24CA1570 Jimenez v 4th Judicial District 11-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1570 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV224 Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge
Anthony L. Jimenez, Sr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Fourth Judicial District Probation Department, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Safety,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE TOW Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 26, 2025
Anthony L. Jimenez, Sr., Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lily E. Nierenberg, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Fourth Judicial District Probation Department
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ann Stanton, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Safety ¶1 Plaintiff, Anthony L. Jimenez, Sr., appeals the district court’s
judgment dismissing his complaint against defendants, the Fourth
Judicial District Probation Department, Executive Director of the
Colorado Department of Corrections, and the Executive Director of
the Colorado Department of Public Safety (collectively, the State
Agencies). We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 In 2000, the People charged Jimenez with first degree murder,
kidnapping, sexual assault, and conspiracy in Teller County Case
No. 00CR178. People v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841, 849 (Colo. App.
2008). The charges were based on Jimenez’s participation in a
criminal incident during which he and Michael Easton were alleged
to have kidnapped a fifteen-year-old girl, sexually assaulted her,
killed her, and disposed of her body in a ravine. Id.
¶3 A jury ultimately convicted Jimenez of the lesser included
offense of second degree murder and the lesser nonincluded offense
of accessory to a class 1 or 2 felony. The jury could not reach
verdicts on the kidnapping, sexual assault, and conspiracy charges.
Id. at 850. The court sentenced Jimenez to consecutive terms of
forty-eight and six years in the custody of the Colorado Department
1 of Corrections (CDOC). Divisions of this court affirmed the
judgment of conviction and numerous denials of postconviction
motions. See id. at 871; People v. Jimenez, (Colo. App. No.
10CA1713, Mar. 22, 2012) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f));
People v. Jimenez, (Colo. App. No. 17CA1120, Mar. 29, 2018) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); People v. Jimenez, (Colo. App.
No. 19CA0827, June 11, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.
35(e)). The prosecution did not retry Jimenez on the remaining
counts, ultimately dismissing them.
¶4 Almost twenty-four years later, Jimenez brought claims
against the State Agencies under the Colorado Criminal Justice
Records Act (CCJRA), sections 24-72-301 to -309, C.R.S. 2025, and
article II, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution. He alleged that
numerous statements in the presentence investigation report (PSIR)
2 were false and sought their correction.1 He also attached what he
asserted was the PSIR to his complaint.2
¶5 The State Agencies filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
(1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
coordinate jurisdiction doctrine; (2) the CCJRA was not the correct
avenue to correct any inaccurate information in the PSIR; (3) the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
under the CCJRA; and (4) the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted under the Colorado Constitution.
They also attached a copy of the complete PSIR to their motion.
1 In response to the State Agencies’ motion to dismiss, Jimenez
claimed that his complaint sought correction not only of the PSIR but “all of the State of Colorado’s Official Records” involving his offense. But neither his complaint nor his appellate briefing are so broadly directed. Thus, we address only his pursuit of amendments to the PSIR. 2 The document Jimenez attached to his complaint was not the full
PSIR. Rather, the first several pages appear to be a part of the CDOC’s diagnostic evaluation, which the CDOC performs on each inmate to identify the inmate’s housing, security, and program needs while incarcerated. See §§ 17-40-102 to -103, C.R.S. 2025. A defendant’s PSIR is provided to the CDOC as part of this diagnostic process. § 17-40-104, C.R.S. 2025. The last two pages of Jimenez’s exhibit are the second and third pages of the PSIR, which contain the relevant description of Jimenez’s offense to which he objects.
3 ¶6 After Jimenez filed his response to the motion to dismiss, the
district court entered an order granting the motion, saying only,
“The court adopts all arguments put forth by [the State Agencies] in
their Motion to Dismiss and Discharge Proceedings in support of its
decision to grant the dismissal.”
