1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JIMMIE EARL JONES, Case No. 24-cv-07831-NW
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS, v. 9 SERVING COMPLAINT, AND DENYING REQUEST FOR SUBPOENA 10 BRET MURPHEY, et al., Re: ECF No. 23 Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff Jimmie Earl Jones, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court dismissed the prior complaints for failure to state a claim and granted 15 Jones leave to amend. The Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22) is now before the Court for 16 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Jones’ request seeking to subpoena a Defendant is 17 also before the Court. See ECF No. 23. 18 For the reasons outlined below, the Court DISMISSES certain claims and Defendants, 19 ORDERS SERVICE of the Third Amended Complaint, and DENIES the request for a subpoena 20 without prejudice to Jones seeking the documents during discovery. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The Third Amended Complaint states as follows: 23 Bret Murphey, a CAL-FIRE employee stationed at the Eel River Conservation Center, 24 sexually assaulted Jones in October 2023 by “aggressively” grabbing Jones’ penis. ECF No. 22 at 25 4. Alyssa Arizaga Esposti and Lieutenant Aaron Auzette, investigators assigned to Jones’ staff 26 Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint, allegedly met with Jones and told him that 27 CAL-FIRE was aware of employees’ “predatory behaviors” but allowed it to “continue and 1 by other prisoners, each involving sexual misconduct by CAL-FIRE employees. Another CAL- 2 FIRE employee, Claudhill, allegedly found out about Jones’ complaint and sexual orientation and 3 commented to Jones that he had seen Jones on an app, Grindr, which Jones describes as a 4 “homosexual . . . hooking up app.” Id. at 4. 5 Jones contends that Lieutenant Reames framed him for a fake rules violation and 6 transferred him to Sierra Conservation Center in retaliation of Jones’ accusation against Murphey, 7 and physically assaulted Jones on December 7, 2023, while Jones was “fully restrained.” ECF 8 No. 22 at 3. Reames also reportedly forced Jones to act as lead cook for two days despite 9 unspecified medical injuries and lied to Jones about Murphey’s identity. Jones alleges that 10 Reames frequently transfers prisoners who file complaints against staff to maintain the appearance 11 that no complaints are being made. Jones suffered mental stress and panic attacks as a result of 12 the incidents. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Federal courts conduct a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress 15 from a governmental entity, an officer, or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 16 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 17 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 18 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro 19 se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 20 (9th Cir. 1990). 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 22 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 23 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 24 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 26 the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 27 A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. 1 Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 2 supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 3 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 4 relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 5 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the 6 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 7 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 8 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 9 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under Section 1983 if the plaintiff 10 can show that the defendant’s actions actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a 11 federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 12 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). “A person deprives 13 another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of Section 1983, if he does an affirmative 14 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 15 required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].’” Leer, 844 F.2d at 16 633 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 The Court addresses each group of claims below. 19 A. Failure to Protect 20 1. Murphey 21 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 22 guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison officials 23 have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners or staff members. Id. 24 at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 25 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). “A prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she 26 proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological 27 justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for 1 demeaning the prisoner.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). As noted in 2 the Court’s prior screening order, Jones states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against 3 Murphey based on his alleged grabbing of Jones’ penis in October 2023. 4 2.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JIMMIE EARL JONES, Case No. 24-cv-07831-NW
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS, v. 9 SERVING COMPLAINT, AND DENYING REQUEST FOR SUBPOENA 10 BRET MURPHEY, et al., Re: ECF No. 23 Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff Jimmie Earl Jones, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court dismissed the prior complaints for failure to state a claim and granted 15 Jones leave to amend. The Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 22) is now before the Court for 16 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Jones’ request seeking to subpoena a Defendant is 17 also before the Court. See ECF No. 23. 18 For the reasons outlined below, the Court DISMISSES certain claims and Defendants, 19 ORDERS SERVICE of the Third Amended Complaint, and DENIES the request for a subpoena 20 without prejudice to Jones seeking the documents during discovery. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The Third Amended Complaint states as follows: 23 Bret Murphey, a CAL-FIRE employee stationed at the Eel River Conservation Center, 24 sexually assaulted Jones in October 2023 by “aggressively” grabbing Jones’ penis. ECF No. 22 at 25 4. Alyssa Arizaga Esposti and Lieutenant Aaron Auzette, investigators assigned to Jones’ staff 26 Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint, allegedly met with Jones and told him that 27 CAL-FIRE was aware of employees’ “predatory behaviors” but allowed it to “continue and 1 by other prisoners, each involving sexual misconduct by CAL-FIRE employees. Another CAL- 2 FIRE employee, Claudhill, allegedly found out about Jones’ complaint and sexual orientation and 3 commented to Jones that he had seen Jones on an app, Grindr, which Jones describes as a 4 “homosexual . . . hooking up app.” Id. at 4. 5 Jones contends that Lieutenant Reames framed him for a fake rules violation and 6 transferred him to Sierra Conservation Center in retaliation of Jones’ accusation against Murphey, 7 and physically assaulted Jones on December 7, 2023, while Jones was “fully restrained.” ECF 8 No. 22 at 3. Reames also reportedly forced Jones to act as lead cook for two days despite 9 unspecified medical injuries and lied to Jones about Murphey’s identity. Jones alleges that 10 Reames frequently transfers prisoners who file complaints against staff to maintain the appearance 11 that no complaints are being made. Jones suffered mental stress and panic attacks as a result of 12 the incidents. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Federal courts conduct a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress 15 from a governmental entity, an officer, or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 16 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 17 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 18 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro 19 se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 20 (9th Cir. 1990). 