Jihad Arlik Ruffin v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 0625242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Causey, Raphael and Senior Judge Clements UNPUBLISHED

JIHAD ARLIK RUFFIN MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0625-24-2 JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY DECEMBER 2, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge

(Kevin Purnell; Kevin D. Purnell, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.

(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Kimberly A. Hackbarth, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a jury trial, Jihad Arlik Ruffin was convicted of felony murder while in the

commission of shooting into an occupied building, Code § 18.2-33, use of a firearm in

commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1, and maliciously discharging a firearm within an

occupied building, Code § 18.2-279. On appeal, Ruffin argues that the evidence was insufficient

to convict him “while [he] was defending a third party from another party aiming and firing a

firearm at such third party.” Ruffin also argues that there was insufficient “evidence of malice

that [he] fired a firearm into an occupied building while [he] was defending a third party from

another party aiming and firing a firearm at such third party.” For the following reasons, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(c); Rule 5A:27(c). BACKGROUND2

On July 3, 2021, a fatal shooting occurred inside the “NOLA by Nisha the Plug” (NOLA)

store, located in the shops at White Oak Village in Henrico. The incident was captured on the

store’s surveillance cameras.

At 5:34 p.m., Ruffin, Vermonte Fitzgerald, and Renardo Brown were inside NOLA

together. Ruffin and Fitzgerald were seen standing together near the store’s entry-exit door,

while Brown was situated near the cash register. Detective Jeff Ensor testified that earlier video

footage showed that the three had been inside the store for approximately 14 minutes before the

shooting occurred.

At 5:34:35 p.m., Trevon Chappelle and Jamiriah Washington entered NOLA. Fitzgerald

immediately advanced toward them as they walked down the left side aisle of the store. At

5:34:43 p.m., the footage shows Ruffin drawing a firearm from his waistband and holding it in

his hand. Fitzgerald also drew a firearm from his waistband at this point, as depicted in still

images taken from the store’s “front left” camera. At 5:34:50 p.m., as Chappelle passed by,

Fitzgerald pushed into him with his left elbow while holding a firearm in his right hand.

Chappelle then raised his own firearm toward Fitzgerald, leading Ruffin to fire three shots at

Chappelle.

One of Ruffin’s bullets struck Jamiriah in the head, causing her to collapse on the spot.

The video footage clearly depicted her lying motionless on the floor as Chappelle fled the store.

The remaining footage, taken from different camera angles (back left, back warehouse, and

2 On appeal, “we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.” Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)). -2- warehouse left), showed the group’s actions immediately after the shooting. Fitzgerald ran to the

back storage area of the store and hid behind wooden shelving. Brown drew his firearm and

positioned himself behind a merchandise display in the back of the store. Ruffin initially ran

toward the back of the store but then peered into the left aisle twice before retreating to the back

storage area. The three men then fled the scene together through the store’s back exit. The video

also showed other customers and employees within the store, including what appeared to be a

young elementary-school-aged girl.

Detective Kevin Harver recovered three bullets from the scene, all of which were

forensically linked to Ruffin’s firearm, a Glock model 32 Gen4 .357 SIG pistol. Forensic

analysis confirmed that Ruffin’s firearm3 was in “mechanical working condition.”

Further forensic analysis traced the bullets’ paths throughout the building. One bullet

went through the wall of NOLA into the adjacent Kay Jewelers store. Bullet fragments from this

projectile were recovered from Kay Jewelers’ bathroom floor, with two of the fragments being

identified as having been fired from Ruffin’s firearm. A second bullet was found on the floor

next to the cash register in NOLA, and it, too, was traced back to Ruffin’s Glock. The third

bullet, which was recovered during Jamiriah’s autopsy from her right posterior scalp, was also

identified as having been fired from Ruffin’s firearm. The medical examiner determined that

Jamiriah died of a gunshot wound to the head.

Following the Commonwealth’s presentation of its case, Ruffin moved to strike the

evidence, arguing that it was insufficient to establish that he acted with malice. The trial court

denied the motion, explaining that malice was a factual determination for the jury to resolve.

Ruffin testified at trial and provided the following account of events. He stated that he

was not from Henrico but lived in Petersburg, Virginia. He recalled that on the day of the

3 Ruffin stipulated that this was his firearm. -3- shooting, he had taken a Lyft to Fitzgerald’s house. Ruffin testified that he had known

Fitzgerald for several months, having met him through a mutual friend, and he met Brown for the

first time that day. According to Ruffin, the three men then went to the shops at White Oak

Village, where Ruffin carried a loaded firearm for personal protection. He testified that he and

Fitzgerald initially visited the Hibbett Sports store, while Brown was not with them. Inside

Hibbett Sports, Ruffin claimed he and Fitzgerald made eye contact with an individual in a red

shirt, although he did not know the person. Ruffin also noticed a “young lady” walking behind

him, but he denied any close interaction with her or Chappelle.

