1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JILL B., ) Case No. CV 18-6139-SP ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER 14 ) ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of ) 15 Social Security Administration, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 ) 18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On July 16, 2018, plaintiff Jill B. filed a complaint against defendant, the 22 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a 23 review of a denial of a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 24 (“DIB”). The parties have fully briefed the matters in dispute, and the court deems 25 the matter suitable for adjudication without oral argument. 26 Plaintiff presents one disputed issue for decision: whether the 27 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly considered the opinion of the 28 1 examining physician. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Complaint (“P. 2 Mem.”) at 4-10; see Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“D. Mem.”) at 1- 3 4. 4 Having carefully studied the parties’ memoranda on the issue in dispute, the 5 Administrative Record (“AR”), and the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes 6 that, as detailed herein, the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of the 7 examining physician. The court therefore remands this matter to the 8 Commissioner in accordance with the principles and instructions enunciated in this 9 Memorandum Opinion and Order. 10 II. 11 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 12 Plaintiff was 63 years old on her alleged disability onset date and attended 13 two years of college. AR at 67, 208. Plaintiff has past relevant work as a clerk 14 typist, assistant retail manager, weight reduction specialist, and group program 15 aide. Id. at 58-59. 16 On April 12, 2016, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 17 DIB due to lower back pain, bulging discs, spinal stenosis, hypothyroid, hormone 18 imbalance, depression, anxiety, arthritis, neck pain, and Bell’s palsy. Id. at 67-68. 19 The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which plaintiff 20 filed a request for a hearing. Id. at 91-105. 21 On February 8, 2018, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and 22 testified at a hearing before the ALJ. Id. at 32-65. The ALJ also heard testimony 23 from Kelly Bartlett, a vocational expert. Id. at 57-64. On March 2, 2018, the ALJ 24 denied plaintiff’s claim for benefits. Id. at 15-26. 25 Applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 26 found, at step one, that plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity 27 between March 19, 2015, the alleged onset date, and September 30, 2017, the date 28 1 last insured. Id. at 17. 2 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of 3 lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease. Id. 4 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or 5 in combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set 6 forth in 20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 19. 7 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),1 and 8 determined plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 9 § 404.1567(b),2 with the limitations that plaintiff could occasionally: climb ramps, 10 stairs, ropes, and scaffolds; balance; stoop; kneel; crouch; and crawl. Id. at 19. 11 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff was capable of performing her 12 past relevant work as a clerk typist and group program aide as actually and 13 generally performed, as well as her past work as an assistant retail manager and 14 weight reduction specialist as generally performed. Id. at 25-26. Consequently, 15 the ALJ concluded plaintiff did not suffer from a disability as defined by the Social 16 Security Act. Id. at 26. 17 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the 18 Appeals Council denied. Id. at 1-3. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final 19 20 1 Residual functional capacity is what a claimant can do despite existing 21 exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155- 22 56 n.5-7 (9th Cir. 1989). “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the 23 claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 24 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 25 2 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent 26 lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). “[T]he full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total 27 of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 28 83-10. 1 decision of the Commissioner. 2 III. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 5 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 6 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by 7 substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) 8 (as amended). But if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal 9 error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court may 10 reject the findings and set aside the decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. 11 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 12 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 14 preponderance.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such 15 “relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support 16 a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 17 F.3d at 459. To determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 18 finding, the reviewing court must review the administrative record as a whole, 19 “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 20 ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s decision “‘cannot be 21 affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” 22 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th 23 Cir. 1998)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing 24 the ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court “‘may not substitute its judgment for that 25 of the ALJ.’” Id. (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 26 1992)). 