Jimma v. Washington State Department of Social and Human Services

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 20, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-01840
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 ALEMAYEHU JIMMA, CASE NO. C19-1840-JCC 10 Plaintiff, MINUTE ORDER 11 v. 12 WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 13 Defendant. 14 15 The following minute order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable John C. 16 Coughenour, United States District Judge: 17 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. On December 4, 2019, the Honorable 18 Michelle L. Peterson, United States Magistrate Judge, granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 19 forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 5.) The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any 20 time if the action raises frivolous or malicious claims, seeks monetary relief from a defendant 21 who is immune from such relief, or fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a 22 claim for relief, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is 23 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted factual 24 inferences are not sufficient to state a claim. Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 25 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). Dismissal is also appropriate if a complaint fails to put forth a “cognizable 26 1 legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 In this case, Plaintiff, a Washington resident, alleges that his child was abused physically, 3 mentally, and sexually by the child’s mother, babysitter, and summer school teacher. (See Dkt. 4 No. 6 at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that although he filed a complaint with the City of Seattle and 5 the State of Washington, Washington’s Department of Social and Human Services (“DSHS”) 6 failed to investigate his claims of abuse. (See id.) Plaintiff therefore asks the Court to “look into 7 [his] claims to protect [his] son,” “to determine the adequate punitive damages” for the pain and 8 suffering Plaintiff has endured, and “for sanctions imposed against [DSHS].” (See id. at 4.) 9 The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that 10 DSHS violated the due process rights of either Plaintiff or his son. Section 1983 provides a cause 11 of action against any (1) person who (2) under color of state law or custom (3) subjects, or 12 causes to be subjected, any person to (4) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 13 secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. As currently written, Plaintiff’s 14 complaint fails to allege a valid § 1983 claim for two reasons. 15 First, Plaintiff has not brought a claim against a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. 16 A state is not a person for purposes of § 1983; consequently, an individual cannot sue a state 17 under § 1983 for violating the individual’s protected rights. See Arizonans for Official English v. 18 Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997). Likewise, an individual cannot sue a state agency under § 1983 19 because state agencies are not persons within the meaning of § 1983. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 20 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff 21 has sued only DSHS, a state agency. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 1–2.) DSHS may not be sued under 22 § 1983. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 365; Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 951; Andrews v. Wash. State 23 Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., C15-5871-BHS, Dkt. No. 18 at 2 (W.D. Wash. 2016). If 24 Plaintiff wishes to bring a § 1983 claim for actions that DSHS did or did not take, he must bring 25 that claim against DSHS officials themselves. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). In 26 doing so, Plaintiff must identify specific DSHS officials and set forth facts demonstrating how 1 each official caused the deprivation of a protected right. See Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 2 (9th Cir. 1981); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 3 Second, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that his or his child’s due 4 process rights were violated. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that 5 “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 6 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A state does not ordinarily violate the Due Process Clause if it fails 7 to protect a child from violence or abuse. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social 8 Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–203 (1989). This is true even if “the State knew that [the child] faced a 9 special danger of abuse . . . and specifically proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to 10 protect [the child] against that danger.” Id. at 197–98. There are, however, two narrow 11 exceptions where a state may be liable for failing to protect: the state must either (1) have a 12 “special relationship” to the child or (2) have created the danger that the child faced. See 13 Campbell v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2011). The first 14 exception applies if “the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his 15 will.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200). The second exception 16 applies if “a state actor ‘creates or exposes an individual to a danger which he or she would not 17 have otherwise faced.’” Id. at 845 (quoting Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1061 18 (9th Cir. 2006)). 19 In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that a state official had a “special 20 relationship” to his child or created the danger that his child faced. While Plaintiff alleges that 21 the City of Seattle, the State of Washington, and DSHS failed to investigate his complaints that 22 his child was being abused at the hands of multiple people, Plaintiff does not allege that a state 23 entity had custody of his child or that a state official exposed his child to danger that his child 24 would not otherwise have faced. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 3–4.) Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to 25 allege facts showing that a state official violated the due process rights of Plaintiff or his child. 26 See Campbell, 671 F.3d at 842. 1 Although the Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 2 granted, it will not dismiss a claim unless “it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the 3 [complaint’s] defect[s].” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, 4 the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff must file an amended complaint no later than 21 days from the 5 date this order is issued. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff must name specific state officials 6 who violated a protected right and set forth facts demonstrating how each named official caused 7 the deprivation of that right. In addition, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that a state entity had 8 custody of his child or that a state official created or exposed his child to a danger that his child 9 would not otherwise have faced. 10 DATED this 20th day of February 2020. 11 William M. McCool Clerk of Court 12 s/Tomas Hernandez 13 Deputy Clerk 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26