Jimmy Joseph Newell v. the State of Texas
This text of Jimmy Joseph Newell v. the State of Texas (Jimmy Joseph Newell v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-22-00415-CR ________________
JIMMY JOSEPH NEWELL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 163rd District Court Orange County, Texas Trial Cause No. B220122-R ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In an open plea, Jimmy Joseph Newell pled guilty to the offense of evading
arrest or detention. The trial court found him guilty and assessed punishment at
eighteen months of confinement. The judgment included an assessment for court
costs and reimbursement fees, which Newell challenges in one issue on appeal. As
discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
1 PERTINENT BACKGROUND
Newell completed an affidavit of indigency, and the trial court appointed trial
counsel and appellate counsel to represent him. The trial court did not mention court
costs or reimbursement fees for attorney’s services in his oral pronouncement. The
written judgment assessed court costs of $290.00 and reimbursement fees of
$965.00, which included $900.00 in fees for court-appointed counsel. The itemized
Bill of Costs showed $290.00 under the heading “Court Costs” and $965.00 under
the heading “Reimbursement Fees.” The “Reimbursement Fees” total consisted of
$900.00 for court-appointed attorney’s fees, $50.00 for the sheriff, and $15.00 for a
time payment.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Newell challenges the court costs and reimbursement fees
that the trial court did not orally pronounce. The State agrees the trial court erred by
assessing reimbursement fees that included attorney’s fees against an indigent
defendant. However, the State asserts that Newell should be required to pay the
legislatively mandated court costs, even though those were not included in the trial
court’s oral pronouncement.
Without a change in a defendant’s indigent status, a trial court cannot impose
an award of attorney’s fees in the judgment against a defendant who remains indigent
when the judgment is pronounced. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p)
2 (stating an indigent defendant is presumed to remain indigent unless a material
change in a defendant’s financial circumstances occurs), 26.05(g); Wiley v. State,
410 S.W.3d 313, 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Roberts v. State, 327 S.W.3d
880, 883–84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). Article 26.05(g) provides that a
judge shall order a defendant to pay a reimbursement fee to offset in part or whole
the cost of legal services provided to the defendant “[i]f the judge determines that a
defendant has financial resources” to do so. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
26.05(g). We have reviewed the record, and it does not demonstrate that the trial
court found a material change in Newell’s financial circumstances. Therefore, the
trial court abused its discretion by awarding reimbursement for court-appointed
attorney’s fees. See id. arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g); Roberts, 327 S.W.3d at 884
(concluding trial court abused its discretion by taxing indigent defendant with
attorney’s fees). We sustain Newell’s complaint as to the reimbursement amount for
court-appointed attorney’s fees of $900.00.
In contrast, court costs are not punitive and do not have to be included in the
oral pronouncement of sentence as a precondition of including them in the trial
court’s written judgment. Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). Court costs are compensatory in nature and a “nonpunitive recoupment of the
costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial of the case.” Id. at
366 (internal quotations omitted); see also Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767
3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The itemized Bill of Costs included in the record shows the
assessed court costs are legislatively mandated and “compensatory in nature.” Weir,
278 S.W.3d at 366. Accordingly, we hold the court costs of $290.00 did not have to
be orally pronounced to be included in the trial court’s written judgment. See id. at
366–67. The other reimbursement fees of $50.00 for the sheriff and $15.00 time
payment were a recoupment of costs authorized by statute, and thus did not have to
be orally pronounced. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 102.011(a)(2)
(authorizing $50.00 peace officer reimbursement fee); 102.030(a) (authorizing
$15.00 time payment reimbursement fee); see also Weir, 278 S.W.3d at 366–67. We
overrule Newell’s complaint relating to court costs and other reimbursement fees.
CONCLUSION
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure authorize us to render the judgment
the trial court should have rendered. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(c). Because the record
does not support the award of $900.00 for the reimbursement of attorney’s fees, we
modify the judgment by deleting the reimbursement fees award of $965.00 and
replacing it with $65.00. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. ________________________________ W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice Submitted on June 22, 2023 Opinion Delivered July 19, 2023 Do Not Publish Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ. 4
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Jimmy Joseph Newell v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jimmy-joseph-newell-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2023.