Ruffin stated that he suggested leaving Hibbett Sports and going to NOLA, where Brown

joined them. Ruffin admitted that the three were inside NOLA for a while, though he could not

recall what Fitzgerald and Brown were doing during that time. Ruffin claimed that he

remembered the “person in the red shirt” entering NOLA and again made eye contact with him.

He also remembered the young lady walking behind him. According to Ruffin, he grew

concerned and had “just a feeling” due to his prior encounter with Chappelle and the young lady

at Hibbett Sports. Ruffin admitted to placing his hand on his weapon and drawing it as

Chappelle walked up the aisle.

Ruffin acknowledged that when Chappelle raised his firearm toward Fitzgerald, he fired

three shots. He further testified that his gun jammed afterward and he fled to the back of the

store. Ruffin stated that he, Fitzgerald, and Brown then left the store through the back exit and

proceeded to an unknown apartment complex. Ruffin claimed that he did not discuss the

shooting with Fitzgerald or Brown and later learned via social media that a “teen” had been shot

and killed. Ruffin admitted that he initially thought Chappelle had been the victim.

The jury found Ruffin guilty of felony murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a

felony, and malicious discharge of a firearm within an occupied building. Following the

-4- conviction, Ruffin filed a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing that the evidence was

insufficient to prove malice and that his defense of others claim should have been established as

a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the jury was entitled to assess the

credibility of the witnesses and to rely on the video evidence in making their determination. This

appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review Sufficiency of the Evidence

“When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal

conviction, its role is a limited one.” Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024). “The

judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is ‘plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)

(quoting Code § 8.01-680). “Thus, ‘it is not for this [C]ourt to say that the evidence does or does

not establish [the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because as an original proposition

it might have reached a different conclusion.’” Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 97 (2023)

(alterations in original) (quoting Cobb v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 941, 953 (1929)).

The only relevant question for this Court on review “is, after reviewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Sullivan v.

Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction,

‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might

differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App.

149, 161 (2018)).

-5- Defense of Others

Ruffin asserts that he was acting in defense of another individual, Fitzgerald, who was

under fire from Chappelle,4 thus, there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions

against him. However, the record supports the jury’s conclusion that Ruffin was not legally

justified in discharging his weapon in a crowded, occupied setting.

“‘Self-defense is an affirmative defense . . . and in making such a plea, a “defendant . . .

assumes the burden of introducing evidence of justification or excuse that raises a reasonable

doubt in the mind[] of the [finder of fact].’”” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 149, 170

(2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729 (2001)).

“Whether an accused [defendant] proves circumstances sufficient to create a reasonable doubt

that he acted in self-defense is a question of fact.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71

(1993). “The trier of fact determines the weight of evidence in support of a claim of self-

defense.” Gardner v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 418, 426 (1986).

“A picture . . . speak[s] a thousand words, and these do.” Campbell v. Commonwealth,

12 Va. App. 476, 484 (1991) (en banc). Along with Ruffin’s “uncontradicted” testimony, as he

characterizes it, the jury was also able to “witness” the encounter thanks to video footage of the

random acts of violence in NOLA on July 3. Thus, the jury viewing this video, along with

Ruffin’s self-serving testimony, could reasonably conclude that Ruffin’s actions were not

defensive but instead represented retaliation or escalation, made in a moment of volatility

without regard for the lives around him. Even where an initial act of defense may be justified,

the law does not excuse a reckless and deadly overreaction, especially in a populated area.

4 Chappelle was sentenced to 15 years with 6 years suspended for charges related to the violence referenced herein. -6- More importantly, the jury was entitled to disbelieve Ruffin and conclude he was “lying

to conceal his guilt.” Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011). Ruffin’s

testimony did not explain his relationship with Fitzgerald, nor how he reasonably believed

Fitzgerald faced imminent harm from his “eye contact” with Chappelle.5 Ruffin testified he and

Fitzgerald did not even talk about the events afterwards. Ruffin had the burden of persuading the

factfinder that he reasonably acted in defense of Fitzgerald, and he simply failed to carry this

burden. See Diffendal v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 417, 421 (1989).

Based on the evidence before it⎯viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth⎯a jury could have reasonably rejected Ruffin’s claim of defense of others.

Accordingly, there was adequate evidentiary support for the jury’s decision that the

defense-of-others defense did not apply.

Malice

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to establish

malice in support of his conviction under Code § 18.2-279 for discharging a firearm within an

occupied building. We disagree.

Under Code § 18.2-279, the Commonwealth must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt . . .

(1) [t]hat the defendant discharged a firearm within a building ‘occupied by one or more

persons’; and (2) [t]hat the firearm was discharged ‘in such a manner as to endanger the life or

lives of such person or persons’; and (3) [t]hat the act was done with malice.” Model Jury

Instrs.—Crim. No. 18.100 (2025) (quoting Code § 18.2-279).