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 22 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 23 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 24 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 26 the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 27 A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. 1 Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 2 supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 3 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 4 relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 5 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the 6 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 7 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 8 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 9 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under Section 1983 if the plaintiff 10 can show that the defendant’s actions actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a 11 federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 12 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). “A person deprives 13 another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of Section 1983, if he does an affirmative 14 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 15 required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].’” Leer, 844 F.2d at 16 633 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 The Court addresses each group of claims below. 19 A. Failure to Protect 20 1. Murphey 21 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to 22 guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Prison officials 23 have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners or staff members. Id. 24 at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 25 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). “A prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she 26 proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological 27 justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for 1 demeaning the prisoner.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). As noted in 2 the Court’s prior screening order, Jones states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against 3 Murphey based on his alleged grabbing of Jones’ penis in October 2023. 4 2. Remaining Defendants 5 In addition, the failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates 6 or staff members, or from other dangerous conditions at the prison, violates the Eighth 7 Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, 8 sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate 9 health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows 10 of, and disregards, an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps 11 to abate it. Id. at 837. A prisoner states a failure-to-protect claim where the prisoner’s allegations 12 are sufficient to raise an inference that the named prison officials knew that the prisoner faced a 13 substantial risk of serious harm, disregarded that risk, and failed to take reasonable measures to 14 abate it. See Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041–42 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). 15 Jones asserts that Esposti, Auzette, and Reames—all of whom were tasked with 16 investigating Jones’ sexual assault and were allegedly aware of other instances of sexual 17 misconduct by CAL-FIRE employees at the camp—failed to intervene or discipline Murphey, 18 placing Jones in danger. Liberally construed, Jones states cognizable claims of failure to protect 19 against Esposti, Auzette, and Reames. 20 The remaining claims of failure to protect fail. To the extent Jones alleges that Reames 21 forced him to work while Jones had unspecified injuries, the allegations are too vague to state a 22 claim of deliberate indifference. Moreover, to the extent that Jones alleges that Claudhill found 23 out about the allegations and made comments about Jones’ sexuality, the Court concludes that 24 although Claudhill’s alleged comments were disrespectful, allegations of verbal harassment and 25 abuse do not amount to a constitutional violation. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th 26 Cir. 2012) (“‘the exchange of verbal insults between inmates and guards is a constant, daily ritual 27 observed in this nation’s prisons’ of which ‘we do not approve,’ but which do not violate the 1 4950178, *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2024) (deputy’s alleged vulgar and racially discriminatory 2 comments to plaintiff did not state constitutional claim). Because the Court has already granted 3 leave to amend on multiple occasions and further amendment would be futile, dismissal of these 4 claims against Reames and Claudhill are without leave to amend. Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 5 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment 6 is futile or would be subject to dismissal.”). 7 B. Retaliation 8 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 9 elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 10 (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 11 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 12 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 13 A prisoner may not be retaliated against for using a prison’s grievance procedures. Id. at 567. 14 Jones alleges that Reames framed him with a fake rules violation and transferred him to a 15 different prison in retaliation for Jones PREA complaint against Murphey in order to maintain the 16 appearance that Eel River Conservation Center did not have any incidents of staff misconduct. 17 Liberally construed, Jones states a cognizable retaliation claim against Reames. 18 C. Excessive Force 19 The treatment of and conditions of confinement for a convicted prisoner are subject to 20 scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). When 21 prison officials are accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Eighth 22 Amendment, the core judicial determination is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 23 maintain or restore discipline, or whether the force was applied maliciously and sadistically to 24 cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). In making this determination, a court 25 may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount 26 of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible 27 officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Hudson, 503 U.S. 1 Here, Jones alleges that Reames physically assaulted him while Jones was “fully 2 restrained.” ECF No. 22 at 3. Accordingly, Jones states a cognizable claim of excessive force 3 against Reames. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (guards may use 4 force only in proportion to need in each situation); Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 5 2005) (finding that kicking a handcuffed prisoner in the genitals was “near the top of the list” of 6 acts taken with cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another). 7 D. PREA 8 Jones contends that he filed a complaint under PREA, 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30309. To the 9 extent Jones is attempting to raise a claim under PREA, however, several courts have found that 10 PREA does not establish a private cause of action, even for allegations of sexual assault. See 11 Krieg v. Steele, 599 Fed. App’x 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); Tenney v. Baldwin, No. 16- 12 cv-00115-SMY, 2016 WL 2755171, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 12, 2016) (“[T]he Court finds that the 13 PREA does not create a private cause of action”); Wimberly v. Alician, No. 19-cv-08316, 2020 14 WL 1877732, *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2020) (same). 15 Therefore, Jones does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted under PREA, and 16 this claim must be DISMISSED. As any amendment would be futile, dismissal is without leave 17 to amend. Wheeler, 894 F.3d at 1059. 