II. Motion to Dismiss
¶7 Jimenez contends that the district court erred by dismissing
his claims brought under the CCJRA and the Colorado
Constitution. We discern no reversible error.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 “Where, as here, there are no disputed issues of material fact,
we review de novo a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Peabody Sage Creek Mining, LLC v.
Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 2020 COA 127, ¶ 9.
¶9 We also review de novo a district court’s order granting a
C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. Williams v. Rock-Tenn Servs.,
Inc., 2016 COA 18, ¶ 9. We accept all allegations of material fact in
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Cnty. Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy USA, Inc., 2025 CO
21, ¶ 25. “There are a few exceptions to this rule, such as when the
4 facts alleged in the complaint run counter to facts of which the
court can take judicial notice.” Walker v. Van Laningham, 148 P.3d
391, 394 (Colo. App. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Warne v. Hall,
2016 CO 50, ¶ 2.
B. Analysis
1. Coordinate Jurisdiction
¶ 10 As a threshold matter, we agree with Jimenez that the district
court erred by concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under the coordinate jurisdiction doctrine.
¶ 11 In his complaint, Jimenez alleged that he filed a request in his
criminal case in Teller County district court (the sentencing court),
asking for a new PSIR because of the inaccurate information in the
current one. He further alleged that the sentencing court denied
this request, stating, “[PSIRs] are done prior to sentencing as per
[section] 16-11-102[, C.R.S. 2024]. PSIRs are not done for purposes
of parole.”
¶ 12 In their motion to dismiss, the State Agencies argued that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Jimenez’s
claims in this case — brought in El Paso County District Court —
5 under the doctrine of coordinate jurisdiction. In addition to the
PSIR, the State Agencies attached four documents: (1) a letter from
Jimenez requesting appointment of counsel and for the sentencing
court to correct inaccurate statements in the PSIR; (2) the
sentencing court’s order denying that request; (3) a second letter
from Jimenez essentially asking for reconsideration of the denial of
his first requests; and (4) the sentencing court’s order reiterating
that the request to correct the PSIR was denied and finding “no
basis under [the CCJRA] to take any further action.”
¶ 13 “[A] district court is without supervisory power over courts of
coordinate jurisdiction; all district courts are equal in the judicial
hierarchy.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pena, 911 P.2d 48, 57
(Colo. 1996). “The jurisdiction of the trial court does not extend to
a review of the decisions and judgment of a court of coordinate
jurisdiction.” Id. “Thus, even if a court enters an erroneous
judgment, that judgment is not subject to collateral attack by
another court of coordinate jurisdiction.” Id.
¶ 14 We disagree with the State Agencies’ characterization of
Jimenez’s complaint as a request for the El Paso County District
Court to review the sentencing court’s orders. The complaint seeks
6 relief under the CCJRA; the sentencing court explicitly took no
action under the CCJRA.
¶ 15 We further reject the State Agencies’ reliance on Estates in
Eagle Ridge, LLLP v. Valley Bank & Trust, 141 P.3d 838, 844 (Colo.
App. 2005), to argue that the “concept of coordinate jurisdiction ‘is
based on the public policies of preventing a conflict of decisions of
two courts of concurrent jurisdiction and avoiding unnecessary
duplication and multiplicity of suits.’” The decision in Eagle Ridge
involved an issue not of coordinate jurisdiction but of concurrent
jurisdiction. The State Agencies cite no case, nor are we aware of
any, in which coordinate jurisdiction applied in a situation in which
plaintiff did not ask one district court to review another district
court’s order or judgment. Thus, the doctrine of coordinate
jurisdiction does not apply.
¶ 16 In short, the district court’s adoption of the State Agencies’
jurisdictional analysis was erroneous. Nevertheless, we conclude
that the court properly dismissed the complaint for failing to state a
plausible claim for relief.
