Jimmy Leftwich v. Mark Driscoll

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 19, 2023
• Docket: 22-1575
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0232n.06

Case Nos. 22-1572/1575

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED May 19, 2023 ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk JIMMY DAN LEFTWICH, et al., ) Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN MARK DRISCOLL, et al., ) Defendants-Appellants. ) OPINION )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; SILER and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Jimmy Dan Leftwich (“Leftwich”) and his wife Lisa (“Mrs.

Leftwich” and collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Mark Driscoll (“Driscoll”) and William Baugh

(“Baugh” and collectively “Defendants”) after Leftwich was shot by Defendants while standing

inside his home holding a pistol. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, asserting their

entitlement to qualified immunity. The district court denied Defendants’ motions. We AFFIRM.

I.

In 2019, the Gibraltar, Michigan, Police Department received a 911 call that a man had

stepped outside his home and fired multiple pistol rounds. The caller identified neither the shooter

nor the shooter’s home address, only that the shots had come from a house located to the right of

where the caller lived and there was a white truck parked in the shooter’s driveway. Multiple

police officers responded to the scene, including Gibraltar Police Sergeant Steven McInchak, Case Nos. 22-1572/1575, Leftwich, et al. v. Driscoll, et al.

Gibraltar officer Zachariah Phillips, and Defendants Driscoll (of the Trenton Police Department)

and Baugh (of the Rockwood Police Department). Because McInchak and Phillips were the only

two Gibraltar police officers on duty, Driscoll and Baugh responded pursuant to a mutual aid

agreement. McInchak instructed the responding officers to carry their patrol rifles.

When the officers arrived on the scene, it was dark. They initially thought that the shooter’s

home was located next to the Leftwich home, and Driscoll stepped onto the Leftwich’s front porch

to get a better view of the home next door. When Driscoll heard talking inside the Leftwich home,

he quickly stepped off the porch. At this point, the parties disagree about what transpired.

Driscoll and Baugh testified that, as the officers were in front of Plaintiffs’ home, Leftwich

opened his front door, racked a round into his pistol, stepped onto the front porch, and pointed the

gun at Phillips. Baugh testified that Phillips “would have been to my left or behind me,” and

Driscoll testified that Phillips was “[s]omewhere behind me.” Driscoll and Baugh then both

shouted “let me see your hands” and immediately discharged a total of six rounds (one by Baugh

and five by Driscoll) toward Plaintiffs, one of which grazed Leftwich’s head. Defendants

recovered Leftwich’s gun, which was loaded and had one round in the chamber.

Phillips, who is not a party to the dispute, testified that while the officers were in front of

the Leftwich house, the front door opened, and he then heard “the sound of a racking of a slide

from a pistol or a handgun or a firearm.” He stated he then heard someone shout “gun” followed

by four or five rifle shots. Phillips testified that he did not fire his weapon because he neither saw

Leftwich holding a firearm nor racking it. He then took Mrs. Leftwich, who was uninjured, into

protective custody.1

1 The fourth officer, McInchak, was also on the scene. However, he was talking with the individual who made the 911 call and only heard Defendants shoot at Leftwich.

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Finally, Leftwich testified that he opened the front door after hearing “commotion out in

front of [his] house.” The officers never identified themselves as police officers before using

deadly force. When Leftwich opened the door, he testified he was holding his pistol in his right

hand but never stepped outside. He also said that the pistol was down at his side, and he never

racked a round into the chamber. When the bullet grazed Leftwich’s head, Leftwich’s body came

to rest about six feet inside his home.

It is undisputed that approximately three seconds elapsed from the time Leftwich started

opening the door to the first shot. And the entire confrontation, from the time Leftwich started

opening the door until the final shots were fired, lasted about six seconds. Leftwich was taken to

the hospital with a minor head wound and discharged the same evening.

Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging nine counts against numerous entities. However, the district

court granted summary judgment for all defendants on all claims except for an excessive force

claim against Baugh and Driscoll for firing their rifles at Plaintiffs. Defendants filed motions for

summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court

denied their motions, stating that “[g]enuine issues of material fact exist which preclude the Court

from deciding whether Baugh and Driscoll’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the

circumstances for purposes of qualified immunity.” Defendants appeal.2

II.

A denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is reviewed de novo, Nelson

v. City of Madison Heights, 845 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted), and we may

2 Neither party contests that we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. The parties raise both legal and factual issues, so we have jurisdiction to review. See Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 905–06 (6th Cir. 2009).

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affirm the district court “on any grounds supported by the record, even if different from those

relied on by the district court,” Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853, 877 (6th Cir. 2020)

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

In reviewing an excessive force claim, this court “limit[s] the scope of [its] inquiry to the

moments preceding the shooting.” Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 (6th Cir. 1996).

Although Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that Defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity, we view all facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Foster v. Patrick, 806 F.3d

883, 886 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). If there is video evidence, we take the facts “in the

light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). However, if the video

evidence “can be interpreted in multiple ways or if [the] videos do not show all relevant facts, such

facts should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Latits v. Phillips,

878 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017).

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can establish

that “(1) the facts show a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly

established when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his

conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right.” Foster, 806 F.3d at 886 (cleaned up) (citing

Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013)).

