UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
Jimmy Smith Case No. 21-cv-133-PJB-AKJ v. Opinion No. 2023 DNH 017
Roger Williams University Law School
ORDER
Plaintiff Jimmy Smith, a law school graduate appearing pro
se, has sued his alma mater, Roger Williams University Law
School (RWULS). Mr. Smith claims that RWULS discriminated
against him because of his race and breached a contractual
promise to provide him with a clinical placement. Invoking Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), RWULS moves to dismiss (Doc. No. 57),
arguing that Mr. Smith’s complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. RWULS also argues that Mr. Smith’s complaint violates
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short plain statement of
the claim”) and 10(b) (requiring separately numbered
paragraphs). Mr. Smith has timely objected (Doc. No. 78), to
which RWULS has replied (Doc. No. 79). The motion is granted in
part and denied in part. Accepting all of Mr. Smith’s well-
pleaded facts as true, the court finds that Mr. Smith has failed
to state claim for racial discrimination, but has adequately set
forth facts to support a claim for breach of contract. Factual Background 1
Mr. Smith, an African American, began his studies at RWULS
in the Fall of 2016. He alleges that, due to his race, RWULS
took adverse actions against him. Specifically, Mr. Smith avers
that he has been outspoken on racial issues since 2016 and that
“when [he] talk[ed] about issues of race and [his] white
classmates complained, he was called by the school’s Title IX
coordinator to talk about the issue.” Mr. Smith has offered no
details of the resulting discussions, other than noting that
they did not result in any formal disciplinary proceeding
against him. He alleges that such meetings were not held when
he complained about white classmates.
Mr. Smith further asserts that RWULS dismissed a
disciplinary complaint he lodged against a white female student
as de minimis but did not dismiss disciplinary proceedings
against him brought by the same student. His complaint contains
no information as to results of those proceedings. He also
claims that the school commenced disciplinary proceedings
1Unless indicated otherwise, the facts are taken from Mr. Smith’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) and amended complaint (Doc. No. 5), the latter of which the Magistrate Judge construed as a “complaint addendum” during her preliminary review of this case. See February 22, 2022, Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 45) at 1, adopted, April 15, 2022 (Doc. No. 62).
2 against him only after the sole African American on the
disciplinary board contracted Covid-19.
Mr. Smith claims that he was denied the opportunity to
participate in a RWULS clinical program because of a “run-”in”
with the law, while white students with legal issues have not
been denied those opportunities and white faculty members have
not been disciplined for their legal troubles. He alleges that
the school did so despite “guaranteeing” students a clinical
placement. He also claims that the school has retaliated
against him for complaining about racial issues by “preventing
him from accessing the same resources” as white students.
Procedural History
Mr. Smith filed his original complaint (Doc. No. 1) on
March 19, 2021, and his complaint addendum (Doc. No. 5) a few
weeks thereafter. On preliminary review, the Magistrate Judge,
construing the pro se complaint liberally, allowed claims for
racial discrimination (Claims and 1 and 2) and breach of
contract (Claim 3) to proceed. February 16, 2022, Report and
Recommendation (Doc. No. 45) at 4-5. The court construed claims
1 and 2 as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and claim 3 as arising
under common law contract principles. The court allowed those
claims to proceed without prejudice to RWULS’s “ability to move
to dismiss on any appropriate basis.” February 16, 2022 Order
(Doc. No. 46) at 1.
3 Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, a plaintiff must make factual allegations
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Id. A claim is facially plausible if it “pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
In testing a complaint's sufficiency, the court employs a
two-step approach. See Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). First, the complaint is screened for
statements that “merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact
or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.
(cleaned up). A claim consisting of little more than
“allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of
action” may be dismissed. Id. Second, after crediting as true
all non-conclusory factual allegations and the reasonable
inferences drawn from those allegations, the court determines if
the claim is plausible. Id. The plausibility requirement “simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence” of illegal conduct. Twombly, 550
4 U.S. at 556. The “make-or-break standard” is that those
allegations and inferences, “taken as true, must state a
plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.”
Sepúlveda–Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29
(1st Cir. 2010).
Analysis
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 10(b)
Before analyzing Mr. Smith’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6),
the court first addresses the defendant’s argument that the
complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
and 10(b).
Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” The pleading must “‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests[.]’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). “At a bare minimum, even in this age of notice
pleading, a defendant must be afforded both adequate notice of
any claims asserted against him and a meaningful opportunity to
mount a defense.” Diaz- Rivera v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 377 F.3d 119,
123 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57
F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir. 1995)).
5 Additionally, “[a] party must state its claims or defenses
in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a
single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “If doing
so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence – and each defense other than a denial
– must be stated in a separate count or defense.”
