Jimenez v. City of Cohoes Police Dep't

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: April 10, 2024
• Docket: 23-955
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-955 Jimenez v. City of Cohoes Police Dep’t

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of April, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT:

SUSAN L. CARNEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. ______________________________________

DAYVID JIMENEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 23-955

CITY OF COHOES POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER J. MURPHY, Badge (1544) City of Cohoes Police Officer in Official Capacity, OFFICER: JOHN DOE 1, City of Cohoes Police Officer in Official Capacity, OFFICER: JOHN DOE 2, Superior Officer at the Scene in Official Capacity,

Defendants-Appellees. ______________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: Dayvid Jimenez, pro se, Batavia, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees: No appearance.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Dayvid Jimenez, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s May 22, 2023

judgment dismissing his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following his

arrest after a traffic stop. Jimenez alleges that the City of Cohoes Police

Department and three of its officers violated his constitutional rights when, after

stopping him for failing to properly signal, the officers detained him based on an

immigration warrant, searched his car, and transferred him to United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. After considering

Jimenez’s proposed amended complaint, the district court dismissed his claims sua

sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), concluding that (1) he failed to sufficiently

plead municipal liability, (2) the officer’s decision to pull him over was objectively

reasonable, and (3) the responding officers had probable cause to arrest him based

2 on the warrant. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural

history, and issues on appeal.

We review de novo a court’s decision to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, applying the familiar standard from Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and asking whether the complaint, construed

liberally and with all reasonable inferences drawn in Jimenez’s favor, states a

facially plausible claim to relief. See Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879

F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009).

I. Initial Stop

The district court did not err in concluding that Jimenez failed to state a

section 1983 claim based on the vehicle stop. It is apparent “on the face of the

complaint” – to which Jimenez attached the sworn statement of the police officer

who stopped him – that the officer observed Jimenez commit a traffic violation.

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). Because the

officer had reasonable suspicion that Jimenez committed a traffic violation, the

3 subsequent traffic stop did not violate Jimenez’s rights under the Fourth

Amendment. See United States v. Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation provides a sufficient basis under the

Fourth Amendment for law enforcement officers to make a traffic stop.”).

Jimenez has not pleaded facts that would suggest the officer lacked

reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Under New York law, “[a] signal of

intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during

not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.”

N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law (“VTL”) § 1163(b). As the district court explained, while

Jimenez alleged in his complaint that he was “positive” he had his turn signal on

as he was approaching the stop sign, he has not asserted that he signaled for the

full 100 feet required by section 1163(b), which was the basis of the violation.

App’x at 18. Jimenez has therefore failed to state a plausible claim that the officer

lacked a lawful basis to stop him. 1 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (plausibility standard

“asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).

1 Jimenez argues for the first time on appeal that, notwithstanding the clear language of section 1163(b), the 100-feet-of-signaling rule does not apply to a vehicle making a turn from a stop sign, since such a vehicle is making a turn “from a parked position” and is therefore subject to different rules. Jimenez Br. at 23–28. Jimenez did not raise this argument in his objection to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, so the argument is forfeited. See United States v. Keshner, 794 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2015) (“It is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” (alterations and internal

4 Jimenez’s further allegations that the officer stopped him on account of his

race are irrelevant to his Fourth Amendment claim because once the officer

observed a traffic violation, he was permitted to stop the vehicle “without regard

to the officer’s own subjective intent.” United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724

(2d Cir. 1998); see also Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (“As

in other Fourth Amendment contexts, the reasonableness inquiry is an objective

one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in

light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.” (alterations and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

II. Arrest

After stopping Jimenez’s car and discovering that he had an outstanding

immigration warrant, the officers took him into custody and then handed him over

to ICE officials. Although we have not had occasion to address the issue, there is

disagreement among our sister circuits as to whether an administrative warrant

quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, the case Jimenez relies on for his argument was expressly overruled on the grounds for which he cites it. See Moore v. City of New York, 151 N.Y.S.3d 682, 684 (2d Dep’t 2021) (overruling People v. Brandt, 81 N.Y.S.3d 880 (N.Y. City Ct. 2018), because a vehicle turning from a red light is not “parked” and therefore is subject to the 100-feet-of-signaling rule).