27 28 1 IV. 2 DISCUSSION 3 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of the 4 consultative examiner, Dr. Michael J. Singleton. P. Mem. at 4-10. Specifically, 5 plaintiff contends the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JILL B., ) Case No. CV 18-6139-SP ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER 14 ) ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of ) 15 Social Security Administration, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 ) 18 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On July 16, 2018, plaintiff Jill B. filed a complaint against defendant, the 22 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a 23 review of a denial of a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 24 (“DIB”). The parties have fully briefed the matters in dispute, and the court deems 25 the matter suitable for adjudication without oral argument. 26 Plaintiff presents one disputed issue for decision: whether the 27 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly considered the opinion of the 28 1 examining physician. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Complaint (“P. 2 Mem.”) at 4-10; see Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“D. Mem.”) at 1- 3 4. 4 Having carefully studied the parties’ memoranda on the issue in dispute, the 5 Administrative Record (“AR”), and the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes 6 that, as detailed herein, the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of the 7 examining physician. The court therefore remands this matter to the 8 Commissioner in accordance with the principles and instructions enunciated in this 9 Memorandum Opinion and Order. 10 II. 11 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 12 Plaintiff was 63 years old on her alleged disability onset date and attended 13 two years of college. AR at 67, 208. Plaintiff has past relevant work as a clerk 14 typist, assistant retail manager, weight reduction specialist, and group program 15 aide. Id. at 58-59. 16 On April 12, 2016, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 17 DIB due to lower back pain, bulging discs, spinal stenosis, hypothyroid, hormone 18 imbalance, depression, anxiety, arthritis, neck pain, and Bell’s palsy. Id. at 67-68. 19 The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which plaintiff 20 filed a request for a hearing. Id. at 91-105. 21 On February 8, 2018, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and 22 testified at a hearing before the ALJ. Id. at 32-65. The ALJ also heard testimony 23 from Kelly Bartlett, a vocational expert. Id. at 57-64. On March 2, 2018, the ALJ 24 denied plaintiff’s claim for benefits. Id. at 15-26. 25 Applying the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 26 found, at step one, that plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity 27 between March 19, 2015, the alleged onset date, and September 30, 2017, the date 28 1 last insured. Id. at 17. 2 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of 3 lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease. Id. 4 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or 5 in combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set 6 forth in 20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 19. 7 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”),1 and 8 determined plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 9 § 404.1567(b),2 with the limitations that plaintiff could occasionally: climb ramps, 10 stairs, ropes, and scaffolds; balance; stoop; kneel; crouch; and crawl. Id. at 19. 11 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff was capable of performing her 12 past relevant work as a clerk typist and group program aide as actually and 13 generally performed, as well as her past work as an assistant retail manager and 14 weight reduction specialist as generally performed. Id. at 25-26. Consequently, 15 the ALJ concluded plaintiff did not suffer from a disability as defined by the Social 16 Security Act. Id. at 26. 17 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the 18 Appeals Council denied. Id. at 1-3. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final 19 20 1 Residual functional capacity is what a claimant can do despite existing 21 exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155- 22 56 n.5-7 (9th Cir. 1989). “Between steps three and four of the five-step evaluation, the ALJ must proceed to an intermediate step in which the ALJ assesses the 23 claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1151 24 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 25 2 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent 26 lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). “[T]he full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total 27 of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 28 83-10. 1 decision of the Commissioner. 2 III. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 5 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 6 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by 7 substantial evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) 8 (as amended). But if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal 9 error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court may 10 reject the findings and set aside the decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. 11 Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 12 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 14 preponderance.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such 15 “relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support 16 a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 17 F.3d at 459. To determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 18 finding, the reviewing court must review the administrative record as a whole, 19 “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 20 ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s decision “‘cannot be 21 affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” 22 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th 23 Cir. 1998)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing 24 the ALJ’s decision, the reviewing court “‘may not substitute its judgment for that 25 of the ALJ.’” Id. (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 26 1992)). 