As the Magistrate Judge noted, Mr. Smith’s complaint and
addendum contain “often-scattershot allegations.” Report and
Recommendation (Doc. No 45) at 5. Nevertheless, the court is
persuaded that the Magistrate Judge’s delineation of Mr. Smith’s
claims provides sufficient clarity to allow the defendant
“adequate notice of any claims asserted against him and a
meaningful opportunity to mount a defense.” Diaz-Rivera, 377
F.3d at 123. Accordingly, dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 or 10
is unwarranted. 2
2The court also rejects Mr. Smith’s argument that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is precluded by the Magistrate Judge allowing those claims to proceed. In the first instance, the Magistrate Judge’s service order (Doc. No. 46) was issued “without prejudice to the defendant’s ability to move to dismiss the claims on any appropriate basis.” Id. at 1. In addition, the defendant has supported its motion with documents -- unavailable to the Magistrate Judge -- that the court may consider on a motion to dismiss (such as the RWULS Handbook) because they were referred to in Mr. Smith’s complaint. Finally, the court is disinclined to deprive the defendant of its right to seek relief under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by essentially considering its motion to be “denied” before it was ever filed, or the defendant had an opportunity to present legal argument. See Aleman v. Dart, No. 09-cv-6049, 2010 WL 4876720, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2010)
6 B. Racial Discrimination Claims
Liberally construing Mr. Smith’s complaint and addendum,
the court allowed the following discrimination claims to proceed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981:
Claim 1(a) -- RWULS and its professors summarily dismissed Mr. Smith’s complaints about racial insensitivity and discrimination at RWULS;
Claim 1(b) -- RWULS and its professors handled internal complaints white students lodged against Mr. Smith differently than complaints he lodged against white students;
Claim 2(a) -- RWULS retaliated against Mr. Smith for filing this lawsuit in violation of his First Amendment rights; and
Claim 2(d) -- RWULS treated Mr. Smith differently than other students and faculty because of his race.
Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 45) at 4-5.
Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons ... shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a). To state a cognizable racial discrimination claim, a
plaintiff must establish that “(1) [he] is a member of a racial
minority; (2) the defendant discriminated against [him] on the
basis of [his] race; and (3) the discrimination implicated one
or more of the activities listed in the statute, including the
(rejecting application of “law of the case” doctrine to defendant’s motion to dismiss pro se complaint that was allowed to proceed after preliminary review).
7 right to make and enforce contracts.” Hammond v. Kmart Corp.,
733 F.3d 360, 362 (1st Cir. 2013). “To succeed on his race-
based claims, [a plaintiff] must show, among other things, that
[the defendant] acted with discriminatory intent.” Doe v. Brown
Univ., 43 F.4th 195, 208 (1st Cir. 2022). In sum, a §
1981 plaintiff must “initially plead and ultimately prove that,
but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of a legally
protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African
American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019, (2020).
Stripped of conclusory factual allegations, the court finds
that Mr. Smith has failed to plead facts sufficient to support a
plausible claim that RWULS discriminated against him because of
his race.
Each of Mr. Smith’s discrimination claims alleges that he
was treated differently than white students. Although
“[i]ntentional racial discrimination can be inferred from
disparate treatment of races[,]” Doe v. Trs. Of Dartmouth Col.,
Civ. No. 21-cv-85-JD, 2021 WL 2857518, at * 8 (D.N.H. July 8,
2021), Mr. Smith’s complaint and addendum contain only
conclusory allegations of discrimination meted out to him. As
previously described, his original complaint alleges, without
any further explanation, that RWULS “gives harsher punishments
to persons of color who are accused by white students.” Compl.
(Doc. No. 1-1) ¶ 11. He further alleges that he made a
8 complaint against two white students that RWULS denied as de
minimis, but a white student’s complaint against him was “deemed
more than de minimis.” Compl. Add. (Doc. No. 5) ¶ 10. In
addition, Mr. Smith asserts that he knows of “other white
students who had run-ins with the law” who received clinical
placements, while he did not. Id. ¶ 15. As for his retaliation
claim, Mr. Smith alleges that he was “denied the same resources”
as white students in retaliation for his complaints about racial
insensitivity. Id. ¶ 18.
RWULS argues that Mr. Smith’s claims of disparate treatment
are merely conclusory and lack sufficient factual details to set
forth a plausible claim for relief. The court agrees. Mr.
Smith’s assertions that RWULS administers “harsher punishments
to persons of color,” Compl. (Doc. No. 1-1) at 6, and that it
treated his complaint against two white students less seriously
than a complaint against him, Compl. Add. (Doc. No. 5) at 2,
lack any information about the nature and circumstances of the
complaints at issue or any resulting adverse action and
therefore do not give rise to a plausible inference of disparate
treatment. See Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 224
(D. Mass. 2017) (granting judgment on the pleadings to college
where plaintiff failed to allege that “other students who were
found responsible for similar violations and received lesser
punishments.”). Nor -- given that Mr. Smith himself was
9 involved in two of the complaints noted above -- is this a
situation where more details are “likely within [the
defendant’s] control.” See Doe v. Tr. of Dartmouth Coll., 2021
WL 2857518 at *8.
