: chronology of the lawsuits, 27 similarity of the parties, and similarity of the issues.” Id. Even if those factors are satisfied, a 1 v. Uniweld Prod., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991). “The circumstances under which an 2 exception to the first-to-file rule typically will be made include bad faith, anticipatory suit, and 3 forum shopping.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 4 B. Discussion 5 1. The Relevant Factors Favor Application of the First-to-File Rule 6 A court may apply the first-to-file rule “when a complaint involving the same parties and 7 issues has already been filed in another district.” Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1240 (citation omitted). The 8 applicability of the first-to-file rule is analyzed under three factors: (1) chronology of the lawsuits, 9 (2) similarity of the parties, and (3) similarity of the issues. Id. 10 Segway argues that the first-to-file rule applies because the Cicero action was filed first, 11 the parties in the Delaware Action and the California Action are substantially similar, and the 12 issues and claims are similar in both actions. Mot. at 4–7. Torres does not contest that these 13 factors favor the application of the first-to-file rule. 14 As to the first factor, chronology of the lawsuits, the Cicero action was filed before 15 Torres’s complaint. Boyle Decl. ¶¶ 2, 8; see Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1240 (“Ordinarily, we start by 16 analyzing which lawsuit was filed first.”). Accordingly, chronology favors application of the first- 17 to-file rule. 18 The second factor asks whether the parties are substantially similar. Kohn, 787 F.3d at 19 1240. Segway argues that the parties are substantially similar because Torres seeks to represent a 20 class of “all persons who purchased the [KickScooters] in the State of California,” Compl. ¶ 59, 21 and the Delaware CAC includes both a nationwide class and a California subclass, Del. CAC ¶ 53. 22 See Mot. at 5–6. In a class action, the “classes, and not the class representatives, are compared.” 23 See Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Ross 24 v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2008)). The proposed classes can 25 be substantially similar where they “seek to represent at least some of the same individuals.” Id. 26 The Court finds that the complaints have overlapping classes and the same defendant, so the 27 parties are substantially similar. 1 issues are substantially similar because the facts and legal theories in Torres’s complaint are 2 substantially the same as those raised in the Consolidated Action. Mot. at 6–7. With respect to 3 the third factor, “[t]he issues in both cases also need not be identical, only substantially similar.” 4 Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1240. Courts analyze whether “there is substantial overlap between the two 5 suits.” Id. at 1241 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even where there are 6 differences between the causes of action, the lawsuits are substantially similar where “the thrust of 7 the lawsuits is identical.” See Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d, 1289, 8 1297 (N.D. Cal. 2013). As discussed, the lawsuits all revolve around the same defect in the 9 Kickscooters and assert overlapping causes of action arising therefrom, including breach of 10 implied warranty, violations of the Song-Beverly Act, violations of the California CLRA, 11 violations of the California UCL, and violations of the California FAL. Compl. ¶¶ 74–143; Del. 12 CAC ¶¶ 84–194. Thus, the Court concludes that the similarity of the issues weighs in favor of the 13 first-to-file rule. 14 2. No Discretionary Exceptions to the First-to-File Rule Apply 15 Even where the three factors favor application of the first-to-file rule, a district court may 16 decline to apply the rule based on equitable considerations. See Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 628. Such 17 considerations include anticipatory suits, forum shopping, or bad faith. Id. “Other circumstances 18 may also warrant a rejection of the first-to-file rule, such as factors involving convenience to the 19 parties or sound judicial administration.” Power Integrations, Inc. v. ON Semiconductor Corp., 20 No. 16-CV-06371-BLF, 2017 WL 1065334, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017). Still, the first-to-file 21 rule “should not be disregarded lightly.” Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). A district 22 court has discretion to “weigh the facts and conclude that the rule should apply.” Alltrade, 23 946 F.2d at 628. Ultimately, “[t]he most basic aspect of the first-to-file rule is that it is 24 discretionary.” Id. 25 Segway argues that no equitable considerations preclude application of the first-to-file rule 26 because there are no facts to indicate that the Cicero action was an anticipatory suit or that Segway 27 has engaged in forum shopping. Mot. at 7–9. Torres contends that equitable considerations favor 1 compel arbitration in California, he will be prejudiced by deferring to Interim Class and Liaison 2 Counsel in Delaware, his choice of venue should be honored, and the witnesses are located in 3 California. Opp. at 5–7. 4 The Court finds that the equitable considerations identified by Torres do not outweigh the 5 first-to-file rule factors. To begin, Torres explains that because there is a pending motion to 6 compel arbitration in In re Segway Scooter Recall Litigation, he anticipates that Segway will move 7 to consolidate his case with the Delaware cases and seek to compel arbitration in this case, too. 8 Opp. at 5. Torres argues that this “plan” weighs against transfer because a Delaware court would 9 be unable to compel Torres to arbitrate in California, which is apparently the chosen forum for 10 arbitration. Opp. at 5–6. 11 Torres refers the Court to Caremark v. Chickasaw Nation, No. 21-cv-00574-PHX-SPL, 12 2021 WL 2780859 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2021) in support of his argument that the pending motion to 13 compel arbitration in Delaware weighs against transfer of this case. Opp. at 6. Applying Tenth 14 Circuit law, the Caremark court found that it would be “inequitable to apply the first-to-file rule in 15 this case and defer the issue of arbitration” to the transferee court, where a motion to compel 16 arbitration was already pending. 2021 WL 2780859, at *2. The court explained that the majority 17 rule (including in the Tenth Circuit, the location of the potential transferee court) is that only a 18 district court in the chosen forum for arbitration may compel arbitration. Id. Because the 19 Caremark court was in the district of the selected arbitration forum, the court declined to defer the 20 arbitrability issue to the transferee court. Id. The Court disagrees that Caremark requires 21 declining transfer. First, whether Segway will move to compel arbitration in this case is not an 22 issue before the Court. Second, if Segway moves to compel arbitration and the Delaware court is 23 unable to compel arbitration—an issue on which the Court expresses no opinion—then the case 24 will be litigated in the Delaware court. 25 Torres’s other arguments, which pertain to possible deference to Interim Class and Liaison 26 counsel, Torres’s interest in litigating at home, the location of the witnesses, and the Court’s 27 expertise do not counterbalance the purpose of the first-to-file rule in promoting judicial efficiency ] favor application of the first-to-file rule, and no exception applies. 2 3. Transfer is Appropriate 3 Having determined that application of the first-to-file rule is warranted, the court “has 4 || discretion to transfer, stay, or dismiss the second case.” Bozic, 888 F.3d at 1052. Courts generally 5 prefer transfer under the first-to-file rule where, as here, the claims asserted in the consolidated 6 || action in Delaware and the California Action are substantially similar, but not identical. Asa 7 || consequence, transfer is appropriate because it “avoids placing an unnecessary burden on the 8 federal judiciary” and “avoid[s] the embarrassment of conflicting judgments.” Young v. L’Oreal 9 USA, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 3d 700, 708 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. 10 || v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Animal 11 || Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016)). 12 || IV. ORDER 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Segway’s motion to transfer the action to 14 || the District of Delaware. Having determined that transfer is appropriate, the Court DENIES 3 15 Segway’s motion to stay the case AS MOOT. All dates are hereby VACATED. The Clerk of the 16 Court SHALL transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 17 || and close the case. 18 19 || Dated: February 5, 2026

TH LABSON FREEMAN 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28