1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 No. 2:23-cv-00937 WBS AC MIGUEL JIMENEZ and JUDE DELATTA, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 15 HOME DEPOT INC., and DOES 1 16 through 10, 17 Defendants. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Miguel Jimenez and Jude Delatta (“plaintiffs”) brought 21 this action against Home Depot Inc. (“defendant”), alleging 22 violations of state law in connection to their experiences while 23 shopping at one of defendant’s stores. They assert claims for 24 false imprisonment (Claim 1); false light (Claim 2); intentional 25 infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Claim 3); violation of 26 the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51 27 (Claim 4); violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law 28 (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Claims 5 and 1 7); and negligence (Claim 6). (See generally Compl. (Docket No. 2 1-2).) Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Mot. 3 (Docket No. 6).) 4 I. Factual Allegations1 5 On four occasions, plaintiffs were stopped by one of 6 defendant’s employees after plaintiffs had used the self-checkout 7 register. (See generally Compl.) During the first incident, 8 which occurred on May 28, 2022, an employee let plaintiffs exit 9 the store after they used the self-checkout register. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 10 9-11.) Shortly after plaintiffs exited, the employee ran after 11 them and demanded plaintiffs show a receipt. (Id. ¶ 12.) The 12 employee explained that other self-checkout employees had said 13 that the plaintiffs had not paid. (Id.) Plaintiffs eventually 14 showed the employee their receipt and the employee confirmed 15 every item had been paid for. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) 16 During the second incident, on June 2, 2022, plaintiffs 17 again were asked to show their receipt after using the self- 18 checkout register. (Id. ¶¶ 16-21.) During this incident, 19 Plaintiff Jimenez asked the employee: “[W]hy is this happening[?} 20 [I]s it because I’m Mexican?” (Id. ¶ 21.) The employee 21 responded: “Don’t pull that shit on me[.] I’m Mexican too!” 22 (Id.) 23 The third incident occurred on June 3, 2022. (Id. ¶ 24 23.) This time, when plaintiffs were using the self-checkout, 25 they overheard an employee tell another employee to “watch them 26 and count all their items.” (Id. ¶ 25.) 27 1 The court takes the allegations of the Complaint as 28 true. 1 The fourth and final incident occurred on June 4, 2022. 2 (Id. ¶ 30.) As plaintiffs were checking out, an employee watched 3 the screen at the self-checkout register to make sure plaintiffs 4 paid for everything. (Id. ¶ 33.) As plaintiffs left the 5 register, the employee told them they did not pay for everything. 6 (Id. ¶ 34.) After checking the receipt and the items, the 7 employee confirmed that plaintiffs had in fact paid for 8 everything and apologized for the mistake. (Id. ¶ 36.) 9 II. Legal Standard 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 11 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 13 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 14 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The inquiry 15 before the court is whether, accepting the factual allegations in 16 the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 17 the non-moving party’s favor, the complaint has stated “a claim 18 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 19 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 20 Courts are not, however, “required to accept as true 21 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 22 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State 23 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see Bell Atl. Corp., 24 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, “for a complaint to survive a 25 motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and 26 reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 27 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss 28 v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 2 III. Discussion 3 A. False Imprisonment (Claim 1) 4 To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff 5 must plead: “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a 6 person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable 7 period of time, however brief.” Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 8 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 9 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (1st Dist. 2000) (quotations omitted). 10 “Restraint of confinement ‘may be effectuated by means of 11 physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by 12 physical barriers, or by means of any other form of unreasonable 13 duress.” Robles v. Agreserves, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 952, 976 14 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (Ishii, J.) (quoting Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 15 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994)). 16 Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants “unlawfully 17 detained” them. (Compl. ¶ 42.) However, the Complaint contains 18 no allegations that plaintiffs were prevented from leaving by 19 “physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by 20 physical barriers, or by means of any other form of unreasonable 21 duress.” Robles, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 975. An employee demanding 22 a customer show a receipt, without more, does not amount to being 23 detained. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts 24 sufficient to support a claim for false imprisonment. 