27 28 1 IV. 2 DISCUSSION 3 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of the 4 consultative examiner, Dr. Michael J. Singleton. P. Mem. at 4-10. Specifically, 5 plaintiff contends the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Singleton’s reaching and 6 handling limitations were not specific and legitimate and supported by substantial 7 evidence.3 Id. at 7. 8 In determining whether a claimant has a medically determinable impairment, 9 among the evidence the ALJ considers is medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1527(b).4 In evaluating medical opinions, the regulations distinguish among 11 three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; and 12 (3) non-examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 13 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (as amended). “Generally, a treating physician’s 14 opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s, and an examining 15 physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician’s.” Holohan v. 16 Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(2). 17 The opinion of the treating physician is generally given the greatest weight because 18 the treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to 19 understand and observe a claimant. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 20 1996); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 21 “[T]he ALJ may only reject a treating or examining physician’s 22 uncontradicted medical opinion based on ‘clear and convincing reasons.’” 23 24 3 Plaintiff later asserts the ALJ also impermissibly rejected Dr. Singleton’s working at heights limitation. See P. Mem. at 10 n.2. Because plaintiff presents 25 this conclusory argument as an afterthought and without evidentiary support, this 26 court will not address it. 27 4 All citations to the Code of Federal Regulations refer to regulations 28 applicable to claims filed before March 27, 2017. 1 Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d 2 at 830-31). “Where such an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected 3 for ‘specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 4 the record.’” Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). The opinion of a non- 5 examining physician, standing alone, cannot constitute substantial evidence. 6 Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 7 Medical Opinions 8 Four physicians offered opinions concerning plaintiff’s physical functional 9 limitations: treating physician Dr. Jody Balloch, examining physician Dr. 10 Singleton, and state agency physicians Dr. James Wright and Dr. E. Wong. See 11 AR at 74-75, 87-88, 529-33, 782-86. 12 Dr. Jody Balloch, an internist, treated plaintiff for twenty years. Id. at 782. 13 Dr. Balloch diagnosed plaintiff with cervical disc disease, lumbar disc disease, and 14 anxiety. See id. Dr. Balloch opined plaintiff, among other things: could stand and 15 walk less than two hours in an eight-hour day; could sit less than two hours in an 16 eight-hour workday; could rarely lift less than ten pounds; needed the ability to 17 shift from standing to sitting at will; and could never climb ladders and stairs, 18 crouch, or walk on uneven surfaces. See id. at 784-85 19 Dr. Singleton, an internist, reviewed some of plaintiff’s medical records and 20 examined plaintiff on August 27, 2016. Id. at 529-33. Dr. Singleton observed 21 plaintiff had, among other things: discomfort bilaterally in her cervical and lumbar 22 spine when demonstrating range of motion; a positive seated straight leg raise; 23 slightly decreased range of motion in her finger and thumb joints; normal motor 24 strength in the extremities; and normal grip strength. Id. at 531-32. Based on his 25 observations and review of the medical record, Dr. Singleton opined plaintiff had 26 the residual functional capacity to: stand and walk up to six hours in an eight-hour 27 workday; sit six hours in an eight-hour workday; lift, carry, push, and pull twenty 28 1 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; occasionally climb steps and stairs, 2 stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, and reach overhead and forward; and frequently 3 handle, finger, and feel. Id. at 532-33. Dr. Singleton precluded plaintiff from 4 working at heights and climbing ladders, scaffolds, and ropes. Id. at 533. 5 The state agency physicians reviewed plaintiff’s medical records and opined 6 plaintiff had the capacity to: stand and walk six hours in an eight-hour workday; sit 7 six hours in an eight-hour workday; lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and 8 ten pounds frequently; occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and 9 scaffolds; and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. See id. at 74- 10 75, 87-88. 11 The ALJ’s Findings 12 In reaching his physical RFC determination, the ALJ did not expressly state 13 which opinions he gave the most weight, but it was clear from his discussion that 14 he gave the greatest weight to the opinions of the state agency physicians since he 15 adopted their opinions in their entirety. See id. at 19, 24-25. The ALJ gave some 16 weight to Dr. Singleton’s opinion, finding that plaintiff could perform a range or 17 light work, and stating he found Dr. Singleton’s evaluation to be “generally 18 persuasive.” Id. at 24. But the ALJ expressly rejected Dr. Singleton’s reaching 19 and handling and working at heights limitations because they were unsupported by 20 the objective medical evidence and plaintiff did not allege significant limitations in 21 her arms or hands in the record or at the hearing. Id. The ALJ also implicitly 22 rejected Dr. Singleton’s preclusion on climbing ladders, scaffolds, and ropes, as 23 well as his fingering and feeling limitations. Finally, the ALJ gave no weight to 24 Dr. Balloch’s opinion. Id at 23. 25 The basis for Dr. Singleton’s reaching and handling limitations was 26 plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease. See id. at 533. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred 27 in rejecting Dr. Singleton’s limitation of plaintiff to occasional reaching overhead 28 1 and forward, and to frequent handling. See P. Mem. at 7. The court agrees the two 2 reasons for rejecting Dr. Singleton’s reaching limitation were not supported by 3 substantial evidence. 