Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-13295 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00190-RWS
JIMMY GRADY TROTTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFREY SHULL, in his individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(December 19, 2017)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Jimmy Trotter brought this action against Deputy Jeffrey Shull, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Shull violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force by handcuffing his wrists too tightly during an arrest. The
district court denied Trotter’s motion to file a second amended complaint and
granted Shull’s motion to dismiss, finding that Shull is entitled to qualified
immunity. We affirm.
I
On August 7, 2014, Deputy Shull pulled Trotter over for a traffic violation
and arrested him for following too closely and on suspicion of driving under the
influence. Trotter alleges that Shull used excessive force in violation of his
constitutional rights by using handcuffs that were not “double locked,” and thus
continued to tighten around his wrists, causing him immediate pain. According to
Trotter, Shull did not loosen the handcuffs despite Trotter’s repeated requests that
he do so. Trotter contends that the handcuffs caused serious injury to his right
wrist, including a chronic scapholunate ligament tear that required surgery, and
that he is now unable to grip or grasp with his right hand and continues to
experience regular pain. Trotter brought this suit for excessive force, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. Shull moved to dismiss, and in lieu of a
response, Trotter filed, and the district court granted, a motion to amend his
complaint. Shull then filed a second motion to dismiss, and after briefing, Trotter
2 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 3 of 6
filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district
court denied as futile.
II
The district court properly dismissed Trotter’s first amended complaint on
qualified-immunity grounds. As an initial matter, we reject Trotter’s assertion that
it was improper for the district court to consider Shull’s qualified-immunity
defense “at this preliminary stage of the litigation.” This Court has repeatedly held
that a district court may dismiss a case on the basis of qualified immunity at the
Rule 12 stage. See, e.g., Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003);
Gonzales v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003); Stritch v. Thornton, 280
F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002).
We turn, then, to the merits of the district court’s qualified-immunity
determination. “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). To receive the protection of qualified immunity, a
defendant must first establish that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1357. Here, there is no dispute that
Shull was acting within his discretionary authority in arresting Trotter. Trotter
3 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 4 of 6
does not allege that Shull lacked probable cause to pull him over or to place him
under arrest. Trotter argues only that he did not resist arrest, and thus that Shull
didn’t need to use force against him.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Trotter to show that qualified immunity is
not appropriate by proving that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right,
and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). We may consider the
two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis—the merits of the underlying
constitutional issue and the question whether the alleged right was “clearly
established”— in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Here, we needn’t grapple with the merits of Trotter’s excessive-force claim
because we are satisfied that, in any event, the law was not sufficiently clearly
established to put Shull on notice that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
In assessing an excessive-force claim, a court must consider whether the
defendant’s actions were “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation,” bearing in mind that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). Importantly, “[t]he
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers
4 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 5 of 6
are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Id.
At the very least, Trotter has not shown that Shull’s actions violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment law. This Court has recognized that “the typical
arrest involves some force and injury” and, more significantly for present purposes,
that “[p]ainful handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force ….” Rodriguez v.
Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2002). Particularly in light of
Rodriguez, none of the cases to which Trotter points are closely enough on point to
clearly establish the law in his favor. In Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir.
2002), for instance, the arresting officer slammed an already-handcuffed woman’s
head into the trunk of her car. In Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997),
far from simply ignoring an arrestee’s complaints about his handcuffed, the
arresting officer broke his arm. And in Sanchez v. Hialeah Police Department,
357 F. App’x 229 (11th Cir. 2009)—which as an unpublished opinion is incapable
of clearly establishing law for qualified-immunity purposes, in any event—the
officer repeatedly punched and beat the plaintiff suspect. None of those cases, or
any others of which we are aware, clearly established that Shull violated the Fourth
Amendment when, as he is alleged to have done, he ignored Trotter’s complaints
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Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-13295 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00190-RWS
JIMMY GRADY TROTTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFREY SHULL, in his individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(December 19, 2017)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Jimmy Trotter brought this action against Deputy Jeffrey Shull, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Shull violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force by handcuffing his wrists too tightly during an arrest. The
district court denied Trotter’s motion to file a second amended complaint and
granted Shull’s motion to dismiss, finding that Shull is entitled to qualified
immunity. We affirm.