7 2. CCJRA Claims
¶ 17 Jimenez contends that the district court erred by dismissing
his claims brought under the CCJRA. We disagree.
a. Applicable Law
¶ 18 The CCJRA provides to “[a]ny person in interest who is
provided access to any criminal justice records [under the statute]
the right to challenge the accuracy and completeness” of those
records to the extent the records involve that person. § 24-72-
307(1), C.R.S. 2025. The statute also gives that person the right to
request that the records be corrected. Id. And if that request is
refused, the person “may apply to the district court of the district
wherein the record is found for an order directing the custodian of
such record to show cause why he should not permit the correction
of such record.” § 24-72-307(4).
¶ 19 To state a plausible claim for relief under the CCJRA,
therefore, Jimenez needed to allege, among other things, that there
were inaccurate statements in the PSIR that needed to be corrected.
¶ 20 Jimenez alleged that the PSIR contains several false
statements. Initially, we note that Jimenez misattributes the
8 following two statements to the PSIR: (1) “[t]he facts of the case
stated that the inmate and his co-defendant both raped the victim
of this case,” and (2) “[a]ttitude and sentence involved a sex
offense.” While these statements appear in the CDOC diagnostic
report, neither statement appears in the PSIR. Thus, his effort to
challenge the correctness of the PSIR as to these statements must
fail.
¶ 21 He further alleges that the PSIR contains the following false
statements:
(1) “[A] 16 year old female . . . had been allegedly kidnapped
in El Paso [C]ounty by the inmate and his co-defendant
in this case.”
(2) “Apparently, the victim was then bound at the hands
with duct tape and on her mouth and then both the
defendant and the co-defendant, along with the victim,
drove to Teller County to a campsite.”
(3) “The victim [w]as then dumped into a creek and both the
inmate and the co-defendant kept her in the creek by the
inmate placing his foot on her head and the co-defendant
holding her legs. According to the autopsy the victim
9 died from blunt force trauma to the head consistent with
the defendant’s boot. However, a drowning could not be
ruled out.”
Jimenez contends that these statements are inaccurate because he
was not found guilty of kidnapping, sexual assault, or binding and
drowning the victim.
¶ 22 Unlike the two statements discussed above, each of these
statements, in substance at least, appears in the section of the PSIR
titled “Details of the Offense.”3 Significantly, however, the
statements follow a prefatory observation:
The following information was obtained from the Teller County Sheriff’s Department narratives, statements made by the defendant and co-defendant, and information obtained from the district attorney in this case as to what Anthony Jimenez had been found guilty on.
3 The first and third quoted statements are actually from the CDOC
diagnostic report. But identical statements appear in the PSIR, with the only difference being that the diagnostic report refers to Jimenez in the quoted sections as “the inmate,” while the PSIR refers to him as “this defendant” in the first statement and “the defendant” in the second.
10 The report then says, “According to the Register or Action charge
description . . .” before providing a narrative of the allegations
against Jimenez.
¶ 23 In context, therefore, these statements are based on the
charge description — not the charges on which the jury convicted
Jimenez. In fact, the last sentence in this section of the PSIR
unequivocally states that Jimenez was convicted of second degree
murder and accessory to a crime. Nowhere in the PSIR does it state
that he was convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, or binding and
¶ 24 Notably, at the time the PSIR was prepared, the kidnapping,
sexual assault, and conspiracy charges were still pending. Thus, it
was undeniably correct at the time that Jimenez was alleged to have
participated in the kidnapping and the sexual assault. Indeed, to
this day, that is an accurate description of the allegations that were
lodged against Jimenez. Thus, we discern no inaccuracy or untruth
in the PSIR.
¶ 25 Jimenez also contends that the PSIR must relay “the
circumstances of the conviction,” not the theory at the initial stage
of the case. But he cites no Colorado authority — nor are we aware
11 of any — to support this contention. The statutory provision
governing presentence investigation reports identifies several topics
that must be covered, but at no point does it require the report to
set forth the circumstances of the conviction. § 16-11-102(1)(a)(I),
C.R.S. 2025.4
¶ 26 Notably, sentencing courts may rely on evidence not presented
in accordance with the due process procedures required in the guilt
stage of a trial. People v. Fritts, 2014 COA 103, ¶ 31; see also CRE
1101(d)(3) (rules of evidence are inapplicable in sentencing
proceedings).