18 E. Request for Subpoena 19 Jones also filed a request seeking that this Court issue a subpoena requiring Esposti to turn 20 over certain discovery. Because Esposti has not yet been served, the request is premature and 21 therefore DENIED without prejudice to Jones seeking the documents through discovery. 22 Following the issuance of this order, Jones may engage in the discovery process with 23 Esposti and the other Defendants. Jones is also advised that subpoenas are generally not utilized 24 in seeking discovery from Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (motion to compel). Rather the 25 appropriate forms of discovery on a party, including Defendants, are depositions, requests for 26 production of documents, interrogatories, and requests for admissions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 31 27 (depositions by written questions), 33 (interrogatories), 36 (requests for admission). 1 must request one in writing from this Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(1) requires a 2 party seeking a subpoena to take “reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on 3 a person subject to a subpoena.” To that end, Jones will be required to submit to the Court for 4 review any proposed subpoena duces tecum and (1) identify the specific evidence sought, 5 (2) show that the evidence is not equally available to him or obtainable from Defendants through 6 discovery, and (3) establish that the evidence sought falls within the proper scope of discovery. 7 Accord Pulido v. Lounes, No. 14-cv-01174-DAD-EPG, 2016 WL 6094900, *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 8 2016). Only upon such showing will the Court consider authorizing the Clerk to issue the 9 proposed subpoena and ordering the U.S. Marshal to serve it. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 The Court orders as follows: 12 1. Jones states the following cognizable claims: 13 a. Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Murphey, Esposti, 14 Auzette, and Reames. 15 b. First Amendment retaliation claim against Reames. 16 c. Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Reames. 17 2. All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED without leave to amend. 18 3. Jones’ request for subpoena (ECF No. 23) is DENIED without prejudice to Jones 19 seeking the documents in question through the discovery process. 20 4. Defendants Murphey, Esposti, Auzette, and Reames shall be SERVED. 21 a. Service shall proceed under CDCR’s e-service pilot program for civil rights 22 cases from prisoners in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, 23 the Clerk of the Court is directed to serve on CDCR via email the following 24 documents: the operative complaint (ECF No. 22), this order, a CDCR 25 Report of E-Service Waiver form, and a summons. 26 b. No later than 45 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR 27 shall provide the Court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver 1 without the need for service by the United States Marshal Service 2 (“USMS”) or whether any Defendant declined to waive service. CDCR 3 also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver to the 4 California Attorney General’s Office, which, within 21 days of service, 5 shall file with the Court a waiver of service of process for the Defendants 6 waiving service. 7 c. Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk shall 8 prepare for each Defendant who has not waived service according to the 9 CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a USM-285 Form. The Clerk shall 10 provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 form and copies of this 11 order, summons, and operative complaint for service upon each Defendant 12 who has not waived service. The Clerk shall also provide to the USMS a 13 copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver. 14 d. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this order to Jones. 15 5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders the following 16 briefing schedule: 17 a. No later than 90 days from the date of service, Defendants will file a 18 motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion will 19 be supported by adequate factual documentation, shall conform in all 20 respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and will include as exhibits 21 all records and incident reports stemming from the events at issue. If 22 Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 23 judgment or other dispositive motion, they will inform the Court prior to the 24 date the dispositive motion is due. All papers filed with the Court will be 25 promptly served on Jones. 26 b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, Defendants will also serve, on 27 a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. 1 Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 2 684 F.3d 934, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and Wyatt notices must be 3 given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss for 4 non-exhaustion is filed, not earlier); Rand, 154 F.3d at 960 (separate paper 5 requirement). 6 c. Jones’s opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, will be filed with the 7 Court and served upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 8 motion was served upon him. Jones must read the attached page headed 9 “NOTICE -- WARNING,” which is provided to him pursuant to Rand, 154 10 F.3d at 953-54, and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 11 1988). If Defendants file a dispositive motion claiming that Jones failed to 12 exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1997e(a), he should take note of the attached page headed “NOTICE -- 14 WARNING (EXHAUSTION),” which must be provided to him as required 15 by Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.4. 16 d. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than 17 14 days after the opposition is served upon them. 18 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 19 Absent a further order of the Court, no hearing will be held on the motion. 20 6. All communications by Jones with the Court must be served on Defendants, or 21 Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of 22 the document to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel. 23 7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24 No further Court order is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 25 8. It is Jones’ responsibility to prosecute this case. Jones must keep the Court 26 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed 27 “Notice of Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a ] to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: February 6, 2026
Noél Wise 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 1] a 12
15 16
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 2 If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. 3 A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if 4 granted, end your case. 5 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 6 Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-- 7 that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 8 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your 9 case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly 10 supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your 11 complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to 12 interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts 13 shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of 14 material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, 15 if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be 16 dismissed and there will be no trial. 17 NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION) 18 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are seeking 19 to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case. 20 You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you did 21 exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations 22 (statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, that is, documents 23 accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are authentic, or other 24 sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or depositions. 25 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it is granted, 26 your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.