I
On August 7, 2014, Deputy Shull pulled Trotter over for a traffic violation
and arrested him for following too closely and on suspicion of driving under the
influence. Trotter alleges that Shull used excessive force in violation of his
constitutional rights by using handcuffs that were not “double locked,” and thus
continued to tighten around his wrists, causing him immediate pain. According to
Trotter, Shull did not loosen the handcuffs despite Trotter’s repeated requests that
he do so. Trotter contends that the handcuffs caused serious injury to his right
wrist, including a chronic scapholunate ligament tear that required surgery, and
that he is now unable to grip or grasp with his right hand and continues to
experience regular pain. Trotter brought this suit for excessive force, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. Shull moved to dismiss, and in lieu of a
response, Trotter filed, and the district court granted, a motion to amend his
complaint. Shull then filed a second motion to dismiss, and after briefing, Trotter
2 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 3 of 6
filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district
court denied as futile.
II
The district court properly dismissed Trotter’s first amended complaint on
qualified-immunity grounds. As an initial matter, we reject Trotter’s assertion that
it was improper for the district court to consider Shull’s qualified-immunity
defense “at this preliminary stage of the litigation.” This Court has repeatedly held
that a district court may dismiss a case on the basis of qualified immunity at the
Rule 12 stage. See, e.g., Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003);
Gonzales v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003); Stritch v. Thornton, 280
F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002).
We turn, then, to the merits of the district court’s qualified-immunity
determination. “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). To receive the protection of qualified immunity, a
defendant must first establish that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1357. Here, there is no dispute that
Shull was acting within his discretionary authority in arresting Trotter. Trotter
3 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 4 of 6
does not allege that Shull lacked probable cause to pull him over or to place him
under arrest. Trotter argues only that he did not resist arrest, and thus that Shull
didn’t need to use force against him.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Trotter to show that qualified immunity is
not appropriate by proving that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right,
and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). We may consider the
two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis—the merits of the underlying
constitutional issue and the question whether the alleged right was “clearly
established”— in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Here, we needn’t grapple with the merits of Trotter’s excessive-force claim
because we are satisfied that, in any event, the law was not sufficiently clearly
established to put Shull on notice that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
In assessing an excessive-force claim, a court must consider whether the
defendant’s actions were “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation,” bearing in mind that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). Importantly, “[t]he
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers
4 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 5 of 6
are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Id.
At the very least, Trotter has not shown that Shull’s actions violated clearly
established Fourth Amendment law. This Court has recognized that “the typical
arrest involves some force and injury” and, more significantly for present purposes,
that “[p]ainful handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force ….” Rodriguez v.
Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2002). Particularly in light of
Rodriguez, none of the cases to which Trotter points are closely enough on point to
clearly establish the law in his favor. In Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir.
2002), for instance, the arresting officer slammed an already-handcuffed woman’s
head into the trunk of her car. In Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997),
far from simply ignoring an arrestee’s complaints about his handcuffed, the
arresting officer broke his arm. And in Sanchez v. Hialeah Police Department,
357 F. App’x 229 (11th Cir. 2009)—which as an unpublished opinion is incapable
of clearly establishing law for qualified-immunity purposes, in any event—the
officer repeatedly punched and beat the plaintiff suspect. None of those cases, or
any others of which we are aware, clearly established that Shull violated the Fourth
Amendment when, as he is alleged to have done, he ignored Trotter’s complaints
about the tightness of his handcuffs.
5 Case: 17-13295 Date Filed: 12/19/2017 Page: 6 of 6
Thus, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that Shull is entitled
to qualified immunity on Trotter’s excessive-force claim.
III
We further hold that the district court properly denied Trotter’s motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. As an initial matter, Trotter has not
adequately explained why he couldn’t have amended his complaint to add the
material he now seeks to include—really just elaborations on facts alleged in his
prior complaints—when the district court granted him leave to amend the first
time. Moreover, and in any event, the second amendment that Trotter now seeks
would be futile. It does not include any new claims, parties, or theories of
recovery, nor does it contain any significant new factual allegations. Denial of
leave to amend based on futility is justified when the proposed amended complaint
remains subject to dismissal. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320
(11th Cir. 1999). Because the additional allegations in Trotter’s proposed second
amended complaint would not overcome Shull’s qualified-immunity defense, the
district court properly denied Trotter’s motion to amend as futile.
IV
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Trotter’s
complaint and denying his motion to further amend his complaint.
AFFIRMED.