Jiles v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Jiles v. State

18 So. 3d 1216, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 14707, 2009 WL 3149381

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedOctober 2, 2009

Docket5D08-2605

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 18 So. 3d 1216 (Jiles v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jiles v. State, 18 So. 3d 1216, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 14707, 2009 WL 3149381 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Kevin A. Jiles appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary of a dwelling with a firearm, false impi-isonment with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We find no revei-sible error relating to Jiles’ trial, and affirm the convictions without elaboration. However, we agree with Jiles that the sentencing record reflects a consideration by the court of improper sentencing factors. Specifically, after Jiles maintained his innocence at trial and dui-ing sentencing, the judge ci-edited a co-defendant for “accepting] responsibility for what he did and ... [being] willing to take the hit for what he did without going through the process.” By contrast, the judge noted that Jiles did not “accept x-esponsibility” but “denied [his] involvement.” These are improper sentencing considerations. See, e.g., Hannum v. State, 13 So.3d 132, 135-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding trial court’s improper considei-ation during sentencing of fact that defendant maintained his innocence at trial and at sentencing and refused to take responsibility for his actions was equivalent to a denial of due process and thus constituted fundamental error); Bracero v. State, 10 So.3d 664, 665-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that consideration of claim of innocence as a factor in determining sentences violated defendant’s due process rights); Soto v. State, 874 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that defendant’s protestation of innocence and unwillingness to admit guilt were impex-missi-ble considerations for sentencing, and that a trial court’s statements indicating consideration of those factors required reversal for resentencing before another judge).

*1217 Accordingly, we reverse the sentences and remand with directions that Jiles be resentenced before a different judge.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES REVERSED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

LAWSON, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Kevin A. Jiles appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary of a dwelling with a firearm, false impi-isonment with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We find no revei-sible error relating to Jiles’ trial, and affirm the convictions without elaboration. However, we agree with Jiles that the sentencing record reflects a consideration by the court of improper sentencing factors. Specifically, after Jiles maintained his innocence at trial and dui-ing sentencing, the judge ci-edited a co-defendant for “accepting] responsibility for what he did and ... [being] willing to take the hit for what he did without going through the process.” By contrast, the judge noted that Jiles did not “accept x-esponsibility” but “denied [his] involvement.” These are improper sentencing considerations. See, e.g., Hannum v. State, 13 So.3d 132, 135-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding trial court’s improper considei-ation during sentencing of fact that defendant maintained his innocence at trial and at sentencing and refused to take responsibility for his actions was equivalent to a denial of due process and thus constituted fundamental error); Bracero v. State, 10 So.3d 664, 665-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that consideration of claim of innocence as a factor in determining sentences violated defendant’s due process rights); Soto v. State, 874 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that defendant’s protestation of innocence and unwillingness to admit guilt were impex-missi-ble considerations for sentencing, and that a trial court’s statements indicating consideration of those factors required reversal for resentencing before another judge).

*1217 Accordingly, we reverse the sentences and remand with directions that Jiles be resentenced before a different judge.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES REVERSED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

LAWSON, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

18 So. 3d 1216, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 14707, 2009 WL 3149381, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jiles-v-state-fladistctapp-2009.

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