Jiménez v. Domenech

47 P.R. 454
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedSeptember 29, 1934
DocketNo.6368
StatusPublished

This text of 47 P.R. 454 (Jiménez v. Domenech) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jiménez v. Domenech, 47 P.R. 454 (prsupreme 1934).

Opinion

Mr. Cheep Justice Del Toro

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The complaint filed herein literally copied reads thus:

“Tiburcio Jiménez, doing business under the style and firm name of Jiménez & Fernández Plaintiff, v. Manuel V. Domenech, Defendant. —Civil No. 18,065.
“Complaint. Now comes the plaintiff, by his undersigned attorneys, and respectfully alleges:
[455]*455“1. That the plaintiff is a merchant who does business under the firm name of Jiménez & Fernández.
“2. That during the term comprised' between January 18, 1929 and December 18, 1930, the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, the latter acting as Treasurer of- Puerto Rico, delivered to the defendant, in several items and in payment of the stamps to which Sections 9 and 10 of Act No. 19, of April 19, 1928, refer, the total sum of $34,758.91, which the defendant received and has not returned to the plaintiff. - '
“3. That the plaintiff paid and delivered to the defendant the said sum, involuntarily and by reason of violence and duress, consisting in threats made to the plaintiff by the defendant and his agents to the effect that the plaintiff would be criminally prosecuted and that his business would be destroyed, in accordance with Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, if he failed to make the said payment and to deliver the above sum. And the plaintiff alleges that said payments and delivery of money were made by the plaintiff to the defendant with the sole object of avoiding such criminal prosecution and the destruction of his business, which latter consisted, at the time of paying and delivering said sum, of the purchase and sale of Puerto Rican and foreign coffee.
“4. That subsequently to the payment and delivery of said sum ■by the plaintiff to the defendant, to wit on March 31, 1931, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the aforesaid Act No. 19 of April 19, 1928, was unconstitutional and later the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also held that said Act was unconstitutional.
“Wherefore the plaintiff prays this‘Honorable Court that judgment be rendered sentencing the defendant to refund and pay to the plaintiff the aforesaid sum of $34,758.91, plus interest and costs.
“San Juan, P. R., January 14, 1933.
JuaN, B. Soto,
Attorney for the Plaintiff.”

The defendant filed the following demurrers to the complaint :

“1. That this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this suit by reason of the action herein brought, inasmuch as The People of Puerto Rico has not given its consent to be sued for the refund of taxes not paid under protest.
[456]*456“2. That there is a lack of parties defendant, inasmuch as the present action is one really brought against The People of Puerto Rico, and instead of this the suit is filed against the Treasurer of Puerto Rico.
“3. That the complaint, as drawn, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
“4. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, inasmuch as the action therein brought has prescribed in accordance with Section 3 of Act No. 8 of April 19, 1927, which provides for the payment of taxes under protest, establishes a procedure for the recovery and refund thereof, etc., and from the face of the complaint it apears that more than a year has elapsed from the date in which the payment of the taxes now claimed was made.
“For the foregoing reasons the defendant prays this Honorable Court that these demurrers be sustained and that the complaint be overruled with all other legal pronouncements, and sentencing the plaintiff to the payment of costs.
“San Juan, P. R., January 25, 1933.
“CHARLES E. WINTER,
Attorney General,
“R. Cordovés Arana,
Deputy Attorney-General.”

The court heard both parties, sustained the demurrers and granted the plaintiff permission to amend. Subsequently, at the request of the plaintiff the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without special pronouncement of costs. The plaintiff then took this appeal. In his brief he assigns six errors which he argues extensively and in an intelligent manner. The defendant in his stead impeaches the errors assigned and analyzes all the cases cited by the plaintiff with great ability. Both documents reveal a careful study of the facts and the law involved herein.

The District Court in its order sustaining the demurrers, expressed the reasons therefor. It seems proper to quote them. They read thus:

[457]*457"It appears from the complaint that the defendant acted as Treasurer of Puerto Rico and that the issue is the refund of taxes paid by the plaintiff. The law applicable herein is Act No. 8 of April 19, 1927, relative to the payment of taxes under protest. The complaint does not allege that payment was made under protest and the action has clearly prescribed under said Act, inasmuch as. more than a year has elapsed from the time payment was made to the date in which the complaint was hied.
"But plaintiff alleges in his brief that the complaint was brought against Manuel V. Domenech in his private capacity and not as Treasurer of Puerto Rico, because the Act on which the latter based the collection of the taxes was unconstitutional and void and because he was not entitled to demand and receive the taxes claimed. If the defendant acted as Treasurer of Puerto Rico, that is, as an agent of The People of Puerto Rico, in the collection of these taxes, he is not personally liable, there being no other law on which the complaint may be based to demand the refund of the amount paid than said Act No. 8 of 1927. In our opinion the remedy established by that Act is exclusive, even if it does not say so, as there is no other law on the subject.
"In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 56 L. Ed. 436, on which the plaintiff largely bases his action, the facts differed from those herein, because while there the action was brought against Timothy O’Connor for the refund of the taxes levied under an unconstitutional law, as he acted in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Colorado, it is expressly said in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes that the action is one brought for the recovery of taxes paid under protest and duress; that the defendant had collected the money and the same was still in his possession; and that in accordance with the law under which the tax was levied and collected, the state, auditor could draw a warrant for the refunding of the tax, upon the filing of a certified copy of the judgment which decides that the corporation had erroneously paid the tax to the secretary of state.
"In accordance with Act No.

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Related

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. O'Connor
223 U.S. 280 (Supreme Court, 1912)

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Bluebook (online)
47 P.R. 454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jimenez-v-domenech-prsupreme-1934.