5 Although Chappelle’s use of deadly force against Fitzgerald constituted an overt act that could potentially justify a defensive response, the law still requires that Ruffin’s own response be reasonable under the circumstances and proportionate to the threat. Diffendal v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 417, 421 (1989) (“[T]he amount of force used must be reasonable in relation to the harm threatened.”) Thus, the jury was free to conclude that Ruffin’s conduct demonstrated conduct that far exceeded any lawful defensive action. -7- Our Supreme Court “first addressed the application of Code § 18.2-279 in Dowdy v.

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 114 (1979). In Dowdy, [they] held that the statute was ‘a legislative

declaration that human lives may be endangered when a deadly weapon is maliciously

discharged at or against a building occupied by people and that such conduct is felonious.’” Ellis

v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 499, 505 (2011) (quoting Dowdy, 220 Va. at 117).

Later, our jurisprudence distinguished the “malice” prong of the statute by holding that

Code § 18.2-279 “is not a specific intent crime; rather, it is a general intent offense.” Fleming v.

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 349, 354 (1991).6 “Code § 18.2-279 contains no such intent

requirement.” Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 811 (2022).

Ruffin posits that the central question is whether he acted with malice, and we have

demonstrated above that the “malicious” intent standard in § 18.2-279, does not refer to the

specific “malicious” intent, but rather general intent. Malice is defined as “the doing of a

wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will.” Watson-

Scott v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 251, 255-56 (2019) (quoting Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186

Va. 55, 61 (1947)). “Malice may be inferred from the ‘deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless,

from all the evidence, [there is] reasonable doubt as to whether malice existed.’” Fletcher v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 493, 507 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickler v.

Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 495 (1991)). Whether a defendant acted with malice is a question

of fact for the jury. Id.

The record indisputably establishes the first two elements. Appellant admitted to firing

three rounds inside the store at approximately 5:34 p.m. on July 3. Surveillance video captured

6 Appellant attempts to distinguish his behavior from Fleming by arguing that Fleming “[was] about a specific intent to induce fear . . . by firing close to 20 shots in comparison to [Ruffin] firing three[,]” while also acknowledging that “Fleming is not directly on point.” (Emphases added). This assertion is an understatement. As noted above, the statute is a general intent statute, thus, the number of shots fired is likely irrelevant. -8- the incident in real-time and showed that at the time of the shooting, the store was actively

occupied by customers and employees, including Jamiriah, and even a child of elementary-

school age.

Ruffin’s firearm was later recovered and found to be in mechanical working condition.

Forensic analysis confirmed that all three bullets recovered at the scene were fired from Ruffin’s

weapon. One bullet penetrated the wall separating the NOLA store from the adjacent Kay

Jewelers store, while another was recovered near the cash register.

Moreover, the record contains ample evidence from which a rational trier of fact could

conclude that Ruffin acted with malice when he fired three rounds from a semi-automatic pistol

inside a crowded retail store, thereby endangering multiple individuals and fatally striking

Jamiriah.

Here, the jury was presented with surveillance video and testimony establishing that

Ruffin intentionally drew his loaded firearm before any shots were fired, raised it in the direction

of Chappelle, and discharged three rounds in rapid succession. The surrounding conduct

reinforces a finding of malice. Ruffin admitted that his firearm was loaded with a bullet in the

chamber and that he fired with the specific intention of hitting Chappelle. His gun only ceased

firing because it jammed.

Malice can also be inferred from Ruffin’s indifference to the danger his actions posed to

innocent bystanders. The shooting occurred in a retail establishment open to the public on a

Saturday afternoon, at a mall that law enforcement described as “very active at all times of the

day and night.” Ruffin’s decision to discharge three high-velocity rounds in such an

environment, without warning, and without regard for the numerous civilians nearby, plainly

endangered the lives of others. Indeed, video evidence showed that Jamiriah was walking behind

the intended target when she was struck in the head, collapsed, and died on the floor.

-9- Further, Ruffin’s conduct after the shooting reflects a consciousness of guilt. Rather than

remain on scene or seek medical help for the victim, appellant fled through the store’s back exit

with Fitzgerald and Brown, hid in an unknown apartment complex, and later claimed he believed

the person he shot was the man he was aiming at—not Jamiriah, who died at the scene. These

actions undermine any suggestion of accident or legal justification. As our Supreme Court has

emphasized, Code § 18.2-279 prohibits discharging a firearm in an occupied building where

“one or more persons” may be imperiled, regardless of their identity or intended target. Bryant

v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 302, 309 (2018); Meade, 74 Va. App. at 811.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to

strike or his motion to set aside the verdict. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ruffin acted with malice in discharging a firearm within an

occupied building, thereby endangering multiple lives and causing Jamiriah’s death.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

- 10 -