¶ 27 Jimenez contends that at trial a forensic expert conclusively
determined that the victim was not bound, and there was no
evidence of sexual assault or drowning; therefore, these statements
are false. But what a forensic expert may have testified about at
trial has no bearing on the truth or accuracy of statements being
attributed to sheriff department narratives; statements made by
Jimenez and his codefendant; and information from the district
attorney, charge description, and autopsy.
4 This was also true at the time Jimenez’s PSIR was prepared in
May 2004. § 16-11-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2004.
12 ¶ 28 More importantly, as noted, Jimenez was not acquitted of any
charges. Rather, the jury could not come to a verdict on the
kidnapping, sexual assault, and conspiracy charges. Thus, it
cannot be said that any testimony regarding the events was
conclusive as to those charges.
¶ 29 In short, even taking Jimenez’s factual allegations to be true
and drawing all inferences in his favor, he cannot plausibly state a
claim that the PSIR contains any inaccuracies. Therefore, the
district court did not err by dismissing Jimenez’s claims under the
CCJRA for failure to state a claim.5
3. Constitutional Claim
¶ 30 Jimenez also contends that the district court erred by
dismissing his claims against the State Agencies under article II,
section 3, of the Colorado Constitution. We discern no error.
5 Because we reach this conclusion, and despite the district court
adopting all of the State Agencies’ arguments made in their motion to dismiss, we do not need to address the State Agencies’ argument that Jimenez cannot seek relief under the CCJRA because he was not provided access to any criminal justice records “pursuant to” the statute.
13 a. Applicable Law
¶ 31 Article II, section 3, of the Colorado Constitution provides that
“[a]ll persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights,
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending
their lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”
“The Due Process Clause guarantees due process only when a
person is to be deprived of life, liberty, or property.” Chambers v.
Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
¶ 32 “An inmate has a liberty interest necessitating due process
where the [C]DOC classifies the inmate as a sex offender based on
preconfinement conduct not resulting in a sex offense conviction”
and then takes action against the inmate if he does not participate
in treatment. Reeves v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 155 P.3d 648, 652
(Colo. App. 2007). “Under these circumstances, the [C]DOC must
afford an inmate a hearing so that the inmate may contest the
sexual basis of the [classification].” Id.; see also Fisher v. Colo.
Dep’t of Corr., 56 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Colo. App. 2002) (“[D]ue process
require[s] that an inmate be afforded a hearing when the basis for
14 such classification is not a listed sex offense of which he stands
convicted.”). Significantly, neither Reeves nor Fisher prohibit the
CDOC from considering charges that did not result in a conviction
when classifying an inmate.
¶ 33 It is not entirely clear what the basis of Jimenez’s due process
claim is.
¶ 34 He alleges in his complaint that he was classified as an S-5
sex offender.6 But he does not allege that he was denied a hearing
at which he could have challenged this classification.
¶ 35 He alleges that the State Agencies disseminated false and
inaccurate information about him to the public and this injured his
“inalienable right to be safe.” But there is no due process right “to
be safe.”7 He also alleges that the description of the facts
6 The State Agencies contend, without record support, that Jimenez
is not classified as an “S5” sex offender (which they characterize as the highest offender level). But the CDOC diagnostic report attached to Jimenez’s complaint states that Jimenez’s sex offender classification is S-5. And, notwithstanding the State Agencies’ contention that this allegation is “not plausible,” we must accept this allegation as true. Cnty. Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy USA, Inc., 2025 CO 21, ¶ 25. 7 Even if there were a right to be safe, Jimenez alleges no set of facts
to suggest that his safety was compromised.