25 B. False Light (Claim 2) 26 To state a claim for false light, the plaintiff must 27 plead that “(1) the defendant caused to be generated publicity of 28 the plaintiff that was false or misleading, and (2) the publicity 1 was offensive to a reasonable person.” Pacini v. Nationstar 2 Mortg., LLC, No. 12-cv-04606, 2013 WL 2924441, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 3 June 13, 2013) (citing Fellows v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 4 3d 234, 238-39 (1986)). “‘Publicity’ . . . means that the matter 5 is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to 6 so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially 7 certain to become one of public knowledge.” Orff v. City of 8 Imperial, No. 17-cv-0116, 2017 WL 5569843, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9 17, 2017) (quoting Rest. 2d Torts, §§ 652D, 652E). 10 Here, plaintiffs base their false light claim on the 11 employees’ demands to see plaintiffs’ receipts. Plaintiffs 12 suggest that these demands could be construed as accusations of 13 theft. (See Compl. ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs also allege that these 14 statements were witnessed by people at or around defendant’s 15 store. (Id. ¶ 50.) The court finds these allegations are 16 insufficient to support a claim for false light. Something being 17 overhead by a few people doesn’t constitute “publicity” for 18 purposes of a false light claim. See Orff, 2017 WL 5569843, at 19 *9 (defining “publicity” as "communicating . . . to the public at 20 large, or to so many persons that [it becomes] public 21 knowledge”).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 No. 2:23-cv-00937 WBS AC MIGUEL JIMENEZ and JUDE DELATTA, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 15 HOME DEPOT INC., and DOES 1 16 through 10, 17 Defendants. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Miguel Jimenez and Jude Delatta (“plaintiffs”) brought 21 this action against Home Depot Inc. (“defendant”), alleging 22 violations of state law in connection to their experiences while 23 shopping at one of defendant’s stores. They assert claims for 24 false imprisonment (Claim 1); false light (Claim 2); intentional 25 infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Claim 3); violation of 26 the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51 27 (Claim 4); violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law 28 (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Claims 5 and 1 7); and negligence (Claim 6). (See generally Compl. (Docket No. 2 1-2).) Before the court is defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Mot. 3 (Docket No. 6).) 4 I. Factual Allegations1 5 On four occasions, plaintiffs were stopped by one of 6 defendant’s employees after plaintiffs had used the self-checkout 7 register. (See generally Compl.) During the first incident, 8 which occurred on May 28, 2022, an employee let plaintiffs exit 9 the store after they used the self-checkout register. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 10 9-11.) Shortly after plaintiffs exited, the employee ran after 11 them and demanded plaintiffs show a receipt. (Id. ¶ 12.) The 12 employee explained that other self-checkout employees had said 13 that the plaintiffs had not paid. (Id.) Plaintiffs eventually 14 showed the employee their receipt and the employee confirmed 15 every item had been paid for. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) 16 During the second incident, on June 2, 2022, plaintiffs 17 again were asked to show their receipt after using the self- 18 checkout register. (Id. ¶¶ 16-21.) During this incident, 19 Plaintiff Jimenez asked the employee: “[W]hy is this happening[?} 20 [I]s it because I’m Mexican?” (Id. ¶ 21.) The employee 21 responded: “Don’t pull that shit on me[.] I’m Mexican too!” 22 (Id.) 23 The third incident occurred on June 3, 2022. (Id. ¶ 24 23.) This time, when plaintiffs were using the self-checkout, 25 they overheard an employee tell another employee to “watch them 26 and count all their items.” (Id. ¶ 25.) 27 1 The court takes the allegations of the Complaint as 28 true. 1 The fourth and final incident occurred on June 4, 2022. 2 (Id. ¶ 30.) As plaintiffs were checking out, an employee watched 3 the screen at the self-checkout register to make sure plaintiffs 4 paid for everything. (Id. ¶ 33.) As plaintiffs left the 5 register, the employee told them they did not pay for everything. 6 (Id. ¶ 34.) After checking the receipt and the items, the 7 employee confirmed that plaintiffs had in fact paid for 8 everything and apologized for the mistake. (Id. ¶ 36.) 9 II. Legal Standard 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 11 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 13 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 14 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The inquiry 15 before the court is whether, accepting the factual allegations in 16 the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 17 the non-moving party’s favor, the complaint has stated “a claim 18 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 19 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 20 Courts are not, however, “required to accept as true 21 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 22 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State 23 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see Bell Atl. Corp., 24 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, “for a complaint to survive a 25 motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and 26 reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly 27 suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss 28 v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 2 III. Discussion 3 A. False Imprisonment (Claim 1) 4 To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff 5 must plead: “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a 6 person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable 7 period of time, however brief.” Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 8 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 9 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (1st Dist. 2000) (quotations omitted). 