A.

“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). The Fourth

Amendment guarantees citizens the right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and a court must

look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an officer used excessive force.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). We use the following factors in evaluating whether

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an officer’s use of force was constitutionally reasonable: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue,

[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

[3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citing

Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9). The reasonableness inquiry “is an objective one” that does not account

for an officer’s “evil” or “good” intentions and “must be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396–97

(citations omitted).

The first factor, the severity of the crime, weighs in Leftwich’s favor. The officers were in

Leftwich’s neighborhood to investigate the discharge of multiple pistol rounds, which is a possible

misdemeanor. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 752.863a. However, Defendants did not know that

Leftwich was the one who had fired his pistol when they used deadly force against him. Because

“the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is limited to what the officer could have known at the

time,” Defendants cannot rely on Leftwich’s supposed previous pistol shots to justify their use of

deadly force. Redrick v. City of Akron, No. 21-3027, 2021 WL 5298538, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 15,

2021) (citing Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 2007)). To the extent Defendants

argue they used deadly force in response to Leftwich’s alleged racking of his pistol, racking a

firearm, particularly in one’s own home, is not a crime. Therefore, under the first factor,

Defendants cannot rely on the alleged racking of a firearm to justify their use of force.

The second factor, whether Leftwich posed an immediate threat to Defendants or others,

also weighs in Leftwich’s favor. Defendants argue that Leftwich posed an immediate threat to the

officers when he racked his pistol and pointed it at Phillips. When an individual is armed, the

reasonableness of an officer’s fear and subsequent use of deadly force often turns on whether the

firearm is pointed at another person. See, e.g., Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d 421, 435–36 (6th Cir. 2020)

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(collecting cases). When a factual dispute exists as to whether a plaintiff’s gun is pointed at another

person when officers use deadly force, as in this case, qualified immunity is inappropriate. See,

e.g., Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1989).

Defendants contend that even apart from whether Leftwich’s pistol was pointed at Phillips,

the fact that he opened his front door and racked a weapon justified deadly force. It does not.

First, the racking of the firearm is also disputed. Second, even assuming Leftwich racked his

pistol, this action alone is insufficient to justify deadly force. Taking the facts in the light most

favorable to Leftwich, Defendants used deadly force against Leftwich when all they knew was that

he had opened his front door and likely had a loaded weapon—he had made no threatening remarks

and had not pointed his pistol at anyone. Instead, Leftwich armed himself and opened his front

door in response to a “commotion out in front of [his] house” in the middle of the night. On these

facts, we cannot say that Leftwich posed “an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. We agree with our sister circuit’s recent holding that “[r]acking

a [firearm] inside one’s home, without more, is no more threatening than coming to the door with

any other loaded firearm. Indeed, any reasonable officer would presume that an individual

carrying a firearm has already loaded it.” Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 219 (4th Cir. 2022)

(citing McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 17 (1986)).

The third factor, active resistance, also weighs in Leftwich’s favor. Defendants have not

claimed that Leftwich resisted arrest or attempted to flee. He was, after all, in his own home. To

the extent Defendants argue they commanded Leftwich to show his hands before they opened fire,

the commands to show his hands and the gunfire were essentially simultaneous, and Leftwich did

not have time to respond. But even if he had failed to comply with Defendants’ commands,

“noncompliance alone does not indicate active resistance; there must be something more.”

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Eldridge v. Warren, 533 F. App’x 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2013). Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, there was nothing more in this case. Accordingly, applying the Graham

factors, Defendants’ firing of their weapons at Leftwich constituted excessive force in violation of

the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Accepting Plaintiffs’ account of the facts, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ clearly

established rights by using deadly force against them following Leftwich’s opening his front door

while holding a pistol but without pointing it at anyone. A right is clearly established if “the

contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates that right.” Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 2013) (cleaned

up and citations omitted). Although there does not have to be a case precisely on point, “existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017) (holding

that “an officer might lose qualified immunity even if there is no reported case directly on point”

if, “in the light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct” is “apparent”

(quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Here, the question is whether it was clearly established in 2019 that police officers could

not use deadly force against a homeowner who, although investigating a nighttime disturbance

with a firearm, was not threatening the officers with imminent deadly harm. It was clearly

established in 2019 that an individual had the right to arm himself for the purpose of self-defense

in his own home. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008). Also, it was

clearly established that an individual had the right not to be shot unless there was “probable cause

to believe that they pose a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”

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Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up and citation omitted). And we

have repeatedly held that when a suspect possesses a weapon but does not have it pointed at

anyone, qualified immunity is generally inappropriate. See, e.g., Hicks, 958 F.3d at 435–36

(collecting cases). Therefore, it was clearly established in 2019 that an individual had the right to

possess a weapon for self-defense in his own home and cannot be shot simply for possessing a

weapon in a nonthreatening manner.

Defendants used deadly force against Leftwich only three seconds after he opened his front

door while holding a pistol within his home. Although Defendants believed they heard Leftwich

rack his pistol, he was holding his pistol down at his side when he opened the door. Because the

contours of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were sufficiently definite in 2019, we hold that clearly

established law precluded Driscoll and Baugh from using excessive force against the Plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED.

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