4 With regard to Dr. Singleton’s reaching limitation, the first reason the ALJ 5 gave for rejecting it was because it was not supported by the objective medical 6 evidence, specifically citing the fact plaintiff had good range of motion and muscle 7 strength in the upper extremities. AR at 24; see Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190, 8 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (an ALJ may discredit physicians’ opinions that are 9 “unsupported by the record as a whole . . . or by objective medical findings”). 10 Contrary to the ALJ’s finding, there was objective evidence to support Dr. 11 Singleton’s opinion. Imaging showed plaintiff had mild to moderate disc 12 herniations in the cervical spine. AR at 314-15, 412. And plaintiff’s treatment 13 notes were replete with findings of tenderness of the cervical and upper thoracic 14 spine and decreased range of motion due to pain. See, e.g., id. at 314, 363, 702, 15 714, 773, 866. Although the ALJ correctly noted plaintiff consistently had full 16 motor strength in her upper extremities, reaching is a manipulative function and 17 does not depend on strength. See, e.g., id. at 311, 363, 714; see also 20 C.F.R. 18 § 404.1569a(c). As such, the ALJ’s first basis for rejecting Dr. Singleton’s 19 reaching limitation was not supported by substantial evidence. 20 The second reason cited by the ALJ – plaintiff did not allege significant 21 limitations in the record or at the hearing – was similarly not supported by 22 substantial evidence. See id. at 24. During the hearing, plaintiff testified she had 23 constant neck and shoulder pain, sitting too long caused pain in her neck and 24 shoulders, the weight of lifting her arms put too much stress on her neck and 25 shoulders, she could reach forward but not “up or way below” because reaching 26 out affected her neck and shoulders, and she had trouble holding up a book. See id. 27 at 37, 41-42, 44-45, 51. And in the Function Report submitted with her 28 1 application, plaintiff stated she reached only as needed and only for a few minutes. 2 Id. at 224. Moreover, this second reason was inconsistent with the ALJ’s own 3 findings, as he acknowledged plaintiff’s hearing testimony about her difficultly 4 reaching earlier in the decision. See id. at 20. 5 As for plaintiff’s handling limitation, the ALJ’s reasons are specific and 6 legitimate and supported by substantial evidence. Other than Dr. Singleton’s 7 examination, no physicians reported any findings regarding plaintiff’s hands. See 8 id. at 532. Throughout 2015, plaintiff complained of neck pain resulting in 9 numbness, pain, and tingling in her arms, as well as dropping things with her 10 hands. See, e.g., id. at 304, 314, 347-48, 351-52. The ALJ correctly noted that it 11 appeared these symptoms greatly improved with chiropractic treatment since 12 subsequent to the last treatment on December 8, 2015, except for one complaint, 13 plaintiff no longer complained of numbness, pain, and tingling in her arms and 14 problems dropping things with her hands. See id. at 347-48, 787-823; see also 15 Crosby v. Comm’r, 489 Fed. Appx. 166, 168-69 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that a 16 physician’s opinion that was inconsistent with his treatment notes, which indicated 17 claimant improved with treatment, was a specific and legitimate basis to discount 18 physician’s opinion). Plaintiff also did not testify to or report any problems using 19 her hands. 20 Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Singleton’s reaching 21 limitation were not specific and legitimate and supported by substantial evidence, 22 but the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Singleton’s handling limitation. 23 V. 24 REMAND IS APPROPRIATE 25 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and 26 award benefits is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 27 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). It is appropriate for the court to exercise this 28 1 discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits where: “(1) the record has been 2 fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful 3 purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 4 evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinions; and (3) if the 5 improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required 6 to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 7 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth three-part credit-as-true standard for remanding with 8 instructions to calculate and award benefits). But where there are outstanding 9 issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, or it is not clear 10 from the record that the ALJ would be required to find a plaintiff disabled if all the 11 evidence were properly evaluated, remand for further proceedings is appropriate. 12 See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 13 211 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, the court must “remand for 14 further proceedings when, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are 15 satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a 16 claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. 17 Here, there are outstanding issues to be resolved and remand is required. On 18 remand, the ALJ shall reconsider Dr. Singleton’s reaching limitation and either 19 credit his opinion or provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by 20 substantial evidence for rejecting it. The ALJ shall then reassess plaintiff’s RFC, 21 and proceed through steps four and five to determine what work, if any, plaintiff 22 was capable of performing. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 27 28 1 VI. 2 CONCLUSION 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered 4 || REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, and 5 || REMANDING the matter to the Commissioner for further administrative action 6 || consistent with this decision. 7 8 || DATED: March 9, 2020 CRP 9 10 SHERIPYM ——— United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11