10 “Restraint of confinement ‘may be effectuated by means of 11 physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by 12 physical barriers, or by means of any other form of unreasonable 13 duress.” Robles v. Agreserves, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 952, 976 14 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (Ishii, J.) (quoting Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 15 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994)). 16 Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants “unlawfully 17 detained” them. (Compl. ¶ 42.) However, the Complaint contains 18 no allegations that plaintiffs were prevented from leaving by 19 “physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by 20 physical barriers, or by means of any other form of unreasonable 21 duress.” Robles, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 975. An employee demanding 22 a customer show a receipt, without more, does not amount to being 23 detained. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts 24 sufficient to support a claim for false imprisonment. 25 B. False Light (Claim 2) 26 To state a claim for false light, the plaintiff must 27 plead that “(1) the defendant caused to be generated publicity of 28 the plaintiff that was false or misleading, and (2) the publicity 1 was offensive to a reasonable person.” Pacini v. Nationstar 2 Mortg., LLC, No. 12-cv-04606, 2013 WL 2924441, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 3 June 13, 2013) (citing Fellows v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 4 3d 234, 238-39 (1986)). “‘Publicity’ . . . means that the matter 5 is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to 6 so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially 7 certain to become one of public knowledge.” Orff v. City of 8 Imperial, No. 17-cv-0116, 2017 WL 5569843, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9 17, 2017) (quoting Rest. 2d Torts, §§ 652D, 652E). 10 Here, plaintiffs base their false light claim on the 11 employees’ demands to see plaintiffs’ receipts. Plaintiffs 12 suggest that these demands could be construed as accusations of 13 theft. (See Compl. ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs also allege that these 14 statements were witnessed by people at or around defendant’s 15 store. (Id. ¶ 50.) The court finds these allegations are 16 insufficient to support a claim for false light. Something being 17 overhead by a few people doesn’t constitute “publicity” for 18 purposes of a false light claim. See Orff, 2017 WL 5569843, at 19 *9 (defining “publicity” as "communicating . . . to the public at 20 large, or to so many persons that [it becomes] public 21 knowledge”). Moreover, plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege 22 facts that support their suggestion that asking to verify a 23 receipt from a self-checkout register is the equivalent 24 accusation of theft. See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (a court is 25 not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely . . . 26 unreasonable inferences”). 27 C. IIED (Claim 3) 28 To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show: “(1) 1 extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the 2 intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of 3 causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe 4 or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate 5 causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous 6 conduct.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 7 1001 (1993); Avila v. Willits Env’t Remediation Tr., 633 F.3d 8 828, 844 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). “Conduct is ‘extreme and 9 outrageous’ when it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of 10 that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Robles, 158 F. 11 Supp. 3d at 978 (quoting Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 12 (2009); Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001). 13 Here, plaintiffs allege that the employees’ accusations 14 of theft support a claim for IIED because such accusations go 15 “against all bounds on decency in human society.” (Compl. ¶ 58.) 16 The court disagrees. Verifying that someone paid for all items 17 at self-checkout, particularly in the absence of threatening or 18 offensive language, does not amount to the “extreme and 19 outrageous” conduct necessary to state a claim for IIED. See 20 Crouch v. Trinity Christian Cent. of Santa Ana, Inc., 39 Cal. 21 App. 5th 995, 1007 (4th Dist. 2019) (“Generally, the case is one 22 in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 23 community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead 24 him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”). 25 Concluding that conduct is “extreme and outrageous” 26 without any factual allegations to support that conclusion does 27 not state a claim for IIED. See Jones v. Dollar Tree Stores, 28 Inc., No. 21-cv-7441, 2021 WL 6496822, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1 2021) (“Plaintiff’s allegations concerning IIED are deficient” as 2 they merely “rel[y] on a formulaic recitation of the elements for 3 an IIED cause of action.”); see also Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F. 4 Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2007) (finding plaintiff 5 failed to state a claim for IIED because allegations of “threats 6 of intimidation and force” are “too vague to give any meaningful 7 notice of the claim’s actual basis”). While plaintiffs may be 8 offended by the alleged accusations of theft, being offended is 9 insufficient to support a claim for IIED. See Yurick v. Superior 10 Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1128 (3rd Dist. 1989) (“[A] 11 plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings.”). 12 Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to 13 support a claim for IIED. 14 D. Unruh Act (Claim 4) 15 The Unruh Act “secures equal access to public 16 accommodations and prohibits discrimination by business 17 establishments.