15 underlying his arrest and original charges have interfered with his
ability to be granted parole, community housing transfers,
admission to CDOC programs, and clemency. In the same breath,
however, he acknowledges that he does not have a liberty interest in
any of those programs. Instead, he asserts that he has a right to
“consideration to the applicant” for such programs. But it is clear
from his own allegations that he has been considered for these
programs and opportunities, but he has been denied.
¶ 36 Finally, relying on Chambers, he contends that he has a liberty
interest in not being classified as a sex offender without a
conviction. In Chambers, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, while there is no liberty interest in simply not being labeled a
sex offender, the CDOC essentially created such an interest because
Chambers had been granted the maximum amount of earned time
credit until he refused to participate in the treatment that his
designation required. 205 F.3d at 1242. Jimenez did not allege
that anything he had been receiving had been taken away as a
result of his classification. Thus, his reliance on Chambers is
unavailing.
16 ¶ 37 Further, in his response to the motion to dismiss, Jimenez
stated that
Mr. Jimenez must suffer the stain to his reputation for being complicit to [the victim’s] murder, and for being an accessory to a crime. These liabilities are Mr. Jimenez’s burden. However, the Official reports go beyond these (above cited) crimes to include stains upon Mr. Jimenez’s reputation for sexual assault and kidnapping, inaccurately. Constitutional safeguards protect Mr. Jimenez’ reputation from sustaining such liabilities without due process of law.
But even liberally construing his claim to include a right to prevent
injury to his reputation, it must fail. See Gandy v. Williams, 2019
COA 118, ¶ 8 (“[W]e liberally construe [pro se] filings while applying
the same law and procedural rules applicable to a party represented
by counsel.”). There is no inalienable right to protect one’s
reputation. See People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Colo. 1993)
(“Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has held
that a convicted person has a right to privacy in his arrest and
conviction records.”); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (“[T]he
interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither ‘liberty’ nor
‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation without due process
of law.”).
17 ¶ 38 Thus, we conclude that Jimenez has not sufficiently pleaded
facts, that if true, would support a due process claim against the
State Agencies.
III. Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice
¶ 39 Finally, Jimenez contends that the district court erred by
dismissing the complaint with prejudice. We discern no error.
¶ 40 We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint with
prejudice for an abuse of discretion. See Hilliard v. Klein, 238 P.2d
882, 884 (Colo. 1951). A court abuses its discretion if its ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. DPG Farms, LLC, 2017 COA 83, ¶ 34.
¶ 41 As an initial matter, Jimenez contends that it was error for the
district court to dismiss his complaint before the State Agencies
filed a reply. But how Jimenez could have been prejudiced by the
opposing party not being permitted to file a reply is unclear.
Jimenez filed his response before the district court dismissed the
complaint and, thus, had a complete opportunity to present his
arguments. Any procedural flaw in the State Agencies not being
permitted a reply was harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at
18 every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.”).
¶ 42 Turning to the merits of his claim, Jimenez cites no authority
for the proposition that a dismissal for failure to state a claim
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) may not be with prejudice. And our
case law is replete with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) dismissals with prejudice.
See, e.g., Fry v. Lee, 2013 COA 100, ¶¶ 13, 65 (affirming C.R.C.P.
12(b)(5) dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s defamation claims);
Graham v. Maketa, 227 P.3d 516, 517-18 (Colo. App. 2010)
(affirming C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) dismissal with prejudice); Denv. Parents
Ass’n v. Denv. Bd. of Educ., 10 P.3d 662, 664-65 (Colo. App. 2000)
(affirming C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) dismissal with prejudice).
¶ 43 Nor does Jimenez provide us (or the district court) with any
explanation regarding how he could have saved his complaint by
amendment or otherwise had it been dismissed without prejudice.
See C.R.C.P. 15(a). Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
IV. Disposition
¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.
19 JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.