5 issued by the Department of Homeland Security provides probable cause under

the Fourth Amendment for local law enforcement officers to effectuate an arrest. 2

We need not decide that issue here, however, since Jimenez’s own submissions

reflect that the officers found that he was driving with an expired license and, as

discussed above, had not properly signaled. The officers therefore had probable

cause to arrest him on either of those violations. See VTL § 509; see, e.g., People v.

Miller, 539 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (2d Dep’t 1989) (“[B]ased on the defendant’s failure

to produce a driver’s license and his admission that he was operating the car, an

arrest of the defendant for driving without a license was . . . warranted.” (citing

2 The Fifth Circuit has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not require probable cause of criminality to detain someone for an immigration offense, and that an ICE detainer – at least when accompanied by an administrative warrant – both authorizes local law enforcement to detain and gives them probable cause to do so under the collective-knowledge doctrine. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 187, 188 n.22 (5th Cir. 2018). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that local officials are entitled to rely on an ICE official’s probable-cause determination in a detainer and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity if the detention turns out to be erroneous. See Mendoza v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 849 F.3d 408, 419 (8th Cir. 2017). And the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s conclusion that ICE violates the Fourth Amendment by issuing detainers to state and local law enforcement agencies in states that do not authorize civil immigration arrests; the court was presented with the question of whether probable cause may be imputed to state or local officers who act pursuant to an ICE detainer, but it ultimately remanded the case for consideration first of whether the ICE detainer database was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause at all. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 975 F.3d 788, 801, 818 & n.23, 819–24 (9th Cir. 2020). By contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that, after Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012), state and local law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they detain someone on the basis of a civil immigration warrant absent ICE’s express authorization or direction, reasoning that civil immigration offenses are not crimes and therefore cannot by themselves give an officer probable cause to believe that an individual is engaged in criminal activity. See Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465–68 (4th Cir. 2013).

6 VTL § 509)); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that

officers had “probable cause to stop and arrest” an individual since they “directly

observed him violating the traffic laws by not signal[]ing lane changes”); United

States v. Bernacet, 724 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that Supreme Court has

held that “minor misdemeanors and traffic offenses” “can constitutionally support

an arrest”); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (finding no

Fourth Amendment violation because officer had probable cause to arrest driver

after observing she was not wearing seatbelt).

That the officers may have told Jimenez that the reason they were arresting

him was the outstanding warrant is of no moment. “The existence of probable

cause to arrest – even for a crime other than the one identified by the arresting

officer – will defeat a claim of false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.”

Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2016). Because damages from a false-

arrest claim arise from the detention itself, “it is not relevant whether probable

cause existed with respect to each individual charge, or, indeed, any charge

actually invoked by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439

F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).

7 Finally, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the arrest need not have

been authorized under state law. See Bernacet, 724 F.3d at 277 (explaining that

legality of arrest under state law does not “inform[] the constitutional inquiry”).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid

a warrantless arrest for a minor offense, even where the offense is not an

“arrestable offense” under state law. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 167 (2008);

see id. at 176 (“[S]tate restrictions [on arrest] do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s

protections.”); United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 235, 243 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining

that Fourth Amendment does not “generally incorporate local statutory or

regulatory restrictions on seizures,” and violation of state restrictions “will not

generally affect the constitutionality of a seizure supported by probable cause”).

Because the traffic violation and offense of driving without a license gave

the officers probable cause to arrest Jimenez, he has failed to plead a false-arrest

claim.

III. Vehicle Search

Finally, Jimenez alleges that the officers illegally searched his vehicle prior

to it being towed. But “[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that when police

take a vehicle into custody, they may search the vehicle and make an inventory of

8 its contents without need for a search warrant and without regard to whether there

is probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of

criminal conduct.” United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Jimenez has not pleaded that the officers’ conduct –

searching the front and back seats and the trunk after they had told Jimenez that

his passenger would not be able to drive the car home – is inconsistent with an

inventory search. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (holding that

reasonable inventory search regulations administered in good faith satisfy the

Fourth Amendment); United States v. Williams, 930 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting

that inventory searches must be performed using standardized criteria or

established routine). We therefore conclude that he has failed to state a section

1983 claim on the basis of the vehicle search.

* * *

We have considered Jimenez’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court