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 989 (quoting Black v. 18 Dep’t of Mental Health, 83 Cal. App. 4th 739, 746 (2nd Dist. 19 2000)) (quotations omitted). To state a claim under the Unruh 20 Act, a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination. See James 21 v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 5:18-cv-01762, 2019 WL 3058971, at *7 (C.D. 22 Cal. Jan. 11, 2019) (“Proof of intentional discrimination is 23 necessary to establish an Unruh Act violation.”) (citing Munson 24 v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 664 (2009)). “To plead 25 intentional discrimination, [a] plaintiff cannot merely invoke 26 his race in the course of a claim’s narrative and automatically 27 be entitled to pursue relief.” Moralez v. Whole Foods Mkt. Cal., 28 Inc., No. 14-cv-05022, 2016 WL 845291, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1 2016). 2 Here, plaintiffs allege that they were asked to show 3 the receipts from self-checkout because of their race. (Compl. ¶ 4 66.) However, the Complaint lacks any facts “that demonstrate 5 that race was the reason for defendant’s actions.” See Moralez, 6 2016 WL 845291, at *3 (quoting Mesumbe v. Howard Univ., 706 F. 7 Supp. 2d 86, 92 (D. D.C. 2010) (quotations omitted). For 8 example, the Complaint contains no allegations that other 9 Hispanic customers were asked to show their receipts or that non- 10 Hispanic customers were not asked to show their receipts. Cf. 11 James, 2019 WL 3058971, at *7 (“[S]imply allowing customers of 12 other races to open [bank] accounts, without more, does not 13 plausibly suggest that the employees discriminated against 14 [p]laintiffs.”). Merely concluding that plaintiffs were stopped 15 because of their race, without alleging any facts in support of 16 that conclusion, is insufficient to state a claim under the Unruh 17 Act. See Jones, 2021 WL 6496822, at *6 (dismissing Unruh Act 18 claim because it “lacks the necessary details and supporting 19 facts to infer discriminatory intent”). 20 E. UCL (Claims 5 and 7)2 21 “California’s UCL[] prohibits ‘any unlawful, unfair, or 22 fraudulent business act or practice.’” Castaneda v. Saxon Mortg. 23 Servs., Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1202 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Shubb, 24 J.) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 25 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999)). To have standing under the UCL, a 26 plaintiff must: “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or 27 2 The court will address Claims 5 and 7 together because 28 the claims, as alleged, are identical. 1 property sufficient to qualify as injury in face, i.e., economic 2 injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, 3 i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false 4 advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. 5 Superior Court, 246 Cal. 4th 310, 332 (2011). 6 Here, defendant argues that plaintiffs do not have 7 standing because they did not allege that they suffered an 8 economic injury caused by defendant’s conduct. (Mot. at 22.) 9 Plaintiffs allege that they lost work and wages because of the 10 employees’ actions. (Compl. ¶ 52.) However, plaintiffs do not 11 provide any additional facts about their alleged economic injury. 12 There is no plausible explanation of how being asked to show 13 their receipt after using a self-checkout register would affect 14 plaintiffs’ work or wages. The court therefore finds that 15 plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to show they have 16 standing to assert a claim under California’s UCL. See Iqbal, 17 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 18 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 19 suffice.”).3 20 F. Negligence (Claim 6) 21 “To state a claim for negligence, plaintiffs must 22 allege: (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2) breach of 23 that duty, (3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the 24 plaintiffs’ injury.” Mendoza v. City of L.A., 66 Cal. App. 4th 25 1333, 1339 (2nd Dist. 1989). Business proprietors, such as 26
27 3 Even if plaintiffs’ had standing, they have failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim under either the UCL’s 28 “unlawful” or “unfair” prongs. 1 defendant, have a “special relationship” with their patrons and 2 thus “owe an affirmative duty to protect [them] from the conduct 3 of third parties, or to assist another who has been attacked by 4 third parties . . . .” Morris v. De La Torre, 36 Cal. 4th 260, 5 269 (2005). 6 Here, defendant argues that its affirmative duty as a 7 business proprietor does not extend to “protecting the emotional 8 well-being of a customer” and is not breached by asking a 9 customer to show a receipt after using the self-checkout 10 register. (Mot. at 22.) The court agrees. Defendant’s duty as 11 a business proprietor was to protect customers. Morris, 36 Cal. 12 4th at 269. The court does not see how verifying payment after 13 the use of a self-checkout register breaches that duty. 14 In their Opposition, plaintiffs argue that defendants 15 “owed a duty to [p]laintiffs to refrain from actions that caused 16 [p]laintiffs’ person or property to be placed at risk of harm” 17 and defendants breached that duty when “they allowed, encouraged, 18 or ratified their agent’s decision to” engage with plaintiffs 19 after they used the self-checkout register. (Opp’n at 10.) 20 Plaintiffs, however, cite no caselaw in support of these 21 propositions. Further, the Complaint does not contain any 22 allegations which support their assertion that they or their 23 property were placed at risk of harm. Therefore, plaintiffs have 24 failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for 25 negligence. 26 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 27 dismiss (Docket No. 6) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 28 Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order to file EI IR NOI EIR ID IIE III IIE EO III ISIS IEEE EIEIO
1 an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with this 2 Order. . 3 | Dated: August 7, 2023 atte A hh be WILLIAM B. SHUBB 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11