While Mr. Smith is not required to plead specific details
about the putative comparator cases, he has, unlike the
plaintiff in Doe v. Tr. Of Dartmouth Coll., failed to identify
with any specificity a “comparator group” that “was treated
differently due to their race.” In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that “at least 9 Black male football players were
suspended or expelled” following disciplinary proceedings, but
no white football players were referred for formal investigation
during that same time period.” In addition, the plaintiff
alleged that “in at least one case a white student-athlete was
allowed [to] delay the imposition of a [disciplinary] suspension
so that he could complete his athletic season”, while no Black
football players were not offered the same opportunity. Id.
Similarly, in Doe v. Harvard Univ., 462 F. Supp. 3d 51,
67 (D. Mass. 2020), the court denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss because the plaintiff alleged a “comparator group –
Caucasian students accused of similar sexual misconduct” and
that the comparator group was treated differently. Mr. Smith’s
allegations, by contrast, lack any indication as to the
similarity of his conduct, e.g., “run-ins with the law,” to the
10 conduct of the white students in question, or as to the
disparity in punishment. As such, he has failed to plausibly
allege that race was a but-for cause of his alleged
mistreatment. And because the complaint and addendum lack any
factual allegations to support a plausible inference of racial
discrimination, a retaliation claim under § 1981 also fails.
See Veal v. Comm'r of Bos. Ctrs. for Youth & Fams., No. 21-CV-
10265-ADB, 2022 WL 715712, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2022)
(observing that plaintiff in section 1981 retaliation claim must
allege retaliation for viable complaints of racial
discrimination). Claims 1 and 2 are therefore dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
C. Breach of Contract
Mr. Smith alleges that RWULS breached its “guarantee” that
students would receive a clinical placement. While the lack of
clinical experience did not prevent Mr. Smith from graduating,
he asserts that it left him less prepared for a legal career.
Under Rhode Island law, the relationship between a student
and a private university is based in contract. Doe v. Brown
Univ., 943 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2019). To state a viable
breach of contract claim, “plaintiffs must prove that a valid,
binding contract existed, the defendant breached the terms of
the contract, and the plaintiffs sustained damages as a result
of the breach.” Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assur. Co., 480
11 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007). When alleging a breach, the
plaintiff must “describe[e], with substantial certainty, the
specific contractual promise the defendant failed to keep. Id.
(quotation omitted).
Courts may rely on ‘catalogs, manuals, handbooks, etc.’ to
assist in the determination of the terms of contract with an
academic institution. Brown v. Suffolk Univ., No. CV 19-40062-
DHH, 2021 WL 2785047, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2021) (cleaned
up). RWULS, citing to the lack of any such “guarantee” in its
Student Handbook (Doc. No., 57-2), claims that no such
contractual promise exists. Information on the school’s
website, however, prevents the court from dismissing this claim.
On the landing page of RWULS’ website is a tab titled “Why RWU
Law?” The drop-down menu from that tab includes a link titled
“Guaranteed Clinical Experience.” That link leads to a page
titled “The Clinical Guarantee,” with those words repeated in a
large font at the top of the following body of text:
RWU Law guarantees that every qualified student will be afforded a substantial, hands-on clinical experience. Just tell us where you want to go – and we'll help you get there. An effective, modern legal education requires both a strong academic grounding, and a robust regimen of hands-on experience.
https://law.rwu.edu/why-rwu-law/clinical-guarantee (last visited
Feb. 14, 2023). Then, after four bullet-pointed paragraphs
12 detailing the attributes of the clinical program, the last entry
on the page is “WE GUARANTEE IT.”
In the court’s view, this “clinical guarantee” language is
sufficiently specific to defeat RWULS’s motion to dismiss Mr.
Smith’s breach of contract claim. See Miranda v. Xavier Univ.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 961, 970 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (denying college’s
motion to dismiss student’s breach of contract claim premised on
website’s “guarantee . . .[of] placement in a quality clinical
environment.”); see also Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic. Inst.,
507 F. Supp. 3d 406, 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (college’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings denied because circular “is
consistently declaratory, with several of its statements
beginning with the phrase ‘we will.’”); but cf. Polley v.
Northwestern Univ., Case No. 20 C 4798, 2021 WL 4192076, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2021) (finding that the descriptions on the
university's website “do not have any language that indicates a
guarantee [of in-person instruction] has been made if
prospective students accept the offer of admissions”). And
while, as RWULS points out in its motion, the RWULS “guarantee”
is couched in terms of “qualified students,” RWULS’s
consideration of Mr. Smith’s “qualifications” is not an issue
that can be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Similarly, Mr.
Smith’s assertion that his career has been hampered by lack of
clinical experience is a sufficient allegation of damage to
13 withstand amotion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court declines
to dismiss Mr. Smith’s breach of contract claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to
dismiss is granted as to plaintiff’s racial discrimination
claims (Claims 1 and 2) and denied as to his breach of contract
claim (Claim 3). (Doc. No. 57).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge
February 16, 2023
cc: Jimmy Smith, pro se Counsel of Record