JIM MACON BLDG. CONTRACTORS. INC. v. Lake County

763 So. 2d 1223, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1210, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 6781, 2000 WL 707286
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJune 2, 2000
Docket5D99-2612
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 763 So. 2d 1223 (JIM MACON BLDG. CONTRACTORS. INC. v. Lake County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JIM MACON BLDG. CONTRACTORS. INC. v. Lake County, 763 So. 2d 1223, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1210, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 6781, 2000 WL 707286 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

763 So.2d 1223 (2000)

JIM MACON BUILDING CONTRACTORS, INC., etc., et al., Appellants,
v.
LAKE COUNTY, Florida, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 5D99-2612.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

June 2, 2000.

*1224 J.A. Jurgens and Scott M. Price of J.A. Jurgens, P.A., Longwood, and John H. Bill of Godbold, Downing, Sheahan & Bill, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellants.

John R. Hamilton of Foley & Lardner, Orlando, and Valerie C. Fuchs, Assistant County Attorney, Tavares, for Appellees.

SAWAYA, J.

The appellants, lot owners in Seminole Springs subdivision, appeal the dismissal of their breach of contract action against Lake County ("the county") and the United Southern Bank ("the bank"), appellees herein. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

In their second amended complaint, the lot owners alleged that, as intended third-party beneficiaries of an irrevocable letter of credit issued by the bank to the county to secure funding for building certain infrastructure in the subdivision, they were entitled to damages as a result of the *1225 bank's refusal to honor the letter of credit and the county's failure to secure the funds pursuant to that document. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140. The trial court granted the county's motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. The court granted the bank's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as against the bank.

The order granting the county's motion is not an appealable order and we dismiss the appeal of that order for lack of jurisdiction. See Klein v. Pinellas County, 685 So.2d 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, the order granting the bank's motion is a final appealable order because it dismissed the complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. See Salasky v. Humana Hosp. Kissimmee Auxiliary, Inc., 478 So.2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Therefore, we will confine the remainder of this opinion to addressing that order and to the facts distilled from the allegations made within the four corners of the complaint, including exhibits attached thereto.

Seminole Springs, Ltd. was the owner of certain real property that was platted and subdivided into Seminole Springs PUD Phase I. Seminole Springs, Ltd. agreed with the Board of County Commissioners of Lake County ("the Board") that in consideration for the Board approving the plat of the subdivision, it would build all required infrastructure in accordance with the construction plans approved by the county. It was further agreed that Seminole Springs, Ltd. would execute and deliver to the Board an irrevocable letter of credit in the sum of $222,200.00 which required Seminole Springs, Ltd. to build or cause to be built the infrastructure and if it failed to complete the infrastructure, the county would utilize the funds from the letter of credit to cause the required work to be completed. Pursuant to this agreement and in order to induce the Board to approve and accept the plat, Seminole Springs, Ltd. obtained an irrevocable letter of credit dated October 14, 1994 from the bank in the amount of $222,200.00 naming the Board as the beneficiary.

The work required to be performed by Seminole Springs, Ltd. in building the required infrastructure has not been completed. The county made demand upon Seminole Springs, Ltd. and the bank to complete the work, but Seminole Springs, Ltd. does not have the assets or the ability to do so and the bank refused to allow the county to draw on all of the funds pursuant to the letter of credit. The county and the bank subsequently entered into a settlement agreement which provided that the county could draw upon the letter of credit to finish construction of the roads in Phase I of the subdivision. The agreement further provided that upon the county's acceptance of the roads, another irrevocable letter of credit would be issued to the county as beneficiary for a central water system for the lots in Phase I of the subdivision. The settlement agreement was entered into on August 5, 1996, and the second irrevocable letter of credit was issued to the county on September 2, 1997. The second amended complaint alleged that the bank has wrongfully refused to allow the county to draw on the second letter of credit as well. The complaint further alleged that as intended third-party beneficiaries of both letters of credit, the Plaintiffs as lot owners were entitled to recover damages for the bank's breach of those documents.

The issue of first impression in Florida presented by this case is whether a party may claim damages for breach of contract as an intended third-party beneficiary against the issuer of a letter of credit. The purpose and the essential characteristics of a letter of credit dictate that we resolve this issue by holding that no such cause of action exists under Florida law.

The right of an intended third-party beneficiary to sue under a contract is *1226 recognized in Florida, but only if the parties to the contract clearly express, or the contract itself expresses, an intent to primarily and directly benefit the third party or a class of persons to which that party claims to belong. See Daniel v. Florida Residential Property & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 718 So.2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 647 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Deanna Constr. Co. v. Sarasota Entertainment Corp., 563 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

However, a letter of credit is not a typical contract. A letter of credit is generally defined as an undertaking by the issuer to the beneficiary at the request of or on account of the issuer's customer to "honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit."[1] It primarily consists of "an offer by the issuer to purchase certain documents" and if those documents are not presented, the offer is not accepted and the issuer will not be obligated under the letter of credit. Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Dade County, 371 So.2d 545, 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In essence, a letter of credit is simply a unique payment device used in commercial transactions for the primary purpose of allowing a buyer "to substitute its financial integrity with that of a stable credit source, usually a bank," so the risks inherent in selling goods or services on open account may be avoided. Banco Gen. Runinahui v. Citibank Int'l, 97 F.3d 480, 482 (11th Cir.1996) (applying Florida law).

Letters of credit are generally governed by Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").[2] The letters of credit at issue in this case, however, specifically provide that they are subject to the provisions of the 1983 revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits ("UCP").[3] The UCP is a "compilation of internationally accepted commercial practices" which may be incorporated by reference into an agreement between the parties.[4]Banco Gen. Runinahui, *1227 97 F.3d at 483. Although it is not accepted by courts or legislatures as the law in any jurisdiction, "the UCP applies to most letters of credit because issuers typically incorporate it into their credits."[5]Id. Therefore, the rules of custom and practice contained in the UCP are to be applied by courts unless they conflict with the provisions of the UCC. See Banco Do Brasil v. City Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

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Bluebook (online)
763 So. 2d 1223, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1210, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 6781, 2000 WL 707286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jim-macon-bldg-contractors-inc-v-lake-county-fladistctapp-2000.